MICHAEL ROTH v. CITY OF SAINT LOUIS (2026)

Introduction

The City of Saint Louis (“City”) appeals the decision of the circuit court (“trial court”) which granted Michael Roth (“Roth”) judgment on the pleadings on his petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief (“Petition”). Roth challenged Section One of the City's Ordinance 70502 (“Unattended Vehicle Ordinance” or “Ordinance”)¹ arguing, inter alia, the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance is invalid as a matter of law because it is preempted by section 21.750 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.² We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2024, while attending church services in the City of Saint Louis, Roth's firearm was stolen from his vehicle. Upon discovering the missing firearm, Roth reported the theft by calling the Saint Louis Metropolitan Police Department (“Police”). The Police informed Roth he would need to report the theft in person, so Roth went to the police station and made a report. Subsequently, the Police issued Roth a citation for violating the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance. The Ordinance in relevant part reads:

No person may place, store, or leave a firearm in an unattended motor vehicle, unless the firearm i[s] stored in a locked container which is permanently affixed to the motor vehicle and is not visible from outside the motor vehicle.

An information was later filed by the City, formally charging Roth for violating the Ordinance. Roth moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that the Ordinance was “void under state law, [ ] facially unconstitutional, and [ ] unconstitutional as applied to Roth.” Before the motion to dismiss was heard, the City dismissed the information by nolle prosequi.³

In November 2024, Roth filed the Petition at issue here challenging ⁴ the Ordinance, arguing it is, inter alia, invalid as a matter of law because it is preempted by subsections 1 and 2 of section 21.750, which read:

1. The general assembly hereby occupies and preempts the entire field of legislation touching in any way firearms, components, ammunition and supplies to the complete exclusion of any order, ordinance or regulation by any political subdivision of this state. Any existing or future orders, ordinances or regulations in this field are hereby and shall be null and void except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

2. No county, city, town, village, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state shall adopt any order, ordinance or regulation concerning in any way the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permit, registration, taxation other than sales and compensating use taxes or other controls on firearms, components, ammunition, and supplies except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

Subsection 3 allows exceptions, including the authority of cities to enact ordinances “which conform[ ] exactly with any of the provisions of sections 571.010 to 571.070 ․ or which regulate[ ] the open carrying of firearms readily capable of lethal use or the discharge of firearms within a jurisdiction ․.”⁵ Section 21.750.3(1).

The City filed an answer to Roth's Petition, admitting in relevant part to: (1) issuing a citation to Roth for violating the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance; (2) filing an information formally charging Roth for violating the Ordinance; and (3) dismissing the information by nolle prosequi. The City also admitted that Roth “would be subject to the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance” and that it intends “to continue enforcing the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance.” The City acknowledged Roth's Petition accurately quoted the language contained within the Ordinance and section 21.750; however, the City disputed, inter alia, Roth's argument that the Ordinance was in direct violation of section 21.750 and should be declared null and void. Later, Roth filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, wherein he requested the trial court declare the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance invalid under section 21.750 based upon the City's aforementioned admissions and requested the City be enjoined from enforcing the Ordinance. The City opposed Roth's motion and filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing the Ordinance governs firearm “storage,” which is a distinct category of firearm legislation section 21.750 does not preempt.

After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Roth, declaring the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance invalid under section 21.750 and permanently enjoining the City from enforcing the Ordinance. In doing so, the trial court found “the General Assembly has expressly preempted local firearm regulation, such as the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance” based upon the plain language within section 21.750. The trial court addressed and rejected the City's argument that section 21.750 does not prohibit an ordinance from regulating “storage” of a firearm in an unattended vehicle, finding the Ordinance “attempts to regulate the ‘use,’ ‘keeping,’ or ‘possession’ of firearms in violation of [section] 21.750.” Furthermore, the trial court found the Ordinance did “not fall within the explicit exceptions listed in the statute.” The City appeals.

Discussion

The City raises one point on appeal arguing the trial court erred in concluding the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance is expressly preempted by section 21.750. The City specifically contends the Ordinance is not preempted by section 21.750 because the Ordinance regulates a distinct category of legislation – firearm “storage” – that section 21.750 does not expressly preempt. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree.

Standard of Review

The interpretation and determination of whether a municipal ordinance conflicts with state law are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. City of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Mo. banc 2015). Municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid and lawful. Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Mo. banc 2017). The burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to prove the entity enacting the ordinance exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. Id. The words contained within the ordinance should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and should be interpreted so as to avoid absurd results. Id.

Ripeness

Before addressing the merits of this appeal, a threshold question this Court must address, even though neither party has raised the issue, is whether the City's appeal involving Roth's claim is ripe for judicial determination. See Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Missouri Clean Water Com'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 26, 31 (Mo. banc 2003); Missouri Retired Teachers Foundation v. Estes, 323 S.W.3d 100, 103 n.8 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); see also Clifford Hindman Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Jennings, 283 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (holding a declaratory judgment action, like the one at issue here, requires there be a justiciable controversy which includes, inter alia, whether the controversy is ripe for judicial review).

Ripeness is a ‘tool’ of the court, which is used to determine whether a controversy is ‘ripe’ or ready for judicial review, or whether by conducting the review, we would simply be rendering an advisory opinion on some future set of circumstances, which we are not permitted to do.

Reeves v. Kander, 462 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citation omitted and quotation marks in original). An action for declaratory judgment is a proper action through which Roth can challenge the validity of an ordinance, which he did. See Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Mo. banc 2018). “However, a court cannot render a declaratory judgment unless the petition presents a controversy ripe for judicial determination.” Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and a bracketed alteration omitted). Similarly, an action for injunctive relief – which Roth seeks alongside declaratory judgment – is an extraordinary and harsh remedy and should not be employed where there is an adequate remedy at law. See Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 368-69 (Mo. banc 2015).

While Roth is not currently being prosecuted under the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance, “a pre-enforcement challenge to [an ordinance] is sufficiently ripe to raise a justiciable controversy when: (1) the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims are fully developed and (2) the laws at issue are affecting the plaintiff[ ] in a manner that gives rise to an immediate, concrete dispute.” See id. at 370 (citation, internal quotation marks, and bracketed alterations omitted; and two bracketed alterations added); see also Building Owners and Managers Ass'n of Metropolitan St. Louis, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, MO, 341 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). “Cases presenting predominantly legal questions are particularly amenable to a conclusive determination in a pre-enforcement context, and generally require less factual development.” Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 594 (citation omitted).

Here, Roth's underlying claim regarding the validity of the Ordinance presents a predominantly legal question. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370; Building Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149. Whether the Ordinance is preempted by section 21.750 and is, therefore, void is a legal question that does not require further factual development. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370; Building Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149. Furthermore, the Ordinance at issue affects Roth in a manner that gives rise to an immediate, concrete dispute. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370; see also Building Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149. Although Roth need not violate the Ordinance to create a controversy ripe for review, he did violate the Ordinance and was previously subjected to prosecution. See Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 594-95; Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370. Moreover, the City intends to continue enforcing the Ordinance, subjecting Roth to the potential of future prosecution. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 370.

Additionally, Roth has no adequate remedy at law. See id. at 368, 369-70. While the underlying prosecution proceedings may have provided an adequate legal remedy for Roth to challenge the Ordinance, the City dismissed the information without prejudice against Roth before the trial court could consider his motion to dismiss. See id. at 369-70. Again, Roth is still subject to potential prosecution as the City intends to continue enforcing the Ordinance. Therefore, Roth is entitled to legal protection as he has an interest in being free from the constraints of a potentially invalid Ordinance. See City of St. Louis v. State, 643 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Mo. banc 2022).

Based on the foregoing, this Court holds Roth satisfied the requirements in bringing a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance. See Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 593-95; Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 368-70; Building Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149. Moreover, injunctive relief is proper because Roth has no adequate legal remedy. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 369-70. Therefore, the City's appeal involving Roth's claim is ripe for judicial determination. See Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 592-93; Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 368-70; Reeves, 462 S.W.3d at 857; Building Owners, 341 S.W.3d at 149; see also Clifford Hindman Real Estate, Inc., 283 S.W.3d at 806.

The Unattended Vehicle Ordinance Is Expressly Preempted by Section 21.750

In the City's sole point on appeal, it contends the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance is not preempted by section 21.750 because it regulates a distinct category of legislation – firearm “storage” – that section 21.750 does not expressly preempt.

Relevant Law

The City is a constitutional charter city and derives its charter powers from article VI, section 19(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which provides:

Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter for its own government, shall have all powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has authority to confer upon any city, provided such powers are consistent with the constitution of this state and are not limited or denied either by the charter so adopted or by statute. Such a city shall, in addition to its home rule powers, have all powers conferred by law.

Mo. Const. art. VI, section 19(a); see Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578 (holding the City of Saint Louis is a constitutional charter city). Pursuant to this constitutional provision, if the City's power to adopt an ordinance is challenged, this Court will uphold the ordinance when: (1) the ordinance is not preempted by statute; and (2) the City acted within the constitutional parameters of the authority delegated to it in its charter. Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578.

The City is not required to exercise delegated powers in the exact same manner as prescribed by the general laws of this state, but local legislation cannot create an inconsistent or irreconcilable conflict with the laws of this state. Id. at 578-79; see also Roeder, 466 S.W.3d at 543. If this Court finds a conflict does exist, state statutes will preempt local ordinances; and as far as the ordinance conflicts with a state statute, the ordinance is deemed void. Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 579; Roeder, 466 S.W.3d at 543, 547; State ex rel. Schmitt v. Choi, 627 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

“Preemption may be either express or implied.” Zang v. City of St. Charles, 659 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Mo. banc 2023). “Express preemption occurs when the legislature ‘explicitly proscribed local regulation in a specific area.’ ” Id. (quoting in part Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 579). Implied preemption occurs either when: (1) the local ordinance permits what the state statute prohibits or prohibits what the statute permits, i.e., conflict preemption; or (2) the General Assembly creates a regulatory scheme so comprehensive that it reasonably can be inferred the General Assembly intended to occupy the entire legislative field, i.e., field preemption. Zang, 659 S.W.3d at 332.

Relevant to this appeal, section 21.750 is an express preemption statute because the plain language of subsections 1 and 2 provide cities, like the City here, mandatory directives that expressly state what firearm legislation will be prohibited by state law subject to certain exceptions. See Choi, 627 S.W.3d at 7, 8-9. Generally, when statutes use the term “shall,” like here, it expresses a directive that is mandatory. See Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644, 664 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). Subsection 1 provides in relevant part:

The general assembly hereby occupies and preempts the entire field of legislation touching in any way firearms ․ to the complete exclusion of any ․ ordinance ․. Any existing or future ․ ordinances ․ in this field are hereby and shall be null and void except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

Section 21.750.1 (emphasis added); see also Edwards, 426 S.W.3d at 664. Furthermore, subsection 2 provides in relevant part:

No ․ city ․ of this state shall adopt any ․ ordinance ․ concerning in any way the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permit, registration, taxation other than sales and compensating use taxes or other controls on firearms ․ except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

Section 21.750.2 (emphasis added); see also Edwards, 426 S.W.3d at 664. “When interpreting a statute, [appellate courts are] guided by the legislature's intent, as indicated by the statute's plain language.” Desai v. Seneca Specialty Insurance Company, 581 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Mo. banc 2019) (citation omitted). Accordingly, when a statute's language is unambiguous, like here, “this Court must give effect to the legislature's chosen language.” See Greer v. SYSCO Food Services, 475 S.W.3d 655, 666 (Mo. banc 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No provision of a statute can be read in isolation, but rather the provisions are read in context to harmonize all of the statute's provisions together. BASF Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Mo. banc 2012) (per curiam).

Analysis

In determining legislative intent, we agree with the City's argument on appeal that subsection 1 of section 21.750 cannot be read in isolation, and must be read in light of the provisions that follow it. See Desai, 581 S.W.3d at 601; BASF Corp., 392 S.W.3d at 444. We disagree, however, that subsection 1 “should give way to the specific language in subsection 2.” (internal quotation marks omitted). See State ex rel. Womack v. Rolf, 173 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Mo. banc 2005) (holding courts will reject an interpretation of a statute which requires words be ignored). Thus, this Court cannot ignore the language in subsection 1 to support the City's notion that “subsection 2 provides the operative statutory language” which governs the intent of the legislature to preempt an entire field of firearm legislation. We find subsection 1 clearly and unequivocally states the legislature's intent to “occup[y] and preempt[ ] the entire field of legislation touching in any way firearms ․” subject to exceptions listed in subsection 3. See Desai, 581 S.W.3d at 601; Greer, 475 S.W.3d at 666; Rolf, 173 S.W.3d at 638; sections 21.750.1 and 21.750.3.

Subsection 2 of section 21.750 is equally as important to determining the legislature's intent. Subsection 2 identifies categories of firearm legislation which are preempted, e.g., the “keeping,” “possession,” or “transportation” of firearms – the categories in which the City argues are not the same as “storage” for purposes of preemption. See section 21.750.2. This Court declines to exercise the maxim expressio unius est exclusio (omissions shall be understood as exclusions), because we find the argument unconvincing that by excluding the specific word “storage,” the legislature intended the regulation of firearm “storage” to be unconstrained by any means of preemption under section 21.750. See Zang, 659 S.W.3d at 333; State ex rel. Hawley v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, 558 S.W.3d 22, 31 (Mo. banc 2018); Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 179 S.W.3d 266, 269-70 (Mo. banc 2005).

Moreover, subsection 2 states in relevant part: “No ․ city ․ of this state shall adopt any ․ ordinance ․ concerning in any way the ․ keeping, possession, ․ [and] transportation ․ on firearms ․ except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.” Section 21.750.2 (emphasis added). The means in which a firearm is kept, possessed, and transported ⁶ undoubtedly concern how firearms are to be stored in an unattended vehicle.

Based on the foregoing, subsection 1 and subsection 2, read together in harmony, clearly indicate the legislature's intent to preempt ordinances like the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance. See sections 21.750.1 and 21.750.2; Desai, 581 S.W.3d at 601; Greer, 475 S.W.3d at 666; BASF Corp., 392 S.W.3d at 444. Here, the Ordinance requires drivers of unattended vehicles to store firearms in a locked container and penalizes those that do not. First, the Ordinance is clearly preempted by subsection 1 in that it: (1) “touch[es] in any way” the regulation of firearms; and (2) is not included within the exceptions listed in subsection 3. See sections 21.750.1 and 21.750.3. Moreover, the Ordinance is clearly preempted by subsection 2 in that it: (1) “concern[s] in any way” the means in which a firearm is “ke[pt],” “possess[ed],” and “transport[ed]”; and (2) is not included within the exceptions listed in subsection 3. See sections 21.750.2 and 21.750.3. Based on the foregoing, we hold the Ordinance is expressly preempted by section 21.750 and is therefore void. See Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578-79; Roeder, 466 S.W.3d at 543; Choi, 627 S.W.3d at 9-10.

To safeguard any concern that our holding would lead to absurd results, see Cooperative Home Care, Inc., 514 S.W.3d at 578, we note both subsection 1 and 2 include the phrase: “except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.” See sections 21.750.1 and 21.750.2. Subsection 3 allows cities, like the City here, to enact ordinances which: (1) conform exactly with the provisions of sections 571.010 to 571.070, i.e., state-wide weapons offenses;⁷ and (2) regulate the open carrying of firearms readily capable of lethal use or the discharging of firearms within a jurisdiction. See section 21.750.3(1). Additionally, subsection 3 includes an exception that if a jurisdiction, like the City, has an ordinance prohibiting the open carrying of firearms, the open carrying of firearms shall not be prohibited in accordance with the following:

(a) Any person with a valid concealed carry endorsement or permit who is open carrying a firearm shall be required to have a valid concealed carry endorsement or permit from this state, or a permit from another state that is recognized by this state, in his or her possession at all times;

(b) Any person open carrying a firearm in such jurisdiction shall display his or her concealed carry endorsement or permit upon demand of a law enforcement officer;

(c) In the absence of any reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, no person carrying a concealed or unconcealed firearm shall be disarmed or physically restrained by a law enforcement officer unless under arrest; and

(d) Any person who violates this subdivision shall be subject to the penalty provided in section 571.121.[8]

See section 21.750.3(2).

The City maintains the language within subsection 1 – “touching in any way” – will render any future firearm ordinance or regulation enacted by a local government invalid. See section 21.750.1. For example, the City argues “[n]oise ordinances could ․ be challenged to the extent they ‘touch’ the firing of firearms.” This argument fails by looking at subsection 3, subdivision 1, which in relevant part states “nothing [ ] in this section shall prohibit any ordinance ․ which regulates ․ the discharge of firearms within a jurisdiction, provided such ordinance complies with the provisions of section 252.243.”⁹ See section 21.750.3(1). Thus, the City is free to enact ordinances regulating the discharging of firearms, and in fact does – Ordinance 71915 ¹⁰ prohibits the unlawful discharge of a firearm when an individual “recklessly discharge[s] a firearm within or into the limits of the City of S[aint] Louis.”

Another example given by the City is “[a] regulation prohibiting workplace violence and intimidation could be challenged if it ‘touches’ an employee who brandishes a firearm at a coworker.” This argument again fails by looking at subsection 3, subdivision 1, which in relevant part states “nothing [ ] in this section shall prohibit any ordinance ․ which conforms exactly with any of the provisions of sections 571.010 to 571.070 ․.” See section 21.750.3(1). Section 571.030.1(4)¹¹ criminalizes the unlawful use of a firearm when “[an individual] knowingly[ ] ․ [e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner[ ] ․.” Notwithstanding this opinion, the City is free to enact ordinances targeting workplace violence in exact conformance with any of the provisions in sections 571.010 to 571.070, such as with section 571.030.1(4). See section 21.750.3(1).

The City's sole point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

For all of the reasons stated above, we find the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance expressly preempted by section 21.750, thus rendering the Ordinance void. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All references are to the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance which is codified within the City of Saint Louis Revised Code as section 15.133.010 (effective from February 21, 2017, to the present).

2.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016.

3.   “A nolle prosequi is a discretionary right of the prosecutor to cease prosecution of a cause at any time.” State v. Lawson, 630 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.06(q) (effective from May 1, 2019, to the present) (defining prosecutor as “any attorney or counselor who represents any county, city, town, or village in the prosecution of a person for a violation of an ordinance”). “The filing of a nolle prosequi therefore results in a dismissal ․ without prejudice ․.” Lawson, 630 S.W.2d at 189 (emphasis added).

4.   Unrelated to this appeal, Roth also challenged the validity of Section Two of the City's Ordinance 70502, codified within the City of Saint Louis Revised Code as section 15.133.020 (effective from February 21, 2017, to the present), which mandates the reporting of stolen or lost firearms.

5.   To avoid unnecessary repetition, other relevant portions of subsection 3 of section 21.750 will be outlined below.

6.   The City argues the Unattended Vehicle Ordinance “does not regulate ‘transportation’ of firearms because it only reaches firearms left in vehicles that are unattended and therefore are not being transported anywhere.” For purposes of this opinion, we find this argument unpersuasive because vehicles are intrinsically tied to transportation and, therefore, the means in which a firearm is stored in a vehicle, regardless of whether the vehicle is unattended or not, “concern[s] in any way the ․ transportation ․ o[f] firearms ․.” See section 21.750.2.

7.   See e.g., section 571.015.1 RSMo Cum. Supp. 2024 (penalizing an individual for committing a felony through the “use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon ․”); section 571.030.1(6) RSMo Cum. Supp. 2024 (penalizing an individual for “knowingly[ ] ․ [d]ischarg[ing] a firearm within one hundred yards of any occupied schoolhouse, courthouse, or church building[ ]”).

8.   The penalty provided in section 571.121 states: “Failure to comply with this subsection shall not be a criminal offense but the concealed carry permit or endorsement holder may be issued a citation for an amount not to exceed thirty-five dollars.” Section 571.121.1.

9.   Section 252.243.3 states: “The discharge of firearms for lawful hunting, sporting, target shooting, and all other lawful purposes shall not be prohibited in hunting heritage protection areas, subject to all applicable state and federal laws, and local ordinances prohibiting hunting or the discharge of firearms adopted before August 28, 2007.” Hunting heritage protection areas are “all land located within the one hundred-year flood plain of the Missouri River and ․ the Mississippi River, as designated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ․.” Section 252.243.1.

10.   Ordinance 71915 is codified within the City of Saint Louis Revised Code as section 15.139 (effective from November 7, 2024, to the present).

11.   All references to section 571.030.1(4) are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2024.

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge

Michael E. Gardner, Judge and Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Judge, concur.