STATE OF MISSOURI v. ADEN XAVIER WARR HARPER (2026)

A jury convicted Aden Harper (“Defendant”) of unlawful possession of a firearm as a prior and persistent offender. Section 571.070, RSMo.¹ In seven points, Defendant asserts the trial court plainly erred by admitting certain evidence and testimony, failing to reappoint counsel to represent him, and failing to recuse itself. We affirm.

Background

On August 13, 2020, a driver (“Driver”) placed a 911 call reporting a road rage incident on U.S. Highway 65. Driver identified himself by name and informed the dispatcher that a driver of a maroon Dodge Caravan, who he described, had “just shot at [him]”, was “trying to kill [him]”, and was “shooting at [him] again.”. Defendant also called 911 around that same time and advised he was going to make a “pit maneuver” on a vehicle. Later, Driver reported that Defendant had pulled off the highway at the Evans Road exit.

Deputy Chris Morgan responded to that location and spotted Defendant, along with the maroon Dodge Caravan, at a gas station on Evans Road. Morgan and Officer Markkeeta Womack detained Defendant. Morgan searched the vehicle for a firearm and located a BB gun in the upper glove compartment and a Canik 9mm pistol in the lower glove compartment. After Defendant admitted he was a convicted felon, police arrested him. The State subsequently charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm.

Although Defendant was represented by counsel with the Public Defender's Office, he filed numerous pro se motions to waive counsel. He repeatedly expressed his distrust for the Public Defender's Office and requested Faretta 2 hearings. The trial court found that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and granted his request to represent himself. Defendant nevertheless repeatedly asked the trial court to appoint private counsel of his choosing, which the trial court denied. After explaining that Defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel of his choosing, the trial court again referred him to the Public Defender's Office for reappointment of counsel. The Public Defender's Office declined to represent Defendant.

During the pendency of the case and before trial, Defendant repeatedly disrupted the proceedings, made threats, and sought the judge's recusal. The case proceeded to jury trial in October of 2024. Defendant represented himself at trial and did not testify. The jury found Defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and found he had committed two prior felonies at different times, making him eligible for sentencing as a persistent offender. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years’ imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Defendant concedes that he failed to preserve any of his points for appellate review and requests plain error review under Rule 30.20.

We generally do not review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20, Missouri Court Rules (2024), permits discretionary review of plain errors affecting substantial rights when manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted. State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. banc 2025). Plain error review is used sparingly, and not every unpreserved claim warrants review. Id. at 584.

Defendant bears the burden of establishing facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court committed evident, obvious, and clear error and that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted. Id. at 583. Mere prejudice is insufficient to establish manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id. Unless Defendant makes the required facial showing, we decline plain error review. Id. Even when that showing is made, review remains discretionary. Id. at 584.

For ease of analysis, we address Defendant's points out of order.

Point 3 – Motion to Recuse

Defendant's third point asserts that the trial judge plainly erred by failing to recuse himself in the underlying case because the judge was the alleged victim in a separate case where Defendant was charged with judicial tampering and for the judge to continue to preside in this case created the appearance of partiality.

Defendant's charges in the judicial tampering case stemmed from threats Defendant made during his repeated efforts to obtain the trial judge's recusal in the underlying case. At one hearing, Defendant attempted to place the judge under “citizen's arrest” for refusing to recuse himself. Defendant later attempted to subpoena the judge as a witness on his behalf after the trial court denied Defendant's motion for judicial recusal. After the trial court quashed the subpoena, Defendant threatened to “recuse him personally” if the judge did not recuse himself. Defendant also urged the trial court to file a probable cause statement against him. The trial judge responded that the case remained set for trial and characterized Defendant's threatening conduct as an attempt to obtain his recusal which had already been made and denied. The trial judge subsequently commented before sentencing that neither Defendant's remarks nor the State's decision to file charges against him had affected his assessment of the issues at trial or any of his rulings in the case.

A judge must recuse himself or herself when the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Mo. banc 2013). This standard encompasses both actual bias and circumstances that would give a reasonable person factual grounds to doubt the judge's impartiality. Id. We presume, however, that a judge acts with honesty and integrity and will not preside over a proceeding in which the judge cannot be impartial. Id. at 92.

