PASCHALL v. SENATH SOUTH HEALTH CARE CENTER (2026)

Nikita Paschall (“Appellant”) sued Senath South Health Care Center, LLC, Abdullah Arshad, M.D., Faaiza Arshad, P.A., Junaid Syed, M.D., and Tiffany Nelson, N.P. (collectively, “Respondents”), alleging their involvement in the wrongful death of Appellant's biological sister, Myesha County (“Decedent”). Respondents filed motions to dismiss Appellant's petition, which the circuit court ultimately granted, on the grounds that Appellant lacked standing to bring her lawsuit because she ceased being Decedent's legal sibling when the parental rights of Markina Freeman (“Mother”) and Michael County (“Father”), Decedent's biological parents, were terminated sometime prior to Decedent's death. Finding merit in Appellant's sole point on appeal, we vacate and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

In addition to Appellant's already-noted allegation that she is Decedent's biological sister, we list other pertinent allegations found in Appellant's petition. On or about March 4, 2022, Decedent became a resident at Senath South Health Care Center, LLC, where all the other named Respondents were employed and administered care to Decedent. Decedent's medical records reflected that she was prescribed certain antipsychotic medications, which never included Olanzapine. On March 13, 2022, Decedent died at Senath South Health Care Center, LLC. An autopsy revealed that Decedent had 880 ng/ml of Olanzapine in her blood and that she died because of acute Olanzapine intoxication.

Respondents’ motions to dismiss Appellant's petition followed, leading to the submission of evidence by all parties. This evidence, which no party disputes, reveals that Decedent was born on November 16, 1995, and that Mother and Father are her biological parents. Although lacking in certain details, the evidence further reveals that the parental rights of both Mother and Father were terminated at some point, and all parties agree that Father is now likely deceased. No adoption of Decedent occurred following termination. After reaching the age of majority and continuing until her death, Decedent was subject to a guardianship and conservatorship by the Jackson County Public Administrator.

After a hearing, the circuit court issued a judgment dismissing Appellant's petition for lack of standing. Appellant timely appeals.

Legal Background and Standard of Review

Whether a wrongful death plaintiff has standing is governed by section 537.080.1, RSMo (2016), which all parties relied on during the underlying proceedings before the circuit court. Section 537.080.1(1)-(3) specifically identifies three classes of plaintiff who may bring such a claim. The first class includes “the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any deceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive.” Section 537.080.1(1). If there is no person listed in the first class then, as relevant here, the statute identifies a second class, including “the brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants[.]” Section 537.080.1(2) (emphasis added). Only if there are no persons provided for in classes one or two is the court allowed to appoint a plaintiff ad litem to bring a claim under a third class including “those persons entitled to share in the proceeds of such action.” Section 537.080.1(3).

“The standard of review for an appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is de novo.” Wilson v. Cramer, 317 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Mo.App. 2010). In this case, the circuit court considered matters outside the pleadings in making its judgment. “Under these circumstances, the motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for summary judgment, and we will review it as such.” Id.; see also Rules 55.27(a), (b), and 74.04, Missouri Court Rules (2025). Additionally, as applicable here, “when the parties both submit matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties waive notice of the court's conversion of the matter into a motion for summary judgment, and they likewise waive compliance with Rule 74.04's procedural requirements.” Wilson, 317 S.W.3d at 208.

A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the defendants can show that the undisputed material facts reveal that the plaintiff lacks standing, then they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We make all reasonable inferences in favor [of] the non-moving party.

Id. (citations omitted).

Analysis

In her sole point, Appellant challenges the circuit court's determination that she lacks standing to pursue her wrongful death claim, contending that the termination of parental rights affects only legal rights between a parent and a child and, therefore, such a termination has no bearing on a sibling's standing under section 537.080.1. We agree.

The requirements and the result of a proceeding to terminate parental rights is set out by statute as follows:

If, after the dispositional hearing, the court finds that one or more of the grounds set out in section 211.447 exists or that the parent has consented to the termination pursuant to section 211.444 and that it is in the best interests of the child, the court may terminate the rights of the parent in and to the child.

Section 211.477.1, RSMo (2016) (emphasis added). Said result “contemplates complete and final severance of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations of the parent and child with respect to each other.” In re S—M—W—, 485 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Mo.App. 1972) (emphasis added).

Respondents do not address in detail this or any other termination of parental rights authority, which, on the face of said authority, appears to limit the consequences of termination to between parents and children. Respondents, instead, spend the bulk of their brief discussing adoption. In doing so, Respondents characterize Missouri's approach to adoption as the “substitution approach,” and they cite Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Blasdel, for the proposition that “a child adopted under Missouri's adoption statutes is taken out of the blood stream of its natural parents and placed, by operation of law, into the blood stream of its adoptive parents[.]” 141 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Mo.App. 2004); see also section 453.090.1, RSMo (2016) (stating that a child who is adopted “shall thereafter be deemed and held to be for every purpose the child of his parent or parents by adoption, as fully as though born to him or them in lawful wedlock” (emphasis added)). Respondents go on to identify cases where, because of adoption, a right to intestate succession was lost. See, e.g., In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445, 447-48 (Mo. banc 2014) (holding that a granddaughter's right to intestate succession from her biological grandfather was severed as result her mother's adoption); Wilson v. Carmichael, 665 S.W.2d 52, 53-55 (Mo.App. 1984) (rejecting claim that a biological nephew was entitled to intestate succession from the decedent, who was adopted as a child).

Relying on this and other adoption authority, Respondents argue that the termination of parental rights is “akin” to the “substitution approach” employed in adoptions. It follows, according to Respondents, that Appellant cannot pursue a wrongful death claim under section 537.080.1 as Decedent's biological sibling because they are no longer related under the law. Respondents’ argument raises an obvious question, which they do not attempt to answer: into whose “blood stream” is a child substituted following the termination of parental rights when, as here, there was no adoption? As listed in section 211.477.1, RSMo (2016), there are various entities or people to whom a court can transfer the legal custody of a child following a termination order. We note that a “relative” is included on said list, see section 211.477.1(3), suggesting that a child is not completely removed from the “blood stream” of his or her family based on a termination order alone.

No Missouri case involving a termination order and a wrongful death action (brought by a family member not subject to the termination order) appears in the parties’ briefing or this Court's research. Appellant, however, directs this Court to several persuasive out-of-state cases involving these issues, including Fraizer v. Velkura, 91 Cal.App.4th 942 (Cal.Ct.App. 2001). Observing that the termination of parental rights contemplates the severance of the relationship between a child and parents, the court in Fraizer held that a termination order had no effect on the relationship of the decedent and her grandmother for purposes of standing to bring a statutory wrongful death action. Id. at 945-47. We reach the same conclusion as to the sibling relationship presented here. Appellant's sole point is granted.

Decision

The circuit court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BECKY J. WEST, C.J.

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS