IN RE: THE MATTER OF: DAVID EADE (2026)

Jennifer Kennedy (Mother), who appears pro se, appeals from a judgment awarding sole legal and physical custody of Son and Daughter to David Eade (Father) and third-party custody of Stepdaughter to Father and granting Mother supervised visitation with the Children.¹ Mother raises seven points on appeal. She argues that the trial court erred because (1) the custody award was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Stepdaughter's biological father, who was never served or given an opportunity to be heard; (3) the court failed to consider evidence of alleged abuse by Father or the Children's wishes as to custody; (4) supervised visitation was not supported by substantial evidence; (5) the court improperly denied Mother direct access to Children's education and medical records; (6) the court's award of attorneys’ fees to Father was improper; and (7) the court mistakenly awarded Father duplicative education expenses for the Children. We affirm in part and reverse in part.²

Background

Mother and Father were married, and two children—Son, now age 15, and Daughter, now age 13—were born to the marriage. Mother and Father divorced on June 3, 2021. By agreement, Mother and Father had joint legal and physical custody of Son and Daughter and a 50-50 parenting schedule, which worked reasonably well for nearly three years.

Mother has an older child—Stepdaughter, now age 17—from a previous relationship. Father is the only father figure Stepdaughter has ever known.³ Approximately four months after the parties’ divorce was finalized, Mother allowed Father to have Stepdaughter on the same schedule as Son and Daughter.

In late 2023, Father became concerned about Mother's mental health and its impact on the Children, prompting him, on March 12, 2024, to file a motion to modify and a motion for a temporary restraining order/temporary injunction for full custody of Son and Daughter. That same day, Father filed a petition for third-party custody of Stepdaughter. The next day, Father filed a motion for temporary restraining order/temporary injunction for full custody of Stepdaughter. On March 21, 2024, the court held a hearing on Father's motions for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction.⁴ Father testified regarding statements by Mother, made in the Children's presence, that people wanted to kill her and the Children in retaliation for Mother reporting her former boss for fraud. And text messages admitted into evidence sent by Mother and a voicemail she left at Stepdaughter's school claimed Mother had been gang-raped by Father and seven other men in 2014, but she never made a formal complaint against Father or the others. Mother testified that she heard a voice coming from a hole under her porch and poured hot water down the hole to flush the person out.

After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the trial court entered a preliminary injunction in both cases on March 25, 2024. The injunction prevented Mother from having contact with the Children other than two supervised Facetime calls a week. Mother also was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation.

In March 2025, a three-day trial was held on Father's motion to modify custody of Son and Daughter and his motion for third-party custody of Stepdaughter. A Lee's Summit police officer called by Father testified regarding “numerous” requests for welfare checks and mental health checks pertaining to Mother. According to those reports, Mother once hid behind a counter at a supermarket because she believed she was being stalked and, on another occasion, she spread branches on her lawn to prevent someone from killing her when she returned home. She told police that her phone had been bugged.⁵ And there was testimony that she called Father a murderer and a rapist in the Children's presence.

The psychologist who performed Mother's court-ordered evaluation (Psychologist 1) testified that Mother's “unusual behavior is concerning and not normal” but Psychologist 1 was unable to provide a mental health diagnosis. Psychologist 1 also testified that she was not given access to all relevant files and that all of the test results except for one were invalid due to Mother's defensive nature.

Mother retained Psychologist 2 to perform a second psychological examination. Psychologist 2 testified that she did not find any evidence of psychosis, but she admitted that she did not perform a “forensic evaluation” and she had not been provided relevant documents. In fact, Psychologist 2 testified that she would have performed a very different clinical interview had she been provided all relevant information, and it could have possibly changed her diagnosis “if she had been given the full picture.”

The trial court found both Psychologists credible and concluded,

Neither doctor was able to diagnose Mother with a current mental health condition. Due to the conduct of Mother during the evaluations, including her withholding information and her defensiveness during testing, the Court does not find either evaluation helpful in determining that there is not a mental health issue with Mother․ The Court finds credible the testimony regarding Mother's previous episodes of a mental health crises, which the Court finds extremely troubling—especially because the [C]hildren were privy to these episodes and because Mother has taken no steps to get treatment for these episodes.

(Emphasis in original.)

Father submitted a proposed parenting plan. Under Father's plan, he would have sole legal and physical custody of Son and Daughter and third-party custody of Stepdaughter and Mother would have supervised visitation with the Children. The Children's Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) submitted a plan almost identical to Father's plan, and Father acquiesced to the differences in the GAL's plan. Mother did not submit a parenting plan for the Children.

As for Son and Daughter, the court determined that Mother's mental health crisis, which occurred after the original custody judgment, represented a substantial change in Mother's circumstances and those of the Children.⁶ As to Stepdaughter, the court determined that the presumption in favor of parental custody was sufficiently rebutted as to both Mother and the biological father.⁷ The court also concluded that Stepdaughter's welfare would be served by protecting the bond she has with Father, whom the court found to be suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable environment for her. As to all three Children, the court concluded that the eight statutory factors for custody enumerated in § 452.375.2 favored Father.

Accordingly, the court awarded legal and physical custody of Son and Daughter to Father, third-party custody of Stepdaughter to Father, and supervised visitation with the Children to Mother. The court explained its conclusion regarding Mother's visitation rights as follows:

Testimony showed that at both the preliminary hearing and Trial, Mother was a danger to the [C]hildren's physical health and emotional development due to her behavior. The Court is greatly concerned with the evidence of Mother's mental health crises and the fact that Mother has sought no mental health treatment during the pendency of this litigation. As a result, the Court finds that Mother is in need of further mental health intervention and until such time that she receives that help the [C]hildren's time with her shall be supervised. The Court finds that unsupervised visitation would endanger the [C]hild[ren]’s physical health and/or impair [their] emotional development and th[at] it is in the [C]hild[ren]’s best interests that the visitation be supervised.

The court then ordered Mother to pay Father $2,700 a month in child support ⁸ as well as $32,400 in child support arrearages, $1,944.50 in unreimbursed expenses, and $25,000 in attorneys’ fees.⁹ Mother filed a motion to amend the judgment, which the court denied.

This appeal follows. Additional facts are provided below as needed to address Mother's points on appeal.

Standard of Review

“We review a bench-tried case under the standard outlined in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).” J.W. by K.C.G. v. N.R.W., 695 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Prevost v. Silmon, 645 S.W.3d 503, 511 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). “In a child custody case, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. (quoting A.J.C. ex rel. J.D.C. v. K.R.H., 602 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020)).

“We will not disturb the trial court's determination of custody issues unless we are firmly convinced of its error and that the award is against the best interests of the children.” Prevost, 645 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting Prach v. Westberg, 455 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). “ ‘We presume the trial court reviewed all the evidence and based its decision on the child[ren]’s best interests’ so we defer to the trial court's credibility determinations.” J.W., 695 S.W.3d at 241 (quoting Ball v. Ball, 638 S.W.3d 543, 548-49 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). “If the trial court has made no specific findings on a factual issue, such findings are interpreted as having been found in accordance with the judgment.” Id. (quoting Ball, 638 S.W.3d at 548).

Analysis

On appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court erred because (1) awarding custody to Father was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Stepdaughter's biological father; (3) the court failed to consider evidence of alleged abuse by Father or the Children's wishes as to custody; (4) supervised visitation was not supported by substantial evidence; (5) the court improperly denied Mother direct access to Children's education and medical records; (6) the court's award of attorneys’ fees was improper; and (7) the court mistakenly awarded Father duplicative education expenses for the Children. We address each of Mother's points in turn.

I. Mother failed to show that awarding custody to Father was against the weight of the evidence.

In her first point, Mother claims that the trial court erred because awarding custody of the Children to Father was against the weight of the evidence regarding Mother's mental health and its impact on the Children.¹⁰

“ ‘[W]eight of the evidence’ denotes an appellate test of how much persuasive value evidence has, not just whether sufficient evidence exists that tends to prove a necessary fact.” In re A.M.R., 673 S.W.3d 864, 874 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Prime Healthcare Servs.-Kansas City, LLC v. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 653 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). “A circuit court's judgment is against the weight of the evidence only if the circuit court could not have reasonably found, from the record at trial, the existence of a fact that is necessary to sustain the judgment.” Id. (quoting Prime Healthcare Servs., 653 S.W.3d at 645).

To succeed on her against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, Mother must engage in the following four-step analysis:

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment;

(2) identify all the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition;

(3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial court's credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and

(4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce belief in that proposition.

Id. (quoting Prime Healthcare Servs., 653 S.W.3d at 645). “As the challenger, [Mother] bears the burden of showing that the trial court's finding is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Prime Healthcare Servs., 653 S.W.3d at 645).

Mother identifies the factual proposition that she challenges, which is the trial court's findings regarding her mental health and its negative impact on the Children. And she identifies the evidence contrary to that finding, namely the absence of a mental health diagnosis by either interviewing psychologist, Mother's high level of performance at work, and her coherent presentation at trial. But Mother fails to acknowledge the evidence and inferences that support the trial court's finding. And she “fails to demonstrate why the favorable evidence and inferences were so lacking in probative value, when considered in the context of the entire record, as to fail to induce the finding that [grounds for awarding custody to Father exist].” Id. at 875 (quoting Prime Healthcare Servs., 653 S.W.3d at 646).

Because Mother did not engage in the four-step analysis for an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, she failed to carry her burden to show that the trial court's findings regarding her mental health and its negative impact on the Children were against the weight of the evidence.

Point I is denied.

II. The trial court did not err in granting Father third-party custody of Stepdaughter because all parties were properly served.

For her second point, Mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding third-party custody of Stepdaughter to Father because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the child's biological father, having affected service on “John Doe” by publication.

Father alleged that the paternity of Stepdaughter was never established and Mother never disclosed to Father the identity of Stepdaughter's birth father. No birth father is listed on Stepdaughter's birth certificate, and no affidavit acknowledging paternity or any judgment of paternity appears in the record. Accordingly, when Father filed his petition for third-party custody, he also filed a motion for service by publication under Rule 54.12(c),¹¹ alleging that the biological father was unknown and requesting permission to proceed serving “John Doe” by publication. The court entered an order granting service by publication, and Father filed an affidavit of service as required by Rule 54.20(e).

Mother subsequently filed an unsworn, unverified statement with the court identifying Stepdaughter's birth father, who purportedly resides in Austria; Mother did not provide an address or other contact information for him. Mother offered no evidence establishing the identity of Stepdaughter's birth father. The court concluded that Stepdaughter's biological father “has never been identified.”

Rule 55.27(a) provides that any defense based on lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process must be asserted in the responsive pleading or made by motion. “A motion making any of these defenses shall be made: (A) Within the time allowed for responding to the opposing party's pleading, or (B) If no responsive pleading is permitted, within thirty days after the service of the last pleading.” Rule 55.27(a). And Rule 55.27(g) states that these defenses are waived if not raised in accordance with Rule 55.27.¹² Assuming, without deciding, that Mother could have raised any of these defenses on behalf of Stepdaughter's alleged biological father, Mother did not raise any of the defenses in the manner or within the time frame permitted by the rules. Thus, these defenses are waived.¹³

Point II is denied.

III. The trial court did not err by failing to consider evidence of alleged abuse by Father or the Children's wishes as to custody.

In her third point, Mother argues that the trial court erred in awarding custody to Father because the court failed to consider evidence of alleged abuse by Father or the Children's wishes as to custody, in violation of § 452.375.2(4), (5), (6), and (8).

Courts “shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren].” § 452.375.2. In determining the children's best interests, the court considers “all relevant factors and issues written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. Factors relevant to the evaluation include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) The wishes of the child[ren]’s parents as to custody and the proposed parenting plan submitted by both parties;

(2) The needs of the child[ren] for a frequent, continuing and meaningful relationship with both parents and the ability and willingness of parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the needs of the child[ren];

(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child[ren] with parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child[ren]’s best interests;

(4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child[ren] frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with the other parent;

(5) The child[ren]’s adjustment to the child[ren]’s home, school, and community ․ ;

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved ․ ;

(7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principal residence of the child[ren]; and

(8) The unobstructed input of [the] child[ren], free of coercion and manipulation, as to the[ir] custodial arrangement.

§ 452.375.2. Where the trial court considered each of these factors and the court's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm the court's judgment. Moyers v. Lindenbusch, 530 S.W.3d 646, 652 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).

Here, the court's detailed findings with respect to the eight factors listed in § 452.375.2 occupy ten pages of the judgment. With respect to the fourth factor—which parent is more likely to allow the children frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with the other parent—the court found that Father is willing to allow Mother regular, meaningful contact and is only requesting that her visits be supervised due to his concerns about Mother's mental health and the effect of her behavior on the Children. Mother, on the other hand, attempted to limit Father's time with Son and Daughter to every other weekend without justification.

As for the fifth factor—the children's adjustment to home, school and community—the court found that the Children are excelling academically,¹⁴ and Father helped Stepdaughter apply for her first job, obtain her driver's license and first car, and open bank accounts.

The court's analysis of the sixth factor—the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved— focused on Mother's mental health. The court did not address Mother's allegations regarding abuse by Father, but those allegations were raised during the dissolution proceeding and initial custody determination.¹⁵ Section 452.410 states in part “the court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it has jurisdiction under the provisions of section 452.745 and it finds that modification is necessary, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree ․” (Emphasis added.) While Mother frequently referenced the abuse allegations during the custody modification/third-party custody proceedings, there were no new allegations of this nature presented to the court. Thus, the court properly refrained from considering the old abuse allegations in the underlying proceedings.

With respect to the eighth factor—the unobstructed input of the children, free of coercion and manipulation, as to their custodial arrangement—the court found, based on the GAL's report, that the Children would like to spend time with Mother, but none expressed that they wanted to live primarily with her.

Based on our review of the record, there was sufficient evidence to support each of the court's findings regarding the Children's best interests. See Moyers, 530 S.W.3d at 652. Thus, we affirm the court's judgment.

Point III is denied.

IV. Mother failed to show that requiring supervised visitation was unsupported by substantial evidence.

For her fourth point, Mother asserts that supervised visitation was not supported by substantial evidence.

“Substantial evidence is evidence that, if believed, has some probative force on each fact that is necessary to sustain the circuit court's judgment.” Chan v. Chan, 704 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 199 (Mo. banc 2014)). “To prevail on [a] substantial-evidence challenge, [the appellant] must demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the circuit court's judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 765-66 (emphasis in original) (quoting Pasternak v. Pasternak, 467 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Mo. banc 2015)). When reviewing whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence, “we view the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” Id. at 763 n.2 (quoting In re K.R., 674 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). “Thus, any citation to or reliance upon evidence and inferences contrary to the judgment is irrelevant and immaterial to an appellant's point and argument challenging a factual proposition necessary to sustain the judgment as being not supported by substantial evidence.” Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 186 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).

A party bringing a not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge must

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment;

(2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; and,

(3) demonstrate why that favorable evidence, when considered along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, does not have probative force upon the proposition such that the trier of fact could not reasonably decide the existence of the proposition.

Boydston v. Boydston, 702 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 187).

Section 452.400 governs the award of visitation rights. It provides, in relevant part,

A parent not granted custody of the child[ren] is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or impair [their] emotional development.

The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child[ren], but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or impair his or her emotional development.

§§ 452.400.1(1); 452.400.2(1).¹⁶

Mother identifies the factual proposition the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment—the trial court's finding that unsupervised visitation with Mother posed a risk to the Children. But Mother fails to acknowledge the favorable evidence supporting the existence of that proposition or demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with all reasonable inferences drawn from it, lacked probative force such that the trial court could not have reasonably concluded that unsupervised visits with Mother would endanger the Children.

Because Mother did not engage in the three-step analysis for a not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge, she failed to carry her burden to show that the trial court's award of supervised visitation was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Point IV is denied.

V. The trial court did not err in denying Mother's direct access to the Children's medical and education records.

In her fifth point, Mother claims that the trial court erred in denying her direct access to the Children's medical and education records under § 452.375.12 because she was not denied custody or visitation rights.

The parenting plan approved by the court provides that Father shall have complete access to the Children's medical records, and Mother will need his written approval before obtaining those records. As for the Children's school records, the Plan states that Mother shall have no access, but Father shall notify her of where the Children are enrolled and attending school and shall provide their semester grades to Mother, if requested.

Section 452.375.12 states, in relevant part,

Unless a parent has been denied custody rights pursuant to this section or visitation rights under section 452.400, both parents shall have access to records and information pertaining to [the] minor child[ren] including, but not limited to, medical, dental, and school records․ Unless a parent has been denied custody rights pursuant to this section or visitation rights under section 452.400, any judgment of dissolution or other applicable court order shall specifically allow both parents access to such records and reports.

As § 452.375.12 clearly states, a parent who has been denied custody rights or visitation rights may be denied access to medical and education records of the children. While Mother was granted supervised visitation, she was denied all custodial rights. Thus, the court did not err is restricting her access to the Children's medical and education records under § 452.375.12.¹⁷

Point V is denied.

VI. The trial court did not err in awarding attorneys’ fees to Father.

For her sixth point, Mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Father because the court failed to properly consider the factors identified in § 452.355.1.

Under § 452.355.1, a court may award attorneys’ fees in a custody modification case “after considering all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, the merits of the case and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action.” “We review the trial court's decision to award attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.” Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d 177, 191 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (quoting Groenings v. Groenings, 277 S.W.3d 270, 279 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008)). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's award was so arbitrary and unreasonable and against the logic of the circumstances as to shock the sense of justice and indicate that the trial court did not carefully consider its decision.” Id. (quoting Groenings, 277 S.W.3d at 280). “Even if the trial court does not expressly indicate that it considered all of the factors under [section] 452.355, we presume that it did consider all the factors, and the complaining party bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.” Id. (quoting Hart v. Hart, 210 S.W.3d 480, 493 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).

Here, the trial court found that Mother earns more money than Father and that Mother's actions during the pendency of the case significantly increased Father's legal expenses. The trial court noted that Mother filed numerous motions, most of which “made the same repetitive egregious allegations.” The court described Mother's filings as “at times hard to follow, repetitive, already being ruled upon, and almost identical.” The court concluded that Father's fees increased considerably due to Mother's excessive filings as well as her failure to respond to discovery in a timely manner or to update her discovery responses. Throughout the proceedings, Father requested attorneys’ fees, but the court chose to defer the majority of those requests until trial. Based on the evidence, the court awarded Father slightly more than half of the attorneys’ fees Father had incurred at the time of trial.

On this record, we do not find that the award of a portion of Father's attorneys’ fees “was so arbitrary and unreasonable and against the logic of the circumstances as to shock the sense of justice and indicate that the trial court did not carefully consider its decision.” Id. at 191 (quoting Groenings, 277 S.W.3d at 280). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father a portion of his attorneys’ fees.

Point VI is denied.

VII. The trial court erred in awarding Father duplicative education expenses.

In her final point, Mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to pay the presumed child support amount (PCSA) and half of all education expenses, without distinguishing between ordinary education expenses, which are accounted for in the PCSA, and extraordinary expenses.

The parenting plan approved by the court dictates that Mother and Father are equally responsible for all of the children's education expenses, including, but not limited to, “PTA fees, activity fees, school books, school supplies, school lunches, registration costs, field trips, etc.” But the court-approved Form 14 awarded nothing for “other, agreed-upon or ordered, extraordinary costs.”

The crux of Mother's final point appears to be that school lunches are included in the PCSA; so, by awarding Father both the PCSA and Mother's half of all education expenses, including school lunches, the court inappropriately attributed duplicative education expenses to Mother.

“The [PCSA] on the Form 14 is intended to cover the children's ordinary living expenses. In addition to ordinary expenses covered by the [PCSA], the court can award extraordinary expenses.” Hereth v. Hereth, 715 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Woolery v. Woolery, 679 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). “Such extraordinary expenses must not duplicate the ordinary expenses included in the PCSA.” Id. “Conversely, not every education expense is extraordinary, so requiring a party already paying the PCSA to additionally pay a portion of all education expenses would duplicate at least some ordinary expenses already covered by the PCSA.” Id. at 579, n.6 (emphasis in original).

Here, the trial court did not include any extraordinary expenses in its calculation of the PCSA. But, in addition to awarding the PCSA to Father, the court also awarded him half of all education expenses, including school lunches. This Court recently addressed this issue in Hereth. In that case, mother was ordered to pay father the PCSA, which we concluded “represents the full extent of [m]other's obligation for the children's ordinary education expenses.” Id. at 580 (emphasis in original). As is the case here, the trial court in Hereth entered $0 in extraordinary expenses for both parties on the court-accepted Form 14. Id. Thus, we concluded that, when the trial court ordered mother to pay the PCSA, “that amount included her full obligation for the children's education expenses.” Id. Nonetheless, the trial court in Hereth also ordered mother to pay half of “any education[ ] expenses for the children, including school lunches,” in addition to the PCSA. Id. (emphasis in original). We concluded that, in doing so, the court erroneously applied the law. Id.; see also McGowan v. McGowan, 43 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (“We conclude that the cost of school lunches is an ordinary, not an extraordinary, child-rearing cost.”). We reach the same conclusion in the present case.

Based on the fact that the trial court did not award any extraordinary education expenses for the children, which neither party contests on appeal, Mother is not responsible for any portion of the children's education expenses beyond her PCSA. See Hereth, 715 S.W.3d at 480.

Point VII is granted.¹⁸

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment ordering Mother to pay half of all the Children's education expenses, in addition to the PCSA, is reversed. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the term “Children” to refer to Son, Daughter, and Stepdaughter, collectively.

2.   On October 23, 2025, Mother filed with this Court a motion to strike Father's brief, exhibits, and appendix and to deny Father's motion to deposit exhibits out of time. By order issued October 31, 2025, we held, “to the extent that [Mother's] motion requests to strike [Father's] brief and appendix due to misrepresentations of the record or reliance on matters outside of the record, such part of the motion is ruled as taken with the case.” Having considered Mother's motion, Father's response, and the record on appeal, we deny Mother's motion.

3.   Stepdaughter's purported biological father, who apparently resides in Austria, was not named on her birth certificate and has no relationship with Stepdaughter. Mother asserts that the identity of Stepdaughter's biological father, who did not participate in the proceedings below, was known to Father; Father denies that. The trial court concluded that Stepdaughter's biological father “is unwilling or unable to be [her] custodian ․ as he has never been a part of [Stepdaughter's] life. In fact, he has never been identified.”

4.   In the present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the evidence and testimony admitted at the preliminary hearing.

5.   Mother denied most of these reports, but the court did not find her testimony credible.

6.   A court may modify a prior custody decree when the court “finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child[ren] or [their] custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child[ren].” § 452.410.1. All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Cum. Supp. 2023.

7.   Section 452.375.5(5)(a) states,When the court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian, or the welfare of the child requires, and it is in the best interests of the child, then custody ․ may be awarded to a person related by consanguinity or affinity to the child. If no person related to the child by consanguinity or affinity is willing to accept custody, then the court may award custody to any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable environment for the child.

8.   Father submitted a Form 14; Mother did not. The court rejected Father's Form 14 and calculated one of its own. According to the court's Form 14, the presumed child support amount (PCSA) for the modification case and the third-party custody case was $4,027 a month. The court rejected that amount as unjust and inappropriate because it did not account for Father's fixed expenditures. The court then determined $2,700 a month to be a just and appropriate award of child support.

9.   Father's attorneys’ fees at the time of trial were $46,868.42.

10.   While Mother's first point also references an alleged “erroneous application of the law,” it appears from Mother's brief that the alleged error in applying the law relates to the weight given by the trial court to the evidence pertaining to Mother's mental health. Thus, we treat Point I as an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge.

11.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024).

12.   “We recognize the challenges [Mother] faces as a pro se litigant on appeal.” Craig v. Craig, 644 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). “But ‘[s]elf-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys; thus, self-represented litigants must comply with Missouri Court Rules, including Rule [55.27].’ ” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Tuckness, 403 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)). “And ‘we cannot give preferential treatment to non-lawyers.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Tuckness, 403 S.W.3d at 598). “It is not for lack of sympathy, but rather is necessitated by the requirement of judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties.” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Tuckness, 403 S.W.3d at 598).

13.   Had Mother truly wanted Stepdaughter's purported biological father to participate in the third-party custody proceedings, Mother could have raised a defense of failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 52.04. Such a defense may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 55.01 or by motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rule 55.27(g)(2).

14.   There was evidence that Son had some behavioral issues at school that resulted in an out-of-school suspension, but Father worked with Son to ensure that he completed assignments on time, and Son was able to maintain grades worthy of honor roll. There also was testimony that, once Father had sole legal custody of Son, Father was able to have him evaluated, diagnosed, and treated for ADHD, and Son was benefitting “tremendously” from the medication.

15.   Following investigations by the Children's Division and the GAL, the abuse allegations against Father were closed as unsubstantiated.

16.   In conjunction with her assertion that supervised visitation was not supported by substantial evidence, Mother claims that the trial court failed to make the statutory findings required by § 452.400. This claim pertains to the form or language of the judgment. Rule 78.07(c) directs that, “[i]n all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review.” See In re D.L.S. III, 606 S.W.3d 217, 225 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (“Rule 78.07(c) requires a party to bring issues involving the form of a judgment (including the absence of required findings) to a trial court's attention as a condition of preserving a claim of error regarding those issues.”). Mother's motion to amend did not address the court's alleged failure to make statutory findings under § 452.400. Thus, that argument is waived.

17.   Although neither the trial court nor Mother mentions it, § 452.376 permits a noncustodial parent with visitation rights to “receive any deficiency slips, report cards or pertinent progress reports regarding [the] child[ren]’s progress in school,” upon request and payment of an administrative fee sufficient to cover the cost.

18.   Father does not address Mother's Point VII in his appellate brief.

Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge

Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge, concur.