IN RE: the Marriage of CYNTHIA CAMPBELL (2026)

Cynthia Campbell (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the circuit court's judgment dissolving her marriage with Bryan Campbell (“Husband”). The circuit court awarded Wife “approximately 70% of the marital equity[,]” which totaled $499,626.66. Neither party was awarded spousal maintenance. The parties have no minor children, though the parties have an adult disabled daughter (“Adult Disabled Daughter”). Wife sought child support for Adult Disabled Daughter considering Wife is appointed as her guardian. The circuit court denied Wife's request.

On appeal, Wife presents nine points relied on. Among other issues, the points purport to challenge the circuit court's division of marital property, valuation of property, denial of spousal maintenance, and denial of child support for Adult Disabled Daughter. We affirm the circuit court's judgment, dismissing eight of her points for briefing deficiencies and denying the remaining point on the merits.

Standard of Review

“In a dissolution of marriage case, we apply the same standard of review as in any other court-tried case.” Gilbert v. Chrismer-Still, 697 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024). “Rule 84.13(d) (2023) and Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 31-32 (Mo. banc 1976), require us to affirm the trial court's judgment ‘unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.’ ”¹ Id. (quoting Pickens v. Pickens, 687 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024)).

Discussion

I. Wife's Points 2 through 9 Violate Rule 84.04's Mandatory Briefing Requirements

“Rule 84.04 briefing requirements are mandatory[.]” Kurz v. Kurz, 674 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). “An appellant's failure to adhere to the briefing standards outlined in Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for appeal and is grounds for dismissal.” Shelton v. Shelton, 717 S.W.3d 810, 814-15 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). Pro se litigants are “held to the same standard as attorneys[,]” including “Rule 84.04's mandatory appellate briefing requirements,” because “[j]udicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties necessitates that we do not grant pro se litigants preferential treatment with regard to their compliance with those procedural rules[.]” Bazuaye v. Bazuaye, 722 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

A point relied on “shall: (A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Rule 84.04(d)(1). Additionally, “a point on appeal must proceed under one of the Murphy v. Carron grounds, each of which requires a distinct analytical framework.” Ebert v. Ebert, 627 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). Conversely, “[i]f a point on appeal fails to identify which one of the Murphy v. Carron grounds applies, Rule 84.04 directs us to dismiss the point.” Id.

“Rule 84.04(d) also requires separate points to challenge separate rulings or actions.” Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505-06 (Mo. banc 2022). “An appellant is not permitted to consolidate multiple, independent claims into a single point.” In re Marriage of Flood, 707 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). “Separate issues should be stated in separate points relied on.” Id. (citation omitted). “This is so because separate and distinct inquiries ․ require discrete legal analyses.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Failure to adhere to these principles renders the point multifarious, violating Rule 84.04(d) and preserving “nothing for review.” Lexow, 643 S.W.3d at 506 (citation omitted).

A. Point 2 is fatally multifarious

Wife's second point states:

The trial court erred in setting child support for [Adult Disabled Daughter] at $0.00, because the court erroneously applied Section 452.340.4 and Sections 452.340.8–.9, RSMo, Rule 88.01, Form No. 14, and disability-benefit law by substituting SSI-based financial reasoning for the required presumed child-support calculation and benefit-preserving analysis, in that [Wife] submitted a Form No. 14 that excluded SSI from parental gross income, the judgment neither adopted that calculation nor identified a court-determined Form No. 14, and the court denied support based on the parties’ financial circumstances and the Social Security benefits received by [Adult Disabled Daughter] and [Wife] without first providing a reviewable presumed child-support calculation or ordering a lawful benefit-preserving mechanism.

Point 2 is multifarious. As we understand it, Point 2 states the circuit court erroneously applied the law by “substituting SSI-based financial reasoning for the required presumed child-support calculation[,]” “den[ying] support based on the parties’ financial circumstances[,]” and not “ordering a lawful benefit-preserving mechanism.” Those legal theories are independent of one another. Rule 84.04(d) requires separate issues to be in separate points. Flood, 707 S.W.3d at 77; see also Meadowfresh Sol. USA, LLC v. Maple Grove Farms, LLC, 586 S.W.3d 329, 341 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019) (“A point relied on should contain only one issue, and parties should not group multiple contentions about different issues together into a single point relied on.”). Wife's second point on appeal does not comply with that requirement. Point 2 is dismissed.

