STONEBRIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. DRAPER (2026)

Stonebridge Homeowners Association (“Stonebridge”) appeals from a trial court order denying its Rule 74.16 motion for attorney's fees.¹ Because Rule 74.16 has been expressly declared by the Supreme Court to be an independent action, the trial court's order fully and finally resolving the motion was required to be denominated a judgment to be final and appealable. The appeal is dismissed.

Procedural History

In July 2022, Harriett Draper (“Draper”) filed a petition against Stonebridge for unjust enrichment. Draper alleged that Stonebridge was paid $3,658.55 from the proceeds of the sale of Draper's home based on an incorrectly calculated homeowner's assessment. Stonebridge filed an answer and a counterclaim for breach of contract. Stonebridge admitted that the assessment had been improperly calculated, but argued that it was understated, not overstated, and that Draper owed more than the amount withheld from the sale proceeds. Draper asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction in response to Stonebridge's counterclaim.

Draper twice amended her petition to assert additional claims for violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) and for slander of title. In August 2023, Draper filed a voluntary dismissal of “her cause of action against Defendant Stonebridge” without prejudice, leaving only Stonebridge's counterclaim for breach of contract unresolved.

Stonebridge's breach of contract claim was tried to a jury in June 2025. At the close of Stonebridge's evidence, Draper moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion and entered a verdict for Draper by docket entry. The docket entry directed Draper to prepare a written judgment. On July 3, 2025, the trial court entered a written judgment in favor of Draper on Stonebridge's breach of contract claim and assessed costs against Stonebridge (“Judgment”).

Stonebridge filed two motions on Monday, August 4, 2025, only one of which is relevant to this case. That motion was titled “Stonebridge Homeowners Association's Motion and Independent Action for Attorney Fees and Alternative Relief” (“Motion for Attorney's Fees”). The Motion for Attorney's Fees noted that it was being filed pursuant to Rule 74.16. Stonebridge argued that it was entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the recorded declarations and covenants of the Stonebridge Homeowners Association and the fee-shifting provisions of the MMPA because Draper did not prevail on her voluntarily dismissed claims. Draper opposed the Motion for Attorney's Fees, arguing that the only matter tried was Stonebridge's claim for breach of contract, as to which Stonebridge did not prevail.

On September 11, 2025, following a hearing, the trial court made a docket entry stating, “Draper's arguments are well taken; Stonebridge was not the prevailing party under the facts and circumstances of this case. Stonebridge's [Motion for Attorney's Fees is] DENIED.” The docket entry directed Stonebridge “to prepare a written form of this order for the Court's signature.” On September 15, 2025, the trial court entered a written order that denied the Motion for Attorney's Fees “as duly noted by docket entry in the Court's record.”

Stonebridge filed a notice of appeal on September 22, 2025. The notice of appeal identified the Judgment in the underlying action as the matter from which the appeal was being taken. In its appellant's brief, the only claim of error raised by Stonebridge involves the trial court's order denying the Motion for Attorney's Fees.

Appellate Jurisdiction

Stonebridge's appellant's brief asserts a single point on appeal challenging the trial court's order denying Stonebridge's Rule 74.16 Motion for Attorney's Fees.

We have a sua sponte duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Mukanjiri v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City, 718 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). “[T]he right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Brownfield v. Heman, 711 S.W.3d 386, 397 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass'n, 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017)).

No statute confers a right to appeal from an order resolving a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees. “Unless a statutory provision confers a right to appeal under other applicable circumstances,” section 512.020(5)² mandates the existence of a “final judgment” as “a prerequisite to appellate review.” Mukanjiri, 718 S.W.3d at 159. To qualify as a final judgment that is eligible for appeal pursuant to section 512.020(5), a judgment must, among other things, satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 74.01(a)³ by being “a writing signed by the judge and denominated ‘judgment’ or ‘decree.’ ”⁴ The lack of a final judgment requires dismissal of the appeal. Davis v. City of Kearney, 681 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

Stonebridge's Motion for Attorney's Fees was filed pursuant to Rule 74.16, which was adopted effective July 1, 2022. Rule 74.16(b)(1) requires a motion for attorney's fees to be filed “no later than 30 days after the entry of judgment on the underlying claim.” And, Rule 74.16(b)(3) provides that “a motion filed under this Rule 74.16 is an independent action and not an authorized after-trial motion.” As a result, the ruling on a Rule 74.16 motion is not incorporated into the judgment on the underlying claim, cannot be appealed as a part of the underlying judgment, and does not suspend the finality of the underlying judgment. WI 909 Walnut, LLC v. 909 Walnut Tower, LLC, 717 S.W.3d 775, 784-85 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). Instead, “Missouri law is clear that a motion that is expressly declared by Supreme Court Rule to be an independent action must be resolved by an independent judgment that meets the requirements of Rule 74.01(a) before it is final and appealable.” Mukanjiri, 718 S.W.3d at 160-61.

Here, both the trial court's September 11, 2025 docket entry and the September 15, 2025 written order fully and finally resolved the Motion for Attorney's Fees by denying same. However, neither the docket entry nor the written order was denominated as a judgment.⁵ As such, the trial court's order denying the Motion for Attorney's Fees is not a final judgment eligible for appeal pursuant to section 512.020(5). Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal.

Stonebridge's notice of appeal reflected its intent to appeal from the underlying Judgment and thus attached the underlying Judgment. It is now apparent, however, that Stonebridge is only appealing from the trial court's order denying the Motion for Attorney's Fees. This order was not attached to Stonebridge's notice of appeal. As a result, the issue implicating our jurisdiction to hear this appeal was not revealed until briefing was complete. At that time, we asked the parties “to submit a letter with additional briefing as to whether the Court has authority to entertain an appeal from an order that denies a Rule 74.16 motion for attorney fees but is not denominated either ‘judgment’ or decree’ pursuant to Rule 74.01(a).”

Stonebridge responded with a letter that concedes its appeal has not been filed from a final judgment and must be dismissed. Stonebridge blames its pursuit of an appeal from a non-final judgment in the independent action to resolve its Motion for Attorney's Fees on the absence of “explicit directions outlining the mandatory ground rules for handling a Rule 74.16 independent action moving forward.” Stonebridge's effort to excuse “counsel and the trial court[’s] ․ default to old habits” by suggesting that dramatic Rule changes are required to avoid confusion in the future ignores that requiring a Rule 74.16 motion for attorney's fees be resolved by an independent judgment that complies with Rule 74.01(a) is neither novel nor confusing. As Mukanjiri observed, it has been the settled and long-standing requirement in all matters expressly declared by Rule to be independent actions that the matter be resolved by an independent judgment that complies with Rule 74.01(a). Mukanjiri, 718 S.W.3d at 160-61 (observing that since its amendment in 2007, Rule 74.05(d) has provided that a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action resulting in an independent judgment that must meet the requirements of Rule 74.01(a)); Id. at 160 n.8 (observing that the same requirements apply to the resolution of independent actions for relief from a judgment filed pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)).

The trial court's order denying Stonebridge's Rule 74.16 Motion for Attorney's Fees is not a final and appealable judgment pursuant to section 512.020(5) because it is not denominated a judgment as required by Rule 74.01(a). Stonebridge's appeal must be dismissed.⁶

Conclusion

Stonebridge's appeal is dismissed for lack of final judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume 1--State, 2025 unless otherwise noted.

2.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as amended through the date Stonebridge filed its notice of appeal unless otherwise indicated.

3.   Though the right of appeal is controlled by statute, our Supreme Court has the authority pursuant to article V, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution to “establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts ․, which shall have the force and effect of law” so long as those rules do not change “the right of appeal.”

4.   Rule 74.01(a)’s denomination requirement is subject to limited exceptions recognized by law, none of which are applicable to this case.

5.   Rule 74.01(a) contemplates that a docket entry may qualify as a judgment. However, a docket entry will not qualify as a judgment where the docket entry “indicates that the court will enter the judgment in a separate document,” in which case the separate document shall be the judgment. Rule 74.01(a). The September 11, 2025 docket entry indicated the trial court's intent to enter a separate written document to reflect its ruling on the Motion for Attorney's Fees.

6.   Draper filed a motion when she filed her respondent's brief seeking Rule 84.19 sanctions against Stonebridge for filing a frivolous appeal. The motion did not raise the issue of our jurisdiction to entertain Stonebridge's appeal. We took the motion with the case. Draper's letter to this court addressing our jurisdiction to entertain Stonebridge's appeal expands on her pending motion for sanctions based on the fact that Stonebridge's appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final judgment.Because we are without jurisdiction to entertain Stonebridge's appeal, we are unwilling to address the merits of Draper's Rule 84.19 motion for sanctions. The motion is denied without prejudice to refiling should Stonebridge secure, and then appeal from, a compliant judgment denying its Motion for Attorney's Fees.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur