T.M.G., Appellant, v. G.M., Respondent. (2026)

Opinion

Pro Se Appellant G.M. appeals the St. Louis County circuit court's order of protection prohibiting G.M. from contacting Respondent T.M.G. for a one-year period between March 13, 2025 and March 12, 2026. T.M.G. filed his petition for a full order of protection alleging G.M. appeared at T.M.G.’s Bel-Ridge property on multiple occasions, threatened him and other contractors working at this location and even damaged the property structure. Following a hearing, the court entered the full order of protection which expired on March 12, 2026. The record does not indicate that the order was

extended, leaving us to conclude the issue is moot. Carlisle v. Carlisle, 277 S.W.3d 801, 802 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). Accordingly, we dismiss this matter as moot.¹ Id.

Background

While Appellant's specific legal argument to reverse the circuit court is complicated by Appellant's briefing deficiencies, we understand that he seeks to invalidate the order of protection. The circuit court entered the full order of protection in favor of T.M.G. following a hearing on March 13, 2025. The order expired on March 12, 2026 and this case was submitted to this court on February 4, 2026.

Discussion

Appellant's single point on appeal challenges the court's application of Chapter 455, Missouri's statutory scheme enabling courts to issue orders of protection.² This case became moot when the order of protection expired on March 12, 2026. L.E.C. v. K.R.C., 674 S.W.3d 97, 103 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (noting that expired orders of protection are moot because there is not a practical effect in vacating an order that has expired). Moreover, a case is moot where it is impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. Carlisle, 277 S.W.3d at 802.

Typically, Missouri courts must dismiss moot issues. L.E.C., 674 S.W.3d at 103 (quoting Warlick v. Warlick, 294 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). However, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to hear and decide a moot question under two exceptions. Id. Under the first exception, the court may consider a matter that becomes moot after a case has been submitted and argued. Id. The second exception occurs when “the case presents an issue that is of general public interest and importance, that will recur, and will evade appellate review in future live controversies.” Id. at 103-04; Section 455.007 (“[T]he public interest exception to the mootness doctrine shall apply to an appeal of a full order of protection which has expired.”). If the appeal qualifies under either exception, then dismissal due to mootness becomes discretionary, not mandatory. L.E.C., 674 S.W.3d at 104.

Although the present matter falls within the parameters of the first exception considering this case became moot after submission, we exercise our discretion and decline to review because G.M. flagrantly disregards the Rule 84.04 appellate guidelines and procedures within his briefing.

Again, the case law identifies the second exception, or the public interest exception, as an avenue for a reviewing court to consider the merits if the court chooses to do so. L.E.C., 674 S.W.3d at 103-04. Similar, but not identical, section 455.007 reminds our court that the public interest exception “shall” apply to an expired full order of protection. Section 455.007. The statute is reasonably interpreted as simply declaring the exception as an available avenue to the court when considering the applicability of the mootness doctrine. In other words, the exception exists but the court is left to determine whether to utilize the exception as a means to review the matter on the merits, and the statutory language does not prohibit the court from exercising its discretion to decline review.

When we applied the public interest exception, Appellant complicated a meaningful review due to the factual deficiencies within his briefing and his innumerable Rule 84.04 violations. Among other problematic issues, the existing conflict between Appellant's representations within his brief and what transpired at trial are impossible to reconcile.

In summary, both exceptions apply to the mootness doctrine, but we exercise our discretion and decline to review this matter on the merits due to Appellant's briefing deficiencies.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also, Appellant failed to comply with the appellate briefing requirements specified in Rule 84.04. Specifically, Appellant's distorted facts relative to the record and included his legal reasoning in his “Summary of Appeal” section which preceded his statement of facts section. Rule 84.04(c).

2.   All statutory references are to the Missouri Revised Statutes 2016.

Thomas C. Clark II, Judge

Renée D. Hardin-Tammons, Presiding Judge and Angela T. Quigless, Judge concur.