LEDBETTER v. JACKSON COUNTY (2026)

Amber Ledbetter (Ledbetter) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County (circuit court), granting summary judgment in favor of Jackson County, Missouri, (Employer) and dismissing all of Ledbetter's claims for sex, age, and race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.¹ In fourteen points on appeal, Ledbetter challenges the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Factual and Procedural Background 2

Ledbetter is a white female who was over the age of forty at all relevant times.

Ledbetter worked for Employer from March 1995 through January 2021. Ledbetter was the population control coordinator in the Jackson County jail which required her to run the department, oversee house arrest clients, do finance, payroll and budgeting, prepare the yearly budget for the county legislature, supervise employees, prepare write-ups for subordinates, take care of personnel issues, and prepare reports for the courts. Ledbetter's performance evaluations from March 2012 through March 2020 do not indicate that Ledbetter received any discipline or criticism of her job performance.

Around March 28, 2016, Ledbetter was temporarily assigned to be the interim records administrator of the records department to “clean up” the department. Ledbetter retained her position in the population control department during the assignment, and D.K./D.T. (Supervisor) was Ledbetter's direct supervisor while she worked in both departments. While working as the interim records administrator, Ledbetter was asked to take over the records department permanently, but she told a supervisor she wanted to return to population control.

In May 2018, Ledbetter submitted a request to Employer to allow her to return to population control and have population control be her only job duty. Supervisor tried to keep Ledbetter in the records department and prevent her return to population control.

Supervisor was dismissive of Ledbetter, did not allow her to voice concerns, was nonresponsive to Ledbetter, and did not allow Ledbetter to discuss work-related issues. Supervisor also excluded Ledbetter from meetings Ledbetter needed to attend to accomplish her job duties, including budget meetings.

Shortly after Supervisor became director of corrections in early 2018, Ledbetter verbally complained to Employer's human resources manager/administrator on several occasions.³ Sometime after May 2018 but before July 2020, Ledbetter additionally reported to Supervisor's superior that she had been stripped of her duties and felt she was being retaliated against.

Around September 2018, Employer's human resources manager/administrator reported to their superior that Supervisor was engaging in inappropriate conduct that made people uncomfortable.

Ledbetter posted an image on Facebook and she was accused of being racially insensitive and inappropriate. On July 20, 2020, Employer placed Ledbetter on administrative leave pending an investigation. Additionally, Ledbetter had a whiteboard in her office that had writing referring to inmate/clients with derogatory terms such as “perps” that was done by Ledbetter's subordinate and left uncorrected.⁴

On October 18, 2020, Ledbetter submitted a written complaint to the human resources director in Employer's human resources department reporting discriminatory treatment by Supervisor. Overall, Ledbetter interacted with Supervisor “maybe a couple of times a month,” except when there were group meetings.

In December 2020, as the result of an investigation into Ledbetter, Supervisor recommended Ledbetter be demoted from population control coordinator to county house arrest officer.

Ledbetter resigned on January 5, 2021, writing in her resignation letter that it was because of “unfair treatment, a hostile environment, and fear of retaliation.”

Ledbetter filed her charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Commission) on January 18, 2021, which contained allegations of age, gender, and race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment as of January 5, 2021, and that these were continuing violations. Ledbetter received her right to sue letter from the Commission on October 27, 2021.

Ledbetter filed her petition in the circuit court on October 13, 2021, alleging one count each of sex discrimination, age discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Ledbetter sought punitive damages on each count.

Employer filed its motion for summary judgment in July 2024. The circuit court granted the motion in May 2025, but did not state the reason for its decision.

Ledbetter appeals. Additional facts relevant to the disposition of the appeal are included below as we address Ledbetter's points on appeal.

Standard of Review

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.” Show-Me Inst. v. Off. of Admin., 645 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). “When the trial court's order does not state the reasons for its grant of summary judgment, we presume that the trial court based its decision on the grounds raised in the movant's motion for summary judgment.” Amoroso v. Truman State Univ., 683 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation omitted). Summary judgment shall be entered when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ․ the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]” Rule 74.04(c)(6). See Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020) (citation omitted). Rule 74.04 governs Missouri summary judgment practice and compliance with the rule is mandatory. Cox v. Callaway Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't., 663 S.W.3d 842, 848 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). Therefore, when considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we use the same Rule 74.04 procedure as the circuit court to determine whether a party is entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 849.

When determining whether the movant has met its burden for a grant of summary judgment, we review the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Perea v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co., 678 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). We do not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations as summary judgment tests for the existence, not the extent, of genuine issues of material fact. Id. (citations omitted). “A factual question exists if evidentiary issues are actually contested, are subject to conflicting interpretations, or if reasonable persons might differ as to their significance.” Id. (citation omitted).

Summary judgment is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because these cases are inherently fact-based. Loerch v. City of Union Mo., 643 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citation omitted). If it is unclear from the summary judgment record that there is a basis for the grant of summary judgment, we will reverse. Jordan v. Peet, 409 S.W.3d 553, 557 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citation omitted).

Discussion

Ledbetter raises fourteen points on appeal, many of which raise similar arguments. We now turn to Ledbetter's points, addressing some out of order for ease of discussion.

Point Two

In Ledbetter's second point on appeal, she argues that the circuit court erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment because a circuit court must consider the summary judgment record, but she argues the circuit court did not do so in that it (1) did not consider Ledbetter's evidence in opposition to summary judgment and (2) exceeded its scope of review by basing its grant of summary judgment on its review of the “court's own file in this case.”

The circuit court's brief judgment states, in relevant part: “The Court, being duly advised of the premises and having reviewed said motion, Memorandum in Support, Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, and the Court's own file in this case GRANTS the motion.” Based on the judgment's language, Ledbetter contends that the circuit court considered only Employer's motion for summary judgment and statement of uncontroverted facts. Ledbetter also takes issue with the circuit court stating it relied on its “own file in th[e] case,” arguing that courts cannot rely on matters that are outside the parties’ summary judgment record.

We are unpersuaded by Ledbetter's argument. Other than pointing to the judgment's language, Ledbetter fails to demonstrate that the circuit court did not consider her responses to Employer's motion for summary judgment. Regardless, “our de novo standard of review means that we look at the summary judgment issues presented on appeal as the trial court should have initially under Rule 74.04 giving no deference to the trial court's ruling.” Switzer Living Tr. v. Lake Lotawana Ass'n, Inc., 687 S.W.3d 476, 483 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In our own review of the summary judgment record, we considered all relevant documents in accordance with Rule 74.04.

Point two is denied.

Point One

In her first point on appeal, Ledbetter contends that the circuit court erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations affirmative defense because the affirmative defense was not pled in its answer to Ledbetter's petition. Ledbetter argues that Employer's answer contains no affirmative defenses whatsoever, and, although the circuit court permitted Employer leave to amend its answer, Employer never did so.

‘‘Invocation of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be raised in a responsive pleading and proven with evidence.’’ Whitlow v. Whitlow, 714 S.W.3d 453, 455-56 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (citation omitted) (explaining that respondents adequately raising and briefing their statute of limitations affirmative defense in the motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support did not substitute for or cure the failure to properly plead the defense in an answer).

On July 19, 2023, Employer filed a motion for leave to amend its answer, a proposed order for leave to amend, and it attached the amended answer. The motion requested leave to file the attached amended answer. On February 16, 2024, the circuit court granted the July 19, 2023, motion for leave to amend by docket entry. Thus, we find that the amended answer, attached to the motion, was deemed filed as of February 16, 2024. See RGB2, Inc. v. Chestnut Plaza, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (finding an amended answer attached to defendant's motion for leave to amend its answer was deemed filed when the transcript revealed a remark by the trial judge that leave to file “the amended answer” was granted despite no docket entry or order addressing the motion).

In its amended answer, Employer argued that under section 213.111 ⁵ Ledbetter is time-barred from litigating any claims arising before October 13, 2019, because she brought the action on October 13, 2021. In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Employer similarly contends that the two-year statute of limitations in section 213.111.1 bars some of Ledbetter's claims, but instead inexplicably uses January 25, 2019, in its argument that the circuit court should grant summary judgment on all claims arising out of any act which occurred before that date.

The Commission issued its notice of right to sue on October 27, 2021, giving Ledbetter until January 25, 2022, (ninety days from the date of the Commission's notification letter) to file her petition.⁶ See § 213.111.1. Additionally, section 213.111.1 states that the action brought in circuit court “shall be filed ․ no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred[.]” See § 213.111.1. Ledbetter filed her petition on October 13, 2021. Therefore, to satisfy the statute of limitations, the alleged events giving rise to Ledbetter's claims must have occurred after October 13, 2019. See Reed v. McDonald's Corp., 363 S.W.3d 134, 140 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

Much of the conduct that Ledbetter complains about in her charge of discrimination and petition occurred in 2018, but Ledbetter claims in her charge of discrimination that the discrimination constituted a continuing violation and maintains that argument in her suggestions in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Under the continuing violation theory, a plaintiff may pursue a claim for an act that occurred outside the filing period if they can demonstrate that the act is part of an ongoing pattern or practice of discrimination by the employer. Gill v. City of St. Peters, 641 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).

However, Ledbetter's brief raises only one point on appeal that addresses the application of the statute of limitations, point one, which seeks reversal of the grant of summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense not being sufficiently pled. And for the reasons discussed supra, we disagree. But beyond point one, Ledbetter fails to expressly address the statute of limitations ground directly and, importantly, fails to argue the continuing violation exception applies which would allow the pre-October 13, 2019, alleged facts to be considered for purposes of summary judgment. Ledbetter's failure to do so is problematic because, without the circuit court's order specifying its reason for granting summary judgment, we presume the circuit court based its decision on the grounds raised in Employer's motion for summary judgment which, in the instant case, includes a statute of limitations defense. See Amoroso, 683 S.W.3d at 302.

Although we review the circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo, that “standard of review does not alter that appellants always bear the burden of establishing error whatever the standard of review.” City of De Soto v. Parson, 625 S.W.3d 412, 416 n.3 (Mo. banc 2021). See also Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Cos., 732 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Mo. banc 2026). In sum, because we presume the circuit court granted summary judgment on the statute of limitations defense, as argued in Employer's motion for summary judgment, and because Ledbetter does not challenge the grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations grounds on appeal, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on any claims based on events occurring prior to October 13, 2019.

To the extent that Ledbetter contends the circuit court erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations affirmative defense because it was never properly pled, point one is denied.

We now turn to the events that occurred within the statute of limitations period to determine whether summary judgment is warranted.

Points Nine, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen

In points nine, ten, twelve, and thirteen, Ledbetter contends that the circuit court erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment on the sex discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims because the circuit court (1) improperly used the burden-shifting analysis and (2) even if the burden-shifting analysis applied, Employer did not meet its burden to show it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Ledbetter made a prima facie case for each respective claim, Employer did not offer an admissible reason for its conduct, and, even if Employer proffered a reason, the believability is a jury question.⁷

It is unlawful for an employer “[t]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability[.]” § 213.055.1(1)(a). When evaluating claims arising under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Missouri courts adhere to the methodology established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). LaBranche v. Cir. Ct. of Jackson Cnty., 703 S.W.3d 226, 234 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis:

(1) [Ledbetter] must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) if [Ledbetter] carries this burden, then the burden shifts to [Employer] to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its conduct; and (3) if [Employer] satisfies this burden, then the burden shifts back to [Ledbetter] to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Employer's] articulated reasons are pretextual.

Id. (citation omitted). Ledbetter can establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination by demonstrating: “(1) that [she] is a member of a protected group; (2) that [she] met the legitimate expectations of ․ her employer; (3) that [she] suffered an adverse action; and (4) that circumstances exist which give rise to an inference of discrimination[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

A prima facie case of retaliation is established by demonstrating Ledbetter: (1) complained of discrimination; (2) Employer adversely acted against her; and (3) there was a causal relationship between her complaint of discrimination and the adverse action. Id. at 235.

Last, for a successful hostile work environment claim, Ledbetter must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected MHRA group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) her membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Eivins v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

In reviewing Employer's and Ledbetter's statements of uncontroverted material facts with the accompanying responses to determine if Ledbetter made a prima facie case for each respective claim based on events occurring after October 13, 2019, we found a number of problems within those documents which, at a minimum, create controverted facts precluding summary judgment for Employer. We note that because of Employer's non-compliance with Rule 74.04(c)(2) and (3), many of Ledbetter's facts are deemed admitted. Rule 74.04(c)(2) clearly requires each denial be supported “with specific references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Specific references to the record are required so the opposing party, the trial court, and this Court are apprised of the movant's claim of entitlement to summary judgment. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo. v. Taveau, 316 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

Many of Employer's denials fail to include any citation to the record or the citations do not include any specific page reference, both of which are insufficient under Rule 74.04(c)(2). For example, in response to Ledbetter's statement of fact (PSOF) 25, which states “[Supervisor] treated male employees much better than she treated [Ledbetter],” Employer only replies “Deny.” In response to PSOF 27 stating, “[Supervisor] tried to keep [Ledbetter] in the records department and tried to prevent [Ledbetter] from returning to work to in [sic] population control,” Employer denied and the only citation to the record was “[Supervisor] Depo Exhibit 15.” Similarly, in response to PSOF 31, “[Supervisor] excluded [Ledbetter] from meetings [Ledbetter] needed to attend to accomplish [Ledbetter's] job duties including budget meetings,” Employer replied: “Deny. [Ledbetter] was not barred from meetings. CITE [Supervisor] Depo.” Furthermore, several of Employer's denials cite to Exhibit I (e.g., PSOF 30, PSOF 39, PSOF 40), which is not in our record on appeal. As a result of these deficiencies in Employer's denials, these facts are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. See Rule 74.04(c)(2).

Additionally, we are unable to decipher from the summary judgment record the timing of much of the alleged discriminatory conduct and acts of reprisal because many of Ledbetter's statements of uncontroverted material facts fail to include dates. It is crucial to determine the timing of facts Ledbetter alleges because, as addressed supra, the statute of limitations bars any claims for events prior to October 13, 2019, since Ledbetter failed on appeal to challenge the grant of summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Some examples of Ledbetter's alleged facts without dates are:

PSOF 29. When [Ledbetter] returned to work in population control only, [Supervisor] told [Ledbetter] and [Ledbetter's] staff that [Ledbetter] was no longer allowed to communicate with the Courts which was a key function of [Ledbetter's] job[.]

PSOF 30. [Supervisor] was dismissive of [Ledbetter], did not allow [Ledbetter] to voice concerns or discuss issues, was nonresponsive to [Ledbetter], and [Supervisor] did not allow [Ledbetter] to discuss work-related issues[.]

PSOF 31. [Supervisor] excluded [Ledbetter] from meetings [Ledbetter] needed to attend to accomplish [Ledbetter's] job duties including budget meetings[.]

․

PSOF 37. [Ledbetter] went to work every day afraid she was doing to be fired[.]

In addition to Ledbetter's lack of specificity in many of her statements of uncontroverted material facts, Employer's denials and supporting citations only create further confusion. As an example, PSOF 29 refers to the time period when Ledbetter “returned to work in population control.” Ledbetter cites the following portion of her deposition in support:

Q. Okay. Why do you think [Supervisor] didn't want you to communicate with the courts?

A. I really don't know. But she told me I was no longer allowed to communicate. And she told my other staff as well.

The deposition, directly below Ledbetter's cited portion, then states:

Q. Okay. And that happened in 2018?

A. Time frames, maybe.

Q. So prior to you moving back full-time ․ as the pop coordinator, this was happening before that?

A. Yes.

Q. And we know that you moved back in 2018?

A. Back to pop control?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. So this would have been prior to May of 2018?

A. Yes.

Employer admits PSOF 29, explaining “[Ledbetter] was not permitted to communicate with the Courts, following a full disciplinary process after she released confidential information.” However, Employer's accompanying citations to the record refer to Ledbetter sending a “COVID safety protocols memo to outside counsel,” and a July 7, 2020, memo regarding Ledbetter's appeal of the disciplinary write-up. Therefore, although this fact is uncontroverted because Employer admits it, the disconnect in the time period referenced in the statement of material fact and the response create a complete inability from the summary judgment record to understand the timeline of events.

This disconnect in the time period between PSOF 29 and Employer's response is especially problematic because Employer repeatedly cross-references this response when denying the following statements of material facts:

PSOF 34. When [Supervisor] became part of [Ledbetter's] chain of command, [Supervisor] instructed [Ledbetter] to not respond to questions and instructed [Ledbetter] to direct all questions to [Supervisor][.]

PSOF 35. [Supervisor's] discriminatory and/or different treatment of [Ledbetter], including [Supervisor] being dismissive of [Ledbetter], not allowing [Ledbetter] to voice concerns or discuss issues, being nonresponsive to [Ledbetter] and not allowing [Ledbetter] to discuss work-related issues drastically affected [Ledbetter's] ability to do her job[.]

PSOF 36. [Supervisor's] conduct including [Supervisor] being dismissive of [Ledbetter], not allowing [Ledbetter] to voice concerns or discuss issues, being nonresponsive to [Ledbetter], and not allowing [Ledbetter] to discuss work-related issues was intimidating and affected [Ledbetter's] work performance[.]

“For purposes of Rule 74.04, a genuine issue exists where the record contains competent materials that establish two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts.” Thompson, 82 S.W.3d at 206. For the reasons discussed supra, we find that the summary judgment record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Ledbetter, contains materials establishing two contradictory accounts of the essential facts. See id. As a result, we find that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment as to claims based on events that occurred after October 13, 2019.

Points nine, ten, twelve, and thirteen are granted as to claims based on events that occurred after October 13, 2019. Because we are reversing and remanding the matter to the circuit court, we decline to review Ledbetter's remaining points on appeal.

We note Ledbetter does not challenge on appeal the grant of summary judgment on her age discrimination claim, as she conceded during oral argument. Therefore, that portion of the judgment remains.

Conclusion

We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the race and sex discrimination, the hostile work environment, and retaliation claims for any events which occurred prior to October 13, 2019, as such claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claim. For the race and sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims based on events which occurred after October 13, 2019, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment is reversed and we remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All judges of the Jackson County Circuit Court recused and a special judge was assigned by order of the Missouri Supreme Court.

3.   The content of Ledbetter's complaints is controverted.

4.   We are unable to determine when the Facebook image and whiteboard incidents occurred based on the summary judgment record. Therefore, these facts may not be listed chronologically. Additionally, while Employer attempted to use these facts to establish a basis for discipline, it cited to and relied on Exhibit E primarily, which contained hearsay and was not authenticated, thus, making it inadmissible as support in the summary judgment record.

5.   Section 213.111.1 states:If, after one hundred eighty days from the filing of a complaint alleging an unlawful discriminatory practice pursuant to section 213.055 ․ the [Missouri Commission on Human Rights’ (the Commission)] has not completed its administrative processing and the person aggrieved so requests in writing, the [C]ommission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter indicating his or her right to bring a civil action within ninety days of such notice against the respondent named in the complaint․ Any action brought in court under this section shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the [C]ommission's notification letter to the individual but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred or its reasonable discovery by the alleged injured party.All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented.

6.   We note that before the Commission issued its notice of right to sue on October 27, 2021, Ledbetter filed her petition in the circuit court on October 13, 2021. “The Commission's issuance of a right to sue letter is a precondition to the filing of [a Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA)] claim in the circuit court.” State ex rel. Naugles v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 561 S.W.3d 48, 56 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). A claimant cannot bring a MHRA claim in circuit court without the right to sue letter. Id. (citation omitted). However, there is no dispute that the Commission has since issued the right to sue letter to Ledbetter, and filing an MHRA action before receiving the notice of right to sue may be cured after the action has begun. See McDonald v. Chamber of Com. of Indep., 581 S.W.3d 110, 113 n.5, 118 n.12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).

7.   We note that points nine, ten, twelve, and thirteen are multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d)(1). “Rule 84.04 is violated if a point groups together multiple, independent claims rather than a single claim of error, and a multifarious point is subject to dismissal.” Eivins v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 695 S.W.3d 212, 219 n.8 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These points on appeal include two different legal reasons as to why the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment, specifically that the circuit court improperly used the burden-shifting analysis and, even if the analysis applied, Employer did not meet its burden to show it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. Because we have discretion to review multifarious points relied on when the separate claims of error can be readily discerned, we choose to exercise this discretion with respect to these multifarious points on appeal. See id.

Janet Sutton, Judge

All concur.