STATE v. CORNELL (2026)

Samuel Cornell (“Cornell”) appeals from the trial court's judgment convicting him of trespassing in the first degree. Cornell argues on appeal that his conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he unlawfully remained on real property owned by Shamrad Metal Fabricators (“Shamrad”) after being asked to leave. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 1

On August 12, 2025, Thomas Worland (“Worland”), the general manager of Shamrad, called police to report a group of fifteen to twenty people lying in a grassy area between the sidewalk and the fenced-in portion of a lot owned by Shamrad at 930 South 8th Street in St. Joseph, Missouri. Officer Gerald Dilley (“Officer Dilley”) and Officer Joshua VanderBol (“Officer VanderBol”) of the St. Joseph Police Department were dispatched in response to the trespass call. When Officer Dilley arrived on the scene, he told the individuals lying on the grassy area that the owner wanted them to leave. Cornell refused to leave even after being asked to do so. Officer Dilley and Officer VanderBol arrested Cornell for trespassing.

The State charged Cornell with one count of trespass in the first degree in violation of section 569.140.² During a bench trial, Worland, Officer Dilley, and Officer VanderBol testified, and a video recording of Cornell's arrest captured by Officer Dilley's body camera was admitted into evidence. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Cornell moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to present any evidence that established that the grassy area between the sidewalk and the fenced-in portion of the lot was owned by Shamrad. The trial court denied the motion. Cornell advised that he had no evidence and orally moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the case. The trial court denied the motion.

The trial found Cornell guilty of trespass in the first degree. At Cornell's request, the trial court proceeded directly to sentencing and sentenced Cornell to time served in the county jail. Thereafter, the trial court entered a written judgment of conviction and sentence (“Judgment”).

Cornell appeals.

Standard of Review

Cornell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for trespass in the first degree. “We assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in a court-tried case using the same standard as in a jury-tried case.” State v. Lasker, 733 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026) (quoting State v. Barac, 558 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). We “must make a de novo determination whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to find the necessary facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Peters, 729 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Mo. banc 2026) (quoting State v. Nowicki, 682 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. banc 2024)). We view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the conviction, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Lasker, 733 S.W.3d at 433.

Analysis

Cornell argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Cornell unlawfully remained on real property owned by Shamrad. Cornell argues that he was partially lying on a public sidewalk and partially in the grass next to the sidewalk, and that the State was required to present evidence whether by “survey, map, title document, or any other piece of evidence” showing the extent of Shamrad's property.

Section 569.140 defines trespass in the first degree as follows:

1. A person commits the offense of trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure or upon real property.

2. A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by:

(1) Actual communication to the actor; or

(2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders․

(Emphasis added.) The State's charge of trespass was based on the emphasized language in section 569.140.2(1), as its amended information charged Cornell with “knowingly remain[ing] unlawfully upon real property located at 930 South 8th Street and owned by Shamrad Metal Fabricators, notice against trespass upon said real estate having been given by actual communication to [Cornell].”

Cornell does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he knowingly remained on the grassy area next to the sidewalk after an actual communication from police officers directing him to leave at Shamrad's request. But, Cornell does dispute whether the State proved that Shamrad “owned the sliver of grass next to the sidewalk that ․ Cornell was partially resting on.” Cornell contends that the only evidence sufficient for this purpose is evidence that establishes Shamrad's precise property lines and that no such evidence was admitted.

Section 569.140 does not expressly require the State to prove “ownership” of real property on which trespass in the first degree is charged. It does, however, require proof that a defendant entered or remained on real property “unlawfully.” Section 569.140.1. Section 569.010(2) defines “enter unlawfully or remain unlawfully” to include, in pertinent part, where “a person enters or remains in or upon premises when he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so.” It is axiomatic that to prove a defendant is not licensed or privileged to enter or remain on premises, the State must prove that someone other than the defendant has the authority to control access to the premises. This obligation is routinely couched as a burden on the State to prove “ownership” of the involved premises. What is not clear, however, is whether the only evidence sufficient to establish “ownership” in a trespass case is proof of legal title to premises, with commensurate proof of legal boundary lines.

