STATE v. JETT (2026)

A Pulaski County jury found Appellant Carl Joe Jett guilty of one count of statutory sodomy. The trial court sentenced Jett to life imprisonment. Jett appeals, arguing three points of evidentiary error by the trial court. We affirm the sentence and judgment of the trial court in regard to Points I and II, and we dismiss Point III for failure to comply with Rule 84.04.¹

Factual Background

Jett was married to the victim's (“Victim”) biological grandmother (“Grandmother”). In 2023, Victim and her parents and siblings lived with Jett and Grandmother. In October 2023, Victim, then seven-years-old, disclosed to her mother (“Mother”) that Jett had touched Victim's vagina and buttocks and placed his penis in her mouth. Mother told her husband, who is also Victim's father [“Father”], and Father directed Victim to tell Grandmother. A few days later, Victim disclosed the abuse to a forensic interviewer with the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”). A grand jury subsequently indicted Jett on a single count of statutory sodomy.

Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit the hearsay statements about Victim's disclosures of the abuse pursuant to § 491.075.² The trial court conducted a hearing (“491 hearing”) to determine whether the video recording of the CAC interview and the testimony of Father, Mother, Grandmother, and the forensic interviewer detailing Victim's disclosures bore the required indicia of reliability for admissibility. Following the 491 hearing, the trial court found that the testimony of Father, Mother, Grandmother, and the forensic interviewer about Victim's disclosures to them provided the statutorily required “sufficient indicia of reliability” to warrant presentation to the jury. The trial court found that the video recording of the CAC interview was also admissible under both §§ 491.075 and 492.304 RSMo.³

Jett raises three points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a Blue Springs, Missouri, detective (“Detective”) who previously investigated Father on a municipal charge of child abuse. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in precluding a full cross-examination of Mother. Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear hearsay testimony lacking sufficient indica of reliability.

Legal Standards

“A trial court ‘has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’ ” State v. Hartman, 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 2016), as modified (Mar. 25, 2016) (quoting State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 248 (Mo. banc 2013)). We find an abuse of discretion “only if [the trial court's] decision to admit or exclude evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting State v. Blurton, 484 S.W.3d 758, 769 (Mo. banc 2016)). But, “error alone will not justify reversal.” State v. Emery, 701 S.W.3d 585, 601 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal punctuation omitted). We review allegations of evidentiary error “for prejudice, not mere error.” State v. Pilkington, 726 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Mo.App. S.D. 2025) (quoting Blurton, 484 S.W. at 769). We will reverse for abuse of discretion only when the error was “so prejudicial that it is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Parry, 703 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Martin, 388 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Mo.App. S.D. 2012)). The defendant bears the burden of showing both the error and resulting prejudice. State v. Howery, 427 S.W.3d 236, 250 (Mo.App. E.D. 2014).

To be admissible, evidence must be both logically and legally relevant. State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Mo. banc 2017). Logically relevant evidence “tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable.” Id. (quoting State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 756 (Mo. banc 2014)). “Legal relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence against its costs—unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness. If the prejudice of the logically relevant evidence outweighs its probative value, it should be excluded.” Id. at 18 (internal citation and punctuation omitted). “The assessment of legal relevance rests soundly within the trial court's discretion.” State v. Vignolo, 732 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo.App. S.D. 2025).

Offers of Proof

“When a trial court sustains an objection to proffered evidence, the party offering the evidence must demonstrate its relevancy and materiality by way of an offer of proof to preserve the matter for appellate review.” State v. Hodges, 529 S.W.3d 28, 30 (Mo.App. S.D. 2017) (quoting State v. Pittman, 167 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Mo.App. S.D. 2005)).

An offer of proof is required to demonstrate to the circuit court what the rejected evidence would show, educating the circuit court as to the admissibility of the proffered testimony, and allowing the circuit court to consider the testimony in context. Offers of proof must show what the evidence will be, the purpose and object of the evidence, and each fact essential to establishing admissibility. The offer of proof must demonstrate the relevancy of the offered testimony, must be specific, and must be definite.

State v. Shutters, 697 S.W.3d 13, 21 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). “Failure to make an offer of proof preserves nothing for appellate review.” Hodges, 529 S.W.3d at 31.

Discussion

Point I

Jett argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Detective's testimony, resulting in fundamental unfairness to Jett because the jury did not hear evidence purportedly supporting Jett's theory of the case, namely, that Father coached Victim to lie.

