BRYAN BUCK ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY AMEREN MISSOURI AND AMEREN CORPORATION (2026)

Introduction

This appeal stems from an action brought by Bryan Buck (“Buck”) on his own behalf and as a representative of other similarly situated Missouri citizens, who are current and former Ameren customers, against Union Electric Company, d/b/a Ameren Missouri, and Ameren Corporation (collectively “Ameren”). Buck appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his action without prejudice.

Buck raises four points on appeal. In Points One and Two, Buck argues the trial court erred in finding his breach of contract, violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”), and negligence claims fall within the primary jurisdiction of the Missouri Public Service Commission (“PSC”). In Points Three and Four, Buck argues the trial court erred in finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because doing so would be futile and administrative remedies are not applicable to his claims.¹

This Court denies Points One and Two because Buck's claims involve a question within the primary jurisdiction of the PSC: what the lawful and applicable rate is for the service Ameren provides to its customers. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Buck's case without prejudice. Because the petition was properly dismissed based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, this Court denies Points Three and Four as moot.

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Background

On March 10, 2025, Buck filed a class action petition against Ameren for breach of contract, violation of the MMPA, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. Therein, Buck alleged Ameren is unlawfully charging its customers a rate in excess of the one set by the PSC. Specifically, Buck alleges Ameren overcharged customers by $0.14 because the monthly “Customer Charge” rate approved by the PSC for electrical services is $9.00, but Ameren charges a rate of $9.14.²

On April 21, 2025, Ameren filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. In its motion, Ameren requested the trial court dismiss Buck's petition because his claims are within the primary jurisdiction of the PSC and he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his action to the trial court. Buck opposed the motion.

The trial court held a hearing on Ameren's motion on May 21, 2025. At the hearing, Ameren withdrew its arbitration argument, and the trial court proceeded on Ameren's motion to dismiss. On July 31, 2025, the trial court entered an order (“Order”) granting Ameren's motion based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and dismissed Buck's petition without prejudice. The trial court subsequently denominated the Order a judgment on November 21, 2025 (“Judgment”).

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. Bray v. Sexton, 534 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). “In determining the appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal of a petition, an appellate court reviews the grounds raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss.” Covert v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Soc. Servs., Family Support Div., 655 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting Ferrill v. Yeung, 577 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). “[T]his Court will affirm a judgment of dismissal if any ground supports the motion, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground.” Double AA Mkt., LLC v. City of St. Louis, 703 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting Goldsby v. Lombardi, 559 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Mo. banc 2018)).

Analysis

Appellate Jurisdiction

Following Buck's notice of appeal, Ameren filed a motion to stay briefing, arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the trial court dismissed the matter without prejudice. The motion to stay was denied but the issue of jurisdiction was taken with the case. Before addressing the merits of Buck's appeal, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter.

Generally, this Court “only has jurisdiction over final judgments disposing of all issues and parties, which leave nothing for future determination.” Beckmann v. Wilson, 725 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting MJDZ, L.L.C. v. De La Cruz, 553 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). “If an intended judgment does not dispose of all issues and all parties in the case or does not form a final disposition of the matter, it is not a final, appealable judgment and [this Court] ha[s] no jurisdiction to entertain an attempted appeal therefrom.” Matter of Taylor, 727 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Smith v. State, 63 S.W.3d 218, 220 (Mo. banc 2001)).

Buck maintains this Court has jurisdiction to review his appeal. On the other hand, Ameren contends both the Order and Judgment are not final and appealable since the trial court dismissed the matter without prejudice. The Judgment is the only judgment entered in the case, and the fact the case was dismissed without prejudice does not automatically deprive this Court of jurisdiction. While it is true that a dismissal without prejudice generally is not a final, appealable judgment, “[a]n exception exists ‘[w]hen the effect of the order is to dismiss the plaintiff's action and not the pleading merely[.]’ ” See Mayes v. Saint Luke's Hosp. of Kansas City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Mo. banc 1991)). For example, a dismissal without prejudice can be deemed final and appealable when a party stands on the original pleadings and decides not to plead further or when refiling the petition at that time would be a futile act. See id.; see also Tolu v. Reid, 639 S.W.3d 504, 513–14 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).

These exceptions apply here. In the present case, Buck chose to stand on his pleadings and did not plead further. Additionally, once the trial court dismissed Buck's petition based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, Buck could not cure this dismissal by refiling and repleading his claims. See Mayes, 430 S.W.2d at 265; see Tolu, 639 S.W.3d at 514 (holding the trial court's dismissal without prejudice was a final and appealable judgment because it dismissed the petition on grounds that could not be addressed by simply refiling and repleading the claims). On either of these grounds, the trial court's judgment is final and appealable, and thus this Court has jurisdiction to address the merits of Buck's appeal. See Mayes, 430 S.W.2d at 265; see also Tolu, 639 S.W.3d at 514.

Points One and Two

Now, we turn to the merits of the appeal. For ease of discussion, this Court will address Points One and Two together. In Points One and Two, Buck argues the trial court erred in finding the PSC has primary jurisdiction over his claims for breach of contract, violation of the MMPA, and negligence.³

When presented with a matter concerning the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the question is not whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, but whether the trial court has the statutory authority to proceed. See Evans v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 346 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). “Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court is restrained from deciding a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until that tribunal has rendered its decision.” Oberreiter v. Fullbright Trucking Co., 117 S.W.3d 710, 717 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003). “This policy of self-restraint applies (a) where administrative knowledge and expertise are demanded to determine technical, intricate fact questions and (b) where uniformity is important to the regulatory scheme.” MCI Metro Access Transmission Servs., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 941 S.W.2d 634, 644 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997).

This Court must resolve whether the PSC has primary jurisdiction over Buck's allegations of an overcharge. For background, the PSC is an administrative agency to which the Missouri Legislature delegated the power to regulate the “sale or distribution of ․ electricity ․ within the state.” Section 386.250.⁴ “The PSC has been given the authority, per statute, over regulated entities in the first instance.” Evans, 346 S.W.3d at 317. As a part of this power, the PSC has the authority to hear complaints “setting forth any act or thing done ․ in violation, or claimed to be in violation, ․ of any utility tariff[.]”⁵ Section 386.390. One example of a violation is when a regulated entity “collect[s] or receive[s] a greater ․ compensation for any service rendered ․ than the rates ․ as specified in its schedule filed and in effect at the time․.” Section 393.140(11). In such circumstances, “the [PSC] is granted the exclusive jurisdiction to determine, in the first instance, the interpretation of the lawful rate applicable to the service provided to the customer.” Evans, 346 S.W.3d at 318 (quoting Inter-City Beverage Co., Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 889 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994)) (emphasis added). As a result, “no other body, judicial, executive or municipal may step in” without the PSC first acting on the matter. See In re Estate of Dothage, 727 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987).

On appeal, Buck asserts his claims do not fall within the primary jurisdiction of the PSC and the trial court has jurisdiction to review them. We disagree. Buck's request for relief is premised on the assumption that the rate Ameren is charging is unlawful. In fact, Buck makes clear on appeal that his “action merely requires the proper interpretation under the law of what constituted the legal ‘Customer Charge’ rate” for the electric service he received. The determination of the lawful and applicable rate for the service Ameren provides to its customers is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PSC. See Inter-City Beverage, 889 S.W.2d at 877–78. Therefore, the PSC has primary jurisdiction over this issue. See May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 107 S.W.2d 41, 57 (Mo. 1937) (“Courts do not have jurisdiction to determine what rates shall be paid for any public utility service.”).

Furthermore, Buck argues the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract, negligence, and MMPA claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine because the PSC does not have the “power” to adjudicate these claims and grant the requested remedy. Although Buck's assertion is correct,⁶ his argument still fails. The fact that the PSC lacks the authority to resolve the claims asserted by Buck or enter a remedy does not negate the PSC's statutory authority to first determine the appropriate rate to charge customers. See DeMaranville v. Fee Fee Trunk Sewer, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Mo. App. 1978) (“Matters within the jurisdiction of the [PSC] must first be determined by it in every instance before the courts have jurisdiction to make judgments in the controversy.”). Buck's artful pleading and strategic argument are clearly an attempt to bypass the PSC's statutory authority of first review. Accepting Buck's argument would contravene the PSC's limited authority to decide questions within its exclusive jurisdiction, such as the one at issue here, and the powers conferred upon the agency by statute. Ultimately, the PSC has the obligation and authority to first determine whether a violation has occurred, and then leaves the remedy to the trial courts. See Evans, 346 S.W.3d at 318–19 (holding a challenge to a statute's validity must first be brought before the PSC, which has “statutory authority to interpret statutes pursuant to the administration of [its] charge[,]” even though it lacks authority to declare a statute invalid).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Buck's case based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. See Inter-City Beverage, 889 S.W.2d at 878 (finding the PSC had primary jurisdiction, in the first instance, to set reasonable rates and determine whether there had been an overcharge).

Points One and Two are denied.

Points Three and Four

In Points Three and Four, Buck contends the trial court erred in finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because doing so would be futile and administrative remedies are not applicable to his claims. While Ameren's motion to dismiss asserted the underlying action should be dismissed due to the primary jurisdiction doctrine and Buck's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the trial court granted Ameren's motion to dismiss based solely on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Because this Court affirms the trial court's judgment on a basis raised in the motion to dismiss and on which the trial court based its dismissal, we need not address Points Three and Four. See Double AA Mkt., 703 S.W.3d at 698.

Points Three and Four are denied as moot.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Buck fails to comply with the appellate briefing requirements of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.04(d)–(e), which govern the points relied on and argument sections of an appellate brief. Specifically, Buck's points relied on fail to state the legal reasons for his claims of reversible error and explain why, in the context of the case, those reasons support his claims of reversible error. See Rule 84.04(d)(1)(B)–(C). Additionally, for each claim of error Buck fails to provide “a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; [and] if so, how it was preserved[.]” Rule 84.04(e). Finally, Buck does not “include the applicable standard of review for ‘each claim of error’; ‘[t]his requirement is not satisfied by [Buck] setting out a statement of the standard of review once at the beginning of the argument portion of [his] brief.” Burgan v. Newman, 618 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 283 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). Despite Buck's noncompliance, this Court exercises its discretion to review Buck's appeal on the merits because “we can ascertain the gist of [Buck's] arguments, notwithstanding minor shortcomings in briefing.” See id. at 714 (quoting Unifund CCR Partners v. Myers, 563 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)).

2.   This Court notes the rate sheet provided by Buck indicates the PSC approved a monthly “Customer Charge” of $9.00 and a monthly “Low-Income Pilot Program Charge” of $0.14.

3.   The trial court's judgment dismissed all six counts raised in Buck's petition based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine. However, Buck only challenges these three counts on appeal.

4.   All references are to Mo. Rev. Cum. Supp. (2025).

5.   “In the context of cases before the [PSC], the terms ‘tariff’ and ‘rate schedule’ are synonymous.” State ex rel. AG Processing, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ex rel. State, 311 S.W.3d 361, 364 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

6.   As an agency of limited jurisdiction, the PSC lacks the authority to: (1) enter a monetary judgment, (2) enforce, construe, or annul contracts, (3) construe the MMPA, (4) or adjudicate tort claims. See Sharp v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823, 828, 829 n.9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge

Philip M. Hess, Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.