STATE v. JONAS (2026)

Mr. Joey E. Jonas (“Jonas”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Andrew County, Missouri (“trial court”), convicting him of the class A misdemeanor of violating the terms of a full order of protection issued pursuant to section 455.085.8.¹ Jonas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jonas was within 500 feet of the victim (“Victim”)² in violation of the order of protection. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

On May 7, 2025, Officer was dispatched to Victim's residence after Victim reported a violation of an order of protection entered against Jonas. Victim stated that Jonas was in the home directly next door to her home, and she believed that distance to violate the order of protection. In the week prior, Jonas was served with an order of protection that prohibited Jonas from being within 500 feet of Victim.

When Officer arrived at the residence next door to Victim's residence, C.H. answered the door and informed Officer that Jonas was in the home. C.H. voluntarily permitted Officer into the home, and Officer found Jonas in the back bedroom. Jonas acknowledged the order of protection entered against him and that it prohibited him from being within a certain distance of Victim, but he did not believe 500 feet was the correct distance (he thought it was 200 feet) and thus disagreed with Officer about whether he violated the order of protection. Officer detained Jonas until he could confirm the terms of the order.

After Jonas was detained, Officer walked next door to Victim's home. Officer spoke to Victim, who was inside her home, and he reviewed a copy of the order of protection. After he confirmed that the terms of the order prohibited Jonas from being within 500 feet of Victim, Officer walked back to the home where Jonas had been detained and informed Jonas that he was placing him under arrest for being within 500 feet of Victim in violation of the order of protection.

At a bench trial held on May 28, 2025, Officer explained how he had determined Jonas had been within 500 feet of Victim, stating:

Well, while I was there, I could physically see it was not 500 feet apart. That would be over a city block. And they were not that far apart. Then when I got back to the office, I pulled it up on Google Maps and done measurements between the houses and the outer furthest points[.]3

Officer testified that the homes were next door to one another and that the property line ran between the two homes. Officer further stated that it took him only five to ten seconds to walk between the homes.

Jonas moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence, which the trial court denied. Jonas did not present any additional evidence in his defense, but at the close of all of the evidence, Jonas moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court, again, denied Jonas's motion. Thereafter, the trial court found Jonas guilty of the class A misdemeanor ⁴ of violating the protection order and entered judgment accordingly.

Jonas appealed.

Standard of Review

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence but rather accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the [judgment], and ignores all contrary evidences and inferences.

Circumstantial rather than direct evidence of a fact is sufficient to support a [judgment]. If that evidence supports equally valid inferences, it is up to the factfinder to determine which inference to believe, as the factfinder is permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the evidence as the evidence will permit. Reliance on circumstantial evidence, however, does not permit this Court to supply missing evidence or give the state the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences. This Court asks only whether there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could have found the defendant guilty.

State v. Lehman, 617 S.W.3d 843, 846-47 (Mo. banc 2021) (citation modified).

Analysis

Jonas argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Jonas was within 500 feet of Victim on May 7, 2025, in violation of the terms of the full order of protection issued pursuant to section 455.085.8. Specifically, Jonas takes issue with the State's failure to present evidence “as to the precise distance” between the location of Jonas's person and Victim's person on May 7, 2025. He argues that the only evidence of the distance between Jonas and Victim presented at trial was Officer's testimony, which, since Officer had not measured the exact distance between them, “was [the] product of sheer conjecture,” and therefore, did not constitute sufficient evidence to support Jonas's conviction.⁵ We disagree.

Section 455.085.8 sets forth the elements of the criminal offense of violating a full order of protection, and in so states:

A violation of the terms and conditions, with regard to domestic violence, stalking, sexual assault, child custody, communication initiated by the respondent or entrance upon the premises of the petitioner's dwelling unit or place of employment or school, or being within a certain distance[6] of the petitioner or a child of the petitioner, of a full order of protection shall be a class A misdemeanor[ ] ․

“The State must prove every element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lehman, 617 S.W.3d at 847. “[C]riminal conduct may be proved by circumstantial evidence, so long as it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 848. “And, if that evidence supports equally valid and reasonable inferences, then the jury or judge is permitted to determine which reasonable inference to believe.” Id. “But, to be sufficient, the circumstantial evidence still must give ‘rise to a logical inference’ that a fact exists, not a speculative inference.” Id. (quoting State v. Regazzi, 379 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo. 1964)).

At trial, Officer testified that the home that Jonas was arrested in on May 7, 2025, was within 500 feet of Victim's home. To support his opinion on his distance testimony, Officer testified that:

• The two homes were “next door” to one another, and the property line was the only thing separating the homes in this residential neighborhood.

• Officer knew exactly where Jonas was located within the home adjacent to Victim's home and “could physically see” that the relevant distance between Jonas and Victim was less than 500 feet, because “500 feet would be over a city block” and the distance here “was well within that.”

• It only took Officer five to ten seconds to walk between the homes, and he used that as a gauge to confirm his belief that the distance “was well within” 500 feet.

• Officer used a computer-software measuring tool to assist him in his distance calculation.

In other words, Officer testified to numerous reasons involving his personal experience and measuring techniques to justify his assertion that Jonas was “well within” 500 feet of Victim in violation of the order of protection.

The present case is far different than the evidentiary record in Lehman. In that case, Lehman argued the State failed to prove that Lehman was loitering within 500 feet of a public park. Id. at 847. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and reversed Lehman's conviction because the evidence admitted at trial failed to provide sufficient facts about the location of the park relative to Lehman. Id. at 848. The only evidence on the topic of Lehman's location in relation to the relevant park was a police report stating that Lehman “was in the ‘2nd parking place on the North side of the parking lot’ and that the parking lot is ‘near’ the park.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Missouri Supreme Court held that this evidence was insufficient to sustain Lehman's conviction because the report “contained no information about how near the park was to the parking lot,” and because “ ‘[n]ear’ is a subjective term” that “does not convey objective information as to the distance between the park and the community building.” Id. at 848 (emphasis added). The Court noted that “[i]t would have been a simple evidentiary gap to fill if a witness were able to testify that the park and parking space were within 500 feet of each other.” Id. at 850 (emphasis added).

The State's prosecutor in this case did what the State in Lehman did not. Here, Officer's testimony, together with the reasonable inferences from his testimony, showed that Jonas was within 500 feet of Victim. The State elicited objective information from Officer about how he arrived at this conclusion—including that he had personally observed the distance between the homes by determining that it took only five to ten seconds to walk from one home to the next, that his visual inspection showed there was nothing but the property line between the two residential homes, that the distance between the furthest points of the two homes was not anywhere near the distance of a city block (which was less than 500 feet according to Officer), and that his use of a computer measuring tool did nothing to convince him that his distance testimony was inaccurate.

Though there is little precedent in Missouri on this topic, other courts have found the above evidentiary record to be sufficient to address the topic of distance. See United States v. Sparks, 2 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1993) (Witness testimony that an aerial photograph demonstrated that a field where the defendant was located was within 1000 feet of the school was sufficient on the issue of distance.); United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2006) (Numerous witnesses testified that the criminal activity that took place “within 1000 feet” of a local school was “obviously sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude just that,” and nothing in the statute required proof of an exact distance, only that the prohibited distance was “within 1000 feet.”); Peek v. State, 494 S.W.3d 156, 167-68 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (An officer's testimony that the location where defendant was stopped, which was “directly across from [a] high school” and was “definitely” less than 1000 feet from the school, was sufficient to establish that the defendant committed an offense “within 1000 feet of a school.”); People v. Clark, 596 N.E.2d 642, 645-46 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (“[Witness] estimated that the distance was well within 1000 feet and was equivalent to the distance from home plate to second base. Although the jurors may not have known the distance between home plate and second base, any rational juror could have found that the distance element was satisfied based on [witness's] testimony that it was well within 1000 feet. Therefore, the State proved this element beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Panton, 846 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1988) (Where the government presented evidence from a witness who measured the distance by number of paces between two distances to correlate the distance testimony, this testimony was objectively reasonable to prove the distance element of the criminal charge.).

We find these cases from around the country to be persuasive and logically reasoned. Applied here, Officer directly testified to his personal knowledge that Jonas was “within 500 feet” of Victim in violation of the order of protection; that he paced the distance to objectively support his opinion on distance; that he compared the relevant distance to much less than a city block that was itself less than 500 feet; and that he had used Google Maps, a computer-software measuring device, to assist him in reaching his distance conclusion. This testimony was much more than testimony that Jonas was “near” Victim. Officer's testimony constituted objectively reasoned evidence clearly describing that Jonas was “within 500 feet” of Victim in violation of the order of protection.

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence, and Jonas's point on appeal is denied.⁷

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through May 7, 2025, unless otherwise indicated.

2.   Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(4) (Supp. IV 2025), we do not use the names of any victims in this opinion. And, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not identify the names of non-party witnesses in our ruling today.

3.   Defense counsel objected to Officer's testimony about his use of Google Maps, arguing that any information Officer obtained through Google Maps was hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection “as to the information obtained through Google Maps[,]” but specifically stated that Officer could testify “as to using the program.” Thus, testimony about Officer's use of the Google Maps measurement program was not excluded, and Jonas has not raised an evidentiary error claim in this appeal.

4.   Because this is a misdemeanor (and not a felony) conviction, we do not expect the Missouri Attorney General's office to enter an appearance on appeal on behalf of the State to respond to the criminal defendant's appeal. However, we have noticed that it has become the practice of some county prosecutors to fail to file any response on behalf of the State of Missouri to defend challenges to misdemeanor convictions by criminal defendants, and we find that practice troubling. If a county prosecutor believes a misdemeanor violation of law has occurred and chooses to prosecute such crime, the job of the prosecutor for the State of Missouri is not complete until final mandate has issued for any conviction obtained. Thus, we find it disappointing that the prosecutor in the present case chose not to file a respondent's brief on behalf of the State, especially in an appeal where the law is not well-settled on the issue raised in the appeal.

5.   To the extent that Jonas's argument could be interpreted as attacking the foundation of Officer's opinion regarding the distance between Jonas and Victim, we reject it with no further discussion. “This is nothing more than an improper back-door attempt by [Jonas] to make an admissibility argument under the guise of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal—and in a scenario where [Jonas] did not object to the admissibility of [Officer's] testimony at trial. We will not permit such a disguised attack on the trial court's judgment.” See H.R. v. State, 722 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

6.   The Judgment of the Full Order of Protection states that Jonas shall not “[c]ome within 500 feet of” Victim.

7.   Lastly, Jonas argues that, because the Missouri legislature failed to define how a “certain distance of the petitioner” is to be measured in section 455.085.8, the text of section 455.085.8 is facially ambiguous, and the Court must apply the rule of lenity to reverse his conviction. He contends that this Court should construe “within a certain distance of the petitioner” to mean within “linear feet from the petitioner's[ ] ․ person” rather than linear feet from petitioner's home. (Emphasis added.) However, because there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Jonas's conviction under either construction of the statute, we decline to address this argument further.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, and Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, concur.