200 ARMOUR BOULEVARD LLC v. JUDSON (2026)

Tabitha A. Judson (“Judson”) appeals from the trial court's judgment granting 200 W Armour Boulevard, LLC (“200 Armour”) a prescriptive easement over a piece of land owned by Judson. Because Judson's notice of appeal was not timely filed, the appeal is dismissed.

Factual and Procedural History

The dispute in this case regards the use of a strip of paved property (“the Disputed Tract”) located between the parties’ buildings in Kansas City, Missouri. Judson owns and lives in a home facing east onto Wyandotte Street. 200 Armour owns the Del Monte, an H-shaped apartment building facing Armour Boulevard to the south, with Wyandotte Street to its immediate east side. On the northern, rear side of the Del Monte, facing Judson's home, is a paved alcove that contains parking spaces for the Del Monte. The Disputed Tract runs east to west between Judson's home and the Del Monte. Judson's home is to the north of the Disputed Tract, the Del Monte is to the south of the Disputed Tract, Wyandotte Street is to the east, and Central Street is at the far opposite end of the block past several other residential structures, to the west.

The parties agree that the Disputed Tract is located entirely on Judson's property. However, testimony at trial revealed that for a number of years, 200 Armour used the Disputed Tract in several specific ways. First, residents of the Del Monte would exit out of the rear doors of the building and travel on the Disputed Tract. Second, trash bins were stored in the northern Del Monte alcove and the trash truck would drive on the Disputed Tract a couple times a week to collect the trash. Third, residents would move in and out of apartments through the Del Monte's alcove instead of through the main entrance on Armour Boulevard, using the Disputed Tract to gain access to the alcove. Fourth, Del Monte maintenance personnel traversed the Disputed Tract in using the rear doors of the Del Monte as a service entrance. Testimony also revealed that tenants of neighboring apartments and the public utilized the Disputed Tract in various ways.

Such use persisted with little conflict between the parties from 2002 until 2014. Then, however, a dispute between the parties arose and as time went on, an increasing number of confrontations occurred regarding each party's use of the Disputed Tract. Eventually, Judson installed bollards along the Wyandotte entrance to the Disputed Tract in February 2017. She then installed bollards on the back of the Disputed Tract in 2019. Such bollards were present at the time of trial, creating a physical barrier impeding use of the Disputed Tract.

In 2019, 200 Armour brought suit against Judson seeking a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over the Disputed Tract. The case proceeded to a bench trial in April 2022. The trial court entered judgment on March 15, 2024, granting 200 Armour a prescriptive easement over the Disputed Tract. This appeal follows.

Timeliness of Appeal

We must first address 200 Armour's assertion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Judson's appeal because she failed to timely file a notice of appeal. To do so, a brief reiteration of the procedural history of the case is necessary. The trial court filed its original judgment in this case on March 15, 2024 (“Original Judgment”), which awarded a prescriptive easement to 200 Armour. Judson filed various timely after-trial motions. On April 25, 2024 the trial court first denied Judson's after-trial motions, after which it entered an amended judgment (“Amended Judgment”) which altered the allocation of costs, a matter not prayed for in the after-trial motions.¹ Judson then filed an additional after-trial motion, which was denied by the trial court on June 10, 2024. Judson filed her notice of appeal ten days later on June 20, 2024.

On appeal, 200 Armour argues the trial court's Amended Judgment is void because the trial court did not have authority to amend the Original Judgment beyond providing the relief requested in the timely after-trial motions. Thus, 200 Armour asserts the Amended Judgment was a nullity that did not prevent the Original Judgment from becoming final because it altered the court's disposition as to costs, which was not requested by the timely after-trial motions. In 200 Armour's view, the Original Judgment became final on April 25th when the trial court denied all pending after-trial motions, and therefore, because Judson did not file her notice of appeal within ten days of April 25th, it is untimely.

We agree the notice of appeal is untimely, and 200 Armour's argument is well-taken.² However, we utilize a different analysis, one which precedes 200 Armour's argument in time and renders such argument irrelevant. We do this because “an appellate court has a sua sponte duty to determine its jurisdiction in every appeal.” Mukanjiri v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan. City, 718 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citing Cook v. Griffitts, 498 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). The natural corollary to this is that our obligation must include addressing jurisdiction in some fashion other than that proposed by a party, when necessary.

“Timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” Fid. Real Est. Co. v. Norman, 586 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Tr., 336 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Mo. banc 2011)). “If a notice of appeal is untimely, the appellate court is without jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.” Id. (quoting Spicer, 336 S.W.3d at 471). “Rule 81.04(a) requires the notice of appeal to be filed no later than [ten] days ‘after the judgment, decree, or order appealed from becomes final.’ ” Heifetz v. Apex Clayton, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo. banc 2018). “[W]hen a judgment becomes final for purposes of filing a notice of appeal depends, in part, on whether an authorized after-trial motion was filed.” Id.

“Rule 75.01 allows trial courts to ‘retain control[ ] over judgments during the [thirty]-day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment within that time.’ ” State ex rel. Hawley v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 558 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Rule 75.01). “A judgment becomes final after this [thirty]-day window expires if neither party has filed an authorized after-trial motion.” Williams v. Mercy Clinic Springfield Cmtys., 568 S.W.3d 396, 411 (Mo. banc 2019) (citing Rule 81.05). However, “[t]he filing of a timely authorized after-trial motion extends a trial court's jurisdiction for up to ninety days ․ ” Heifetz, 554 S.W.3d at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massman Constr. Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. banc 1996)). Under Rule 81.05, after the filing of such a motion, the judgment becomes final at the earlier of:

(A) [Ninety] days from the date the last timely motion was filed, on which date all motions not ruled shall be deemed overruled; or

(B) If all motions have been ruled, then the date of ruling of the last motion to be ruled or [thirty] days after entry of judgment, whichever is later.

Rule 81.05(a)(2).

Once a judgment becomes final, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. State ex rel. AJKJ, Inc. v. Hellmann, 574 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Mo. banc 2019) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained “this [ninety]-day extension terminates, and the [trial] court loses jurisdiction[,] when the [trial] court rules, or declines to rule, on all timely authorized after-trial motions.” Cole v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 713 S.W.3d 180, 193 (Mo. banc 2025) (citing Rule 81.05(a)(2)(A)-(B)). “Generally, the trial court loses the authority to control a judgment for most purposes once it rules on an authorized after-trial motion.” In re A.L.W., 623 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing State ex rel. Steinmeyer v. Coburn, 671 S.W.2d 366, 371-72 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984)).

Here, after the trial court entered its Original Judgment on March 15th, Judson filed a timely motion to amend the judgment or for a new trial (“Motion”), which extended the trial court's jurisdiction over the case for an additional ninety days, or until the Motion was ruled upon, whichever came first.³ The trial court denied the Motion on April 25th. The Original Judgment became final the moment the trial court ruled on Judson's Motion, and the trial court immediately thereafter lost jurisdiction over the case. This made the Original Judgment the operative final judgment from which Judson could appeal. The trial court's subsequent entry of the Amended Judgment later that day is void and of no effect.⁴ Hellmann, 574 S.W.3d at 242 (“Following divestiture, any attempt by the trial court to continue to exhibit authority over the case, whether by amending the judgment or entering subsequent judgments, is void.” (quoting Spicer, 336 S.W.3d at 470)); accord WI 909 Walnut, LLC v. 909 Walnut Tower, LLC, 717 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (holding a trial court had no authority to enter a new or different judgment once its previous judgment on the matter become final); Bank of Brookfield-Purdin, N.A. v. Burns, 730 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987) (deeming a trial court's order without force or effect because it was entered after the court ruled on the motion for new trial).

Because the Amended Judgment is void, Judson was required to file her notice of appeal within ten days of the Original Judgment, which became final on April 25th when the Motion was denied. Her notice of appeal filed on June 20th, in reliance on the void Amended Judgment, is ineffective. “If the trial court lacked authority to enter the judgment on which review is sought, and the appeal is filed out of time, then the appellate court cannot review it on the merits.” A.L.W., 623 S.W.3d at 646 (citation omitted). Likewise, “[i]f the notice of appeal is untimely, we are without jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.” Douglas v. Off. of State Cts. Adm'r, 470 S.W.3d 29, 30 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citing Relaxation, Inc. v. RIS, Inc., 452 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). This is where we find ourselves in this case.

Conclusion

The trial court's Amended Judgment entered April 25, 2024 is void. Judson's notice of appeal was not timely filed in relation to the final judgment (Original Judgment) in this case, entered March 15, 2024 and which became final April 25, 2024. The appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court's order denying Judson's after-trial motions bears a file stamp noting the order was electronically filed in the trial court's division at “18:50.” The Amended Judgment also bears a file stamp noting it was electronically filed in the trial court's division at “18:53,” and thus after the order denying the after-trial motions. See Rules 43.02(b), 103.06(f).All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024).

2.   Under Rule 75.01, the trial court retains the authority to amend a judgment on its own motion for thirty days after the judgment's entry. In this case, that thirty-day period expired on April 15, 2024 (April 14th being a Sunday). “[O]nce the thirty[-]day period in Rule 75.01 expires, a trial court's authority to grant relief is constrained by and limited to the grounds raised in a timely filed, authorized after-trial motion.” State ex rel. AJKJ, Inc. v. Hellmann, 574 S.W.3d 239, 242 n.3 (Mo. banc 2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting Massman Constr. Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 802-03 (Mo. banc 1996)). Here, Judson's after-trial motions did not challenge the Original Judgment's allocation of costs; therefore, the trial court had no authority to amend the judgment to address that issue once the thirty-day period specified in Rule 75.01 had expired.

3.   A motion to amend the judgment is an authorized, after-trial motion. Heifetz, 554 S.W.3d at 393.

4.   It is for this reason 200 Armour's argument is not relevant. Because the after-trial motions were ruled upon prior to the entry of the purported amended judgment, there is no amended judgment to which to apply 200 Armour's analysis as it has been rendered void.

W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

All concur.