ANDERSON v. TRUMAN MEDICAL CENTER INC (2026)

Wendy Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Truman Medical Center, Inc. (“Truman”), by the Circuit Court of Jackson County on Anderson's petition for damages. Anderson argues that the trial court erred in considering Truman's motion for summary judgment after issuing a new scheduling order. The judgment is affirmed.

Background

On August 1, 2023, Anderson filed a petition for damages. Truman filed an answer.

On December 5, 2023, the trial court issued a scheduling order, which set the discovery deadline as September 2, 2024; set the dispositive motion deadline as October 8, 2024; and scheduled trial for January 6, 2025. The order provided: “Failure to complete Discovery consistent with this Order shall not be a basis for continuance.” (emphasis in original).

On October 8, 2024, Truman filed a motion for summary judgment, along with suggestions in support and a statement of uncontroverted material facts.

On October 31, 2024, Anderson filed a motion for continuance of the trial setting that requested “that the Court grant a continuance of the trial setting and schedule a new case management conference to facilitate the continuance.” The motion indicated that Anderson's counsel had experienced two deaths in the family that had prevented counsel from giving the amount of time and attention “needed for discovery and Motion for Summary Judgment.” The motion requested that the trial date be continued to allow counsel to “further prepare Plaintiff's case.”

Anderson's motion also requested “in the alternative” that Anderson be given a 14-day extension to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The motion indicated that defense counsel had agreed to an extension but had asked that the trial date be moved back if an extension was granted for the summary judgment response. The motion further indicated that the parties were in agreement that continuing the trial was appropriate. The prayer of the motion stated: “WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant this Motion and set a case management conference to select a new trial date.”

On November 7, 2024, the trial court issued an order that stated:

The Court takes up Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance of the Trial Setting filed on 31 October 2024. No objections have been filed.

Being fully advised, Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance of the Trial Setting is GRANTED. This matter is scheduled for a case management conference on 20 December 2024 at 8:30 A.M. IT IS SO ORDERED.

The trial court's order did not address the request for an extension of time to respond to the summary judgment motion.

On November 27, 2024, Truman filed a motion requesting a ruling on its motion for summary judgment. Truman's motion asserted that Anderson's response to the motion for summary judgment had been due on November 7, 2024 pursuant to Rule 74.04(c)(2); that counsel for Truman and Anderson had communicated regarding a two-week extension of the deadline, which would make Anderson's response to the motion for summary judgment due on November 21, 2024; that the trial court's scheduling order had indicated that failure to complete discovery consistent with the order would not be a basis for a continuance; that the events forming the basis for Anderson's request for a continuance had occurred more than two weeks after discovery had already closed; that prior to the dispositive motion deadline of October 8, 2024, Truman had conducted written discovery and taken the deposition of Anderson; that Anderson had failed to conduct written discovery or take depositions of any Truman employees or third-party witnesses; that Truman had consented to the extension of the deadline to respond to Truman's motion for summary judgment, but had noted that such an extension should be accompanied by a request to continue the January 6, 2025 trial date due to its close proximity; that Anderson's motion for continuance of the trial setting was based in part on a prior inability to complete discovery due to events that occurred after discovery closed; that the motion for continuance requested a case management conference to select a new trial date, or, in the alternative to grant a two-week extension to file a response to Truman's summary judgment motion; that the trial court's order granted a continuance of the trial date, but did not address an extension of the deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not eliminate Anderson's responsibility to respond in accordance with the requirements of Rule 74.04(c)(2); that Anderson had failed to timely respond to the motion for summary judgment even if the two-week extension were to be considered granted; that Anderson never filed a response to Truman's motion at any time; and that the motion was ripe for ruling.

On December 5, 2024, Anderson filed a response to Truman's motion for ruling on its motion for summary judgment. Anderson's response indicated that defense counsel had graciously agreed to continuing the matter due to deaths in Anderson's counsel's family; that defense counsel also agreed to continue the deadline for a response to the motion for summary judgment prior to the trial court's November 7, 2024 order that continued the trial setting and set a case management conference on December 20, 2024; that the trial court granted the continuance but did not address the requested extension; that Anderson presumed the extension would be addressed at the case management conference; that the events underlying the request for a continuance did not occur until after the discovery deadline, but painful events did occur prior to the deadline; that Anderson's counsel did not wish to dodge the passage of deadlines but did request the court not punish his client for such omissions; that Anderson was requesting a short period in which to conduct discovery; that Anderson was asking the court to push the deadline for responding to the motion for summary judgment to December 20, 2024; and that Anderson was requesting that the court deny Truman's motion.

On December 10, 2024, Truman filed a reply to Anderson's response. Truman argued that Anderson acknowledged that the trial court's order regarding continuance did not include any language regarding an extension of time with which to respond to summary judgment; that Anderson's obligation to respond to the summary judgment motion as provided by Rule 74.04(c)(2) never changed; that a request for additional discovery does not alter the requirements of Rule 74.04; that Rule 74.04(f) provides an avenue for a party to assert that additional discovery is needed, but that the party must meet certain requirements to support such an assertion, including describing the evidence that will be adduced and its materiality; that Anderson made no attempt to explain why additional discovery was needed under Rule 74.04(f); and that Anderson had not shown good cause for reopening discovery after failing to conduct discovery in the ten months following Truman's answer until the close of discovery.

