STATE v. NOONAN (2026)

Introduction

Thomas R. Noonan (“Noonan”) appeals following his convictions of two counts of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree, one resulting in physical injury to his stepson, L.W., and the other in the death of L.W.’s friend, Z.F.

Noonan raises four points on appeal. In Points One and Two, Noonan argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal for each count because Z.F. and L.W.’s choice to ingest drugs amounted to an intervening cause, thereby relieving him of criminal responsibility. In particular, Noonan argues the death of Z.F. and physical injury to L.W. were not the “natural and proximate results” of his act of possessing fentanyl in a manner easily accessible to minor children. In Point Three, Noonan argues the trial court erred in denying his request to remove Juror No. 4 for cause. Specifically, Noonan argues Juror No. 4's demand that Noonan be made to look at L.W. during L.W.’s testimony indicated Juror No. 4 was unable to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially. In Point Four, Noonan argues the trial court plainly erred in finding his prior convictions were committed at different times because a jury was required to make that finding.

This Court denies Points One and Two because Noonan's argument does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any element of the offenses for which he was convicted. This Court dismisses Point Three because Noonan fails to develop an argument for his claim of reversible error. Point Four is unpreserved for appellate review, and this Court declines to exercise its discretion to review for plain error.

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Background

In 2021, L.W. lived in a house with his mother, younger sister, grandmother, stepfather Noonan, and Andrew Amelung, Noonan's friend and co-defendant in this case. L.W. and his sister shared a bedroom on the second floor of the house, directly across the hall from Noonan's bedroom.

On August 28, 2021, L.W.’s friend, Z.F., came over to his house for a sleepover. After dinner, L.W. and Z.F. noticed about fifteen to twenty pill capsules on a table on the second-floor landing between the bedrooms. Curious, the boys took a few of the pills into L.W.’s room. L.W. pulled one of the capsules apart at his desk and “a bunch” of white powder fell out. Using the back of his Xbox controller, L.W. divided the powder into two lines, and he and Z.F. used a straw to snort the powder. Z.F. was thirteen-years-old at the time, and L.W. was twelve.

Shortly after taking the drugs, L.W. got lightheaded and fell unconscious. The next morning, L.W. woke and saw Z.F. lying on the floor in what he described as an “unnatural position.” Upon seeing his friend, L.W. immediately threw up into a trash can. He then ran to get his mother and they called 911.

Officers responded to the scene and found Z.F. lying unresponsive on the bedroom floor with Noonan and L.W.’s mother beside him. The officers noticed Z.F. had a frothy, bloody discharge coming out of his nose and mouth, he was cool to the touch, and rigor mortis had set in. When paramedics arrived, they confirmed Z.F. had no pulse.

Detectives searched the home and collected evidence. In L.W.’s room, officers found half of a capsule on the desk and half of a capsule on the floor near one of the baseboards. Under the desk was a plastic baggie filled with white powder made up of fentanyl and Benadryl. On a shelf next to L.W.’s desk, detectives discovered a powder-filled capsule, which also contained fentanyl and Benadryl. The trash can on the floor held two straws, half of a capsule, and L.W.’s vomit.

In Noonan's bedroom, detectives discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Specifically, detectives found a glass pipe with visible residue of methamphetamine in a drawer of the dresser and a blue pouch containing Noonan's Missouri SNAP EBT card and methamphetamine on top of the dresser. Detectives also recovered some unused syringes and a mirror with a line of white powder residue, which was later determined to be fentanyl and methamphetamine.

When questioned by detectives at the house, L.W. admitted he and Z.F. had ingested drugs. After making this admission, L.W. was transported to the hospital and gave a urine sample. The urine sample came back positive for fentanyl, fentanyl metabolites, methamphetamine, and Benadryl. The next day, police took blood and urine samples from Noonan, L.W.’s mother, and Amelung. Noonan's urine sample contained the same mix of drugs as L.W.’s, and Noonan's blood test determined he had fentanyl, fentanyl metabolites, and methamphetamine in his blood.

The State charged Noonan as a prior and persistent felony offender with endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree resulting in death (“Count One”), and endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree resulting in physical injury (“Count Two”). The matter proceeded to trial on May 12, 2025.

Prior to the start of trial, the State offered Exhibits 50 and 51, which were certified copies of Noonan's prior felony convictions. Noonan had no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Then, the following exchange took place:

[PROSECUTOR]: Just to be clear for the record, are you stipulating that –

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He is a prior and persistent offender.

[PROSECUTOR]: And not necessarily for the jury to make that finding?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

THE COURT: Very well. So defense counsel has stipulated two things, both that Mr. Noonan is a prior and persistent offender; and secondarily, that the Court may make that finding, and that the jury does not need to do so. [The Prosecutor] has provided the Court with an order. The Court is going to find beyond a reasonable doubt in this matter that the defendant, [Noonan], is a prior persistent offender.

At trial, the State presented testimony from the officers, detectives, and the paramedic who responded to the scene, Z.F.’s mother, a forensic pathologist, a forensic toxicologist, and L.W. The forensic pathologist, who performed Z.F.’s autopsy, testified Z.F. died of acute fentanyl intoxication from a “whopper dose” of fentanyl. Noonan testified in his defense.

The jury found Noonan guilty of both counts of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Noonan as a prior and persistent offender to life in prison on Count One, and fifteen years on Count Two, to be served consecutively.¹

This appeal follows.

Discussion

Points One and Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

For ease of discussion, Points One and Two will be addressed together. In these points, Noonan argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal because L.W. and Z.F.’s decision to ingest drugs was an intervening cause sufficient to relieve Noonan of criminal responsibility. Specifically, Noonan contends the injury to L.W. and death of Z.F. were not the “natural and proximate result[s]” of his possession of fentanyl in a manner that was easily accessible to minor children.

This Court finds Noonan's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge fails because the State did not have the burden of establishing and the jury did not need to find proximate causation for Noonan to be found guilty of child endangerment.

Standard of Review

This Court “review[s] the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under the same standard of review used in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's guilty verdict.” State v. McClain, 685 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Bennish, 479 S.W.3d 678, 684–85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). This Court's review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining “whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Holmes, 626 S.W.3d 339, 341 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction “and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence but rather accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidences and inferences.” State v. Hartwein, 648 S.W.3d 834, 844 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting State v. Lehman, 617 S.W.3d 843, 846–47 (Mo. banc 2021)).

Analysis

“The State has the burden of proving every element of a criminal case.” State v. Ragland, 494 S.W.3d 613, 629 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Here, Noonan was charged with and found guilty of both the class A and class C felonies of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree. “A person commits the offense of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree if he or she ․ [k]nowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to the life, body, or health of a child less than seventeen years of age[.]” Section 568.045.1(1).² The offense is a class A felony if it “[r]esults in the death of a child” and a class C felony “where physical injury to the child results[.]” Section 568.045.2(1), (3).

On appeal, Noonan argues L.W. and Z.F.’s own acts in choosing to take the drugs “amounted to an ‘intervening cause’ rising to the level of a new and independent force which became the sole cause of this accident, thereby exonerating [him].” Noonan's argument completely misses the mark by failing to develop an argument centered upon the elements of first-degree child endangerment. To be clear, there is no “proximate cause requirement” for the crime of child endangerment. See Section 568.045. To meet its burden of proof, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following four elements: (1) Noonan committed an act; (2) Noonan's act created a substantial risk to the lives, bodies, or health of the two victims; (3) the victims were less than seventeen years of age; and (4) Noonan acted knowingly. See State v. Boedecker, 717 S.W.3d 225, 234 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Noonan does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any of the aforementioned elements. Instead, Noonan's argument consists of the definitions for “substantial” and “risk” as well as selective quotes from criminal cases and a secondary source to support the application of the proximate cause principle.³ Though Noonan's argument is amorphous, this Court deduces that Noonan contends proximate cause is somehow synonymous with “substantial risk.” It is not. “In the context of section 568.045, ‘[s]ubstantial’ means ‘not seeming or imaginary: not illusive,’ and ‘risk’ means ‘the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage or destruction.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Shoemaker, 675 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023)). Missouri courts have clarified that, “[i]n a child endangerment case, the State is not required to prove [d]efendant's actions caused [v]ictim's death ․ [r]ather, the State is required to prove risk, i.e., the possibility of loss, injury, or disadvantage.” Id. (quoting Scroggs v. State, 655 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (emphasis added). In fact, “no injury or harm need result; a substantial risk may exist even though the risk does not materialize into actual harm.” Id. at 235 (quoting State v. Todd, 183 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005)). Accordingly, the State did not need to put forth evidence to establish Noonan's possession of fentanyl was the proximate cause of L.W.’s injury and Z.F.’s death; it only had to prove, in pertinent part, that Noonan's act of possessing fentanyl created a substantial risk to the lives, bodies, or health of the two victims.

Additionally, Noonan's argument fails because he omits any reference to or application of the controlling principles of appellate review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

[A]n insufficient-evidence claim involves the following sequential steps:

1. Identify a challenged factual proposition needed to sustain the conviction;

2. Identify all favorable evidence in the record tending to prove that proposition; and

3. Show why such evidence, when considered along with its reasonable inferences, is so non-probative that no reasonable fact-finder could believe the proposition.

State v. Hooper, 552 S.W.3d 123, 136 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (quoting State v. Light, 407 S.W.3d 135, 137 n.4 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013)). Here, Noonan's argument focuses exclusively on L.W. and Z.F.’s decision to take the drugs. In doing so, Noonan ignores the most fundamental task in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge: identifying the evidence favorable to the verdict. Specifically, Noonan fails “to account for all of the favorable evidence in the record, and all the reasonable available inferences therefrom, that could support [his] challenged factual proposition, and then confront and dispel the probative value attending the same supportive evidence and inferences.” Id. By foregoing this mandatory task, Noonan's argument lacks any persuasive or analytical value. See id.

For the reasons set forth above, Noonan fails to demonstrate there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Noonan's motions for judgment of acquittal.

Points One and Two are denied.

Point Three: Removal of Juror for Cause

In his third point on appeal, Noonan argues the trial court erred in denying his request to remove Juror No. 4 for cause and seat one of the alternate jurors because Juror No. 4 demanded Noonan be made to look at L.W. during his testimony. Noonan contends this demand unequivocally indicated Juror No. 4's inability to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially, and prevented or substantially impaired Juror No. 4 from effectively performing his duties as a juror. This Court dismisses Noonan's point because he fails to develop an argument for his claim of reversible error.

Analysis

This Court cannot reach the merits of Noonan's point on appeal because his argument is deficient in two respects. First, it violates Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.04(e), which requires that the argument section contain a statement of the applicable standard of review. Here, Noonan fails to identify the applicable standard of review for this Court to review the trial court's decision not to replace Juror No. 4 with an alternate during trial. See State v. Craig, 721 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (“This [C]ourt will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror during trial, absent an abuse of that discretion.”).

More importantly, Noonan fails to develop an argument. “To properly brief the alleged error, an appellant ‘must explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error by showing how principles of law and the facts of the case interact.’ ” Burgan v. Newman, 618 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting Midtown Home Improvements, Inc. v. Taylor, 578 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). Noonan's argument is devoid of any legal analysis or citation to any relevant authority. His entire argument consists of a block quote of Juror No. 4's request and the trial court's response, followed by his conclusion that “[i]t was an abuse of discretion to deny and overrule [Noonan's] request to remove Juror [No.] 4 and seat one of the alternate jurors, and [Noonan] is therefore entitled to a new trial.” Conclusory statements and a mere recitation of the facts do not provide a legal reason upon which this Court can find reversible error. See Mecey v. Harps Food Stores, 721 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

When a party, such as Noonan, “fails to support contentions with relevant authority or argument beyond conclusory statements, [this Court] deem[s] the point abandoned.” Landwehr v. Hager, 612 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Thus, Point Three is dismissed.

Point Four: Prior and Persistent Offender

In his final point on appeal, Noonan argues the trial court plainly erred in finding his prior convictions were committed at different times because a jury was required to find that fact. Noonan concedes he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, and thus requests plain error review under Rule 30.20.⁴ This Court holds Noonan has failed to establish substantial grounds for believing the trial court committed plain error when the record demonstrates he: (1) agreed to the admission of certified records of his prior convictions, (2) stipulated to the fact he was a prior and persistent offender, and (3) stipulated that the trial court–not the jury–could make the determination of his prior and persistent offender status. Thus, this Court declines to exercise its discretion to review for plain error.

Standard of Review

Generally, appellate courts do not review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. banc 2025). Rule 30.20 alters this principle, allowing appellate courts to review certain unpreserved claims of error. Id. According to Rule 30.20, this Court may “review ‘plain errors affecting substantial rights’ that are not briefed or otherwise properly preserved for appellate review ․ if the court finds ‘manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice’ resulted from the error.” Id. (quoting Rule 30.20). “Plain errors” are “defined as errors that are ‘facially evident, obvious, and clear.’ ” Id. at 583 (quoting State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019)). “The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review.” Id. at 584 (quoting State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020)).

Analysis

Under section 558.016, the trial court has the authority to sentence a defendant to an enhanced term of imprisonment if the defendant is a persistent offender. A persistent offender, within the meaning of the statute, is “one who has been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times.” Section 558.016.3. In 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Erlinger v. United States, held “[v]irtually any fact that increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt” unless such facts were “freely admitted in a guilty plea.” 602 U.S. 821, 834, 144 S. Ct. 1840, 219 L. Ed. 2d 451 (2024) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)) (internal quotations omitted).

Following Erlinger, Missouri appellate courts have seen an increase in appeals requesting plain error review of cases where the trial court found the defendant was a persistent offender and did not submit the issue to the jury. See State v. Brown, 2026 WL 1194027, *2 (Mo. App. S.D. May 1, 2026); State v. Brewer, 731 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026).⁵ Specifically, this Court in Brewer and our colleagues in the Southern District in Brown declined plain error review because the defendants in each respective case failed to establish the trial court committed evident, obvious, and clear error when defendants stipulated to the facts constituting their prior and persistent offender status and that the trial court be the one to determine whether they are a prior and persistent offender. See Brown, 2026 WL 1194027 at *3; see also Brewer, 731 S.W.3d at 886.

This Court recognizes Erlinger provides clarification and guidance to Missouri courts and litigants. Still, despite the explicit holding in Erlinger, defendants have not only continuously failed to object to the State's evidence supporting their prior convictions but have also stipulated or acquiesced in the trial court making the finding of their prior and persistent offender status, only to then request plain error review on appeal.

This case is no different from the aforementioned cases. The record clearly indicates the trial court took up the issue of Noonan's prior and persistent offender status on the first day of trial, prior to jury selection. When the State offered records of his prior felonies, Noonan did not object to their admission. Noonan also affirmatively stipulated: (1) to the fact he is a prior and persistent offender, and (2) that the trial court make the finding of his prior and persistent offender status. Based on his affirmations and stipulations, the trial court ultimately found Noonan was a prior and persistent offender. When asked if he had anything further on the issue, Noonan stated “No, sir” and did not object to the trial court's finding.

The record clearly indicates Noonan never wavered in his position that the trial court make the finding regarding his prior and persistent offender status. As a result, he relieved the jury from having to make such a finding. See Brewer, 731 S.W.3d at 886. Thus, this Court cannot find “evident, obvious and clear” error. See Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583.

Accordingly, this Court declines to conduct plain error review. See id. at 585 (stating an appellate court can decline plain error review when “appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the [trial] court committed plain error, i.e., evident, obvious, and clear error”).

Point Four is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Additional facts relevant to this appeal will be set forth in the analysis below.

2.   All references are to Mo. Rev. Cum. Supp. (2024).

3.   This Court does not find the cases cited relevant because they do not concern a child endangerment conviction; rather, they involve convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault, which require a jury to find a defendant's actions were the proximate cause of a victim's death or injury. See State v. Reichert, 854 S.W.2d 584, 598–99 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (affirming defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter and second-degree assault and finding victim's actions would not “have risen to the level of a new and independent force which would have become the sole cause of this accident, thereby exonerating defendant.”); see also State v. Huff, 789 S.W.2d 71, 76–78 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990) (affirming defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter and second-degree assault and finding victim's conduct did not exculpate defendant from liability because the concept of contributory negligence does not apply as a defense to vehicular manslaughter). Noonan also cites to Lewis v. State, which is not persuasive because it similarly does not involve a conviction for child endangerment, and this Court is not bound to follow law from a different state. See Lewis v. State, 474 So.2d 766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (reversing defendant's conviction of criminally negligent homicide and holding “the causal link between the [defendant's] conduct and the victim's death was severed when the victim exercised his own free will.”); see also Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of St. Louis, 311 S.W.3d 818, 823 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (stating the “decisions of other state courts are not binding on us.”).

4.   All references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025).

5.   This Court notes State v. El-Mumin, 2025 WL 2698537, *7 (Mo. App. E.D. Sept. 23, 2025) is another case concerning this issue. In El-Mumin, this Court held that relief was not forthcoming for the defendant under Erlinger because the defendant admitted to the pleaded facts constituting his persistent status, and thus relieved the State of its burden of proof on the matter and the jury from having to make the finding. Id. at *8. Subsequently, the defendant in El-Mumin requested transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which is currently pending.

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge

Philip M. Hess, Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.