STATE v. BROWN (2026)

On November 20, 2024, Timothy Edward Brown was convicted by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri (“trial court”), following a jury trial, of first-degree statutory sodomy, section 566.062 ¹ , enticement of a child, section 566.151, third-degree child molestation, section 566.069, and felony sexual misconduct involving a child, section 566.083. Having waived his right to jury sentencing, the trial court sentenced Brown to a total of sixty-four years in prison. Brown timely appealed.

Brown claims four points of error on appeal. In point I, Brown alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Brown's objection and admitting the propensity testimony of another alleged victim ² (“Indiana Victim”) because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In point II, Brown alleges that the trial court plainly erred in overruling Brown's objection and failing to grant Brown's request for a curative instruction after the jury was permitted to hear testimony that Brown initially believed the Children's Division Investigator was interviewing Brown about a different victim. In point III, Brown alleges that the trial court erred in entering judgment on the verdict of the count of enticement of a child because the State failed to prove Brown's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, in point IV, Brown alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Brown's objection and permitting the State to admit Indiana Victim's victim impact statement at sentencing.

We affirm the sentence and judgment of the trial court.

Factual background 3 and procedural history

In late Spring of 2019, just after turning twelve years old, C.W. (“Victim”) began attending Wednesday evening youth group activities (“Youth Group”) at the Frederick Boulevard Baptist Church in St. Joseph, Missouri (“St. Joseph Church”). The Youth Group was supervised by the church youth pastor (“Youth Pastor”) and adult volunteers, including Brown. By the time Victim began attending Youth Group, Youth Pastor had been working at the St. Joseph Church for several years. Brown was already volunteering with the St. Joseph Church Youth Group when Youth Pastor was hired.

In November 2019, Youth Pastor notified Victim's parents that “there had been an incident” between Victim and Brown. Youth Pastor sent Victim's parents a video ⁴ of the incident; Brown was dismissed from his volunteer duties working with the Youth Group because of this incident.

The video showed Brown placing Victim on his lap. The video also showed a kicking and fighting incident between Victim and another Youth Group attendee. When Youth Pastor initially contacted Victim's parents, the conversation focused both on Victim's behavior of not listening to authority and that a male volunteer had put his hands on the Victim. When Victim's parents showed Victim the video, she became upset and tense. When Victim's parents asked her if Brown had ever touched her before, Victim grew defensive, claimed nothing had happened, and refused to discuss it. No police report was made at the time. At Youth Pastor's recommendation, Victim's parents kept her home from Youth Group for several weeks “until she [was] able to obey authority and not act out.” At some point after the video surfaced, Victim began journaling about her thoughts and feelings associated with the incidents involving Brown.

At trial, Victim testified that she did not tell her parents what Brown had done to her when they initially viewed the video together because she felt “[g]uilt, shame,” and “[she] didn't really understand it, because I was 13.” Nonetheless, Victim's mother testified that “every few months” Victim “would bring up the situation.” Victim's mother testified that she was “always a little perplex[ed]” when Victim revisited the incident because Victim's mother thought, “[i]t's been discussed; it's been handled; it's done; you won't have any contact with him.” Victim would say, “[h]e touched me, though.” Victim's mother grew frustrated with the ongoing dialogue because Victim's mother believed “there's nothing else to be done.”

In the years from 2019 to 2023, Victim testified that she told several friends about the incidents with Brown. Ultimately, one of her friends told her mother, who then contacted Victim's parents. Still, even after Victim showed her parents how Brown had touched her during a Youth Group basketball game, Victim's parents believed there was nothing more they could do about it. Victim's mental health continued to decline with panic and anxiety attacks at school and, in September of 2023, Victim's teacher referred Victim to the school counselor (“Counselor”). When Victim and Counselor first met, Victim “was not ready to talk at all.” Shortly thereafter, the school nurse notified Counselor that Victim was crying in the bathroom. The following day, Victim went to Counselor with her journal. Victim eventually permitted Counselor to read her journal while Victim sat in the Counselor's office.⁵ After Counselor read Victim's journal, Counselor told Victim that Counselor would have to call Victim's parents and make a hotline report.

When Victim's mother arrived at Victim's school she was told about Victim's disclosures, the journal, and the hotline report. Victim allowed her mother to read the journal. Victim's mother testified that she then apologized to Victim because she learned “a lot more than [she] previously knew.”

Victim's journal contained more than twenty-five pages of Victim's memories of interactions between Victim and Brown as well as Victim's thoughts and feelings in the years following those interactions. At trial, Victim testified that when she attended Youth Group, Brown “would touch me, sexually touch me, and he would tell me things that a 13-year-old should not hear.” Brown first made Victim uncomfortable when he “grabbed [Victim's] butt in a game of basketball.” Brown told Victim that “he was just guarding [her] and there's nothing more to it.” Victim testified that after the first interaction Brown made Victim feel uncomfortable every week at Youth Group. Victim particularly mentioned Brown telling Victim that he loved her and she “meant the world to me.” As the weeks went on, Brown vacillated between telling Victim that her world “is a piece of shit” and that she “didn't belong here” to “the reason you are on this Earth is to please my desires” and “you are a woman and you need to be with me.”

On one occasion when the Youth Group was doing a game with Snickers candy bars, Victim testified that Brown said, “[o]h, I bet you would like my Snickers” before exposing the tip of his penis to Victim. Brown told Victim to touch it and wanted Victim to look at it. Victim refused.

Victim also testified that, on another occasion, Brown was “very upset” with Victim when she did not meet him at his car after Brown told Victim to “come to my car so we can have some alone time together.” When Brown returned inside, he castigated Victim for not meeting him at his car and said she “just made things worse.” He then grabbed her and forcefully put her on his lap. There was also an incident where Brown came out of the bathroom and forced Victim to drink from a cup full of an unknown liquid or “he would rape [Victim].” Brown told Victim that “drinking this liquid ․ was close enough to having sex with her.”

Each week the Youth Group had a worship service during which the lights were turned down. Victim testified that on multiple occasions during the worship services, Brown grabbed Victim's hips, forced her onto his lap, and touched her breasts and her vagina both over and under her clothes. If Victim tried to pull away, Brown would forcefully pull her back onto his lap. Victim described bruising on her waist and hips after some of these encounters. Brown once gave Victim lingerie and told her to wear it under her clothes to church.

As a result of the hotline call, in October of 2023, Victim met with an investigator from the Children's Division (“Investigator”) and, later that month, a forensic interviewer with the Child Advocacy Center. Records of both interviews were provided to the Family Crimes Division detectives with the St. Joseph Police Department (“Detectives”).

Investigator also interviewed Brown. Investigator testified to the following facts from that interview. First, Brown signed a waiver of rights. Brown was then told that he was being interviewed in connection with allegations by Victim. Initially, Brown said he assumed he was being interviewed about a “different victim.”⁶ When asked, Investigator testified that Brown did not identify the “other victim.” At that point in the Investigator's testimony, Brown's counsel objected to use of the term “victim” on the basis that it violated the pre-trial orders of the trial court. The trial court overruled the objection after the State commented that it was “just using the language of the witness.”

In the course of further conversation with Investigator, Brown admitted that during his volunteer work with Youth Group at St. Joseph Church he once grabbed Victim and pulled her onto his lap. Unprompted, Brown also told Investigator that he had waited until age 23 and he was married to have sex with his wife and then said, “I have asked for forgiveness.” Investigator did not know to whom Brown was referring when Brown said he had asked for forgiveness.

After watching the recordings of Victim's interviews, Detectives ⁷ then furthered the investigation by interviewing Youth Pastor and the senior pastor at St. Joseph Church. From the investigation, Detectives learned that there were allegations of inappropriate touching made against Brown years earlier when he worked at a church in Bedford, Indiana (“Indiana Church”).⁸ After reaching out to Indiana Church and obtaining the identity of the person who had previously made allegations of inappropriate touching by Brown, Detectives reached out to the Indiana Victim.

Detectives also interviewed Brown. After Brown completed a waiver of rights, Detectives told Brown they were interviewing him about Victim. Initially, Brown said he did not remember Victim. Later, after Brown was asked why he was no longer a volunteer at St. Joseph Church, he remembered that one day at Youth Group he had to control Victim by grabbing her and pulling her onto his lap. Brown also said that there were other times Victim would follow him around, come and sit on his lap, and that she was very attached to him.

When asked why he left his past churches, Brown said his “time was just up” and he moved on to youth pastor work at a different church. Brown also volunteered that because of his diabetic medication he was unable to get an erection and had suffered with erectile dysfunction for approximately eight years. Brown did not testify at trial and called no witnesses.

The State called a therapist (“Therapist”) to testify as an expert on child sex abuse. Therapist never met with Victim. Therapist testified extensively on the ways in which a perpetrator may “groom” a child to establish trust and secrecy, including how the perpetrator may use religion to support abuse. Therapist also testified about the ways a child may disclose abuse and how disclosures can be affected by the response of the adults to whom the abuse is disclosed. Finally, delayed disclosure (anything that takes longer than a week after the event or events) is the “most common.” Statistically, eighty-six percent of child sexual abuse is never disclosed.

Over objection, Indiana Victim testified at trial about events that happened to her from 1999 - 2002. Indiana Victim testified that, beginning at age nine or ten and until age thirteen, Brown was her youth pastor at Indiana Church. She stated that her relationship with Brown grew very close and that they discussed everything from “kid drama” to how she felt about her “relationship with God and the church.”

Indiana Victim testified that when she was ten years old, Brown took her to his private study, closed the door, and gave her a teen study bible that included colorful inserted pages involving discussions of relationships, dating, friendships, and sex. He then pressed himself up behind her and she could feel his erection. Indiana Victim also testified that they frequently played games at the church where they hid in the dark. During those games, Brown would expose his penis to Indiana Victim while they hid together. On at least one occasion Brown and Indiana Victim hid behind the baptismal and Brown asked Indiana Victim “to give [his penis] a little kiss.”

Indiana Victim also testified that, at numerous volunteer events connected with the Indiana Church youth group, Brown exposed his penis to Indiana Victim and put his hand underneath her skirt and touched parts of her vagina. Indiana Victim testified that Brown exposed his penis to her “more than 50” times. Ultimately, Indiana Victim shared the events with her mother who then told the senior pastor of Indiana Church. The allegations were never turned over to law enforcement. Brown was allowed to resign from his position rather than be fired.

The jury convicted Brown on all four counts. Brown waived jury sentencing. Brown's motion for new trial was overruled. At the sentencing hearing, following the receipt of victim impact statements from the Victim, each of her parents, and the Indiana Victim, the Court sentenced Brown to a total prison term of sixty-four years.

Standard of Review

Brown raises four claims of error on appeal. In Point I, Brown claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the propensity testimony of Indiana Victim because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We review the trial court's ruling to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Mo. banc 2017).

Brown's Point II argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to grant a curative instruction after the Investigator testified that Brown alluded to a “different victim” during his interview. Plain error review is discretionary; this Court may exercise its discretion where the error is evident, obvious, and clear and when manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice will result from the failure to correct the alleged error. State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582-83 (Mo. banc 2025) (interpreting and applying Rule 30.20 ⁹ ).

In Point III, Brown argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment on Count II, enticement of a child, because the State failed to prove Brown's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Boyd, 659 S.W.3d 914, 925 (Mo. banc 2023).

Finally, in Point IV, Brown claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Indiana Victim's impact statement at sentencing. An abuse of discretion in sentencing occurs only “when the trial court's action is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.” State v. Fields, 480 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

Analysis

I. Abuse of Discretion to Admit Propensity Evidence from Indiana Victim.

The trial court has “wide discretion over issues of relevancy and admissibility of evidence.” Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 818. This discretion affords the trial court “broad leeway in choosing to admit evidence; therefore, an exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the logic of the circumstances.” State v. Primm, 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011).

While propensity evidence generally is excluded in criminal prosecutions,

[I]n prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving a victim under eighteen years of age, relevant evidence of prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible for the purpose of corroborating the victim's testimony or demonstrating the defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is presently charged. The Court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Mo. Const. art I, sec. 18(c); State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 282-83 (Mo. banc 2018) (interpreting and applying Mo. Const. art I, sec. 18(c) to affirm the “well-recognized exception to the general ban on propensity evidence” in cases involving sexual misconduct with a minor child).

To be probative, “the evidence of the prior criminal act must tend to show the defendant actually had a propensity to commit the charged crime at the time it is alleged to have occurred.” Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 289. Factors to consider in evaluating the probative value of such evidence include “the similarity between the prior act and the charged act, the amount of time between the acts, and the prosecution's need for the evidence to prove its case.” State v. Watson, 697 S.W.3d 44, 54 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified); see also State v. Brown, 596 S.W.3d 193, 208-09 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (finding evidence probative, despite significant gap in time, where conduct, age of victims, and surrounding circumstances were very similar).

In assessing the risk of unfair prejudice, the trial court may consider whether the jury is informed whether the defendant was punished for the prior act, how the prosecution proves the prior act, how the prosecution uses the evidence of the prior act, and whether the evidence of the prior act eclipses the evidence of the charged crime. Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290-91. The factors considered and the weight given to each factor will vary from case to case. Id. at 288; State v. Shepard, 662 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (“to the extent any factor is relevant in a particular case, it is but one consideration in the overall probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test”).

Here, Indiana Victim testified to specific events that took place between Brown and her more than twenty years prior to the charged offense—events that are extremely similar to those inflicted on Victim. Both victims were similarly young in age, both acts involved Brown groping the victims’ breasts and touching their vaginas, both involved exposing his penis, both involved interactions that took place in the “safe space” of church youth groups, and both included multiple interactions that escalated over time.

The time lapse between the acts perpetrated against these two victims does “not automatically render evidence of prior criminal acts inadmissible.” State v. Robinson, 662 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (citation modified) (“On the contrary, an inference of propensity might be proper notwithstanding a significant time lapse between the prior crime and the charged crime if the two crimes are highly similar.”); see also State v. Brammer, 614 S.W.3d 18, 27-28 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (despite the sizeable amount of time between the past allegations and the current charges, the evidence was highly probative of defendant's tendency to commit these types of child-sex crimes because the acts were substantially similar to the current charges); State v. Pierce, 678 S.W.3d 115, 122 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (defendant's commission of similar acts of abuse against other similar-aged victims was afforded “great weight” despite nearly forty years between the currently-charged acts and those committed against the propensity witness).

Moreover, the State used Indiana Victim's testimony to corroborate Victim's allegations, particularly because Brown focused his defense on attacking Victim's credibility. See Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290 (noting that the probative value of propensity evidence is enhanced where the only eyewitness to the sexual abuse is the victim and the defense attacks the victim's credibility). The prior unadjudicated acts evidence need not be absolutely necessary to the State's case; “it need only be helpful or practically necessary.” Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 770 (citation modified). In the present case, the similarity of the abuse along with the lack of forensic evidence and the attacks on Victim's credibility strongly suggest that the evidence was highly probative.

Conversely, although there was danger of unfair prejudice from Indiana Victim's testimony, that danger was minimized by the way the State presented the evidence. While Indiana Victim did testify that Brown's prior abuse was never reported to law enforcement in Indiana, that evidence came in through cross-examination. A defendant's complaint of unfair prejudice arising from the disclosure of previous unadjudicated criminal acts is diluted when it is defense counsel who elicits the testimony. See State v. Coyle, 671 S.W.3d 702, 725 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

Indiana Victim's allegations were presented to the jury through her live testimony. The risk of unfair prejudice increases if the testimony is presented live, is overly detailed, graphic, and not dispassionate. Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 213 (holding that the high probative value of the propensity evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice largely because of the “inflammatory manner” in which the State presented the evidence at trial and repeatedly referred to defendant as a “pedophile” in closing argument despite no official pedophilia diagnosis); see also State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 739 (Mo. banc 2022) (J. Powell, concurring) (affirming the propriety of admitting propensity testimony of two other unadjudicated victims while reflecting on the potential risks of admitting unadjudicated propensity evidence in child sexual abuse cases when the evidence is presented by a “living, breathing person recounting unfathomable details of traumatic events and abuse” compounded by “the fundamental problem of establishing the defendant engaged in the unadjudicated criminal act”).

Still, admitting the testimony of prior bad acts is “not per se unfairly prejudicial.” Shepard, 662 S.W.3d at 771 (holding probative value of live testimony about defendant's prior uncharged acts outweighed unfair prejudice despite uncharged acts being different in nature from charged acts because testimony was brief, not elaborately detailed, and did not eclipse victim's testimony).

Here, the Indiana Victim testified specifically and mostly dispassionately about the sexual abuse she endured from Brown. The description of the abuse was necessarily graphic in order to be clearly understood and to show the similarity between those acts and the charged offenses, but nothing in the record suggests that Indiana Victim embellished or was overly emotional in testifying regarding the events Brown perpetrated against her. Indiana Victim was permitted to testify to the long-term repercussions she believes she suffered from Brown's actions, and that testimony likely was jarring to the jury. Nonetheless, in contrast to the testimony in State v. Brown, where two previous victims were permitted to testify in great detail about defendant raping them, there is nothing in the record suggesting Indiana Victim's testimony was overly graphic or that it implicated anyone other than Indiana Victim. See Brown, 596 S.W.3d at 213 (two previous victims testified about their forcible rape in graphic and passionate detail and described an unnamed third victim).

Further, in contrast to the manner in which the State argued the prior uncharged rapes in Brown, including repeatedly branding the defendant a “pedophile” and using the propensity evidence at least five times in closing to “essentially invite the jury to convict” defendant “because he [was] a pedophile,” here the State precisely limited its opening statement and closing argument to explaining that it asked Indiana Victim to testify only to show Brown had a propensity to commit the acts the State charged Brown with committing. Lastly, despite the court finding plain error in Brown, the Brown court emphasized that the trial court had the discretion to allow some evidence of the two prior rapes as propensity evidence. Id. Here, we believe the trial court adhered to an appropriate level of discretion and that the danger of unfair prejudice was not substantially outweighed by the probative value of the propensity evidence.

Weighing the probative value of Indiana Victim's testimony versus the danger of unfair prejudice in this case, we find no error in the trial court's ruling allowing the admission of Indiana Victim's testimony.

Point I is denied.

II. Plain Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury to Disregard the Investigator's Testimony.

Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude “any reference whatsoever to any conclusory statements that [listing of types of abuse] were committed by defendant against the alleged victim.” The State did not object to the motion. At trial, the State asked the Investigator if, during her interview of Brown, Investigator “explain[ed] to the defendant that the allegations were concerning [name of victim]?” The Investigator replied that she did and that Brown replied that “[h]e was under the assumption that [Investigator] was there for a different victim.” The State then asked Investigator if Brown told Investigator “who that other victim he thought you were there for was.” After Investigator replied, “[n]o,” defense counsel objected to the term “victim” on the basis that it violated the pretrial orders of the trial court. Defense counsel asked that the term “victim” be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it. The State responded that it “was just using the language of the witness.” The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection.

The parties agree that Brown's claim of error was not preserved and is reviewable only for plain error under Rule 30.20. Brown concedes in his brief that the objection at trial was limited to the use of the word “victim” and that the objection did not raise the issue of relevance or other uncharged bad acts, which is the basis of the argument raised on appeal. The grant of plain error review by an appellate court is discretionary and should “be used sparingly.” Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 584. This Court may, in its discretion, engage in plain error review under Rule 30.20 only if the appellant establishes facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court committed “plain error affecting substantial rights” and if it also finds a “manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted.” Id. at 582-83 (citation modified).

An error affecting substantial rights is an error that is “facially evident, obvious, and clear.” Id. at 583 (citation modified) (noting that the terminology signifies that the trial court “definitively should have recognized the error”). The error must be so obvious and clear that the trial court is obligated to step in even though no party has raised the issue or requested the court do so. Id. The “flagrancy” of the error is further highlighted when it affects “substantial rights.” Id. Substantial rights reflects the court's concern that the error, if left uncorrected, could result in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Id.

Manifest injustice requires more than prejudice alone. Id. Rather, appellant must show that his rights will suffer so substantially from the error that a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will occur if the error is left uncorrected. Id. (declining to review for plain error because, while the circuit court may have erred in submitting an improper jury instruction with language that varied from the charged offense, the error was not “evident, obvious, and clear”).

Against this backdrop we review the Investigator's trial testimony related to her interview with Brown. The State argues that the Investigator's testimony did not violate Brown's motion in limine. We agree. The motion in limine sought an order prohibiting any witness from testifying regarding the witness's opinion that Brown committed a specific offense against the Victim. This witness merely testified that when Brown was interviewed he indicated his belief the authorities were there to talk about a different victim. This testimony was not prohibited by the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine.

Brown advances multiple arguments to support his position that the two references to “victim” by the Investigator rise to the level of plain error. Seeing no evident, obvious, and clear error, and given that the reference was very brief and that two alleged victims testified at trial, we decline to exercise our discretion to grant further review of this claim of error.

Point II is denied.

III. Sufficient Evidence to Establish Enticement of a Child Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.

Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove enticement of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown was explicitly charged with enticement of a child by soliciting the Victim. Brown argues that the evidence showed only an attempt to persuade, solicit, coax or entice but it did not show actual enticement. Brown acknowledges that the punishment for attempted enticement and enticement are identical but argues his conviction must be overturned because he was charged and convicted only of enticement and not attempted enticement. Ultimately, Brown asserts that the term “solicits” is ambiguous and further, because the statute and the verdict directors ¹⁰ distinguish between enticement and attempted enticement, those must be distinct crimes. Brown did not object to the proffered instructions at trial.

Sufficiency of the evidence claims are automatically preserved for appellate review. State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Mo. banc 2015). All record evidence should be considered in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, even if that evidence was not published to or reviewed by the jury. State v. Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Mo. banc 2025). This Court is limited to determining whether that evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Finally, this Court is limited to reviewing appellant's claim based on how the crime was charged rather than examining the verdict director. State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Mo. banc 2016) (abrogated on other grounds).

The crime of enticement of a child or attempt to commit enticement of a child requires the State prove that 1) a person twenty-one years of age or older, 2) persuades, solicits, coaxes, entices, or lures whether by words or actions, 3) any person less than fifteen years of age for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct. Section 566.151.1, 3 (emphasis added).¹¹ “An attempt to commit enticement has the same penalty as actual enticement.” State v. Cooper, 669 S.W.3d 370, 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (interpreting section 566.151.3). On appeal Brown argues exclusively about the element of enticement by soliciting and does not dispute that, at the time of the alleged sexual conduct, he was a person over the age of twenty-one and Victim was a person under the age of fifteen.

In State v. Doubenmier, the Southern District of this Court affirmed a conviction for enticement of a child where the defendant texted a police officer posing as the victim with photos of his penis, described his penis, suggested she should come to his town to see him and said that if he had the money, he would come to her town and get a motel room. 444 S.W.3d 921, 924, 928-29 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (holding there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer and find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's purpose in communicating with the victim was to entice her to meet him for purposes of engaging in sex despite there being no agreed upon time and place to meet).

Here, Brown was charged with enticement because he “solicited” Victim by asking her to come out to his car so they could have some fun together, and he did so for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with Victim. The evidence of enticement included testimony from Victim that Brown told her he wanted her to come out to his car “so we can have some alone time together.” Victim testified that immediately after this statement, Brown went out to his car and Victim stayed in the church gym. When Brown returned to the gym Victim testified Brown was “very upset” that Victim had not joined him in his car and that Brown told Victim she had “just made things worse and that [she] should have listened to him and came [sic] out to his car.” Victim's journal also documented this encounter and exchange, adding that when Brown returned to the gym he pulled Victim onto his lap, put his hands down her pants and told her that “if [she] had just listened then [they] could have had some fun together/alone time.”

The evidence at trial surpasses the evidence of enticement in Doubenmier where the defendant solicited a police officer who was pretending to be an underaged girl with only text messages. Here the evidence showed that Brown solicited the Victim by telling her to meet him at his car, immediately leaving the church to go to his car, subsequently returning to the church, and declaring that if Victim had listened to him they could have had some fun together. Pursuant to the statute, once Brown solicited the Victim, the offense of enticement was completed, not merely attempted, even though his solicitation was unsuccessful. We find the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the charge of enticement of a child beyond a reasonable doubt.

Point III is denied.

IV. Abuse of Discretion to Consider Indiana Victim's Impact Statement at Sentencing.

Brown argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion when it admitted and considered the Indiana Victim's impact statement at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, Brown argues that, under Section 595.229.2 ¹² , because the Indiana Victim was not a victim in the present case, her victim impact testimony did not relate to the charged offenses and was inadmissible for purposes of determining Brown's sentence.

An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's “decision to admit or exclude evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. banc 2019) (citation modified).

Section 595.229.2 provides, in relevant part, that at the time of sentencing of any person who has been found guilty of a felony offense, “the victim of such offense may appear before the court ․ for the purpose of making a statement or may submit a written statement.” Section 557.229.2 “does not restrict or modify the common law rule that a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry, broad in scope, largely unlimited in nature either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” Fujimoto v. State, 407 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (citation modified) (affirming admissibility of testimony during sentencing from a local victims’ rights representative and one of defendant's victims from a prior, unrelated case); see also Figgins v. State, 858 S.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993) (affirming admissibility of testimony during sentencing from representative of local advocacy group encouraging court to impose the maximum sentence on admitted intoxicated driver and noting that the statute “guarantee[s] the right of the named individuals to testify at a sentencing hearing” but does “not preclude others from testifying when appropriate”).

Brown acknowledges that Section 595.229 is “intended to guarantee the right of victims to testify at a sentencing hearing and does not limit testimony from other witnesses the court deems appropriate,” Fujimoto, 407 S.W.3d at 662, but argues that under State v. Voss, 488 S.W.3d 97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016), the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Indiana Victim's impact statement during Brown's sentencing. Voss held that a jury should not have been permitted to hear testimony from the mother of another alleged victim when the jury determined sentencing because mother was not a victim of the charged offense and her statement did not solely relate the facts of the current case. Id. at 119-120 (nonetheless, the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court after finding the improperly admitted testimony did not prejudice the defendant). We find Voss inapplicable to the facts of the present case where the trial judge, not the jury, determined Brown's sentence.

Here, the trial court's decision to permit Indiana Victim's testimony at sentencing was not an abuse of discretion. Victim and Indiana Victim shared a similar history of suffering childhood sexual abuse perpetrated by Brown when he was in a position of trust at their respective churches. During trial, Indiana Victim testified about that abuse. Although Brown was not on trial for the actions involving Indiana Victim, the trial court was within its discretion to consider the impact Brown had on Indiana Victim during sentencing. Further, in contrast to the sentencing phase of the trial in Voss, which required the jury to recommend the sentence, here the sentence was determined exclusively by the trial court, a court we presume would not consider improper evidence and the court in which Indiana Victim testified during the trial.

Point IV is denied.

Conclusion

The trial court's sentence and judgment are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri in effect in 2019, the date of the offense.

2.   Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not list the names of individuals and witnesses other than parties.

4.   The video was admitted without objection at trial.

5.   Victim's journal was admitted without objection at trial.

6.   The phrase “different victim” was used by Investigator in her testimony about her interview with Brown. The record does not include what phrase Brown used in his interview to describe this person, but Investigator testified Brown did not name this person in the interview.

7.   The trial court heard testimony from three detectives. For simplicity, the detectives’ collective testimony is referred to as “Detectives.”

8.   The connection to the Indiana Church came to light because Brown had disclosed his employment with Indiana Church when he previously applied to be the full-time youth pastor at St. Joseph Church.

9.   Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024), the version applicable to Brown's criminal trial, unless otherwise noted.

10.   MAI 420.60 applies to enticement of a child; MAI 420.62 applies to attempted enticement of a child. Neither party objected to MAI 420.60 (Instruction 11) at trial. Both are “unclassified felonies.” Section 566.151.3.

11.   This is the version of the statute in effect when Brown was charged. Section 566.151 was revised in August 2025.

12.   Section 595.229 was previously codified as Section 557.041. When transferred to section 595.229 in 2017, the text was unchanged.

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge

All concur