On December 20, 2024, the trial court entered a scheduling order following a case management conference.¹ The scheduling order set the cause for trial on March 23, 2026. The scheduling order indicated that production and designation of expert witnesses was closed. The order indicated that discovery was to be completed by June 3, 2025. The order also indicated that dispositive motions, such as summary judgment motions must be filed on or before September 19, 2025. The order did not contain language referring to Truman's previously filed motion for summary judgment or Truman's request for a ruling on its motion for summary judgment.

Following the new scheduling order, Anderson filed two notices that depositions would be taken. On June 4, 2025, Anderson requested an extension of the discovery deadline indicating that depositions had been taken and that additional time was needed despite counsel's diligence. Truman argued that discovery should have been completed within the original discovery deadline or in the additional nine months after the original discovery deadline. Truman asserted that Anderson had not served written discovery until more than three months after the reopening of the discovery deadline, and that Anderson waited until just before the close of discovery to attempt to take depositions.

On June 18, 2025, the trial court denied the motion to extend discovery.

On August 19, 2025, the trial court granted Truman's motion for summary judgment, which had been filed on October 8, 2024. The trial court indicated that Anderson had not responded to the motion, such that all of Truman's statements of uncontroverted material fact in support of the motion were deemed admitted. Based on this record, the trial court concluded that Truman was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment in favor of Truman on all claims in the petition.

On August 19, 2025, Anderson filed a motion to set aside the judgment entered earlier that day. The motion recognized that Truman had filed a motion for summary judgment to which Anderson had never responded. Anderson asserted that, following Truman's filing of the motion for summary judgment, the trial court moved the trial from January 6, 2025, to March 23, 2026, to allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery, and that Truman had said that Truman would file a new motion for summary judgment. Anderson asserted that the trial court entered a new scheduling order setting a new dispositive motion deadline for September 19, 2025; that discovery continued until June 3, 2025, with Anderson taking several depositions; and that Truman had never filed a new motion for summary judgment after the initial scheduling order.

The trial court denied Anderson's motion to set aside the judgment.

Anderson now appeals to this Court.

Analysis

In her sole point on appeal, Anderson argues that the trial court erred in granting Truman's motion for summary judgment filed on October 8, 2024. Anderson argues that the trial court could no longer consider Truman's motion after issuing a new scheduling order, such that Anderson was deprived of an opportunity to respond. Anderson does not raise any substantive arguments regarding the grant of summary judgment – which the trial court indicated was based on the facts deemed to be admitted due to Anderson's failure to respond to the summary judgment motion – but instead argues that the trial court erred in considering the motion for summary judgment at all. Anderson argues that the trial court exercised its discretion to issue a new scheduling order and therefore was precluded from ruling on the previously filed motion for summary judgment prior to the September 19, 2025 deadline for dispositive motions as set forth in the new scheduling order. Anderson essentially argues that she was entitled to rely on the new scheduling order as relieving Anderson of the obligation of responding to the prior motion for summary judgment.

Rule 74.04 governs motions for summary judgment. A defending party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time. Rule 74.04(b). “Within 30 days after a motion for summary judgment is served, the adverse party shall serve a response on all parties․” Rule 74.04(c)(2). Rule 74.04(c)(2) further provides, as pertinent: “A response that does not comply with this Rule 74.04(c)(2) with respect to any numbered paragraph in movant's statement is an admission of the truth of that numbered paragraph.” Thus, when a party fails to properly respond to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 74.04(c)(2), the party is deemed to have admitted each of the opposing party's statements of material fact. See Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, 732 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo. banc 2026).

Generally, a trial court has discretion to modify scheduling orders and enlarge the period of time in which a party may respond to a motion for summary judgment. See Rule 44.01(b); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Addison Ins. Co., 448 S.W.3d 818, 825-26 (Mo. banc 2014). “A court's decision on a party's request for additional time is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Scottsdale, 448 S.W.3d at 825 (citation omitted). A circuit court abuses its discretion only when the ruling “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” Holmes v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 617 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Mo. banc 2021).

In this matter, contrary to Anderson's arguments, the trial court never relieved Anderson of the obligation of responding to Truman's motion for summary judgment. Anderson fails to point to a ruling of the court that purported to relieve her of the obligation of responding to the motion for summary judgment or a ruling that carried such a legal effect.

Anderson never responded to the motion for summary judgment at any time. Anderson did file a motion for a continuance, which requested a continuation of the trial date, and which requested a two-week extension of time with which to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The trial court did indicate that a continuance of the trial setting was granted, but the trial court did not indicate that it was extending the deadline for Anderson's response to the motion for summary judgment. In her response to Truman's request for a ruling on its motion for summary judgment, Anderson expressly acknowledged that the trial court's November 7, 2024 order granting a continuance did not address an extension of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Anderson did indicate to the trial court that Anderson had assumed that the extension would be taken up at the case management conference, and further requested that the trial court grant Anderson until December 20, 2024, to respond to Truman's motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not rule on this request, and Anderson did not file a response prior to the December 20, 2024 case management conference.

Following the case management conference, the trial court issued a new scheduling order, which moved back the discovery deadline, the dispositive motion deadline, and the trial date. However, the new scheduling order did not address an extension of time for Anderson to respond to the previously filed motion for summary judgment. Anderson fails to point to a ruling of the trial court that relieved her of the obligation of responding to the motion for summary judgment.

Anderson takes the position that the trial court's scheduling order automatically voided the previously filed summary judgment motion. We disagree. The new scheduling order indicated that summary judgment motions were to be filed on or before September 19, 2025. However, in extending the dispositive motion deadline, the trial court's order did not purport to void any previously filed motions, which were necessarily filed before the new deadline. As such, Truman's motion for summary judgment was filed within the parameters of both the initial scheduling order and the subsequent scheduling order. The issuance of the new scheduling order, which did not purport to address previously filed motions, did not automatically void Truman's previously filed summary judgment motion, which remained pending without a timely response by Anderson.

Regarding the fact that the trial court's new scheduling order extended the discovery deadline, Rule 74.04 rejects the notion that a valid motion for summary judgment cannot coexist with ongoing discovery, in that a defendant may move for summary judgment at any time. Rule 74.04(b). Thus, Rule 74.04 expressly contemplates that motions for summary judgment are not defeated nor rendered nullities simply because discovery in the case is ongoing.²

Generally, when a party is required by Rule 74.04(c)(2) to respond to a motion for summary judgment, yet believes that an extension of time is warranted, the party is not without recourse. A party may seek an extension of time within which to respond to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 44.01(b).³ Scottsdale, 448 S.W.3d at 825. However, such a request is subject to the trial court's discretion and the requirements of Rule 44.01(b). Importantly, in the absence of a trial court ruling granting such relief – which, again, is subject to the trial court's discretion – a party's obligation to respond to a motion for summary judgment in accordance with the requirements of Rule 74.04(c)(2) is not eliminated. In this matter, the trial court did not issue an order that purported to extend Anderson's time to respond to the summary judgment motion or an order that necessarily carried such a legal effect.

Rule 74.04(f) provides an avenue for relief for a party opposing a motion for summary judgment when that party believes that additional discovery is necessary to allow the party to properly oppose the motion for summary judgment:

When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that for reasons stated in the affidavits facts essential to justify opposition to the motion cannot be presented in the affidavits, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

Rule 74.04(f).

But, Rule 74.04(f) does not authorize a party to assert generically that additional discovery is needed as a means of prolonging a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Rather, as Rule 74.04(f) has been interpreted, a party seeking a continuance under Rule 74.04(f) must file a response to the motion for summary judgment with a supporting affidavit and must explain with specificity the evidence sought by additional discovery and its materiality to the issue of whether a grant of summary judgment is appropriate. See Duncan v. Dempsey, 547 S.W.3d 815, 821-22 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Adams v. City of Manchester, 242 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)). A general allegation that additional discovery might provide additional material evidence is insufficient; rather, the affidavit must describe such evidence and explain its materiality. Duncan, 547 S.W.3d at 822 (citing Adams, 242 S.W.3d at 427).

In this matter, Truman's motion for summary judgment was not filed until after the initial ten-month period of discovery had closed. Anderson did not respond to Truman's motion for summary judgment at any time, and did not receive a ruling relieving her of the obligation of serving a timely response under Rule 74.04(c)(2) or extending her time in which to do so. Anderson did not attempt to respond with affidavits or make any specific argument regarding why a response would require additional discovery. Most significantly, Anderson fails to point to any ruling of the trial court that had the legal effect of relieving her of the obligation of responding to Truman's motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 74.04(c)(2).⁴

Anderson's point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties both recognize that a transcript of the case management conference does not exist.

2.   That said, when a motion for summary judgment hinges on a claimant's ability to produce evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the claimant, Missouri courts have long recognized that a non-movant claimant should be allowed “an adequate period of discovery” from which to produce, or be able to produce at trial, evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the claimant. See, e.g., Lisle v. Meyer Elec. Co., Inc., 667 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Mo. banc 2023) (quoting ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. banc 1993)).

3.   Rule 44.01(b) provides:(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon notice and motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 52.13, 72.01, 73.01, 75.01, 78.04, 81.04, 81.07, and 84.035 or for commencing a civil action.

4.   Because Anderson's sole point on appeal was premised upon her erroneous belief that the new scheduling order relieved her of her obligation to respond to the summary judgment motion, we do not in this opinion address what the trial court could have or should have done in response to Anderson's requests for extensions of time to respond to the summary judgment motion. As noted, Anderson never responded to the motion for summary judgment within the requested periods of time or at any other time.

Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

All concur.