STATE OF MISSOURI v. DUSTIN CHARLES ZOOK (2026)

Following a bench trial, Dustin Charles Zook (Defendant) was convicted of the class E felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree. See § 574.120.¹ On appeal, Defendant presents a single point challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Finding no merit in his point, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 8, 2025, Defendant messaged a co-worker and friend (Friend) via Facebook Messenger. Although they were not always employed at the same location, Defendant and Friend had worked together for “six or seven months” at “Fast ‘N Friendly” convenience stores in Bolivar, Missouri. During the text conversation with Friend, Defendant suspected he was going to be fired because he was not on the work schedule. Defendant also described his intent to cause an explosion of the “above ground storage tanks” outside the “Store 14” location where Defendant worked. One of Defendant's messages inquired: “How hot do you think we would have to get it for the gas tanks[,] the above ground storage tanks at [S]tore 14 to explode?” Friend responded: “What TF you planning bro? We need to stay alive lol.” Defendant replied: “Level the store, maybe [the general manager's] house[.] It's all a joke entirely hypothetical[.]” Defendant also stated that, if he was going to do something like that, “it'd be like two bricks of C4, super easy to make.”

Later that day, Defendant was arrested by the Boliver Police Department. During his post-Miranda interview, Defendant admitted he sent the messages but claimed “it was entirely a joke.”² Defendant admitted that he understood people did not view the messages as a joke and stated that he “took it too far.”

Defendant was charged by felony information with the class E felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree, in violation of § 574.120. The information alleged that Defendant committed this offense when he “recklessly disregarded the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation” and that he “knowingly communicated an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life, to-wit: to cause an explosion at a business and residence.” Defendant did not file a motion to dismiss the information as insufficient because his statements failed to allege a “true threat,” nor did Defendant present a constitutional challenge that his statements were protected by the First Amendment.

At the close of the State's evidence, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that “no threat was ever made[.]” This motion was overruled by the trial court. Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses on his behalf. At the close of all evidence, Defendant again moved for judgment of acquittal, and this motion was also overruled by the court.

The trial court found Defendant guilty of the class E Felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree. The court sentenced Defendant to four years’ imprisonment, suspended execution of that sentence, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for five years. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

In a court-tried criminal case, the court's findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. Rule 27.01(b). Our review is governed by the principles set forth in State v. Keathley, 707 S.W.3d 718 (Mo. App. 2024):

“In reviewing a claim that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, this Court does not weigh the evidence but, rather, accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal brackets and citations omitted). Our review is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Mo. banc 2011); State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Mo. banc 2008). We will not weigh the evidence anew since the “fact-finder may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with the facts, circumstances and other testimony in the case.” State v. Crawford, 68 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Mo. banc 2002); Freeman, 269 S.W.3d at 425.

Further, “[t]he State may prove its case by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to each element of the crime.” State v. Jones, 296 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Mo. App. 2009). “Intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof and is usually inferred though circumstantial evidence.” State v. Smith, 668 S.W.3d 605, 608-09 (Mo. App. 2023). Upon appellate review, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is given the same weight as direct evidence and the [fact-finder] is free to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.” Jones, 296 S.W.3d at 509; State v. Plopper, 489 S.W.3d 848, 849-50 (Mo. App. 2016).

Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 721.

Discussion and Decision

Defendant contends the trial court erred by finding him guilty of making a terrorist threat in the second degree because there was “insufficient evidence” to show he was “aware the statements were ‘practically certain’ to communicate an express or implied threat to cause an incident that endangered human lives.” We disagree.

“The elements of a crime are found only in the statute creating that crime.” State v. Costa, 737 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Mo. App. 2026). In its entirety, § 574.120 provides:

1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree if he or she recklessly disregards the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation and knowingly:

(1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or

(2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or

(3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life.

2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree is a class E felony.

3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree if the person: (1) “recklessly disregards the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation”; and (2) “knowingly ․ [c]ommunicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life[.]” D.C.M. v. Pemiscot County Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. banc. 2019); § 574.120.1(1).

Defendant's sole point on appeal challenges the second prong, contending that the evidence was insufficient to show Defendant “knowingly communicated an express or implied threat[.]” Defendant argues the State failed to prove he “acted knowingly” because “the full context of the statements would not allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude [Defendant] knew those statements constituted something ‘practically certain’ to communicate an intent to endanger human life.” However, Defendant's framing is contrary to this Court's standard of review regarding sufficiency claims, as Defendant ignores evidence that was favorable to the verdict. See D.C.M., 578 S.W.3d at 786 (“evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, is considered in the light most favorable to the judgment”); Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 725 (appellate courts “must” view evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict); State v. Diaz, 611 S.W.3d 373, 374 (Mo. App. 2020) (we accept as true “all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable interferences that support the verdict”).

Furthermore, “[a] person ‘acts knowingly,’ or with knowledge” with respect to: (1) the “conduct or to attendant circumstances” when that person “is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist”; or (2) “a result of [the] conduct” when the person “is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.” § 562.016.3. These are alternative ways to prove knowledge. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove the latter alternative. That argument is misdirected because the State proved the former alternative. See D.C.M., 578 S.W.3d at 786 (required evidence that the defendant was “aware he was communicating an express or implied threat” to cause an incident endangering human life).

Here, Friend testified she received text messages from Defendant, including one inquiring “[h]ow hot do you think we would have to get it for the ․ above ground storage tanks at [S]tore 14 to explode?” Moreover, when Friend asked Defendant what he was planning, Defendant replied: “Level the store, maybe [the general manager's] house[,]” and suggested he would use “two bricks of C4” that would be “super easy to make[.]” Furthermore, when Defendant was asked about the text messages by a Bolivar police officer, Defendant stated he “took it too far.” Accordingly, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's verdict, as we must, there was sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder could have found Defendant was aware his statements communicated an express or implied threat. See Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 725.

Defendant further contends that his messages did not constitute “definite, declaratory statements,” but this claim lacks merit as well. Defendant relies on C.G.M., II v. Juvenile Officer, 258 S.W.3d 879 (Mo. App. 2008), which held that a juvenile's expressions to a classmate were not definitive or declaratory statements of a threat because he merely “inquired whether a classmate wanted to help him blow up the school, if C.G.M. received dynamite for his birthday.” Id. at 883-84. However, the circumstances surrounding Defendant's messages in this case differ significantly because Defendant claimed knowledge and the ability to act on his threat, whereas C.G.M. lacked the means and certainty to blow up a school. Likewise, Defendant attempts to distinguish the case at bar from D.C.M. because Defendant's statements did not designate a specific date or time for the threat. See D.C.M., 578 S.W.3d at 787. However, this reliance is also misplaced. While stating a specific date or time is sufficient for determining whether a defendant knowingly communicated an express or implied threat, it is not necessary. For instance, our decision in Keathley illustrates that a statement need not specify a date or time to constitute a threat. There, we found the defendant's statement that he would “take care of the kids himself” could be determined by a reasonable juror to be a definitive and declaratory threat without any temporal specification. Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 726.

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knowingly communicated a terrorist threat. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016). All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

2.   See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

BECKY J. WEST, C.J. – CONCUR JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J. – CONCUR