Outside of the hearing of the jury, defense counsel informed the trial court that Father's testimony would be used to impeach his credibility and to “establish that his character for truth and veracity is not good.” Defense counsel expected Father to testify that he was truthful in the prior investigation and did not encourage his son to lie. Father did testify that he never lied to the police and never encouraged his children to lie during an investigation. Defense counsel intended to impeach Father's and Mother's credibility with the testimony of Detective, who had been involved in a prior investigation of domestic abuse against Father. Defense counsel stated that he expected Detective to testify that she believed Father and Mother had “coached” their son to lie to the police during the investigation.

Despite concerns that the expected testimony would entail “the most layers of hearsay I've ever come across,” the trial court heard Detective's testimony in an offer of proof. Detective testified Father “did not cooperate” in the investigation “in any way, shape[,] or form.” When asked whether Father had lied during the investigation, the Detective responded, “To my knowledge, he didn't talk to anybody.” When asked if she had evidence of Father coaching the children, the Detective replied, “I don't have any evidence of his involvement in it.”

Regarding Mother's alleged deceptive behavior during the prior investigation, Detective indicated Mother told Children's Division that she would seek an order of protection against Father, but she failed to complete the necessary paperwork. Detective further testified that Mother only produced one of the parties’ children for a forensic interview. Finally, Detective articulated her belief that that child had been coached about what to say during the forensic interview. Detective intimated that Mother bribed the child to change his story.

As to the Detective's offer of proof, the trial court determined:

So after the offer of proof based upon the testimony of the witness and the prior purposes put forth by the Defense, the request to have this witness testify regarding the truthfulness of [Father], based upon her answers that she never spoke to him, that request is overruled and denied.

The request ․ that he had coached the children, there was no testimony to that, so that request is also overruled and denied.

Regarding the veracity of [Mother], based upon the testimony of the witness, I don't show any direct evidence that [Mother] lied, so that request is likewise overruled and denied.

As to the coaching issue, while there appears to be some sort of observation by [Detective] regarding a forensic interview of the child, the testimony of the child -- while at least the description of that testimony may involve what would be coaching, I don't have any notes indicating that there was ever any questioning of [Mother] regarding whether she coached the children or specifically that she had previously coached children in prior instances.

And the, I think, three or four layers of hearsay, I don't think we can get through, so that request is likewise denied. But I will show the offer of proof taken up, considered.

The objection by the State as to testimony of this witness regarding those four issues is granted, and the witness will not be permitted to testify regarding those issues.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of Detective's testimony. As to Father's veracity, the Detective's testimony was neither logically nor legally relevant. The Detective testified that Father did not cooperate in the investigation, did not speak to anyone, and she had no evidence regarding Father's coaching of son. Her testimony would not have made the existence of any of the facts supporting Jett's defense “more or less probable[,]” thus it was not logically relevant. See Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. Nor was Detective's testimony about Father legally relevant. What little, if any, probative value the Detective's statements might have carried is vastly outweighed by the confusion of the issues and the potential to mislead the jury. See Id. at 817-18.

As for the trial court's exclusion of Detective's testimony about Mother's behavior, Detective's testimony about Mother's statements to the Children's Division were inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, Detective's beliefs about Mother's alleged “coaching” of son could not have impeached Mother's testimony because Mother was not asked in her direct testimony or on cross-examination whether or not she coached her son about what to say to anyone.

As the trial court correctly emphasized, Detective's statements were mostly hearsay, and defense counsel did not attempt to overcome that obstacle to admissibility. See State v. Broussard, 57 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) (determining failure of offer of proof on basis of hearsay).

Finally, an offer of proof comprising evidence that is admissible in part and inadmissible in part is subject to exclusion in its entirety. Id. Jett failed to demonstrate either error or resulting prejudice to support his argument that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Detective's testimony. Point I is denied.

Point II

Jett argues that he was prejudiced because he was not allowed to cross-examine Mother to demonstrate her bias or “fully explore” her “potential dishonesty.” The record belies his assertion. On cross-examination of Mother, the following occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: Have you ever filed for an order of protection against [Father]?

[Mother]: No.

[The State]: Judge, objection; relevance.

THE COURT: What is the relevance?

[Defense Counsel]: The relevance is to show that [Father] has a tendency to influence other members of his family.

[The State]: [Father] has no bearing in this case, Judge.

THE COURT: That'll be sustained.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. I'll pass the witness.

Jett did not preserve this issue for appellate review. “To preserve a claim of improperly excluded evidence, the proponent must attempt to present the excluded evidence at trial, and if it remains excluded, make a sufficient offer of proof.” State v Michaud, 600 S.W.3d 757, 761 (citation modified) (quoting State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 263 (Mo. banc 2014)). The offer of proof must

demonstrate to the circuit court what the rejected evidence would show, educating the circuit court as to the admissibility of the proffered testimony, and allowing the circuit court to consider the testimony in context. Offers of proof must show what the evidence will be, the purpose and object of the evidence, and each fact essential to establishing admissibility.

State v Tetmeyer, 699 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Michaud, 600 S.W.3d at 761-62).

After the trial court sustained the objection to Jett's question, Jett did not attempt an offer of proof to let the court hear the response to the excluded question. Nor did Jett make any attempt to present any further evidence to demonstrate that Father tried to exert influence over his family members. In fact, Jett's counsel abruptly terminated his cross-examination of Mother when the objection was sustained. Thus, Jett failed to preserve this issue for our review. See Id.

We do not generally review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. banc 2025). We may, within our discretion, review unpreserved claims for plain error when we find resulting manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Id. See Rule 30.20. However, Jett does not request plain error review and makes no claims of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Additionally, in cases where a party fails to provide an offer of proof, “the absence of a fully developed record ․ justifies the court's decision to deny plain error review.” Shutters, 697 S.W.3d at 21. Accordingly, we decline plain error review and deny Point II.

Point III

In his third point on appeal, Jett challenges the trial court's admission of the video recording of the CAC interview and the testimony of Father, Mother, Grandmother, and the forensic interviewer. Jett argues that the testimonies and video are inadmissible hearsay.

Deficient Point on Appeal

Jett's third point on appeal violates Rule 84.04. First, Jett's point is multifarious. Specifically, Jett patently challenges five separate evidentiary rulings in one point. “Rule 84.04(d) requires each point relied on to identify a single claim of reversible error, concisely state the legal reasons for that claim of error, and summarily explain why the stated legal reasons support the claim of error.” State v. Wolf, 690 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024) (quoting Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 744 (Fischer, J., concurring)). Asserting multiple claims of error in a single point relied on renders the point multifarious, violates Rule 84.04, preserves nothing for review, and subjects the point to dismissal. Id.

Deficient Argument

Jett also violates Rule 84.04(e) in the argument section of his brief. The requirements of Rule 84.04(e) are straightforward:

The argument shall substantially follow the order of ‘Points Relied On’ ․ for each claim of error, the argument shall also include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review. An argument must explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error. It should advise the appellate court how principles of law and the facts of the case interact.

State v. Yount, 710 S.W.3d 49, 58 (Mo.App. S.D. 2025), transfer denied (Apr. 29, 2025) (internal citation omitted); Rule 84.04(e).

Jett fails to provide accurate facts regarding the evidence provided to the trial court at the 491 hearing. In most instances, rather than citing to the transcript of the 491 Hearing, Jett cites to the trial transcript, which is irrelevant to our review of his claims of error. “[W]e assess only the evidence presented at the [Section] 491 Hearing.” State v. Rugen, 708 S.W.3d 513, 526 (Mo.App. E.D. 2025) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ragland, 494 S.W.3d 613, 623 (Mo.App. E.D. 2016)). Furthermore, Jett fails to discuss and makes only one passing reference to the trial court's written findings regarding the admissibility of the testimony and video recording Jett challenges on appeal. Without identifying and discussing the pertinent evidence and findings, Jett presented us with nothing to review. We are precluded from combing the legal file for facts to decipher Jett's argument, as that would violate our role as a neutral arbiter. State v. Studdard, 688 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024).

When counsel fail in their duty by filing briefs which are not in conformity with the applicable rules and do not sufficiently advise the court of the contentions asserted and the merit thereof, the court is left with the dilemma of deciding that case (and possibly establishing precedent for future cases) on the basis of inadequate briefing and advocacy or undertaking additional research and briefing to supply the deficiency. Courts should not be asked or expected to assume such a role. In addition to being inherently unfair to the other party to the appeal, it is unfair to parties in other cases awaiting disposition because it takes from them appellate time and resources which should be devoted to expeditious resolution of their appeals.

Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 1978)).

Jett also failed to advise this court how the law and the facts we are permitted to consider interact to support his claim of reversible error. See Yount, 710 S.W.3d at 58. As deficient briefing renders the point unreviewable, we dismiss Jett's Point III.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment as to Points I and II on appeal and dismiss Point III for briefing deficiencies under Rule 84.04.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise specified, rule references are to Supreme Court Rules (2025).

2.   Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to RSMo. (2012).

3.   Section 492.304 RSMo. (2004).

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – CONCURS