MOORE v. STATE (2026)

Mr. Sadiq J. Moore (“Moore”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Missouri (“motion court”), which denied his Rule 29.15 ¹ motion for post-conviction relief (“PCR motion”) following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 2

The underlying facts relevant to Moore's present appeal relate to crimes committed by Moore and two co-conspirators: an accomplice who joined Moore in breaking into a home (“Accomplice”) and a getaway driver (“Driver”).

Around 4:35 a.m. on June 27, 2020, a black vehicle occupied by Moore, Accomplice, and Driver was parked near Victim's ³ house in a residential neighborhood in Mexico, Missouri (“Mexico”).⁴ Around that time, Moore and Accomplice exited the vehicle and unlawfully entered Victim's house through the front door and shot and killed Victim after Victim had exited his bedroom to investigate the commotion. Moore and Accomplice then fled Victim's house and ran toward the location where they expected the black vehicle to be parked. However, Driver had sped away from the scene upon hearing the gunshot without waiting for Moore or Accomplice.

Driver drove to an apartment complex and entered an apartment where two female acquaintances and one male were staying that night. When Driver entered the apartment, the man and one of the women heard Driver say that he, Moore, and Accomplice had attempted to rob Victim and that Moore and Accomplice were now missing. Driver asked the three people in the apartment to join him in Driver's black vehicle to help him find Moore and Accomplice. Over the next hour, surveillance video captured the black vehicle traveling to several locations around Mexico before the group returned to the apartment without Moore or Accomplice. After returning to the apartment, Driver received a phone call, drove away in the black vehicle, and returned to the apartment with Moore and Accomplice about fifteen minutes later.

Several weeks later, Accomplice and Moore were pulled over in a traffic stop in Quincy, Illinois. After Moore was asked to step out of the vehicle by the police officer, Accomplice and Moore sped off in the vehicle and, after the vehicle got stuck on railroad tracks, the two fled on foot from the vehicle. Though law enforcement did not apprehend Accomplice and Moore that night, the abandoned vehicle was searched and law enforcement found Accomplice's driver's license and Moore's bank card.

Moore, Driver, and Accomplice were all eventually arrested and charged with crimes relating to Victim's murder. Prior to being arrested, Moore resided with another friend of his and he confided to the friend that he had been involved in the fatal shooting; that the plan was only to rob Victim, not kill him; and that he felt especially remorseful because Victim's children were in the house during the shooting and could have been harmed.

During Moore's post-arrest police interview, he initially denied being in Mexico on the day of the shooting, claimed that he had only ever been to that city three or four times in his life, and that his permanent residence at that time was in Kirksville, Missouri. However, cellular tower data confirmed that Moore's phone was located in Kirksville at 1:35 a.m. and approximately ninety minutes later was located in Mexico and remained located there until shortly after the shooting. Moore testified at trial that he always had his phone with him and had no explanation for why he was in Mexico on the night of Victim's murder. And, Moore's explanation for why his fingerprints were found on Victim's door by law enforcement during their murder investigation was that he had visited Victim's house several weeks before the murder.

Over the course of three days at trial, the State presented the above evidence, including witnesses that had heard Driver's statement to them that Moore had been involved in the shooting and Moore's friend who confirmed that Moore admitted his involvement and remorsefulness for being involved in the shooting. Moore's case-in-chief consisted entirely of his own testimony in which Moore asserted that he was not involved in the shooting.

The jury convicted Moore. Moore was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder, ten years’ imprisonment for unlawful use of a weapon, ten years’ imprisonment for first-degree burglary, and five years’ imprisonment for each of the three counts of armed criminal action. The court ordered all sentences to run concurrently with each other except that the sentences for armed criminal action would run consecutively to the sentence for second-degree murder—a total of thirty years’ imprisonment. Moore's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court.

Moore then filed his pro se Rule 29.15 PCR motion, which was later amended by appointed counsel. In Moore's PCR motion, he raised a single claim: that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and call Driver as a witness. Moore alleged that Driver would have testified (1) that Moore did not enter a conspiracy to commit the burglary, (2) that Moore was not involved in the shooting, and (3) that Driver never made the statements in the Mexico apartment that incriminated Moore.

At the PCR hearing, Moore presented the testimony of Trial Counsel and Driver.

Trial Counsel explained that he decided against calling Driver as a witness because of the possibility that Driver would incriminate rather than exonerate Moore. Trial Counsel had attempted to contact Driver for a pretrial interview, but Driver's criminal defense attorney refused to permit an interview because Driver was considering a plea agreement that would have required him to cooperate with the State's case against Moore.⁵ Without having the chance to interview Driver, Trial Counsel testified that he could not know whether Driver's testimony would be helpful or incriminating or if Driver would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify at all. Ultimately, Trial Counsel testified that he declined to call Driver as a witness at trial as a matter of trial strategy.

At the PCR hearing, Driver testified that, if called as a witness during Moore's trial, he would not have invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and would have testified as Moore alleged in the amended PCR motion. But, during cross-examination, Driver also admitted during his PCR testimony that he had pleaded guilty to acting “in concert with others, specifically Sadiq Moore and [Accomplice]” and that “the State would prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that the co-defendants had “killed [Victim]” and would be found “guilty ․ of Murder in the Second Degree.” Further, even after Driver had pled guilty to charges arising from the crimes he committed with Moore and Accomplice, had been sentenced, and no longer had any fear of any additional jeopardy attaching to him during the PCR hearing, he chose to assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to some of the questions posed by the State during the PCR hearing. Not surprisingly, the motion court found Driver's testimony to be utterly lacking in credibility.

Following the hearing, the motion court denied Moore's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court concluded that Trial Counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient because Trial Counsel had made a reasonable investigation into Driver by contacting Driver's attorney and, after being told by Driver's attorney that he refused to permit Trial Counsel to speak with Driver, Trial Counsel's decision against presenting Driver's unknown testimony was a reasonable trial strategy. In reaching this conclusion, the motion court expressly stated in the judgment that it found Trial Counsel to be highly credible and that Driver's testimony was not given any weight because it was not credible.

Moore timely appealed from the motion court's judgment. In his sole point on appeal, Moore argues the motion court erred in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the [motion] court's action on the motion filed under this Rule 29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.” Scott v. State, 719 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. banc 2025) (quoting Rule 29.15(k)). “In applying this standard, appellate courts should defer to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and recognize the ‘circuit court is entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing.’ ” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Mo. banc 2024) (emphasis added) (quoting Driskill v. State, 626 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 2021)). To find that a decision was clearly erroneous, this Court must form a “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made” after a review of the entire record. Id. at 416 (quoting Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016)). “The motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be correct.” Beck v. State, 637 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Hays v. State, 360 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)).

Analysis

“To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed to meet the Strickland test.” Watson v. State, 520 S.W.3d 423, 435 (Mo. banc 2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); accord Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 420. Under Strickland, the movant must demonstrate: “(1) his trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent trial counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he was prejudiced by that failure.” Watson, 520 S.W.3d at 435.

To establish the performance prong, “a movant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective and identify specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” McKee v. State, 540 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citation modified) (quoting Hoeber v. State, 488 S.W.3d 648, 655 (Mo. banc 2016)).

To establish the prejudice prong, the movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

If the movant fails to prove either prong, relief cannot be granted. Hecker v. State, 677 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Mo. banc 2023). And if the movant fails to satisfy one prong, we need not address the other. Staten v. State, 624 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2021); accord Shores v. State, 674 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

Performance Prong

“Ordinarily the choice of witnesses is a matter of trial strategy and will support no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 906 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Mo. 2014)). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and call a witness, a movant must plead and prove that: “(1) trial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness's testimony would have produced a viable defense.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 908 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Mo. banc 2007)). “Even then, counsel's decision not to call a witness is presumptively a matter of trial strategy and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant clearly establishes otherwise.” Dillard v. State, 699 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Mo. banc 2005)).

Here, Trial Counsel knew about Driver and even attempted to interview him prior to trial. But Driver's attorney refused to permit (Moore's) Trial Counsel to speak with Driver because Driver still had charges pending against him for the same murder that Moore was charged with and, in fact, was attempting to negotiate a plea deal with the State that would have required Driver to testify against Moore at Moore's trial. This is certainly consistent with Trial Counsel's reasonable belief that Driver either would refuse to testify at trial (by asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination) or would testify negatively about Moore at trial. In fact, this is precisely what Driver did when admitting his guilt of acting in concert with Moore and Accomplice when Driver pleaded guilty to the charge of Murder in the Second Degree.

If trial counsel reasonably believes that a witness will not provide any useful testimony for the defendant, particularly when the witness is charged for their own involvement in the same crime that the defendant is charged with, choosing not to call that witness is a reasonable trial strategy that will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Mo. banc 1987) (concluding that trial counsel reasonably believed the alleged accomplice in an armed robbery would not be allowed by her own counsel to testify in the defendant's trial while facing her pending charges for the same armed robbery); Tyler v. State, 694 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (Where there is a risk that a witness may refuse to testify or, worse, blame the defendant for the crime in order to avoid risk of further prosecution, it is not unreasonable trial strategy for trial counsel to choose not to call the witness.); Lowery v. State, 650 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Mo. App. S.D. 1983) (holding trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for choosing not to call a co-defendant with unconfirmed belief that co-defendant would either refuse to testify or, worse, would incriminate defendant).

Instead, “[i]f a potential witness's testimony would not unqualifiedly support a defendant, the failure to call such a witness does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75, 88 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 577). “[T]rial counsel exhibits reasonable trial strategy in declining to call a potentially unreliable witness whose testimony will not assuredly aid the defense.” Tyler, 694 S.W.3d at 473.

Driver's testimony at the PCR evidentiary hearing was internally inconsistent, and the motion court logically concluded that it was not credible. First, Driver claims he would have testified that Moore had nothing to do with the crime but later confirmed that he admitted the opposite when he pleaded guilty for his conduct in the same crime that Moore was charged with. Second, Driver claimed at the PCR hearing that he would not have chosen to refuse to testify at defendant's trial prior to negotiating his plea agreement; yet, after his plea agreement had been reached and Driver had pleaded guilty and been sentenced, he chose to assert rights relating to the Fifth Amendment during the PCR hearing.

Combined with Trial Counsel's knowledge that Driver's attorney refused to permit Trial Counsel to even interview Driver prior to trial and Trial Counsel's knowledge that Driver was actively pursuing a plea agreement with the State prior to Moore's trial, Moore simply cannot meet his burden of proving that Trial Counsel's strategic decision to choose not to call Driver as a witness at Moore's trial was unreasonable or that Trial Counsel's assistance of counsel at Moore's trial was otherwise constitutionally deficient.

Because Moore has failed to satisfy the Strickland performance prong, we need not address the prejudice prong,⁶ his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails, and his point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to I Missouri Court Rules – State 2022.

3.   Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(4) (Supp. IV 2025), we do not use the names of any victims in this opinion. All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through June 27, 2020, unless otherwise indicated.

4.   Many of the underlying facts are taken directly from the published opinion issued in Moore's direct appeal, State v. Moore, 687 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024), without further attribution.

5.   In fact, the State endorsed Driver as one of its witnesses that the State intended to call in the case-in-chief for the prosecution of Moore.

6.   Ex gratia, any favorable testimony from Driver at Moore's trial would not have refuted the overwhelming evidence of Moore's guilt, to-wit: cell tower data demonstrating that Moore drove approximately 90 miles from his residence to the scene of the crime at around 1:30 a.m. and that he was at the scene of the crime before and after the murder; Moore initially lied to police about being in Mexico, Missouri, at the time of the murder; Moore claimed to have no memory of why he would have traveled 90 miles to Mexico, Missouri, in the middle of the night; Moore's palm print was on the Victim's front door, where the break-in occurred; surveillance video corroborated the apartment witness's testimony that Driver asked them to help search for Moore after the robbery; Moore attempted to evade law enforcement after the crime; and testimony from Moore's friend that he confessed to his involvement in the murder and his regret for doing so.“The relative strength or weakness of the prosecution's case is significant in determining whether any [alleged] deficiencies in trial counsel's performance were prejudicial.” Borst v. State, 337 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (citation modified) (quoting Clay v. State, 954 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)); Stewart v. State, 387 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (same).Simply put, Moore has also failed to satisfy his burden of proving the Strickland prejudice prong.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge, concur.