We determine that Defendant failed to meet his burden to establish facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court committed evident, obvious, and clear error and that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted here.

Although the trial judge's assurance that he remained impartial despite Defendant's threats does not, by itself, resolve whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, it is relevant when considered with the circumstances surrounding Defendant's threats. Id. at 91.

Here Defendant threatened the trial judge while attempting to obtain his recusal in the underlying case. The trial court was not obligated to reward Defendant's outbursts or threats by doing the very thing Defendant demanded, by granting the Defendant's motion for judicial recusal, as “[a]n accused cannot claim the benefit of constitutional rights while at the same time engaging in disruptive conduct that makes it exceedingly difficult to carry on at trial.” State v. Redmond, 686 S.W.3d 333, 341–42 (Mo.App. 2024). In this context, the trial judge's status as the alleged victim in the separate judicial tampering case does not, without more, facially establish substantial grounds for believing that his failure to recuse himself in the underlying case constituted evident, obvious, and clear error resulting in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. We therefore decline plain error review.

Point 1 – Appointment of Counsel

Defendant's first point asserts that the trial court plainly erred by denying his request to reappoint counsel after he waived his right to counsel.

Defendant had a contentious relationship with the Public Defender's Office. Defendant repeatedly expressed distrust of appointed counsel and requested appointed private counsel, which the trial court denied. He subsequently waived his right to counsel. Later, in response to another request, the trial court stated:

As to your request for counsel, you have waived the right to counsel after extensive discussion about that issue. I am not going to get into the reasons for my previous rulings, but I'm not going to change them either. I'm not going to appoint you private counsel outside the public defender's office. I don't believe I have the authority to do so․. The only option at this point would be for me to make a referral to the public defender's office which, again, would need to be made with the understanding that the case remains set for trial when it is set. But I'm not going to dictate, if they were to represent you, what particular attorney would be involved, and it certainly wouldn't be Mr. Sowash as he's no longer with the office and is now in another state. But that's -- that's not something that I'm going to order any particular attorney to represent you within or without the system. The option that you would have is for me to make a referral to the public defender's office. So the question for you is, is that something you're asking me to do or not?

Defendant requested the referral and the trial court explained he would need to fill out the application on the form available at the jail. The Public Defender's Office declined representation.

Defendant renewed his request for appointed counsel and disputed the Public Defender's determination that he was not indigent, relying on its previous representation, and requested representation by either private counsel or the Public Defender's Office. The trial court declined to appoint private counsel or order the Public Defender's Office to represent him, noting his previous waiver of counsel.

“The Sixth Amendment affords the right to those accused in all criminal prosecutions to have the assistance of counsel for their defense. At the same time, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused the right to make his own defense.” State v. Teter, 665 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Mo. banc 2023) (internal citation omitted).

However, once a defendant has intelligently waived their right to counsel, a court has no duty to appoint counsel unless “the gravity of the offense charged and other circumstances ․ may result in injustice to the defendant.” Rule 31.02(a), Missouri Court Rules (2024). “A trial court is not categorically required to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw a previously entered, valid waiver of counsel at any time he so desires.” State v. Leonard, 490 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Mo.App. 2016). “[I]t is within the trial court's discretion to deny motions filed by a defendant which are calculated to delay trial, as well as to deny a defendant's assertions that his constitutional rights were violated when such assertions are made simply to hinder his prosecution.” State v. Richardson, 304 S.W.3d 280, 289 (Mo.App. 2010).

Defendant challenged the Public Defender's non-indigency determination, asserting that the office had previously represented him and that his financial circumstances had worsened following his wife's death. Section 600.086.3, RSMo. 2016, requires a person claiming indigency to file an affidavit containing the financial information necessary to determine eligibility, and section 600.086.6, RSMo. 2016, places the burden of establishing eligibility on the defendant. Defendant's motion, however, contained no financial affidavit and supplied no specific information concerning his income, assets, available resources, or dependents. Defendant's reliance on prior representation and a general assertion of worsening finances did not supply the required financial showing. His subsequent representation likewise does not establish his financial eligibility when the renewed request was denied.

The trial court made the referral Defendant requested. The Public Defender's subsequent refusal to represent him did not, without the required showing of eligibility, obligate the court to order renewed representation. Defendant has not facially established evident, obvious, and clear error in the court's handling of his request. We decline plain error review of Point I.

Point 5 – Admission of the Firearm

Defendant's fifth point asserts that the trial court plainly erred by admitting the firearm recovered during a warrantless search of his vehicle into evidence at trial. He argues that the information provided by the 911 operator to the officers did not justify his detention and the protective search, that discovery of the BB gun eliminated any justification for further searching, and that officers could not lawfully search the locked lower glove compartment.

Warrantless seizures are generally unreasonable unless an exception applies. State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. banc 2014). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 30 (1968), officers may briefly detain a person when specific, articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. Id. Reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause and depends on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999).

During an investigative detention, officers may conduct a limited protective search of a vehicle's passenger compartment when specific, articulable facts support a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–1050 (1983); State v. Rainey, 729 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Mo.App. 2025). The search is limited to areas where a weapon could be hidden, and its justification is the protection of officers and others nearby. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049; State v. McFall, 991 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo.App. 1999).

Defendant first argues that the State failed to establish the source and reliability of the information underlying the dispatch. He relies on State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 643–644 (Mo. banc 1992), and State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 653–654 (Mo. banc 1995). Those cases establish that transmission through police dispatch does not itself supply reasonable suspicion; the record must establish the information underlying the dispatch so the court can evaluate the justification for the detention.

Here, the record supplies sufficient information to evaluate reasonable suspicion. Womack testified at trial about dispatch notes documenting calls from both Defendant and another person who called. The notes attributed the proposed “pit maneuver” to Defendant and reported shots fired, the vehicles’ movements, and a maroon Dodge Caravan exiting at Evans Road. Morgan monitored dispatch and the corresponding call notes before locating a vehicle matching the reported description at a gas station near the reported location. Unlike the unexplained dispatch information in Franklin and Miller, the information here arose from contemporaneous reports concerning an ongoing confrontation, included specific vehicle descriptions and locations, and was corroborated by Morgan's observations. These circumstances supplied reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant and investigate the reported shooting. The report that shots had been fired from a vehicle also supplied an objective basis to believe that a weapon remained nearby and posed a danger during the investigation. See Rainey, 729 S.W.3d at 30-31.

Defendant next argues that finding the BB gun eliminated any justification for continuing the protective search. He relies on State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo.App. 2000), in which continued detention was unlawful after the officer determined that the suspect was not intoxicated and the justification for the detention had dissipated.

Discovery of the BB gun did not similarly dispel the circumstances supporting the search here. Morgan testified that the 911 operator could hear shots being fired while speaking with Defendant. Based on the reported information, Morgan testified he believed that those sounds were not produced by a BB gun and that another weapon remained in the vehicle. Thus, finding the BB gun did not resolve the reported danger or require officers to abandon the limited search for a firearm.

Finally, Defendant argues that the lower glove compartment was inaccessible because it was locked. Morgan could not recall whether the compartment was locked. He testified that he had the vehicle's keys and would have used them to open the compartment, if necessary, although he could not recall whether the keys came from the ignition or Defendant's person.

The possibility that the compartment was locked did not necessarily place its contents beyond Defendant's potential access. Both State v. Harp, 680 S.W.2d 297, 299–300 (Mo.App. 1984), and State v. Brown, 661 S.W.3d 27, 37 (Mo.App. 2023), recognize that possession of a key can make the contents of a locked glove compartment readily accessible. Although those accessibility discussions concerned possession rather than the scope of a protective search, they illustrate why a lock does not alone resolve the question of access. Here, the key was available, the compartment was within the passenger compartment, and it could conceal the weapon officers reasonably believed remained in the vehicle. Further, the vehicle was parked with the Defendant outside of the vehicle when officers located him which showed Defendant had access to the whole vehicle after it stopped. Considered with the reported shooting and the possibility of Defendant regaining access to the vehicle, the compartment's potential locked status did not render the limited protective search unlawful.

Defendant also argues that his removal from the vehicle and placement in handcuffs eliminated any safety justification for the search of the locked glove compartment because it rendered the compartment inaccessible to Defendant. Morgan confirmed that Defendant was handcuffed before officers searched the vehicle. Temporary police control, however, does not necessarily foreclose a protective search. Long recognizes that a suspect may regain access to a vehicle during an investigation or upon release from an investigative detention. 463 U.S. at 1051–1052; see also McFall, 991 S.W.2d at 674. Here, officers were investigating a reported shooting, and discovery of the BB gun had not dispelled the reasonable belief that another weapon remained in the passenger compartment. Defendant's temporary restraint did not, by itself, eliminate the justification for checking areas where the weapon could be concealed before he regained access to the vehicle.

The circumstances justified Defendant's detention and the protective search, and neither discovery of the BB gun nor Defendant's temporary restraint dispelled the reported danger. Defendant has not demonstrated error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of the firearm. Point V is denied.

Points 2, 4, 6 and 7– Other Evidence

Defendant's second point asserts the trial court plainly erred in quashing his subpoena and denying his request to endorse Kent Shipley as a witness. His fourth point challenges the admission of the 911 recordings. His sixth and seventh points challenge the admission of Harley Barnhart's testimony regarding a “birthday video” and Michael Thomas's testimony that Defendant carried a firearm on a different occasion. We address these points together because Defendant has not facially established substantial grounds for believing that the alleged errors resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.

Defendant argues that the challenged testimony from Barnhart and Thomas was central to proving his knowledge of the firearm. He also argues that Shipley would have impeached Thomas's testimony concerning Defendant's possession of a firearm after the charged offense. Defendant proffered that Thomas had told Shipley he did not see Defendant carrying a firearm, contrary to the account Thomas later gave the prosecutor's paralegal. At trial, Thomas testified that he saw Defendant carrying a firearm in 2021.

Even assuming without deciding the trial court erred in admitting the challenged testimony and excluding Shipley's proposed impeachment testimony, substantial independent evidence connected Defendant to the firearm on the day of the charged offense. Police recovered a Canik 9mm pistol from Defendant's vehicle. Apart from her testimony about the birthday video, Barnhart testified that Defendant retrieved her 9mm pistol from the entertainment center and left the house armed with it in a holster on August 13, 2020. She further testified that Defendant drove his van alone that morning. Thomas Holloman testified that Defendant had told him about the “secret glovebox in his car.” Defendant controlled the keys to the lower glove compartment where police found the firearm.

Prejudice is not considered apparent when there is ample other evidence to support the conviction. State v. Griffin, 172 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Mo.App. 2005). This evidence supported a finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm independently of the birthday video and Thomas's account of a separate occasion. Barnhart placed the pistol on Defendant's person that morning, and the remaining evidence connected him to the vehicle and the compartment where police recovered it. Shipley's proposed impeachment of Thomas's account of an encounter in 2021 would not have contradicted that evidence of Defendant's possession on August 13, 2020. Considered against this independent evidence, the alleged errors do not facially establish manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.

Defendant likewise has not made the required showing concerning the 911 recordings. He argues that the recordings supplied substantive proof that he discharged a firearm despite the absence of objective forensic evidence of discharge. Whether Defendant discharged the firearm, however, was not an element of the charged offense of unlawful possession of a firearm. Section 571.070, RSMo (2016). As with the other point, even assuming without deciding the recordings were erroneously admitted, the evidence of knowing possession did not depend on the reported shooting. Without the recordings, the jury still had Barnhart's testimony that Defendant left the house carrying her pistol that morning, Holloman's testimony concerning Defendant's knowledge of the secret glove compartment, and the evidence that police recovered the pistol from a compartment to which Defendant controlled the keys In light of that evidence, Defendant's argument concerning the absence of forensic proof of discharge does not facially establish that admission of the recordings resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Griffin, 172 S.W.3d at 866.

We decline plain error review of Points 2, 4, 6 and 7.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo. (2016).

2.   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

PER CURIAM.