STATE v. JOHNSON (2026)

The State appeals the trial court's judgment granting Paul Johnson's (“Defendant”) motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict after a jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree assault (§ 565.050) 1 and attempted first-degree burglary (§ 569.160). The State presents two points on appeal claiming there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts for both assault and attempted burglary. Finding that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings, we reverse the trial court's judgment granting Defendant's motion and remand to the trial court to accept the jury's verdicts and sentence Defendant accordingly.

Standard of Review

When the trial court grants a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a jury's guilty verdict due to insufficient evidence, we consider whether “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, was sufficient for reasonable persons to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with matters of credibility and inconsistencies in testimony being left to the jury's consideration.” State v. Rainey, 545 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting State v. Magalif, 131 S.W.3d 431, 434 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)).

This is not an assessment of whether the [appellate c]ourt believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Price, 732 S.W.3d 145, 167 (Mo. App. S.D. 2026) (quoting Rainey, 545 S.W.3d at 923) (internal quotations omitted).

When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in the face of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's guilty verdict, “this Court does not weigh the evidence but rather accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidences and inferences.” State v. Meador, 660 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022). This Court does not “act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact.” Price, 732 S.W.3d at 167 (quoting Rainey, 545 S.W.3d at 923). The court, however, “may not supply missing evidence, or give the [State] the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.” Id.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the following facts were adduced at trial. On December 25, 2024, Victim and his wife [“Wife”] were awoken by their children around 4:30am or 5:00am with complaints of a loud banging sound on the front door of their home. Victim's oldest daughter said someone was “banging on the door” and it “sounded like they were trying to break into the house.”

Victim and Wife got out of bed and observed Defendant, whom they did not know, “beating on the door” and causing the loud banging sound. Victim said the banging noise was so loud that he could feel it in his feet when he put them on the floor. Defendant was on the porch wearing only pajama pants while banging on the front door “super loud.”

Victim grabbed his shotgun, exited the home out the back door and circled around the house to where Defendant was standing on the front porch. Victim pointed the shotgun towards Defendant who put his hands up and said, “my name's Paul” and “don't shoot.” Victim told Defendant, “doesn't matter, not welcome here, you know, don't know [you], keep on moving.” Victim escorted Defendant to the fence row where Defendant jumped the fence and left the property. At this point, Victim returned to the house and the family proceeded with their Christmas morning.

At approximately 11:00am or 12:00pm that same day, Victim started hearing the same banging noise on the front door. Defendant was standing on Victim's front porch, now fully clothed, despite being walked off the property and told not to come back hours earlier. Defendant had opened the exterior storm door and was kicking the front door hard enough to leave marks on the door. Victim's children were crying and panicking. Wife got the children into one of the bedrooms and told them to get down and shut the door behind them.

Victim again retrieved his shotgun and opened the front door, pointing the gun at Defendant. Defendant said, “I'll teach you to point that gun at me,” lunged forward, and grabbed the barrel of the shotgun with both hands. Defendant pulled Victim out of the house, and both Defendant and Victim struggled for the shotgun. Wife grabbed her pistol and stood in the doorway in case someone tried to come through.

During the struggle, Victim pulled the trigger of the shotgun which clicked but did not go off. Defendant and Victim had equal control over the shotgun at this point. Victim put Defendant in a headlock and threw him to the ground, at which point Victim noticed a knife on the porch. Victim yelled for Wife to call the police and Wife did so.

Defendant started yelling that he was “done” and “I give up,” after which Victim released him. Defendant got up and started walking away and Victim picked up the shotgun from where it fell on the ground. Victim again escorted Defendant towards the property line. When they were 150 yards away from the home, Defendant turned as if to confront Victim again. Victim discharged a round into the ground in front of him, after which Defendant finally left the property.

Deputy Sean Bonner testified he received a referral from the Highway Patrol about an “attempted break-in and altercation between two men” on December 25, 2024. Deputy Bonner arrived at Victim's residence and learned that Defendant's father lived across the street. Deputy Bonner arrested Defendant, Mirandized him, and interviewed him. Defendant claimed he thought another person, Perry, lived in Victim's home and wanted to speak to Perry's adult daughter, Payton. However, law enforcement determined that there was no “Perry” or “Payton” in the area like Defendant claimed. Defendant referenced drinking alcohol during the interview and Deputy Bonner noticed Defendant had a “strong odor” of alcohol. Defendant was subsequently charged with first-degree assault, attempted first-degree burglary, and second-degree harassment.

A jury trial was held on October 16, 2025. At trial, Defendant testified that he was in a field at 4:30am on December 25, 2024, talking to a man claiming to be Perry Odom. Defendant thought his friend Perry had invited him to Victim's property that morning. Defendant stated he saw the purple paint around Victim's property and “no trespassing” signs in Victim's front yard and walked up to the front door anyways. Defendant also said he opened the glass storm door before banging on the front door because he “didn't want to break their glass storm door.”

Defendant admitted he was intoxicated that morning and thought Victim might be one of Perry's sons. Defendant admitted the knife that fell on the ground during the struggle with Victim was in his pocket. During cross-examination, Defendant claimed he went back to Victim's property because “the same person” (referring to Perry) came to his house around 9:00am and although Defendant “didn't get up to open the door” he was advised by Perry to “just come back later, we'll work this out.”

During the jury instruction conference, Defendant elected not to submit instructions for any lesser included offenses and instead pursued an “all or nothing” defense. The trial court would not permit the State to instruct on a charge of burglary because it did not believe there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's actual entry into Victim's home, but did permit the State to submit a verdict director for attempted burglary, stating:

So, however, the evidence is sufficient, I think, to support submission of attempted entering of the building. There was a banging or a kicking on the door. Perhaps the jury will determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was attempting to enter the structure unlawfully, or enter into the building unlawfully. That's why I'm allowing the lesser included of attempted burglary.

The jury convicted Defendant of all charges. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict, which was heard at sentencing. Following argument, the trial court sustained Defendant's motion as to the first-degree assault and attempted first-degree burglary charges due to insufficient evidence. The trial court found Defendant guilty of the underlying crime of harassment for his attempted burglary charge and the lesser charges of misdemeanor fourth-degree assault and misdemeanor first-degree trespass. Defendant was sentenced to one year (Count 1) and six months (Count 2) in the Texas County Jail to be served consecutively and was given credit for time served. Defendant was additionally sentenced to one year in jail for Count 3, but the execution of that sentence was suspended, and Defendant was placed on two years of probation. This appeal followed.

Analysis

Count I (First-Degree Assault)

The State claims the evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant attempted to cause serious physical injury to Victim to support his conviction for first-degree assault. “The elements of a crime are found only in the statute creating that crime.” State v. Layton, 736 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Mo. App. S.D. 2026) (quoting State v. Winter, 719 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Mo. banc 2025)). Under § 565.050, “[a] person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if he or she attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to another person.” “An attempt to cause serious physical injury constitutes assault in the first degree.” State v. Durison, 698 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (citing State v. Bruce, 677 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023)).

[T]o be convicted of attempted first-degree assault, [d]efendant must have: (1) had the purpose to commit that offense and (2) committed some act that is a substantial step toward completing that offense. To act purposefully is to have the conscious object to engage in certain conduct or to cause a certain result. A ‘substantial step’ is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense.

State v. Harris, 684 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In ruling on Defendant's motion, the trial court held the evidence that Defendant grabbed the gun for the purpose of assaulting Victim was insufficient because “the jury can't read minds better than any of us in this courtroom” and it was possible Defendant was just trying to avoid being shot.² Intent, however, “is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence and is most often inferred circumstantially.” State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Mo. banc 2016) (citing State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011)). “[T]he necessary intent may be based upon circumstantial evidence or inferred from surrounding facts such as defendant's conduct before the act, from the act itself, and from the defendant's subsequent conduct.” Harris, 684 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Potter v. State, 679 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023)). “[A] defendant's presence, opportunity, companionship, conduct, and flight are circumstances from which his purpose to commit a crime can be inferred.” State v. Davidson, 521 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (quoting State v. Holleran, 197 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). “Intent may also be inferred from conduct that would tend to cause death or serious physical injury.” Harris, 684 S.W.3d at 389 (internal quotations omitted).

In Durison, an inmate and a corrections officer were engaged in a physical altercation while the inmate was being treated at a hospital. 698 S.W.3d at 887-88. The inmate repeatedly stated he was “not going back” and the officer drew his taser in an attempt to subdue the inmate. Id. at 888. The inmate got control of the taser from the officer and attempted to stun him multiple times, succeeding in striking him two times in the arm. Id. The inmate was found guilty of first-degree assault and argued on appeal there was insufficient evidence that he intended to cause serious physical injury. Id. at 889-90. This Court found inmate's repeated statements that he was “not going back” and repeated attempts to stun the officer constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the inmate intended to cause serious physical injury to the officer. Id. at 891-92.

The totality of Defendant's conduct in this case, including both before, during and after the charged incident, establishes facts from which a reasonable juror could have found Defendant acted purposefully and took a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury to Victim. Just a few hours before the charged incident, Defendant had been banging on the door of Victim's home, escorted off the property at gunpoint and told not to return. Defendant admits that he knew he was not supposed to be on Victim's property. Despite this knowledge, Defendant returned to Victim's property just a few hours later armed with a knife. Defendant opened the glass storm door on Victim's house and began banging and kicking on the interior door of the house. When confronted by Victim at gunpoint for the second time that day Defendant, instead of surrendering like he had done previously, said “I'll teach you to point the gun at me” and grabbed Victim's gun with both hands. Defendant yanked Victim out of the house and fought over the gun to the point that Defendant gained “equal control” of it. After Victim had subdued Defendant and was again escorting him off the property, Defendant turned to confront the Victim a second time and only retreated after Victim fired a shot into the ground.

Defendant returning to the property with a knife after previously being removed at gunpoint and stating he was going to “teach [Victim] to point the gun at [him]” and his subsequent attempts to gain control of the gun are facts from which a juror could reasonably infer that Defendant acted purposely and intended to cause serious physical injury to Victim. Durison, 698 S.W.3d at 891-92. It is presumed that Defendant, when engaging in this conduct, intended the “natural and probable consequences” of his actions. State v. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Mo. banc 1993). While Defendant argues that the evidence shows that he was simply mistaken and fearful for his own safety, the jury disagreed with such conclusion and we are required to accept the jury's factual findings and disregard any evidence or inferences to the contrary. See State v. Young, 582 S.W.3d 84, 96 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (“The jury is tasked with resolving conflicts in evidence, and it is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness.”).

Additionally, Defendant attempted to explain his actions with a story about how “Perry” invited him over earlier that day and he thought Perry and Perry's adult daughter, Payton, lived at Victim's residence. Defendant told this story to law enforcement at the scene, at which time there was evidence of Defendant's intoxication, but then reiterated the same story when he took the stand at trial. Law enforcement determined that there was no one named “Perry” or “Payton” who lived in the vicinity. The jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's story was false and demonstrated a consciousness of guilt from which the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant's purpose in showing up at Victim's house a second time and grabbing Victim's gun was to cause serious physical injury to Victim. See State v. Lundstrom, 725 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (“Exculpatory statements, when proven false, evidence a consciousness of guilt.” (quoting State v. Webb, 569 S.W.3d 530, 541 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018))).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, we find that a reasonable juror could have found that Defendant's purpose in showing up to Victim's house a second time with a knife, grabbing Victim's gun, pulling Victim out of his home, and struggling to gain control of the gun was to attempt to cause serious physical injury to Victim. As such, the trial court erred in granting Defendant's request for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the charge of First-Degree Assault.

Point 1 is granted.

Count II (Attempted First-Degree Burglary)

The State also asserts that the trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the attempted first-degree burglary conviction because there was sufficient evidence that Defendant attempted to enter the Victim's home for the purpose of committing the underlying crime of harassment when, despite being escorted off the property hours earlier, Defendant returned, opened the glass storm door and started kicking and banging on Victim's interior door hard enough to leave foot marks.

Under § 569.160.1,

[a] person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing an offense therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant in the offense:

(1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or

(2) Causes or threatens immediate physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or

(3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime.

(Emphasis added).

Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit an offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the offense. A ‘substantial step’ is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense.

§ 562.012 (emphasis omitted).

“The attempt to commit first-degree burglary may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Umfleet, 621 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing State v. Berryhill, 673 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982)). As noted above, “[b]ecause direct evidence of a particular mental state is seldom available, proof of the defendant's mental state usually rests on circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences.” Id. (citing State v. Lee, 332 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)).

In Umfleet, defendant repeatedly knocked and banged on victim's front door and bedroom window. Id. At one point, victim's neighbor saw defendant had his hands on each side of victim's bedroom window “like he was trying to find a way to get in.” Id. The victim and defendant ended their relationship before this incident, but defendant continued to try and communicate with her until she blocked him. Id. The Eastern District held that because of defendant's prior history of unwanted contact, “a jury could reasonably infer that [defendant] took a substantial step towards unlawfully entering [v]ictim's home” by repeatedly banging and knocking on her front door and bedroom window. Id. at 23-24.

“The necessary intent may be inferred from surrounding facts such as the defendant's conduct before the act, from the act itself, and from the defendant's subsequent conduct.” State v. Todd, 707 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Elledge, 673 S.W.3d 826, 830 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). In Todd, the defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree burglary after entering onto the victim's deck and “banging on the glass [door] with his fists and kick[ing] the door.” Id. at 631. The defendant never physically entered the home but was convicted of attempted first-degree burglary despite his argument that he was simply high on drugs and not attempting to enter victim's dwelling. Id. at 631-32.

In the instant case, Defendant showed up at Victim's house at approximately 4:30 am and started banging on the door. Victim informed him he was trespassing, led Defendant off the property at gunpoint, and told him not to return. Defendant admitted he knew he was not to return to the property and saw the purple paint and “no trespassing” signs in Defendant's yard. Nevertheless, Defendant returned a few hours later with a knife in his pocket, opened Victim's glass storm door and began kicking and banging on the interior front door. Defendant was kicking and banging on the interior front door hard enough that it left marks and caused the occupants to believe he was trying to break in. Based on this conduct, it would be reasonable for a juror to infer both that Defendant intended to kick the door hard enough he would potentially shatter the glass door and that he was attempting to gain entry to the home.

Similar to Umfleet, Defendant had a previous unwanted encounter with Victim hours before and the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant's actions were “strongly corroborative” of his purpose to unlawfully enter Victim's home to harass him and his family, and that his opening the storm door and then kicking and banging on the interior door was a substantial step towards committing that offense. Much like in Todd, Defendant never physically entered the home. Based on Defendant's conduct before the act (banging on Victim's front door at approximately 4:30 am, being told to leave, and being led off the property), the act itself (Defendant returning to Victim's home and kicking and banging on the front door forcefully enough to leave marks on the door), and subsequent conduct (turning back around as if to confront Victim while he was being lead off the property a second time), a reasonable juror could have inferred the necessary intent to support Defendant's attempted burglary conviction.

While Defendant again asserts a more innocent explanation of his conduct that morning, such explanation was rejected by the jury, and we must accept their resolution of such conflicting interpretations on appeal. See State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 414 (Mo. banc 1993) (“It is not the function of the court to decide the disputed facts; it is rather the court's function to assure that the jury, in finding the facts, does not do so based on sheer speculation.”). Point 2 is granted.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to accept the jury's verdicts for first-degree assault and attempted first-degree burglary and to proceed with sentencing and any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo (2016), as amended through October 16, 2025.

2.   The jury was given a self-defense instruction on behalf of the Defendant but rejected such claim and convicted Defendant of first-degree assault.

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J.

BECKY J. WEST, C. J. – CONCURS JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J. – CONCURS