B. Point 3 is fatally multifarious

Wife's third point states:

The trial court erred in relying on the factual proposition that [Wife] had sufficient personal resources or earning capacity and that the guardianship and benefit evidence undermined the claimed support needs, because no substantial evidence supported that proposition, in that the evidence favorable to the judgment showed only the timing and procedure of [Adult Disabled Daughter]’s guardianship, benefit payments administered by [Wife] as [Adult Disabled Daughter]’s representative payee, and [Wife]’s unpaid caregiving, household, advocacy, and courtroom activities, none of which established an improper guardianship motive, personal income available to [Wife], or sustainable employment sufficient to meet her reasonable needs without speculation or unsupported inference.

We agree with Husband's position that Wife's Point 3 is multifarious. Similar to her second point, Wife's third point on appeal presents multiple independent claims that Rule 84.04(d) requires to be raised in separate points. Point 3 attempts to challenge multiple factual propositions that Wife claims are necessary to support the judgment: (1) Wife's personal resources; (2) Wife's earning capacity; (3) Wife's appointment as guardian of Adult Disabled Daughter; and (4) Adult Disabled Daughter's social security disability benefit payments.² Even though Wife's Point 3 purports to challenge a single “proposition[,]” her argument section makes clear these claims are independent, describing them as “subsidiary findings[.]” Point 3 is dismissed.

C. Points 4, 5, and 6 fail to identify a Murphy standard

Wife's fourth point states:

The trial court erred in determining the post-judgment chronology and legal effect of [Wife]’s filings in the October 16, 2025 Judgment Setting Aside Order of Dismissal, because Rules 74.01, 75.01, 78.04, and 81.05 required the court to account for a timely motion seeking additions to the judgment and the certified proceedings on that motion, in that the May 7, 2025 Motion to Establish Special Needs Trusts was filed one day after the date appearing on the judgment, noticed and addressed at the May 13 hearing, continued to June 17 for ruling, and sought trust provisions in the decree for support and property implementation, yet the October order treated only the June 12 motion as relevant to finality and stated that the May 7 motion had never been called up or ruled upon.

Wife's fifth point states:

The trial court erred in denying [Wife]’s disability-related request for an inter-day recovery interval when the court directed the parties to return for a second consecutive trial day after an off-record discussion with counsel, because Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) required a state court to make reasonable modifications necessary to afford a qualified participant meaningful access unless the modification would fundamentally alter the proceeding, in that accommodation and processing needs had already been addressed, the transcript contains no on-record agreement by [Wife] to waive recovery time, [Wife] and counsel explained that she had not slept because of pain, was physically and mentally unable to sustain a second consecutive trial day, needed medical care, and was subject to medical limits on sustained activity, [Husband] urged the court to infer capacity and credibility from [Wife]’s demeanor, body language, voice, and responses, yet the court denied the request, allowed only a five-minute medication break, resumed [Wife]’s cross-examination, and later relied on her attendance and courtroom participation as evidence that she could sustain part-time employment and did not need maintenance.

Wife's sixth point states:

The trial court erred in valuing the marital residence at $225,000 and using that amount in the property division, because Section 452.330 required the court to divide marital property in light of the parties’ economic circumstances when the division became effective and Missouri law requires marital property to be valued as of the time of trial on evidence having substantial probative force, in that the only professional appraisal valued the residence at $265,000 “subject to completion,” the appraiser testified that the residence in its actual September 2023 condition was not worth $265,000, the appraisal predated the February 2025 trial by approximately seventeen months, and the judgment selected a $40,000 repair deduction without identifying appraisal, contractor, or other competent evidence establishing that $225,000 was the residence's fair market value in its actual condition at trial.

We dismiss Wife's Points 4, 5, and 6 because the points fail to identify which Murphy standard applies to the point. That shortcoming requires dismissal. See Ebert, 627 S.W.3d at 580; see also Taldone v. Shephard, 726 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (“A deficient point relied on requires the respondent and appellate court to search the remainder of the brief to discern the appellant's assertion and, beyond causing a waste of resources, risks the appellant's argument being understood or framed in an unintended manner.”) (citation omitted). Points 4, 5, and 6 are dismissed.

D. Points 7, 8, and 9 fail to identify a Murphy standard

Wife's seventh point states:

The trial court erred in dividing and directing implementation of [Husband]’s Fidelity 401(k), also identified as the NTCA Retirement and Security Program, because Section 452.330 and the federal QDRO requirements required the decree to express a coherent and definite substantive formula capable of being implemented by a qualified domestic relations order, in that the judgment authorized either a withdrawal or loan of “no more than but up to $80,000” for the actual mortgage balance and related tax burden, but then deducted a fixed $80,000 from the account before calculating [Wife]’s fifty-percent share; made [Husband] responsible for the tax burden without stating whether the tax reserve reduced only his share or the marital balance before division; required approval by [Husband]’s attorney before submission without a deadline or neutral resolution procedure; authorized the mortgage transaction before the QDRO; and left the benefit-preserving distribution dependent on later personal withdrawal and trust action rather than a definite, plan-compliant implementation method.

Wife's eighth point states:

The trial court erred in adopting Schedule A and relying on its totals to find that [Wife] received approximately seventy percent of the marital equity and sufficient property to produce supplemental income, because Sections 452.330 and 452.335 required the court to identify, classify, and divide property belonging to the spouses and then evaluate the property actually available to [Wife], in that Schedule A included within [Wife]’s gross property total accounts expressly identified with Gabrielle or [Adult Disable Daughter], an account identified as [Wife]’s Special Needs Trust, three vehicles subject to disputed title and adult-child contribution evidence, and a vacant lot carrying transfer, tax, insurance, and benefit-preservation consequences, without findings separating ownership, beneficial interests, restrictions, transfer obligations, or practical availability before the resulting $499,626.66 gross total was used as a financial resource against maintenance.

Wife's final point states:

The trial court abused its discretion in maintaining and applying the September 6, 2023 discovery restriction to material financial and residence information while later crediting [Husband]’s hardship narrative and adopting his proposed financial distribution, because Rule 56.01 permitted protection of sensitive information only through terms that still allowed fair use of relevant discovery and Sections 452.330 and 452.335 required an informed determination of the parties’ economic circumstances, in that the order required [Husband] to answer Interrogatories 1 and 7 but prohibited [Wife]’s counsel from disclosing the information to [Wife] verbally or in writing and required counsel to return to court before using it at a hearing, the restriction was invoked at trial when [Husband] was questioned about who he lived with while claiming he had been “literally homeless,” and the judgment then relied on [Husband]’s financial position and Schedule A without reconciling the restricted residence evidence or his later Texas housing testimony.

Points 7, 8, and 9 fail to identify a Murphy standard. They are also convoluted, failing to “[e]xplain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case” Wife's legal reasons support her claims of reversible error. See Rule 84.04(d); Fritz, 243 S.W.3d at 487 (“An insufficient point relied on, which cannot be understood without resorting to the record or the argument portion of the brief, preserves nothing for appellate review.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As was the case with Points 4, 5, and 6, Wife's failure to identify a Murphy standard within each point requires dismissal, and therefore we likewise dismiss Points 7, 8, and 9.

II. Point 1 is Denied Because Wife Misconstrues the Circuit Court's Reasoning

Wife's first point on appeal contends the circuit court erroneously applied § 452.335 by denying her request for spousal maintenance based on “eligibility concerns” due to her reception of social security disability benefits.³ We disagree with Wife's framing of this issue.

In its written judgment, the circuit court detailed the following reasons for denying spousal maintenance to both parties:

After considering those factors enumerated in Section 452.335 RSMo., the Court finds that [Husband] is capable of supporting himself through appropriate employment and is not in need of maintenance. The Court hears evidence that [Wife] receives Social Security disability benefits, that are subject to many rules and requirements to maintain. The Social Security Administration treats maintenance as unearned income, which means that maintenance is considered a source of income that can be used to meet a person's needs, similar to a job or other income sources. If [Wife] receives maintenance as requested, and it exceeds the income limits to receive disability payments, she may become ineligible or receive a reduced benefit.

Nonetheless, after hearing two days of evidence regarding [Wife]’s physical abilities, cognitive abilities, organizational skills, advocacy experience and other skills, as well as her ability to perform household, parenting, educational and other such duties during the parties marriage, and while [Wife] has qualified for receiving disability benefits, said qualification is not dispositive or conclusive of her ability to earn any income for the purposes of maintenance. The Court observed [Wife]’s functioning at multiple court appearances, heard testimony as to her abilities to perform duties for home schooling the children with very successful educational outcomes, including activities requiring physical exertion, reviewed her report as guardian and the activities she reported with [Adult Disabled Daughter.]․

․ The Court ․ finds that [Wife] appears more than capable of earning some additional income to support herself for maintenance purposes, which looks at different factors than a social security disability determination. However, in consideration of her ability to retain her disability income, as well as due to the significant property distribution by the Court in her favor, [Wife] shall not lack sufficient property based on the division of property and debt set forth herein, so that neither party is entitled or in need of maintenance from the other.

Section 452.335 “provides a two-step process for an award of maintenance.” Archdekin v. Archdekin, 562 S.W.3d 298, 307 (Mo. banc 2018). First, the circuit court “must first determine there is a need for maintenance because the party seeking it lacks sufficient property to provide for the party's reasonable needs and is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment.” Id. “[T]he party seeking maintenance has the burden of establishing both statutory threshold requirements.” Scruggs v. Scruggs, 161 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). Only then will the circuit court proceed to “consider all relevant factors set forth in Section 452.335.2(1-10) to set the amount and duration of the maintenance award.” Ganev v. Ganev, 734 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026); see also Archdekin, 562 S.W.3d at 307 (“Prior to determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the court must first determine there is a need for maintenance”).

Here, Wife misconstrues the circuit court's judgment. Wife testified at trial that she wanted to keep her social security disability benefits. Consequently, she argued for a maintenance award to be paid into a “Special Needs Trust” so that it would not “reduce or affect” her disability benefits.⁴ The circuit court noted Wife's request in its findings “in consideration of her ability to retain her disability income” and because “qualification [to social security disability benefits] is not dispositive or conclusive of her ability to earn any income for the purposes of maintenance.”

That recognition and reference notwithstanding, the circuit court ultimately concluded that Wife “is capable of performing work at a minimum of part time employment” and that she is “capable of earning some additional income to support herself for maintenance purposes[.]” The circuit court also concluded that spousal maintenance was not appropriate because of the “significant property distribution by the [circuit court] in [Wife's] favor[.]” To this extent, we agree with Husband that Wife's first point violates Rule 84.04(d). Wife does not challenge the circuit court's threshold determination that she is not in need of maintenance because she has sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, see § 452.335.1(1), and she is able to support herself through appropriate employment, see § 452.335.1(2).

Point 1 is denied.

Conclusion

“Compliance with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on arguments that have not been made.” Shelton, 717 S.W.3d at 814 (citation omitted). Points 2 through 9 are dismissed. Reaching the merits of Point 1, we deny the point. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025), and all statutory references are to RSMo 2016.

2.   We also note the point does not challenge a particular ruling or action. See Hoover v. Hoover, 581 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (“When an appellant makes the entire judgment one error and then lists multiple grounds therefore, the point contains multiple legal issues in violation of Rule 84.04(d).”) (citation omitted); Fritz, 243 S.W.3d at 486 (“The error contemplated by Rule 84.04(d) in a court-tried case is not the judgment itself but the trial court's actions or rulings on which the adverse judgment is based.”) (citation omitted).

3.   In its entirety, Wife's first point states:The trial court erred in denying maintenance to [Wife], because the court erroneously applied Section 452.335, RSMo, and disability-benefit law by treating SSI eligibility concerns as a reason to deny maintenance rather than to structure maintenance in a lawful benefit-preserving manner, in that [Wife] requested Special Needs Trust relief, the judgment stated that maintenance could reduce or affect [Wife]’s SSI benefits, and the court denied maintenance without ordering maintenance through a Special Needs Trust or other SSI-compliant mechanism.She goes on to explain in her argument section for Point 1:This Point challenges only the denial of maintenance to [Wife]. It does not ask this Court to reweigh every disputed fact from trial. The legal error is that the judgment treated SSI eligibility concerns as a reason to deny maintenance rather than as a reason to structure any maintenance award in a lawful, benefit-preserving manner.And she explains that: “The judgment therefore treated SSI consequences as a barrier to maintenance instead of applying the maintenance statute together with lawful implementation tools.”

4.   Wife's point also argues for this relief on appeal. We do not reach the issue since the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its denial of maintenance.

JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS BECKY J. WEST, C.J. – CONCURS