In the Interest of B.L., a Minor, Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER (2026)

B.L. appeals the judgment of the juvenile division of the Caldwell County Circuit Court (“juvenile division”) committing her to the custody of the Missouri Division of Youth Services based on a finding of delinquency for involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. B.L. argues that the juvenile division plainly erred by accepting her admission to the offense because the record does not sufficiently establish that her admission was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Finding no plain error or manifest injustice, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2025, the juvenile officer filed a petition alleging that then 15-year-old B.L. recklessly caused the death of a victim when she drove on the wrong side of a divided highway and struck the victim's vehicle. Pursuant to section 211.031.1(3), the petition alleged B.L. engaged in conduct that, if she were an adult, would constitute one count of the felony of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree in violation of section 565.024.¹

The juvenile officer filed a motion for certification and dismissal to allow prosecution under general law. At the October 3, 2025 hearing on the motion, B.L. was present with counsel and her parents. The attorney for the juvenile office offered the testimony of the chief juvenile officer for the 43rd Judicial Circuit. The chief juvenile officer testified that the allegation in the petition was “very serious, as [B.L.] was operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner and a man lost his life as a result.” Despite the severity of the allegation, the chief juvenile officer did not recommend prosecuting B.L. under general jurisdiction because B.L. had a better chance at being rehabilitated within the juvenile system. She testified that B.L. was doing well in the detention center and needed the structure that the Division of Youth Services offered. The chief juvenile officer stated that if B.L. remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division, she would recommend B.L. be committed to the Division of Youth Services until the age of nineteen.

A psychiatrist who had evaluated B.L. also testified. She stated that B.L. was experiencing “significant guilt and blame” following the car crash. She testified that B.L. had expressed “a lot of empathy and remorse” and was motivated to engage in treatment to change her life and behaviors. This testimony was consistent with the chief juvenile officer's testimony that B.L. acknowledged her conduct, that she was experiencing significant guilt, and that she knew she needed treatment and support to address the emotional and/or substance abuse issues that had caused her to take her mother's keys, and to drive on the highway despite having no license or permit, and no meaningful driving experience.

At the close of the evidence, the juvenile division took the matter under submission. The juvenile division later entered an order denying the motion for certification and dismissal.

On October 15, 2025, the parties appeared in the juvenile division for a scheduled adjudication hearing. When the juvenile division asked the parties to confirm that the matter was set for adjudication, and proceeding on that basis, B.L.’s attorney responded:

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, my client is prepared to admit to the allegation listed in the petition, that if she were an adult it would be involuntary manslaughter.

Juvenile Division: Okay. And, [B.L.], is that correct? Are you prepared to admit to the allegations in the petition, which are that you are charged with the Class C felony of involuntary manslaughter?

B.L.: Yes.

Juvenile Division: Okay. And, [counsel for the juvenile office], what would the facts be if this were to proceed to hearing?

Juvenile Office: Judge, the facts would be that if this were to proceed to a hearing, it would be pursuant to 211.031, that this alleged delinquency was that the juvenile would have violated a state or municipal ordinance in violation of 565.024 if she were an adult; that on or about June 20, 2025, in the county of Caldwell, state of Missouri, the juvenile recklessly caused the death of [the victim] by driving eastbound in the westbound lane of divided Highway U.S. 36, striking the vehicle driven by [the victim] and that that resulted in [the victim's] death.

Juvenile Division: All right. [B.L.], you've heard the comments of the attorney for the juvenile office. Do you have any disagreement with what he stated with regards to the facts of the case?

B.L.: No, ma'am.

Juvenile Division: Okay. All right. I will accept that admission. I will find that the juvenile is in need of care and treatment of the Court and make the minor a ward of the Court, proceed to disposition.

During the dispositional portion of the hearing, the victim's family read several victim impact statements. The juvenile office and defense counsel then presented their requests for disposition. The juvenile office recommended that B.L. be committed to the Division of Youth Services until the age of nineteen. Defense counsel requested that B.L. be committed to the Division of Youth Services for an indeterminate period of time. Counsel explained that B.L. “accept[ed] responsibility for what she ha[d] done, and she [was] not asking this Court to merely place her on supervision.” Counsel asserted that B.L. was not “asking for just the slap on the wrist ․ She's saying ‘I know I need help and I know I did something wrong.’ ” At the close of counsel's argument, B.L. read the following statement to the victim's family:

I'm really sorry for what happened that day. I would do anything to take back what I did. Not a day goes by that I don't think about what happened, and I'm keeping your family in my prayers every day.

The juvenile division ordered B.L. to be committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services until the age of nineteen. The juvenile division issued a judgment ordering B.L.’s commitment to the Division of Youth Services (“Judgment”). In the Judgment, the juvenile division found that B.L.’s admissions at the adjudication hearing were freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made, and that a basis in fact existed for her admissions. The juvenile division determined that based on B.L.’s admissions, she had committed the offense alleged in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.L. timely appealed.

Standard of Review

Juvenile proceedings are reviewed under the same standard applied in other court-tried civil cases. B.O. v. Juv. Office, 595 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). We “will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. (citing In re A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and ignore evidence to the contrary. Id.

B.L. concedes that her challenge on appeal to the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of her admission is not preserved for our review. B.L. requests plain error review pursuant to Rule 84.13.² “Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, in the discretion of the court, though not raised or preserved, when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Rule 84.13(c). “Plain error review requires a two-prong analysis to determine: (1) whether there was an error that is evident, obvious, and clear; and (2) whether a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of that error.” A.J.L.G. v. Juv. Officer, 679 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting In re D.E.D., 653 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). “[T]he injustice must be so egregious as to weaken the very foundation of the process and seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.E.D., 653 S.W.3d at 431).

Analysis

B.L. asserts that the juvenile division committed plain error in accepting her admission to the allegations in the petition because sufficient evidence does not support that her admission was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. In developing her point on appeal, B.L. emphasizes that the juvenile division failed to conduct an in-court colloquy to ensure she was admitting to the conduct alleged in the petition voluntarily and knowingly, in violation of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. We disagree.

Juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil, not criminal. A.J.L.G., 679 S.W.3d at 560. Some safeguards of criminal due process are nevertheless needed in a delinquency proceeding when “ ‘the issue is whether the child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of liberty[,]’ ․ as such proceedings are ‘comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). This does not require a juvenile division to conform delinquency proceedings to all of the requirements of a criminal trial. Id. But the juvenile division must nonetheless follow “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” during a juvenile adjudication hearing. Id. (quoting In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d at 429); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (due process applies to a juvenile adjudication hearing).

At an adjudication hearing, the juvenile division must determine whether the allegations in the juvenile officer's petition are established. Rules 124.06(c), 128.02(b). Similar to a guilty plea in a criminal case, a juvenile can admit to any allegations in the petition during the hearing. See Rule 128.02(b), (d). If the juvenile makes such an admission, it “must not only be a voluntary expression of the [juvenile's] choice, it must also be a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the act.” In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d at 429 (quoting Ramsey v. State, 182 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)). Consistent with the “minimum due process rights afforded adult criminal defendants during guilty pleas,” id., Rule 128.02(d)(3) provides that after a juvenile admits to any allegations, the juvenile division must make findings regarding whether: (1) the admissions of the juvenile are freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made; and (2) a basis in fact exists for the juvenile's admissions.

Here, the juvenile division complied with Rule 128.02(d)(3) by finding in the Judgment that B.L.’s admissions were freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made, and that there was a factual basis for B.L.’s admissions. B.L. does not dispute that the Judgment is in technical compliance with Rule 128.02(d)(3). B.L. also does not dispute that the juvenile division's finding that there was a factual basis for her admissions is supported by the record.

B.L. does challenge, however, the juvenile division's finding that her admissions were freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made. B.L. contends that this finding is not supported by the record because, before accepting B.L.’s admission, the juvenile division did not expressly ask B.L. whether her admission was voluntarily and knowingly given, or whether she understood the constitutional rights she was waiving by admitting the allegation in the petition.

There is no dispute that “[s]ome of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the state criminal trial have equal application to that part of the state juvenile proceeding that is adjudicative in nature.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). “Among these are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.; see J.A.T. v. Jackson Cnty. Juv. Office, 637 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 2022) (“The United States Supreme Court has held certain rights enumerated within the Bill of Rights apply to juvenile proceedings, including notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege against self-incrimination.”) (citation omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court “has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in [her] delinquency proceeding. Indeed, the [Supreme] Court specifically has refrained from going that far․” McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533, 91 S.Ct. 1976. What matters is that a juvenile adjudication hearing “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Id. at 534, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (quotation omitted).

B.L. argues her adjudication hearing did not measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment because the juvenile division did not ask B.L. if she understood the constitutional rights she was waiving by admitting the allegation in the petition. And B.L. argues that in the absence of a clear and unequivocal on-the-record colloquy inquiring whether a juvenile understands the constitutional rights they are waiving, a juvenile division cannot find, as a matter of law, that the juvenile's admissions were “freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made” as required by Rule 128.02(d)(3).

We conclude, for multiple reasons, that plain error review is unwarranted in this case. As an initial matter, it is notable that B.L. cites no Missouri precedent for this contention. B.L. does cite to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), a criminal case, for the general proposition that a plea of guilty in a criminal case is both an admission by the accused that she committed certain acts and a waiver of important constitutional rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. We have already acknowledged that these same constitutional rights are afforded a juvenile during an adjudication hearing. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533, 91 S.Ct. 1976.

Though B.L. does not develop the point, we are aware that Boykin also stands for the separate proposition that a criminal defendant's waiver of the aforesaid important constitutional rights by pleading guilty to a criminal offense cannot be presumed “from a silent record.” 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709. This holding led to the adoption or modification of federal and state rules of criminal procedure that impose detailed on-the-record colloquy requirements on a trial court before a criminal guilty plea can be accepted as to ensure that the plea and the commensurate waiver of rights were knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., Rule 24.02;³ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. However, the United States Supreme Court has not extended Boykin’s “silent record” holding to juvenile adjudication hearings. And though a handful of states in the years after Boykin have expressly concluded that juvenile admissions must follow the procedures required by Boykin,⁴ Missouri is not among those states. In fact, although Missouri courts have recognized generally that “juveniles are entitled to the same minimum due process rights afforded adult criminal defendants during guilty pleas,” In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d at 429, there is not a single reported juvenile case in Missouri which cites to Boykin.

Besides the fact that no Missouri case has held that the Due Process Clause requires that a juvenile be specifically advised of her constitutional rights before admitting to acts of delinquency, no such requirement is imposed by Rule, either. Although Rule 128.02(d) contemplates a juvenile division's acceptance of a juvenile's admission of factual allegations in a petition, neither that nor any other juvenile rule imposes an obligation on the juvenile division to conduct a scripted on-the-record colloquy as a condition of finding that the admission is freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made.⁵ No Missouri case has held that the procedure described in Rule 128.02 for accepting an admission in a juvenile adjudication hearing must align with the procedure required for accepting a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding under Rule 24.02.

We are not permitted to engraft in-court colloquy requirements into Rule 128.02(d)(3) as a condition of a juvenile division's authority to make the findings required by that Rule. Cf. Rinehart v. Bateman, 363 S.W.3d 357, 368-69 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (“We are simply not permitted to read unwritten requirements into statutes whose language is clear and unambiguous.”) (citation omitted). The juvenile division did not violate the applicable Supreme Court Rules by accepting B.L.’s admission without first conducting an in-court colloquy, scripted analogously to that required in criminal cases by Rule 24.02. A.J.L.G., 679 S.W.3d at 560 (quoting In re D.E.D., 653 S.W.3d at 431).

Finally, the record fails to establish that the juvenile division's acceptance of B.L.’s admission constituted a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Regardless of whether the colloquy described in Boykin is required, the record must nonetheless support Rule 128.02(d)(3)’s required finding that B.L.’s admission was freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made. See A.J.L.G., 679 S.W.3d at 560-61 (holding that the record of the delinquency proceeding must reflect that a juvenile's admissions were a voluntary and knowing expression of the juvenile's choice, and that there was a factual basis for the alleged conduct). “[W]hether a[n admission] is knowing and voluntary is determined from the record as a whole.” A.B. v. Juv. Officer, 722 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Booker v. State, 552 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Mo. banc 2018)). Here, the record as a whole is sufficient to establish that B.L.’s admission to the allegation in the petition was freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made because B.L. understood she had a right to adjudicate the allegation in the petition in lieu of admitting the allegation; B.L. consistently expressed remorse for her actions and a desire to take responsibility for them; B.L. knew the likely consequences of commitment to the Division of Youth Services before admitting the allegation; and B.L. understood the factual basis for her admission.

First, the record supports the conclusion that B.L. knew she had a right to insist on a contested adjudication hearing to address the allegations in the petition, akin to the right to trial in a criminal proceeding. An adjudication hearing was set for October 15, 2025. When the parties appeared on that date, the juvenile division first confirmed on the record that the matter was set for an adjudication hearing and then asked the parties whether they were ready to proceed with the adjudication hearing. At that point, B.L.’s counsel stated that B.L. was “prepared to admit to the allegation listed in the petition, that if she were an adult it would be involuntary manslaughter.” The juvenile division asked B.L. to confirm her desire to admit the allegation in the petition, which she did, on the record.

Second, the record establishes that B.L. voluntarily and knowingly admitted the allegation in the petition because she regretted her actions and wanted to accept responsibility for what had happened. At the certification hearing, the psychiatrist and the chief juvenile officer both testified that B.L. had voiced intense remorse for the car crash on multiple occasions. B.L.’s remorse was again expressed by B.L. and her counsel during the dispositional hearing. In her statement to the victim's family, B.L. stated that she was sorry for what had happened; that she wished she could take back what she did; that she thought about what happened every day; and that she prayed for the victim's family every day. B.L.’s counsel also asserted that B.L. was not asking to be placed on supervision because she “accept[ed] responsibility for what she ha[d] done” and did not want a mere “slap on the wrist” for her actions. Counsel explained that B.L. was asking for an indeterminate commitment to the Division of Youth Services because B.L. knew she “need[ed] help and [she] kn[ew] [she] did something wrong.” The context surrounding B.L.’s admission supports the juvenile division's conclusion that B.L. understood the nature and gravity of her actions underlying the allegation; that she wanted to take accountability for them; and that she was admitting to her conduct voluntarily and knowingly.

Third, unlike a typical plea agreement in a criminal case, B.L.’s choice to admit the allegations in the petition was not based on assurances about the ultimate disposition of the case. At the certification hearing before B.L.’s admissions, the chief juvenile officer testified that following an adjudication, she would recommend B.L. be committed to the Division of Youth Services until her nineteenth birthday. Because B.L. was present during the certification hearing, she was aware of the juvenile office's recommended disposition. In lieu of proceeding with a contested adjudication hearing, B.L. chose to admit the allegation in the petition, at which time the juvenile office recommended B.L.’s commitment to the Division of Youth Services until the age of nineteen.⁶ The juvenile office's consistent dispositional recommendation was unconnected to B.L.’s decision to admit the allegation in the petition, and was not offered to entice B.L. to avoid a contested adjudication hearing. In fact, B.L. knew the result of her admission would be commitment, as even she requested a disposition that would have her committed to the Division of Youth Services, although for an indeterminate period of time. B.L. knew when she made this request that the juvenile division had already demonstrated that it was unwilling to be lenient with her, as it had previously refused an uncontested request that B.L. be released from detention subject to G.P.S. ankle bracelet monitoring pending her certification hearing. The record supports the juvenile division's finding that B.L.’s admission was freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made because she had “sufficient awareness of the ․ likely consequences of the act,” that is detention until her nineteenth birthday, before admitting the allegation. In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d at 429 (quoting Ramsey, 182 S.W.3d at 658).

Finally, “a sufficient factual basis can be an important factor in a voluntariness determination.” A.B., 722 S.W.3d at 587 (quoting Booker, 552 S.W.3d at 528). A “factual basis exists when the conduct the [juvenile] admits establishes the [juvenile's] commission of the offense that is the subject of the [admission].” Id. (quoting Booker, 552 S.W.3d at 527). “[T]he factual basis serves as a safeguard to [a juvenile] who is in the position of [admitting] voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that [her] conduct does not actually fall within the charge.” Id. (quoting Booker, 552 S.W.3d at 528). As B.L. concedes, the juvenile office met its burden to establish that B.L. admitted to a factual basis for the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree by recklessly causing the death of another person. See section 565.024.1. At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile office established that B.L. would have violated section 565.024 if she were an adult, when she “recklessly caused the death of [the victim] by driving eastbound in the westbound lane of divided Highway U.S. 36, striking the vehicle driven by [the victim] and that that resulted in [the victim's] death.” When the juvenile division asked B.L. whether she disagreed with these facts, B.L. responded, “No ma'am.” This exchange supports the juvenile division's determination that B.L. made her admission freely and knowingly because she had “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances” to which she admitted. In re A.C.C., 561 S.W.3d at 429 (quoting Ramsey, 182 S.W.3d at 658). B.L.’s repeated and heartfelt expressions of remorse for her actions further support this conclusion. The palpable essence of the record in this tragic case is that B.L. fully understood and accepted responsibility for the gravity of her actions, and believed it appropriate, even essential, that she rehabilitate with the benefit of services that could be provided during a commitment with the Division of Youth Services.

The clear factual basis for B.L.’s admission to the allegation in the petition distinguishes this case from A.B., which B.L. relies on to argue that the juvenile division's failure to conduct an in-court colloquy addressing the voluntary and knowing nature of B.L.’s admission was plain error resulting in manifest injustice. 722 S.W.3d at 589. In A.B., the juvenile officer filed four amended petitions asserting various allegations. Id. at 582-83. In the fourth amended petition, the juvenile officer added a new allegation in paragraph 4f that if the juvenile were an adult, he would have committed the felony of assault in the second degree. Id. at 583. At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile office dismissed all allegations except for the new assault allegation in paragraph 4f. Id. However, in securing the juvenile's admission during the adjudication hearing, the juvenile office, defense counsel, and the juvenile division only referred to the remaining assault allegation as “allegation F” or “4f,” without describing or establishing the facts supporting the allegation. Id. at 583-85. The record consequently did not establish that the juvenile knew that “allegation F” or “4f” alleged conduct that would qualify as assault in the second degree. Id. at 587. And, the juvenile was never asked whether he agreed that he engaged in specific conduct that supported “allegation F” or “4f.” Id. We thus held that the juvenile division committed plain error resulting in manifest injustice by failing to comply with Rule 128.02 because the record was devoid of evidence that the juvenile knew which of the multiple allegations he was admitting, and that as a result, his admission was not voluntary or knowing. Id. at 588-89.

In contrast, there was no confusion about the allegation B.L. admitted. The record clearly establishes B.L. knew and understood the nature of the alleged conduct because the petition alleged only a single count of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree; B.L. confirmed she was prepared to admit to the felony of involuntary manslaughter at the adjudication hearing; and B.L. affirmed the juvenile office's detailed rendition of the underlying facts at the hearing. This detailed and specific inquiry of B.L. about the factual basis for her admission lends further support to the juvenile division's finding that B.L.’s admission was voluntarily and knowingly made as B.L. understood the exact offense and the specific conduct to which she was admitting.

In reviewing this record as a whole, we conclude that the juvenile division's finding that B.L.’s admission was “freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made” as required by Rule 128.02(d)(3) is supported by sufficient evidence. See A.B., 722 S.W.3d at 587 (“whether a[n admission] is knowing and voluntary is determined from the record as a whole”) (quoting Booker, 552 S.W.3d at 528). Even had we found that the juvenile division committed plain error by not conducting a detailed on-the-record colloquy about the constitutional rights B.L. was waiving by admitting the allegation in the petition,⁷ we would not find, on the record as a whole in this case, that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred as a result.⁸ See A.J.L.G., 679 S.W.3d at 560 (“[T]he injustice must be so egregious as to weaken the very foundation of the process and seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.”) (quotation omitted).

Point One is denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented through June 20, 2025, the date of B.L.’s delinquency offense, unless otherwise noted.

2.   All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I - State, 2025, unless otherwise noted.

3.   Rule 24.02 expressly requires a trial court to conduct an in-court colloquy before accepting a criminal defendant's guilty plea. Rule 24.02(b), (c). In a criminal guilty plea proceeding, the trial court must “address the defendant personally in open court” to determine whether: (1) the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the minimum and maximum penalty for the offense provided by law; (2) the defendant understands the right to counsel; (3) the defendant understands the right to plead not guilty or to persist in a plea already made; (4) the defendant understands a guilty plea waives the right to trial; (5) the defendant's plea is voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises apart from a plea agreement; and (6) the defendant's willingness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or defendant's attorney. Rule 24.02(b), (c).

4.   See, e.g., State in re Lucas, 543 So.2d 634, 636 (La. Ct. App. 1989); J.N. v. State, 483 So.2d 885, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1177-78 (R.I. 1984); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-90110, 127 Ariz. 389, 621 P.2d 298, 302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); In re Michael M., 11 Cal.App.3d 741, 96 Cal. Rptr. 887, 888-89 (1970).

5.   This is in stark contrast to Rule 128.02(d)(1), which separately requires the juvenile division find “whether the juvenile is present with counsel or, if not, whether the juvenile has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel” when a juvenile admits the allegations in a petition. A juvenile's constitutional right to counsel is expressly set forth in Rule 115.01(a). A juvenile's ability to waive the right to counsel is subject to specific procedures and requirements, including that waiver requires approval of the court. Rule 115.01(b), (c). Missouri cases have thus held that “[b]ecause of the strong presumption against waivers of counsel, the trial judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case ․ demand.” In re D.L., 999 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). This has led our courts to require an on-the-record discussion with a juvenile who seek to waive the right to counsel that aligns with the on-the-record inquiry required of defendants in a criminal case. Id. at 296; see also In re N.R.W., 482 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (specifying the detailed understandings the record must establish a juvenile possesses for a waiver of the right to counsel to be considered knowing and intelligent).

6.   Commitment to the Division of Youth Services until the age of nineteen is the maximum commitment permitted within the juvenile system without a petition and showing of good cause for an extended commitment to the age of twenty-one. Section 219.021.1

7.   Though not expressly required by Rule 128.02(d)(3), we strongly encourage juvenile divisions to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with a juvenile about the constitutional rights made applicable to juvenile adjudication hearings by controlling decisional law that are waived by admitting to the allegations in a juvenile petition. In the absence of such an inquiry, the juvenile adjudication is susceptible to an avoidable challenge that the record is insufficient to support the required finding that a juvenile's admission is freely and voluntarily given and knowingly made.

8.   Without marginalizing the due process considerations attendant to juvenile delinquency proceedings, we have a difficult time fathoming what B.L. stood to gain by challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of her unequivocal admission to, and acceptance of full responsibility for, the conduct alleged in the juvenile petition. There is no intimation in B.L.’s brief that she regrets her admission to the allegation in the petition, or that she now wishes she had proceeded with a contested adjudication hearing because she believes she would have received a more favorable disposition had she done so.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur