STATE OF MISSOURI v. STEVIE DON LINLEY (2026)

Stevie Linley (“Defendant”) appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and unlawful use of a weapon. See sections 579.015 and 571.030 RSMo.¹ In two points, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it did not suppress evidence of 1) methamphetamine; and 2) a firearm discovered during an unlawful search of his residence. Finding no merit in either point, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Law enforcement officers, including members of the United States Marshals Service, went to Defendant's residence to execute a valid arrest warrant. Upon arriving, officers encountered Keith Dick outside of the house, who indicated Defendant was inside in the back of the residence.

The residence consisted of a kitchen and living area separated by a counter, a hallway, bedrooms, and a bathroom. Deputy Marshal Reichert testified that “the main point of entry into the residence” was “a kitchen/living type general area there that we had to go through.” Although portions of the residence were visible from the entryway, officers could not observe all areas of the home from that location.

Officers located Defendant inside the residence and arrested him pursuant to the warrant. After Mr. Dick was detained outside and Defendant was removed from the residence, officers conducted a protective sweep of the home. Sheriff's Detective Gardner (“Detective Gardner”) testified that Mr. Dick was eventually released and “he left.”

During the sweep, Deputy Marshal Reichert observed a bag containing a crystalline substance on a counter separating the kitchen and living areas. Deputy Marshal Reichert also observed a firearm in plain view on a bed in a rear bedroom. Deputy Marshal Reichert notified Detective Gardner of both items.

Detective Gardner testified that “normally” when a person was taken into custody and transported, and there was “no one to release the” residence to, the person would be asked if there was anything that the person wanted to take with them such as “medications, IDs, phones, anything like that, [or] monies.” Defendant requested that Detective Gardner retrieve personal items from the bedroom. Detective Gardner found the personal items in a bedroom where he also found a firearm “[o]n the bed.” Detective Gardner confirmed that the firearm “was found out in the open in the bedroom[.]” Detective Gardner further observed a substance on a counter separating the kitchen from the living area, which, based on his training and experience, he immediately recognized as suspected methamphetamine.

Following the seizure of the items, Defendant admitted the methamphetamine belonged to him and stated Mr. Dick had no knowledge of it.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized arguing the search was “unlawful in that it was conducted without a proper warrant, without probable cause and was not within the scope of any exception to the warrant requirement.” The court denied the motion to suppress without making express findings and also denied Defendant's motion to reconsider.

At trial, Defendant raised numerous objections to the admission of the evidence, which the trial court overruled. The jury found him guilty on both counts. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“On appeal, we only determine whether the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Teel, 645 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Mo.App. 2022). “The facts and any reasonable inferences drawn from the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and any evidence or inferences to the contrary are disregarded. Deference is given to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations.” State v. Cromer, 186 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Mo.App. 2005). “Where, as here, the trial court made no factual findings, we presume the court found the facts in accordance with its decision and may affirm ‘under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence.’ ” State v. Dierks, 564 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Mo.App. 2018) (quoting State v. Galen, 554 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Mo.App. 2018)).

“Whether a search is permissible and whether the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence seized are questions of law reviewed de novo.” State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e will only reverse if the denial was clearly erroneous. Clear error is error that leaves us with a definite and firm belief a mistake was made.” State v. Little, 604 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Mo.App. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Discussion

Defendant's two points argue evidence of the methamphetamine and the firearm should have been suppressed because they were discovered as the result of a protective sweep that was in fact an illegal search. Because the same legal basis supported the seizure of both the methamphetamine and the firearm, we address the points together.

Although the evidence concerning the precise manner in which Defendant was arrested was conflicting, the trial court was free to believe all, part, or none of any witness's testimony, and we must defer to the court's credibility determinations. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, we presume the trial court resolved these factual conflicts consistent with its decision. Further, we must presume the court found the facts in accordance with its decision and affirm “under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence.” Dierks, 564 S.W.3d at 362.

In examining whether this was an illegal search we are guided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, which provide equal guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Little, 604 S.W.3d at 720; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV; and Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 15. As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional, and evidence deriving therefrom must be excluded absent a well-delineated exception to Fourth Amendment protections. Little, 604 S.W.3d at 720; see also Teel, 645 S.W.3d at 123. “Generally, evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree.” State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). However, “if law enforcement personnel would have ultimately or inevitably discovered the evidence[,]” then the evidence may not be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Mo. banc 2009). Application of the inevitable discovery doctrine depends upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) that certain standard, proper and predictable procedures of the local police department would have been utilized and

(2) those procedures inevitably would have led to discovery of the challenged evidence through the state's pursuit of a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation.”

Id.

Here, Defendant focuses on whether the subsequent protective sweep was a violation of those constitutional protections.

We need not determine the outer limits of the protective-sweep doctrine. Nor do we hold that execution of an arrest warrant, standing alone, authorizes a protective sweep of a residence. Rather we hold that the firearm and methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered in the course of the procedures that the officers normally follow under these circumstances, even if the contraband had not been observed during the sweep of the premises.

The trial court could reasonably conclude from the officers’ testimony that Defendant had been arrested on the warrant and Mr. Dick had left the scene. The trial court could also conclude that it was a normal procedure for Detective Gardner's department to ask an arrestee whether there was anything that they needed the officers to take to the jail with them when there was no one else to release the residence to, and that Defendant directed Detective Gardner to the bedroom where the firearm was found. Once lawfully present in the premises at Defendant's request, the officers would have inevitably discovered the apparent controlled substance on the counter in the main, general area of the home on the way to the bedroom where the personal items were to be found and the firearm was on the bed. “If an officer sees the fruits of crime or what he has good reason to believe to be the fruits of crime—lying freely exposed on a suspect's property, he is not required to look the other way, or disregard the evidence his senses bring him.” State v. Gott, 456 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo. 1970). “Entry of a residence upon valid consent of a resident in charge of the home is lawful.” State v. Apel, 156 S.W.3d 461, 467 (Mo.App. 2005). Thus, the officers were not required to ignore the contraband.

The trial court did not clearly err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. Points 1 and 2 are denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo. 2017, including, as applicable, any statutory changes effective August 28, 2021.

BECKY J. WEST, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS