CITY OF KANSAS CITY v. BURGETT (2026)

Charles Lamar Burgett (“Burgett”) appeals from the trial court's judgment finding him guilty of driving in excess of the posted speed limit in violation of a Kansas City, Missouri (“City”) ordinance. Burgett argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion seeking disclosure of evidence and information from City, in denying his request for a jury trial, and in interfering with his right of appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History 1

On June 4, 2024, at approximately 3:22 p.m., an officer with City's Police Department observed a gray Toyota RAV4 driving on Ward Parkway at a speed greater than the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. The officer used a laser device issued by the police department to check the vehicle's speed. The laser device captured the Toyota RAV4 traveling at 70 miles per hour. The officer stopped the vehicle, walked up to the driver's side of the vehicle, and observed Burgett sitting in the driver's seat. The officer asked Burgett for his driver's license and proof of insurance. Burgett provided his driver's license, but the insurance card he gave the officer was expired. The officer issued Burgett two municipal citations: one for driving 31 to 35 miles per hour over the posted speed limit and one for operating a motor vehicle without maintaining financial responsibility. This appeal involves only the citation for driving over the posted speed limit.²

The municipal division found Burgett guilty of both charged ordinance violations. Burgett filed applications for a trial de novo for both offenses pursuant to section 479.200.³ The matters were assigned to the associate circuit division of the Circuit Court of Jackson County under separate case numbers.

In connection with the citation for driving over the posted speed limit, Burgett filed a request for standard discovery pursuant to Rule 25.03 ⁴ and a motion for additional material and information pursuant to Rule 25.04(a). The motion for additional material and information sought, among other things, the operating manual for the laser device used to detect the speed of Burgett's vehicle and other citations issued by the officer on June 4, 2024, between 2:45 p.m. and 3:45 p.m. City responded that Burgett's request for additional material and information was not reasonable in that “it either does not exist, is not relevant or is otherwise objectionable under the rules of evidence, not material to [Burgett's] case, or may be established through the testimony of the officer.” Burgett filed a motion to compel.

Trial was scheduled on the citation for driving over the posted speed limit for June 9, 2025. The trial on the citation for operating a motor vehicle without maintaining financial responsibly was scheduled for the same date and time.

When the cases were called for trial on June 9, 2025, the trial court asked the parties if there were any preliminary matters. Burgett responded, “I did not waive my right to a jury trial,” and told the trial court that he had a pending motion to compel. The trial court heard argument on Burgett's motion to compel and denied the motion. Burgett then asked the trial court, “For my motion for a jury trial, what's the decision on that?” The trial court asked whether there was a written request for a jury trial in the record, and Burgett admitted that he had not filed one. The City prosecutor argued that Rule 37 requires a jury trial be requested in writing ten days before trial. The trial court reviewed the rules and concluded that Rule 37.61(d) requires a written request for a jury trial to be filed at least ten days before trial. Accordingly, the trial court denied Burgett's request for a jury trial.

The City prosecutor entered Exhibit 1 into evidence without objection. The prosecutor described Exhibit 1 as the “certified ordinance 70-362(2) for maximum limits established and the penalty section for the violation of the chapter, which is 70-101.” Ordinance 70-362(2) is the ordinance identified on the citation Burgett received for driving over the posted speed limit.

After hearing testimony from the officer and Burgett, and reviewing video captured by the officer's body camera, the trial court found Burgett guilty of violating the City's ordinance for driving over the posted speed limit. The trial court sentenced Burgett to pay a $100 fine and court costs, and entered a written judgment accordingly on June 9, 2025 (“Judgment”).

Two days later, Burgett filed a motion for new trial which argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel disclosure of the operating manual for the laser device and other citations issued by the officer on June 4, 2024. The motion for new trial also claimed error in the denial of Burgett's request for a jury trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Burgett filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment on June 27, 2025. Burgett then filed a motion seeking leave to file a notice of appeal out of time. This Court dismissed Burgett's first-filed appeal as untimely and issued an order permitting Burgett leave to file a second notice of appeal out of time. Burgett timely filed a second notice of appeal from the Judgment.

Standard of Review

“Prosecutions for municipal ordinance violations are civil proceedings with quasi[-]criminal aspects” in that “Rule 37, which governs ordinance violations, mirrors the rules governing criminal proceedings.” Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Mo. banc 2015). However, our standard of review in an appeal involving a municipal ordinance violation does not mirror our standard of review in criminal cases. Instead, we review a municipal ordinance violation using the standard outlined in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), for court-tried civil cases. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. Carroll, 597 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). The Murphy standard requires us to “affirm the trial court's decision unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Jackson Cnty. v. Stamps, 708 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting City of Joplin v. Marston, 346 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)). In applying this standard, we view all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the municipality” and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. (quoting City of Joplin, 346 S.W.3d at 341).

Analysis

Burgett raises three points on appeal. In his first point on appeal, Burgett asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to require City to disclose additional material and information because the discovery requested was “reasonable, relevant and material.” Burgett's second point on appeal asserts that the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial because Burgett did not waive his right to a jury trial. Burgett argues in his third point on appeal that the trial court interfered with his right of appeal. We discuss Burgett's points on appeal in order.

Point One: The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to Require City to Disclose the Operating Manual for the Laser Device or Other Citations Issued by the Officer

Burgett's first point relied on states:

The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying [Burgett's] motion for disclosure of additional material and information because it deprived him of his constitutional right of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution; and, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.04(a) in that the material and information requested is reasonable, relevant and material to [Burgett's] case.

In the argument following his point relied on, Burgett limits the scope of his claim of error to the undisclosed laser device's operating manual and other citations issued by the officer. Burgett contends that reversal of his conviction is required because he was denied meaningful discovery.

Burgett's motion for additional material and information was filed pursuant to Rule 25.04(a), which provides:

The defense may make a written motion in the court having jurisdiction to try said case requesting the state to disclose material and information not covered by Rule 25.03.5 Such motion shall specify the material or information sought to be disclosed. If the court finds the request to be reasonable, the court shall order the state to disclose to defendant that material and information requested which is found by the court to be relevant and material to defendant's case.

We review the denial of a Rule 25.04(a) motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Frazier, 721 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” State v. Brown, 701 S.W.3d 917, 926 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 26 (Mo. banc 2004)). With respect to a claim that a defendant was denied “meaningful discovery,” we analyze “whether the trial court abused its discretion in such a way as to result in fundamental unfairness,” which “occurs when the state's failure to disclose results in defendant's genuine surprise and the surprise prevent[s] meaningful efforts to consider and prepare a strategy for addressing the evidence.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 134 S.W.3d at 26). “[A] defendant is not entitled to information on the mere possibility that it might be helpful, but must make some plausible showing how the information would have been material and favorable.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 134 S.W.3d at 26). “Bare assertions of prejudice are not sufficient to establish fundamental unfairness and do[ ] not show how the trial was substantially altered.” State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 762 (Mo. banc 2002) (holding that fundamental fairness requires a defendant to establish that there is “a reasonable likelihood that denial of discovery affected the outcome of the trial”).

Burgett's Rule 25.04(a) motion sought disclosure of the laser device's operating manual and other citations issued by the officer on the same day and in the same approximate time frame as Burgett's citation. Burgett's Rule 25.04(a) motion did not explain the requests and thus afforded no basis to determine whether the requests were reasonable.

City's response to the Rule 25.04(a) motion asserted that Burgett's requests for the operating manual and other citations issued by the officer were “not reasonable” because the materials either “do[ ] not exist, [are] not relevant or [are] otherwise objectionable under the rules of evidence, not material to [Burgett's] case, or may be established through the testimony of the officer.” Burgett then filed a motion to compel which argued summarily, and without explanation, that the operating manual and other citations issued, were “reasonable, material[,] and relevant” to Burgett's case.

It was not until the trial court heard argument on the motion to compel on the morning of trial that Burgett explained why he believed the operating manual and other issued citations were “meaningful discovery.” Burgett claimed that the operating manual would be used “to disprove the testimony of the officer; among other things, its [sic] training, use of, and condition of the device used,” and that the other citations would be used to disprove the officer's testimony regarding his location when his offense took place. The trial court denied the motion to compel, and made an express finding with regard to the operating manual that Burgett's request was not reasonable as the court had not heard any reason the operating manual would be needed in the case.

Burgett has not sustained his burden to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Price, 732 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Mo. App. S.D. 2026) (holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court committed reversible error). At best, Burgett's delinquently articulated arguments in support of disclosure of the operating manual and other citations establish a “mere possibility” that the materials would be helpful. There is no showing that the trial court's refusal to require disclosure of these materials resulted in fundamental unfairness to Burgett because without them, the outcome of his trial was substantially altered.

Point One is denied.

Point Two: The Trial Court Did Not Err in Conducting a Bench Trial After Burgett Orally Requested a Jury Trial on the Morning of Trial

Burgett's second point relied on states:

The trial court erred in conducting a bench trial because it deprived [Burgett] of his constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; article I, sections 18(a) and 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution; and, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.01(a), in that [Burgett] did not waive his right to trial by jury.

In the argument portion of his brief, Burgett more specifically asserts that the trial court erroneously relied on Rule 37.61(d) to deny his request for a jury trial because that rule only applies to proceedings conducted before a municipal division and does not apply to trials de novo in the circuit court pursuant to section 479.200.

Rule 37.01 provides, in pertinent part, that “Rule 37 governs the procedure in all courts of this state having original jurisdiction of ordinance violations.” Rule 37.61(c) provides that “[t]he judge shall determine all issues of fact in ordinance violation cases unless a jury trial is authorized by law and requested by the defendant.” Rule 37.61(d) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] request for a jury trial shall be made by motion filed at least ten days prior to the scheduled trial date.”

Burgett concedes that he did not make a written request for jury trial at least ten days prior to his scheduled trial date. Instead, he asserted on the record on the morning of trial that he had not waived his right to a jury trial. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to comply with Rule 37.61(d).

Burgett argues, without citation to any authority, that Rule 37.61(d) applies only to the proceedings before the municipal division, and not to trials de novo conducted in the circuit court pursuant to section 479.200. Burgett's summary contention is dispelled by Rule 37.01, which requires the conclusion that Rule 37.16(d) applies “in all courts of this state having original jurisdiction of ordinance violations.” “Court” as used in Rule 37 is “a division of the circuit court having jurisdiction to consider ordinance violations.” Rule 37.06(f). “Court” thus includes the municipal division, which is a division of the circuit court pursuant to article V, section 27 of the Missouri Constitution. “Court” also includes the circuit court which has “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal” pursuant to article V, section 14(a) of the Missouri Constitution. A trial de novo conducted in the circuit court pursuant to section 479.200 is thus a proceeding over which the circuit court has original jurisdiction. City of Springfield v. Stoviak, 110 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (“The de novo court does not sit as an appellate court to consider alleged irregularities in the lower court. A trial de novo essentially provides a defendant with a second trial.” (citations omitted)).

Any doubt about our construction of Rule 37.61(d) is eliminated by the fact that the rule was adopted on May 14, 1985, less than a month after the decision in State ex rel. Estill v. Iannone, 687 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. banc 1985). In State ex rel. Estill, our Supreme Court considered whether a defendant accused of violating a municipal ordinance was entitled to a jury trial in a trial de novo in the circuit court. The Court noted that the rules of criminal procedure are used in trials de novo of an ordinance violation, and reasoned that, if the rules of criminal procedure apply, the right to a trial by jury must also exist. Id. at 173-74 (citing Rule 27.01(a)).⁶ However, because municipal ordinance violations “are more akin to misdemeanors or infractions,” the Court concluded that “the proper procedure calls for the [defendant] to request a jury trial” in writing. Id. at 174. “[I]f the [defendant] does not make written demand for a jury trial, the case may be bench tried.” Id.

Subsequent to State ex rel. Estill, Missouri courts have consistently held that, while a defendant in a municipal ordinance violation is entitled to a jury trial in a trial de novo proceeding, the request for a jury trial must be timely and made in writing. See State ex rel. Bank v. Byrnes, No. ED114506, 2026 WL 1542412, at *4 (Mo. App. E.D. June 2, 2026) (“Consistent with Estill, this Court holds Relator has the right to a jury trial at his trial de novo because he made a timely request.”); City of Kansas City v. Calon, 767 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989) (“A defendant has a right to request a jury in a trial de novo on appeal from a municipal court conviction, but trial by jury is not automatic; if the appellant does not make written demand for a jury trial, the case may be tried to the court.”).

We are constitutionally bound by the holding in State ex rel. Estill, which remains controlling authority on the issue raised by Burgett in his second point on appeal. Doe v. Meritas Health Corp., 732 S.W.3d 207, 227 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026) (citing Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 2). Yet, Burgett fails to mention, let alone address, the case. Instead, he relies on Rule 37.74, which provides that “[a]ll trials de novo shall proceed in the manner provided for the trial of a misdemeanor by the rules of criminal procedure.” Burgett reasons that this means trials de novo are subject to Rule 27.01, which provides in subsection (a) that “[a]ll issues of fact in any criminal case shall be tried by a jury” unless that right is “waived as provided in this Rule,” and which provides in subsection (b) that the waiver of the right to trial by jury in a criminal case may be accomplished with the assent of the court, and must, in a felony case, be entered on the record.

The fallacy in Burgett's reasoning is two-fold. First, ordinance violations, whether tried in the municipal division or de novo in the circuit court, are not criminal cases. They are instead “civil proceedings with quasi[-]criminal aspects.” Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 371. Second, although “Rule 37, which governs ordinance violations, mirrors the rules governing criminal proceedings,” id., Rule 37.08 expressly provides that “[i]f no procedure is specially provided by this Rule 37, the court shall be governed by Rules 19 to 36, inclusive, to the extent not inconsistent with this Rule 37.” Plainly, Rule 37.61(d) specifically addresses the procedure for perfecting the right to trial by jury of an ordinance violation, and that procedure is inconsistent with Rule 27.01(a) and (b). Burgett's reliance on Rule 27.01 is of no assistance to his claim of error.⁷

Because Burgett did not make a request for jury trial in writing at all, let alone at least ten days before his scheduled trial, the trial court did not commit error when it conducted Burgett's trial de novo by bench trial.

Point Two is denied.

Point Three: The Trial Court Did Not Interfere with Burgett's Right to Appeal

Burgett's third point relied on states:

The trial court erred in interfering with Appellant's exercise of his right to appeal because it deprived him of his constitutional right of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution; and Missouri Supreme Court Rules 29.07(b)(3) and 29.11(c), in that it disregarded the rules causing harm to [Burgett].

Burgett's argument explains that the trial court's purported interference with his right to appeal was twofold: (1) the trial court rendered judgment before the time for filing a motion for new trial expired in violation of Rule 29.11(c); and (2) the trial court failed to advise Burgett of his right to appeal after the imposition of sentence in violation of Rule 29.07(b)(3). Burgett argues that because of these errors, Burgett's first notice of appeal was untimely, requiring him to pay another $70 filing fee to file his second notice of appeal out of time. Burgett seeks a refund of $70.

Rule 29.11(c) provides that “[n]o judgment shall be rendered until the time for filing a motion for new trial has expired and if such motion is filed, until it has been determined.” That rule is inconsistent, however, with Rules 37.62 and Rule 37.64(b). Rule 37.62 describes the order of trial in nonjury ordinance violation cases, and expressly provides at subsection (i) that after arguments by counsel at the conclusion of the evidence, “[t]he judge pronounces judgment.” Rule 37.64(b) provides that “[s]entence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay.” Rule 37 does not authorize delaying the entry of judgment or the imposition of sentence beyond the time for filing a motion for new trial. Pursuant to Rule 37.08, Rule 29.11(c) is not controlling in a nonjury ordinance violation proceeding.

Even if Rule 29.11(c) were controlling in an ordinance violation proceeding, its application was waived by Burgett's express consent on the record to the court's immediate imposition of sentence at the close of the case. The court asked both parties whether there was any reason it should not proceed with sentencing immediately after Burgett was found guilty, to which City and Burgett both responded “no.” Burgett's statement constituted a waiver of “any error regarding the timing of the trial court's [J]udgment.” State v. Jacobs, 421 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013).

Once sentence was imposed, Burgett's judgment of conviction became final for purposes of appeal, requiring Burgett's notice of appeal to be filed within ten days. State v. Chapman, 704 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Mo. App. S.D. 1986) (citing Rule 30.01(d); State ex rel. Wagner v. Ruddy, 582 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Mo. banc 1979)). Burgett's failure to timely file his first notice of appeal within ten days after his judgment of conviction become final on June 9, 2025, was not attributable to trial court error. It follows that Burgett's need to pay two filing fees was not attributable to trial court error.

Burgett also complains that after sentence was imposed, he was not advised of his right to appeal as required by Rule 29.07(b)(3). Rule 29.07(b)(3) provides that “[a]fter imposing sentence in a case that has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of his or her right to appeal.” The transcript reveals that after Burgett's sentence was imposed, the trial court advised that it would enter a written judgment that same day. However, the trial court did not advise Burgett of his right to appeal.

Rule 37 is silent with respect to advising a defendant in an ordinance violation proceeding of the right to appeal after the disposition of a trial de novo.⁸ Pursuant to Rule 37.08, this suggests that Rule 29.07(b)(3) may apply to trials de novo disposing of ordinance violations. Assuming without deciding that Rule 29.07(b)(3) applies to Rule 37 trials de novo, we nonetheless conclude that Burgett has not established any prejudicial error warranting relief.

As a general rule, “where a convicted defendant is not advised of his appellate rights as required under Rule 29.07(b)(3) and where the defendant has no independent knowledge of the existence of these rights, the case must be remanded for resentencing.” Novak v. State, 787 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990). Stated another way, a defendant must “show that he is prejudiced by the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 29.07(b)(3).” Id. “[I]f the defendant knows of his right to appeal his conviction, the purpose of Rule 29.07(b)(3) is accomplished.” Id.

Burgett plainly had independent knowledge of his right to appeal. He exercised that right. He cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 29.07(b)(3), even presuming that was required. At best, “such [an] omission [in advising of the right to appeal] might, in an appropriate case, supply a basis to argue that good cause existed for granting leave to file a late notice of appeal.” Chapman, 704 S.W.2d at 676. That relief has already been afforded Burgett. Moreover, Burgett's initial filing of an untimely notice of appeal does not establish prejudice because Rule 29.07(b)(3) does not require a trial court to inform a defendant of the time limits for appealing a criminal conviction. See Miley v. State, 559 S.W.3d 97, n.4 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (trial court not required to inform a defendant of time limits for filing a motion for post-conviction relief under similarly worded provisions of Rule 29.07(b)(4) (citing Hawkins v. State, 807 S.W.2d 214, 214-15 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991)).

Point Three is denied.

Conclusion

The Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Burgett has a separate appeal pending that involves the citation for operating a motor vehicle without maintaining financial responsibility. Our opinion in that appeal, styled City of Kansas City v. Burgett, WD88170, is being handed down simultaneously with this opinion.

3.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented through June 4, 2024, unless otherwise indicated.

4.   All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I--State, 2025, unless otherwise indicated.

5.   Rule 25.03 concerns those disclosures that the state is required to provide a defendant without a court order. Burgett has never argued that the laser device's operating manual or the other citations issued by the officer were mandatory disclosures required by Rule 25.03.

6.   Rule 27.01 took effect on January 1, 1980, and while (b) was amended effective July 1, 2022, (a) has remained unchanged since its adoption.

7.   For the same reason, we reject Burgett's additional contention that Rule 37.74 requires us to apply Rule 27.01(b)’s waiver of jury trial procedures to trials de novo for ordinance violations. Rule 37.74 simply provides that “[a]ll trials de novo shall proceed in the manner provided for the trial of a misdemeanor by the rules of criminal procedure.” By its plain terms, this rule addresses the manner of conducting the trial itself, and not to pre-trial matters including requests for a jury trial. And even if that were not the case, this generally stated rule yields to the more specific directive in Rule 37.08 that procedures specified by Rule 37 shall govern ordinance violations where inconsistent with procedures set forth in Rules 19 to 36.

8.   In contrast, Rule 37.64(c) requires a defendant to be advised of “any right to trial de novo” after sentence is imposed in an ordinance violation proceeding.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur