IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF KRISTIN N. DEGRACE (2026)

Philip DeGrace appeals the judgment of the Jackson County Circuit Court dissolving his marriage to Kristin DeGrace and dividing assets and debts between them. In his first point on appeal, he claims the trial court erred in the valuation it placed on the marital home because his wife's opinion of the home's value was based on incompetent evidence, namely the property's assessed value for taxation purposes. In his second point on appeal, he claims the trial court incorrectly calculated the equalization payment he needed to pay to his wife. The judgment is affirmed.

Facts

Philip DeGrace (“Husband”) and Kristin DeGrace (“Wife”) were married in 2011. They separated in January 2022, and Wife sought a dissolution. The matter went to bench trial in December 2023, March 2024, May 2024, June 2024, August 2024, September 2024, October 2024, November 2024, and December 2024. At the time of trial, Husband and Wife had three living children, ranging in age from five to eleven years old.

Husband and Wife agreed that the marital home (“the Home”) was a marital asset. The Home was located in Lee's Summit, Missouri. It was purchased in September 2020 for $425,000. At the time of trial, the Home had a mortgage with a balance of $386,032.

Husband and Wife disagreed about the value of the Home. Wife requested that the court give her the Home, and she would assume the mortgage. She opined that the Home was worth $464,300, because that was the value assessed by Jackson County for property tax purposes. A supervisor at the Jackson County Assessment Office testified to the same valuation. Husband requested that the Home be sold and the proceeds divided. He relied on the testimony of an agent of the bank that holds the Home's mortgage who stated the bank's appraisal of the Home was $607,340.

In its judgment,¹ the trial court found in relevant part:

73. The Court heard evidence over the course of 19 days, which included the testimony of [Wife], [Husband], several witnesses on behalf of each party, and numerous exhibits. ․ On the whole, the Court found [Wife] to be a more credible witness. The findings and conclusions made by the Court in this Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage are consistent with the Court's determination of the appropriate weight of the evidence and the credibility of each witness.

PATTERN OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

74. The Court finds that [Husband] engaged in misconduct both before and after the parties’ separation. [Husband's] conduct placed a disproportionate burden upon [Wife] in the marital partnership. The Court's maintenance award, division of property, and attorney fees take into consideration [Husband’] misconduct.

75. The Court finds that Husband's conduct constitutes abuse as defined in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.375.2(6).

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87. While Husband denies engaging in any abusive behavior toward Wife and the children, the Court has reviewed extensive documentary evidence that contradicts his testimony. ․. Specifically, ․ video and audio recordings provide direct evidence of Husband's pattern of domestic violence, much of which occurred in the presence of the minor children. ․

88. The Court finds that while Husband attempted to blame Wife for his suicide attempts by claiming she threatened to take the children away from him, the audio and video recordings tell a different story. ․

89. Husband used money and financial threats to scare and control Wife ․.

90. Furthermore, the recordings show Husband actively strategizing ways to interfere with Wife's relationship with the children. He plotted with his mother to have Wife involuntarily committed to a psychiatric ward, threatened to trigger Division of Family Services investigations based on fabricated concerns, and repeatedly threatened to have Wife jailed for both alleged false police reports and credit card use he had previously authorized. The Court finds these machinations particularly reprehensible given Husband's own testimony that Wife is a good mother. ․

91. Although Wife's psychological evaluation reflects Wife was mentally well, Husband engaged in a pattern of manipulation designed to make Wife question her own perceptions and judgment. He would deny events that were recorded, attempt to convince her she was mentally unstable despite evidence to the contrary, and reframe his abusive conduct as her fault. ․

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93. Beyond these detailed threats above regarding the children and mental health allegations, Husband made explicit threats about divorce litigation that Wife testified prevented her from leaving. ․

94. While the Court received a plethora of evidence of testimony, recordings and text messages of Husband's abuse toward Wife, Husband provided no such evidence demonstrating that Wife acted in a similar manner toward Husband.

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96. Husband used the family dog as a means to cause Wife distress. ․

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99. Husband's conduct meets the definition of assault, which is defined as purposely or knowingly placing Wife in fear of physical harm. ․

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101. The evidence shows that Husband made death threats towards Wife that were very specific. ․

102. Husband's physical intimidation and death threats were accompanied by a persistent pattern of suicidal threats and attempts that he used to control Wife's behavior.

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115. Husband's pattern of domestic violence also encompassed financial coercion that created and maintained a power imbalance between the parties.

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122. In the months leading up to the divorce being filed, Husband's control of the parties’ finances became much more severe.

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125. [From August 2021 through May 2022], bank records show that Husband spent $19,045.00 on sports gambling, deposited and lost approximately $30,000.00 through his Robinhood investment account, purchased a $3,639.00 dog, spent over $4,000.00 on marijuana, paid over $6,000.00 for baseball cards, and gambled $3,290.00 at the casino. When Wife requested financial assistance for basic necessities, Husband claimed he had no funds available and suggested she sell the children's PlayStation to buy food. Wife resorted to food pantries to feed herself and the children.

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128. The Court finds particularly troubling that Husband engaged in substantial discretionary spending for himself, including gambling, drugs, and other unnecessary purchases, while his children's mother relied on charitable assistance for basic needs for herself and the children.

129. Husband's history of gambling and excessive spending is consistent with his bipolar diagnosis. ․ Throughout the marriage, Husband exhibited a pattern of reckless gambling that imperiled the family's security, with individual losses reaching as high as $40,000 in a single day.

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131. The devastating impact of Husband's conduct is evidence in the current state of the marital estate. ․

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134. In addition to financial control, Husband displayed possessive, jealous, and controlling tendencies towards Wife and her interaction with others. ․

135. Husband's controlling behavior towards Wife escalated over time, particularly after the loss of the parties’ child ․ which then marked the beginning of Husband's unwanted sexual contact with Wife.

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144. Husband raises three primary arguments to challenge Wife's credibility regarding sexual abuse: (1) she remained in the marriage for many years; (2) she admitted to consenting to some of the sexual encounters; and (3) she never reported the abuse to law enforcement. ․

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150. Based on the totality of the evidence, the Court explicitly rejects Husband's arguments that Wife's credibility is undermined by the marriage's duration, her participation in sexual relations, or her failure to report to law enforcement. Such reasoning ignores the complex reality of domestic violence, especially when children are involved. The Court finds Wife's testimony particularly credible as it aligns with the expert testimony in ways that strongly suggest authenticity. ․

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161. The Guardian ad Litem's proposed parenting plan recommends sole legal custody and sole physical custody to [Wife] subject to a specific schedule of visitation with [Husband].

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166. For most of the marriage prior to separation, [Wife] stayed at home to care for the children while [Husband] worked to financially support the family. ․

The trial court awarded child support to Wife in the amount of $5,191.00 per month. It awarded Wife maintenance in the amount of $2,500.00 per month until the death of either party, Wife's remarriage, or further order of the court. The trial court ordered Husband to pay the Guardian ad Litem fees. Husband was ordered to pay $70,000 of Wife's attorney's fees. The trial court further found in its judgment:

370. During the pendency of the case, the Court ordered the parties not to spend or remove assets except for the usual course of business or the necessities of life. ․ [Husband] blatantly and knowingly violated this order in many respects.

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372. The Court finds [Husband] has squandered marital assets in anticipation of divorce and engaged in financial marital misconduct.

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401. The division of property takes into account approximately $134,943.00 in assets squandered and dissipated by [Husband] which are treated and considered in the overall division of property as an advance distribution of [Husband's] share of the marital estate. It should be noted that Husband has squandered well over the initial figure of $134,943 during the period in which this trial has been ongoing, yet he seeks compensation of $275 for the sale of his Traeger grill and Foosball table which Wife used for living expenses.

402. Husband refused to pay marital debts, including the mortgage, during the pendency of the case but now seeks to benefit from the increased equity in the home, which is solely the result of Wife's efforts to preserve the marital estate. ․

403. The Court finds that [Husband's] substantial marital misconduct imposed a disproportionate burden on [Wife]. This misconduct justifies an unequal division of marital property ․.

404. Equitable Division: The Court's division of property and debt must be equitable given the circumstances of the case, but need not be equal. ․ The Court's division of property and debt in this matter is equitable, although not equal, after consideration of the evidence and all relevant factors.

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406. [Husband] listed the fair market value of [the Home] at $475,000 on his asset and debt statement ․ which he signed on May 17, 2022. ․ On November 20, 2023, 19 days before the start of trial, [Husband] increased the value of the residence to $607,340 ․.

The trial court valued the Home at $464,300 and granted the home to Wife. In its judgment, the trial court divided various debts and assets. It then found:

414. To effect an equitable division of property, after taking into consideration all relevant factors including the factors of § 452.330.1 R.S.MO, the Court finds it just and appropriate that [Husband] pay to [Wife] the sum of $33,948.38 as an equitable division of the marital property and debt, excluding each party's debt for attorney fees. The equitable payment was calculated as follows:

To Husband To Wife Property Net of Secured Debt $52,162.00 $88,224.00 Unsecured Debt, excluding each -$58,708.70 -$27,724.75 party's attorney fee debt Husband's dissipation of $139,942.71 marital assets Subtotal to Each $128,396.01 $60,499.25 Payment to Equalize -$33,948.38 $33,948.38 Total to Each $94,447.63 $94,447.63

The trial court dissolved the marriage. It stated in relevant part:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Wife] is awarded a judgment against [Husband] in the amount of $33,948.38 as an adjustment to effect an equitable division of property. ․

The trial court awarded Wife sole legal and physical custody of the children. It set out a detailed parenting plan. The court awarded Wife “$3,783.00 for unjust enrichment, representing tax refunds and Advanced Child Tax Credit payments [Husband] wrongfully obtained and retained through his filing of joint tax returns without [Wife's] consent for tax years 2021 and 2022.” Wife was awarded $11,949.00 for retroactive child support. Husband was ordered to pay Wife $3,869.93 for unpaid medical expenses for the children. Husband was ordered to pay 85% of the cost of children's educational and extracurricular expenses. The judgment provided that Wife can request that Husband submit to a drug test up to three times per year. If Husband tests positive for drugs, his parenting time with the children will be suspended until he provides a clean drug test. The judgment went on to state:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] equalization payment of Forty-Five Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Eight and 88/100 Dollars ($45,698.88) paid within 90 days of this Judgment.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“On review of a court-tried case, [we will] affirm the [trial] court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Starke v. Starke, 727 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence, including its credibility determinations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “As such, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Concerning the specific issue of property division within a dissolution, such a division is presumed to be correct, and the party challenging the division bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.” Sporleder v. Sporleder, 655 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion in classifying, valuing, and dividing marital property in a dissolution proceeding, and an appellate court will interfere with the trial court's decision only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, if reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's decision, then it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. at 7-8 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The division of marital property need not be equal, but must only be fair and equitable given the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We note that in reviewing a court-tried dissolution case, our Court is predominately concerned with the correctness of the trial court's ruling rather than the route taken to reach it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “As such, we are obliged to affirm if we determine that the trial court reached the correct result, regardless of whether the trial court's proffered reasons are wrong or insufficient.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Point I

In his first point on appeal, Husband argues the trial court erred in valuing the Home at $464,300. He states that Wife's opinion of the value of the Home was based on incompetent evidence. Husband claims that a property's assessed value for property tax purposes is not competent evidence of the property's fair market value.

“As with the other aspects of dissolution cases, the trial court has broad discretion as to the valuation of marital assets.” Janet v. Janet, 638 S.W.3d 570, 580-81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

Therefore, a trial court is prohibited from entering a valuation of marital property not supported by any evidence at trial, ․but [w]hen the trial court's valuation of property is within the range of conflicting evidence of value offered at trial, the court acts within its discretion to resolve conflicts in evidence.

Id. at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence at trial was that the Home was located in Lee's Summit, Missouri. It has five bedrooms, one office, four full bathrooms, and one half bathroom. The Home was in need of repairs. The deck had holes in it. The fence was falling apart and needed to be replaced. A repainting project had been started at the home, but was never finished. There were holes in the master bedroom wall and the master bedroom closet wall. There was a dent in the master bedroom wall. The Home was purchased in September 2020 for $425,000. At the time of trial, in late 2023 through 2024, the Home had a mortgage with a balance of $386,032.

In her statement of assets and debts, Wife stated the Home had a value of $464,300. She testified that she arrived at this value from 2023 Jackson County tax assessment she received. Wife testified that Husband initially agreed with the assessed value. In his May 2022 statement of assets and debts, Husband stated the Home had a value of $475,000. In November 2023, shortly before trial, Husband amended the statement and listed the Home's value as $607,340. Husband testified this was the value placed on the Home by the mortgage holder, U.S. Bank.

A U.S. Bank manager testified that the appraisal of the Home was an automatic valuation metric. She stated, “[a]n automated valuation is conducted based on square footage of a house, rooms, and things like that. The same way the county assess [sic] your property value. And you take that and compare it to houses that are similar to the one that you're looking at doing anything with.”

Husband now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's valuation of the marital home, because that valuation was based on testimony which was purportedly incompetent, because it improperly relied on the assessment of the property for tax purposes. Husband did not object to Wife's testimony on this basis during trial, however; nor did he object to the relevance or competence of the testimony of a supervisor from the Jackson County Assessor's Office, who testified to the same value.

The argument Husband raises on appeal is an evidentiary objection, which he was required to preserve at trial by objecting when the evidence was adduced. Husband cites to a number of cases to argue that tax assessments are incompetent evidence of fair market value. Each of those cases, however, treats the question as an evidentiary issue, which must be preserved by timely objection at trial. See Esmar v. Zurich Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Mo. 1972) (rejecting appellants’ claim that trial court erroneously excluded evidence of tax assessments); Kansas City & Grandview Ry. Co. v. Haake, 53 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Mo. 1932) (awarding new trial in condemnation case where “the trial court allowed the plaintiff to put in evidence, over defendant's objections, the assessed valuation for general taxation of the land in controversy for ․ the date of the condemnation”); Moran v. Flach, 752 S.W.2d 956, 959-60 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (affirming trial court's exclusion of tax assessment as evidence of property value); State ex rel. State Hwy Comm'n v. Koziatek, 639 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (affirming exclusion of evidence of tax assessments of property); State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Blue Ridge Baptist Temple, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 248, 250-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979) (holding that tax assessments may be used to impeach an assessor who testifies to a value varying from the assessor's prior tax assessments, even though “evidence of assessed valuation is generally inadmissible to establish a present fair market value of property”); Union Elec. Co. v. Mount, 386 S.W.2d 126, 131-32 (Mo. App. 1964) (rejecting appellant's argument objecting to admission of evidence of property's assessed valuation, because appellant failed to object when evidence was admitted at trial); St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Gordon, 382 S.W.2d 451, 451 (Mo. App. 1964) (affirming award of new trial where testimony concerning assessments for tax purposes was admitted “[o]ver objection of defendant”).

Husband does not cite to a single case in which an appellate court determined that a judgment was unsupported by sufficient competent evidence due to the trial court's reliance on evidence of tax valuations which was admitted at trial without objection. The general rule is that “[a] party cannot resurrect an admissibility objection it failed to make, by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a decision because the unchallenged evidence should be disregarded.” Stock v. Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Fund, 712 S.W.3d 40, 49 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). This principle has been applied in dissolution cases, where one spouse challenges on appeal the testimony of the other spouse concerning the value of marital property. See In re Marriage of Cunningham, 571 S.W.3d 688, 697–98 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019) (rejecting husband's argument that valuation of property was against the weight of the evidence, because valuation was based on wife's hearsay testimony which merely repeated the results of a third-party appraisal; citing the rule that “[a]dequacy of the factual or scientific foundation for expert opinion is an admissibility issue which is waived absent a timely objection or motion to strike”); Quilty v. Fischer, 393 S.W.3d 130, 132–33 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (rejecting husband's claim that trial court's valuation of his shop tools was against the weight of the evidence; noting that wife “testified at trial—without objection—that the value of the tools was ‘in the neighborhood of $50,000.’ [Husband] had an opportunity at trial to challenge the $50,000 value placed on the tools during cross-examination or by his own testimony or that of other witnesses during his case in chief.”).

Having failed to object to the evidence at trial, Husband cannot now complain that the trial court relied on the evidence. The point is denied.

Point II

In his second point on appeal, Husband argues the trial court erred in ordering Husband to pay to Wife an equalization payment of $45,698.99. He states that this contradicts the earlier order in the same judgment that Husband pay Wife a $33,948.38 equalization payment. He argues that the order to pay $45,698.99 is not supported by substantial evidence.

“[T]he award of a higher percentage of the marital assets to one spouse is not a per se abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Foster, 391 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Disproportionate divisions of marital property are routinely affirmed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “That is largely due to the fact that section 452.330.1 ² sets forth a variety of relevant factors a trial court is to consider in fashioning a fair and equitable division of marital property, many of which have nothing to do with the value of the property.” Id. Section 452.330.1 states in relevant part:

In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage ․ the court ․ shall divide the marital property and marital debts in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:

(1) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children;

(2) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;

(3) The value of the nonmarital property set apart to each spouse;

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage; and

(5) Custodial arrangements for minor children.

As set forth above, the trial court's judgment is 179 pages long. The trial court made numerous detailed findings. When discussing property, the trial court included finding 414 which included a chart and found that “[t]o effect an equitable division of property, after taking into consideration all relevant factors including the factors of § 452.330.1 R.S.MO, the Court finds it just and appropriate that [Husband] pay to [Wife] the sum of $33,948.38 as an equitable division of the marital property and debt․.” This was on page 141 of the judgment. After addressing numerous other issues, the judgment states on page 153:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Wife] is awarded a judgment against [Husband] in the amount of $33,948.38 as an adjustment to effect an equitable division of property. ․

After addressing numerous other issues, the judgment states on page 176:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] equalization payment of Forty-Five Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Eight and 88/100 Dollars ($45,698.88) paid within 90 days of this Judgment.

The trial judge's signature appears on page 178 of the judgment.

In his brief, Husband states:

The error in this point is straightforward: the trial court went to great lengths to calculate what it found to be an equitable division of the marital estate, including an equalization payment for Husband to pay to Wife of $33,948.38, but then inexplicably ordered Husband to pay Wife a different amount $11,750.50 higher as the equalization payment. That higher amount lacks substantial evidence in its support. The Court should exercise its power under Rule 84.14 and modify the ordered equalization payment to be the amount the evidence supported of $33,948.38.

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The Court should therefore correct the equalization payment to be $33,948.38 as the trial court found and reiterated, and not the $45,698.88 that inexplicably appears at the end of its judgment. “Under Rule 84.14,” this Court “may enter the judgment the trial court should have entered, making any necessary corrections or amendments.”

In her brief, Wife argues that the trial court awarded Wife two separate judgment amounts: $33,948.38 and $45,698.88. Wife states that Husband's argument is that the trial court erroneously entered judgment for $45,698.88 when it really meant to reiterate the earlier award for $33,948.38 and that the two awards are duplicate awards rather than two separate awards. Wife notes that Husband did not raise this issue in his Motion to Amend the Judgment. She argues this point on appeal is not preserved.

Rule 78.07 states in relevant part:

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Rule 78.07(c), in cases tried without a jury or with an advisory jury, neither a motion for a new trial nor a motion to amend the judgment or opinion is necessary to preserve any matter for appellate review if the matter was previously presented to the trial court.

(c) In all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review.

Husband argues that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence does not need to be raised to the trial court. See § 510.310.4; Rule 73.01. In his reply brief, Husband states:

Husband is not claiming that the judgment contains a drafting error, misstates a label, or contains an internal inconsistency of form requiring correction. Instead, he is challenging whether there is substantial evidence supporting the factual determination that the equalization amount is 45,698.88.

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Here, the error Husband challenges does not arise from anything Husband did or failed to do. It is a finding that appears on the face of the judgment. The trial court made detailed findings culminating in a calculation of $33,948.38 as the equalization payment. It then repeated that amount. Then, it ordered a different amount in the decretal paragraph. That incongruous later finding does not require preservation but instead is reviewed for substantial evidence․ The error Husband challenges is not that the judgment used the wrong words or lacked particular findings but that the judgment imposes a financial obligation that the evidence does not support.

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Wife argues that the $33,948.38 figure and the $45,698.88 figure are two different awards ․. The judgment itself contradicts Wife's theory.

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If the trial court intended to award an additional equitable payment of $45,698.88, it did not say so. It did not provide findings supporting an unequal division. It did not state that misconduct required an additional award. It did not articulate any equitable basis for a second sum. It simply inserted a different number in the decretal paragraph.

Wife's suggestion that the court intended two separate awards is unsupported by the record.

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As Husband pointed out in his opening brief, this Court routinely modifies judgments where the findings support one figure but another is ordered. ․ When this happens, Rule 84.14 allows the court to enter the judgment the trial court should have entered.

That is the situation here. The trial court made explicit findings of the evidence supporting a $33,948.38 equalization payment. It did not make findings supporting the larger sum. This Court is therefore empowered to correct the judgment under Rule 84.14.

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The trial court identified the $33,948.38 figure, calculated it, adopted it, and reaffirmed it. The decretal figure of $45,698.88 is unsupported and unexplained. ․ The law of Missouri is that this Court should modify it to fit the trial court's findings of the evidence.

(Emphasis in original) (citations to the record omitted).

Husband's argument is circular. Because he did not raise the issue in his Motion to Amend the Judgment, Husband states he is not arguing that the judgment has a mistake that needs to be corrected. Yet, he asks this court to enter the judgment the trial court should have entered because the trial court intended to award $33,948.38. He does not agree that the judgment has two different monetary awards to Wife. Yet, Husband argues that the award of $45,698.88 is not supported by sufficient evidence.

Any argument that the judgment has a mistake and the court entered $45,698.88 when it intended to enter $33,948.38 is not preserved for appellate review.

Any argument that the award to Wife for $45,698.88 is not supported by sufficient evidence is without merit. Husband acknowledges “the trial court had the discretion to divide the marital estate unequally” but states “that is not what the trial court said that it was doing. The court stated that each party was to receive fifty percent of the net marital estate at $94,447.63.” (Internal quotation marks omitted).

We disagree. The trial court explicitly stated it was not going to divide the martial estate equally:

403. The Court finds that [Husband's] substantial marital misconduct imposed a disproportionate burden on [Wife]. This misconduct justifies an unequal division of marital property ․.

404. Equitable Division: The Court's division of property and debt must be equitable given the circumstances of the case, but need not be equal. ․ The Court's division of property and debt in this matter is equitable, although not equal, after consideration of the evidence and all relevant factors.

(Emphasis added). The trial court created a chart creating an equal distribution. It then entered a second provision awarding Wife an additional $45,698.88. This is entirely in line with what the trial court stated it was going to do. Contrast Torres v. Torres, 606 S.W.3d 168, 178 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (remanding for clarification where the trial court stated each party was to receive fifty percent of the marital estate but did not divide the marital estate equally).

“The division of marital property need not be equal, but must only be fair and equitable given the circumstances of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “And the trial court has substantial discretion in dividing marital property and marital debt.” Id. “An ‘equalization’ payment is awarded by the trial court to make the division more equitable, but not necessarily equal.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 406 S.W.3d 919, 925–26 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The trial court made numerous findings regarding Husband's conduct during the marriage. Wife was awarded sole custody of the children. The trial courts extensive and detailed findings on these two factors, identified in § 452.330.1, are sufficient evidence to support the award of $45,698.88.

The point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The judgment in this case is 179 pages long.

2.   All statutory citations are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented unless otherwise stated.

Anthony Rex Gabbert, Chief Judge

All concur.