STATE v. CUNNINGHAM (2026)

Micah Nathaniel Cunningham was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Schuyler County, Missouri (“trial court”), of Resisting/Interfering with Arrest for a Felony, section 575.150.¹ Cunningham was sentenced to four years in the Missouri Department of Corrections.

On appeal, Cunningham alleges that the trial court erred in overruling Cunningham's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence: 1) that Cunningham committed a felony versus a misdemeanor resisting arrest because Cunningham's arrest was for a “warrant,” not a “felony”; and 2) that Cunningham committed a felony versus a misdemeanor resisting arrest because the jury never found Cunningham resisted arrest for a felony arrest warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,² the facts are as follows. On May 10, 2023, the Circuit Court of Sullivan County, Missouri, issued a warrant for Cunningham's arrest for an E felony of resisting arrest, an A misdemeanor of driving while revoked, and a B misdemeanor of careless and imprudent driving. On May 28, 2023, two deputies attempted to serve the arrest warrant on Cunningham at the home of a third person ³ (“Homeowner”).⁴ As Deputy One approached the residence, he saw Cunningham's child outside in the yard.⁵ When the child saw Deputy One, the child “ran off” to the back side of the property. Deputy One approached the front door while Deputy Two stood near the back of the residence to watch the back door.

Homeowner eventually answered Deputy One's knock on the front door and Deputy One told Homeowner he was there to arrest Cunningham. Homeowner denied Cunningham was inside the residence and, initially, Homeowner refused consent to allow Deputy One to search the residence. Homeowner went back inside the residence for several minutes; he returned outside and then gave Deputy One permission to search the residence for Cunningham.

A few seconds after entering the residence, Deputy One heard Deputy Two yell, “he's running.” Deputy One exited the front door of the residence, rounded the corner to the back of the residence, and saw Cunningham ⁶ running away. Both deputies pursued Cunningham into a thick, wooded area. Deputy One ordered Cunningham to come out of the woods, but he did not.

Before trial, outside the hearing of the jury, Cunningham and the State entered into a stipulation. First, the State offered Exhibit 1, which was a certified copy of the warrant that had been issued for Cunningham's arrest by the Circuit Court of Sullivan County, Missouri, on May 10, 2023, for the Class E felony of resisting arrest, as well as two misdemeanor offenses. The arrest warrant was received into evidence without objection. At Cunningham's request, the parties stipulated that Exhibit 1 would not be shown to the jury, and if the jury requested exhibits during deliberations, the exhibit would not be sent back to the jury room. Cunningham specifically noted that the reason for the stipulation was because he did not want to jury to be informed as to “what that warrant was for.”

The following stipulation was read to the jury before the close of State's evidence:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's the stipulation between the defense and the State that on May, 10, 2023, that there was a [sic] active warrant for the arrest of [Cunningham] out of the Circuit Court of Sullivan County, Missouri.

After the State rested its case, Cunningham filed a written motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case; the trial court denied Cunningham's motion. Cunningham presented no evidence. The trial court also denied Cunningham's written motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence. The jury found Cunningham guilty of resisting arrest and the trial court sentenced Cunningham to a four-year prison sentence.⁷

Standard of Review

On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction, this Court “is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Beck, 717 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). In reviewing the evidence, we accept as true all evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011). We do not act as a “super juror” with veto powers, but give great deference to the trier of fact. State v. Milazzo, 711 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 2025).

Analysis

Both Cunningham's points on appeal allege the State presented insufficient evidence to prove Cunningham resisted a felony arrest such that his offense in this case was a felony. Rather, Cunningham argues that the State only proved that Cunningham resisted arrest for a warrant, and therefore he could only be convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute.

In Point I, Cunningham argues that his arrest was for a “warrant” and not for a “felony” and argues these are distinctly different bases for an arrest. Resisting or interfering with an arrest is committed when a person knows or reasonably should know a law enforcement officer is making an arrest or attempting to lawfully detain or stop the person, and for purposes of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, the person resists the arrest by fleeing. Section 575.150.1(1). The offense of resisting arrest can be either a felony or a misdemeanor. Id.; see also State v. Kiser, 722 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

A violation of Section 575.150 for resisting arrest constitutes a misdemeanor unless the offense falls under one of its provisions that increases the punishment for the offense to a Class E felony. Specific to Cunningham's case, Section 575.150.5 increases the offense of resisting arrest to a Class E felony when the arrest is for a:

(1) Felony;

(2) Warrant issued for failure to appear on a felony case; or

(3) Warrant issued for a probation violation on a felony case.

Therefore, resisting arrest is a class E felony if the offense for which the person is being arrested is “a felony.” Section 575.150.5(1).

The Eastern District of this Court recently addressed the exact issue Cunningham raises in State v. Robinson, 728 S.W.3d 904 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026), transfer denied (February 24, 2026). In Robinson, the defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for burglary in the first degree, a felony offense. Id. at 905–06. He argued, similarly to Cunningham, that only a warrantless arrest for a felony would give rise to a felony resisting arrest offense whereas he was being arrested for a warrant and not for the underlying charge giving rise to the warrant. Id. The Robinson court held that where a defendant is being arrested on a felony warrant, the defendant is being arrested “because of” or “on account of” the underlying felony. Id. “An arrest made pursuant to a warrant is not an arrest for the warrant; it is an arrest for the offense that gave rise to the warrant.” Id. (emphasis in original). We agree. Here, there is no dispute that the underlying arrest warrant included a charge of felony resisting arrest. Cunningham's arrest was not “for the warrant,” it was for the felony offense which gave rise to the arrest warrant being issued.

Point I is denied.

In Point II, Cunningham argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he committed a felony offense for resisting arrest because the jury never found that he was being arrested for a felony arrest warrant.

There is no dispute that on the first morning of trial and before jury selection, Cunningham and the State stipulated that Cunningham had an active arrest warrant and agreed that the jury would not hear evidence identifying the specific offenses set out in the warrant.⁸ The trial court then admitted a certified copy of the arrest warrant into evidence, by agreement of the parties, with the understanding that the jury would not see the actual warrant. The record reveals that Cunningham's counsel believed it was “improper for the jury to know what the warrant was for.” Cunningham admits, in his briefing to this Court, that “[u]ndoubtedly, there was evidence in the record that officers attempted to arrest [Cunningham] for a felony warrant.”

Cunningham now, for the first time on appeal, argues that his conviction for felony resisting arrest was in error in that the State failed to prove felony resisting arrest because the jury did not make a finding that the arrest warrant was for a felony. Cunningham cannot have it both ways. He specifically sought to ensure the jury was not informed of the underlying charge that was set forth in the warrant but now wants to argue the State failed to prove to the jury the nature of that charge.

“Stipulations of fact relieve the parties from proving the matters stipulated.” James v. State, 681 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citation modified) (holding motion timely filed when State admitted facts underlying defendant's compliance with time limits for filing motion). Likewise, “a judicial admission is an act done in the course of judicial proceedings that concedes for the purpose of litigation that a certain proposition is true.” State v. El-Mumin, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2698537, *8 (Mo. App. E.D. September 23, 2025) (holding defendant waived proof of the facts alleged regarding his persistent offender status when defense counsel expressly acknowledged to the trial court on behalf of his client that defendant had two prior convictions for two previous felonies).

Here, Cunningham seeks to avoid the results of the stipulation he requested at the beginning of the trial. As in James where the State was bound by admitting to facts related to timing of a motion, Cunningham is bound by the stipulation – entered into at his request – to the existence of the underlying warrant. Cunningham concedes that there was evidence in the record that officers were attempting to arrest him for a felony warrant.

Moreover, Cunningham misunderstands our standard of review on claims of sufficiency of the evidence. In State v. Tate, our Supreme Court explicitly pronounced that evidence admitted at trial, but not published to the jury, is properly considered in a sufficiency of the evidence analysis. 708 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Mo. banc 2025) (overruling previous cases that limited the sufficiency analysis to evidence admitted to trial and published to the jury and holding that admitted, but unpublished, medical records are properly considered in a sufficiency analysis even when they were not “presented” to the jury). In Tate, the Court noted that the “critical inquiry is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation modified).

Not only is evidence admitted at trial but not published to the jury properly considered in a sufficiency analysis, “[i]t is the nature of the offense for which the individual is arrested that matters under section 575.150.5(1), not the means by which the officer came to make the arrest.” Robinson, 728 S.W.3d at 906; see also State v. Cross, 672 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (noting that a resisting arrest charge constituted felony resisting arrest because the warrant on which the defendant was arrested was for a felony); State v. Johnson, 613 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (holding an arrest on a warrant for a parole violation was not for a felony under section 575.150.5.(1) because a parole violation itself did not constitute a felony).

In Cunningham's trial, by agreement of both Cunningham and the State, the jury did not see the underlying warrant related to Cunningham's arrest. But the warrant was admitted into evidence, and Cunningham does not dispute that the admitted certified record was for an arrest warrant arising from a felony. Just as the admitted but unpublished medical records were properly considered in analyzing sufficiency of the evidence in Tate, here too the admitted but unpublished felony warrant is properly considered in our determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Cunningham of felony resisting arrest. In reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence that the underlying warrant was for a felony and two misdemeanors. Accordingly, because the State presented sufficient evidence that Cunningham resisted arrest for a felony (itself a felony charge of resisting arrest), Point II is denied.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as updated by supplement through 2025.

2.   See State v. Hendricks, 619 S.W.3d 171, 173 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (on appeal, evidence viewed in light most favorable to the verdict).

3.   Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not list the names of individuals and witnesses other than parties.

4.   Cunningham's relationship to Homeowner is not clear from the record.

5.   The parties do not dispute that Deputy One correctly identified the child as Cunningham's.

6.   Deputy One testified that he was “familiar” with Cunningham and knew what he looked like.

7.   Cunningham was charged as a prior offender under section 558.016.

8.   Clearly, Cunningham had valid reasons to try to keep the jury from hearing that the warrant the officers were trying to serve upon him was for the same offense that he was charged with herein.

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge

All concur