This same issue has arisen in connection with other offenses which share the essential element that a defendant has entered or remained unlawfully on premises. Chapter 569, which houses section 569.140, also houses section 569.160 describing burglary in the first degree. That offense similarly requires proof that a defendant “enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully” in a building or inhabitable structure, with the definition of said phrase being similarly controlled by section 569.010(2). Section 569.160.1.

It is settled law in Missouri that the State's burden to establish that a defendant unlawfully entered or remained on premises in a burglary case requires proof of “ownership,” and that this burden is discharged by proof that someone other than the defendant had the right to occupy or possess the premises. See State v. Smith, 626 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo. App. E.D. 1981) (“Ownership in the context of a burglary does not mean title to the fee of the premises. It serves to designate with certainty the premises burglarized so as to protect defendant against a second prosecution for the same offense and to show that defendant did not have the right to possession or free access to the premises.”); State v. Wilhite, 587 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979) (holding that “[p]roof of the ownership of a building burglarized does not refer to the title but the occupancy,” so that an allegation that a defendant broke into a building being used and operated by third persons as a store was sufficient to “charge ownership for purposes of the burglary statute”) (quotation omitted).

Missouri cases have surmised, without expressly deciding, that the evidence sufficient to establish “ownership” in burglary cases “may well also be sufficient for trespass.” State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187, 194 n.8 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989). This conclusion would certainly be consistent with the concept of trespass in the civil arena, where “[t]he gist of an action for trespass is disturbance of [a] plaintiff's possession, not his record title.” Brown v. Wilkinson, 495 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. App. 1973) (citing Poole v. Roloff, 361 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Mo. App. 1962)). See also, Schroeder v. Ziegelman, 443 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. App. 1969) (“The law has long been settled in Missouri that, as against a mere tort-feasor, actual possession of land is alone sufficient to maintain trespass, although such possession is altogether unsupported by evidence of title, and even though it affirmatively appears that plaintiff is without title.”) (citations omitted).

We see no basis for distinguishing between trespass in the first degree and burglary in the first degree when both require proof of a common essential element that is statutorily defined by section 569.010(2). We conclude that “ownership,” for purposes of establishing that a defendant committed trespass in the first degree because the defendant entered property unlawfully or remained unlawfully on property despite being asked to leave, is sufficiently proven by “evidence of the legal equivalents of ownership occupancy, use or possession.” Wilhite, 587 S.W.2d at 323. Stated another way, evidence relevant to establish occupancy, use, or possession of premises where unlawful entry or remainder by another is alleged includes, but is broader than, evidence of title.

This conclusion still requires the State to prove the extent of occupancy, use, or possession of premises where unlawful entry or remainder is alleged. In a trespass case, the evidence must be sufficient to permit the fact-finder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in a location where he did not have a right to possession or free access because the location was occupied, used, or possessed by another. The State's evidence was sufficient to sustain this burden.

Worland, Shamrad's general manager, testified at trial that he called the police on August 12, 2025, because a group of individuals were “trespassing on the property.” He testified that the precise location of the trespass was “at Olive and 8th ․ I believe its 930 Olive and 8th,” which he described as “a lot we have on the other side of the road.” Worland testified that this “property is owned by Shamrad.” On cross-examination, Worland repeated that the lot in question is “a lot that we own.” Worland explained that a part of the lot is fenced in and is used for the storage of materials, and that the grassy area between the fence and the sidewalk is approximately three to four feet wide. Though Worland acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not know the “coordinates” of the property line, he expressly testified that he believed the property line butted up against the sidewalk. Worland testified that Shamrad maintained the grassy area between the fence and the sidewalk.

Officer Dilley testified that he was dispatched to a lot located at 930 South 8th Street because the owner of the property, Shamrad, reported that a number of persons were “trespassing on private property.” Officer Dilley reported seeing several persons lying in the grassy area between the fence and sidewalk when he arrived on the scene and testified that they were asked to leave. Cornell refused to do so and was told he would be arrested if he did not. On cross-examination, Officer Dilley testified that he told the individuals that “the owner wanted them to go,” a statement that was confirmed by the Officer's bodycam video.

Officer VanderBol testified that he responded to a call on August 12, 2025, because a “business had called us and said that people were on their property and scaring their customers.” He described the location as the corner of 8th and Olive, and that he observed “a bunch of people [lying] in the grass off the public sidewalk” when he arrived. Officer VanderBol confirmed that the individuals were asked to leave and that Cornell was informed, after refusing to do so, that he would be arrested for trespassing if he did not leave.

This evidence is sufficient to permit the trial court to reasonably infer that Cornell was trespassing on property owned (that is occupied, used, or possessed) by Shamrad and that he continued to do so despite an actual communication directing him to leave. Though Cornell emphasizes that Worland did not know the exact location of Shamrad's property line, this argument disregards our standard of review, which requires us to view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the conviction, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Lasker, 733 S.W.3d at 433.

Cornell disagrees and cites State v. Caldwell, 352 S.W.3d 378 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011), for the proposition that a trespass prosecution requires proof that the complaining party has the “legal right to possession” of the real property where the defendant remained after being asked to leave. Caldwell does not stand for that proposition.

In Caldwell, the defendant was charged with “trespassing upon ‘real property located at 160 N.W. 251’ ” in Warrensburg, Johnson County, Missouri. Id. at 380 n.3. The charging document did not further describe the property at that address or name the owner of the property at that address. Id. The evidence established that the defendant parked her vehicle at the Central Missouri Skyhaven Airport after its hours of operation, and when asked to leave the parking lot by a University of Central Missouri public safety officer, the defendant refused. Id. at 380-81. Caldwell reversed the trespassing conviction, holding that “there was no evidence presented that identified the address in the [i]nformation and verdict-directing instruction as the [a]irport” or that implied that the airport was located at “160 Northwest 251.” Id. at 382 (emphasis omitted). Thus, when “the prosecutor told the jurors during closing argument that the real property located at ‘160 Northwest 251’ was owned by the [u]university and was the [airport],” the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence. Id. at 383 (emphasis omitted).

Caldwell does not stand for the proposition that evidence of legal ownership of property is essential to support a conviction of trespass in the first degree. Instead, Caldwell stands for the narrow proposition that where a specific address is identified in a charging document, the evidence admitted at trial must connect that address with the premises on which a defendant is claimed to have trespassed. The issue that required reversal in Caldwell is not present in Cornell's case.

In the argument portion of his brief, Cornell claims that the trial court improperly focused on the presence of a fence when it determined that Cornell was guilty of trespass in the first degree because the trial court stated on the record that the fence placed persons on notice that they should not be lying on the property between the fence and the sidewalk. This stray argument is untethered to Cornell's point on appeal and preserves nothing for our review. State v. Devore, 669 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (“Claims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in a point relied on are not preserved for our review.”) (quotation omitted). In any event, Cornell acknowledges that the State's theory of guilt as expressed in the amended information was unrelated to the trial court's perceived focus on whether the fence afforded notice that the grassy area was privately owned, which would have been relevant to establish that Cornell knowingly entered the premises unlawfully. Instead, the amended information required proof that Cornell knowingly remained on premises unlawfully after an actual communication that he was trespassing. We have already explained that the evidence was sufficient to support Cornell's conviction of trespass in the first degree on this theory.

Because sufficient evidence supported a reasonable inference that Shamrad owned the grassy area next to the sidewalk where Cornell was laying, and that Cornell refused to leave the grassy area despite having been told that he needed to leave because he was trespassing, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

Point denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented through August 12, 2025, unless otherwise indicated.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur