STATE EX REL PRIVETTE v. JUSTUS (2026)

The Honorable Steven Privette and Alice Bell (hereinafter referred to individually as Judge Privette or Bell, and collectively as Relators) filed a writ of prohibition with this Court asking that the Honorable James Justus (Respondent Judge) be prohibited from granting leave to Betty Grooms (Grooms) to amend her petition in the underlying case by requesting punitive damages. We issued a preliminary writ, and the cause was briefed and orally argued by the parties. We now make the preliminary writ permanent. See State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. banc 2009); State ex rel. Jackson v. Parker, 496 S.W.3d 559, 563 n.8 (Mo. App. 2016).

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2022, circuit clerk Grooms was directed by Judge Privette to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases after local sheriffs alleged their departments had not received reimbursement from the State of Missouri for costs incurred incarcerating individuals in their county jails. When she allegedly failed to comply with this court order, Judge Privette ordered Grooms to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. After Judge Privette overruled Grooms’ motion to dismiss the contempt action, she filed a petition for prohibition or mandamus in our Supreme Court. The Court issued a preliminary writ prohibiting Judge Privette from proceeding further in the matter and ultimately held that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order. State ex rel. Grooms v. Privette, 667 S.W.3d 92, 93-94 (Mo. banc 2023).

Grooms filed her petition against Judge Privette and Bell on May 9, 2024. The petition sued Judge Privette and Bell only in their individual capacities.¹ The gist of Grooms’ petition was that Judge Privette and Bell, “acting in concert and pursuant to a conspiracy,” committed an abuse of process to harass Grooms, because Judge Privette initiated the contempt proceeding against her with respect to the record of board bills she had been asked to prepare.² The petition requested that actual damages in various amounts be awarded to Grooms.

On October 23, 2024, Grooms filed a first-amended petition, without leave of court, requesting that punitive damages be awarded. On November 4, 2024, Relators filed a motion to strike Grooms’ request for punitive damages. Relators filed their answer and affirmative defenses to the first-amended petition on January 17, 2025.³

On March 31, 2025, Grooms filed a motion for leave to include the request for punitive damages in her first-amended petition. On April 10, 2025, Relators filed a memorandum with the trial court opposing that request. Relators pointed out that they were being defended by the State Legal Expense Fund (hereinafter, SLEF) and that § 105.711 expressly prohibited the recovery of punitive damages.⁴ On April 25, 2025, the trial court entered an order stating, in relevant part:

The Court this date rules on all issues pending at this time. Court grants [Grooms’] motion for punitive damages. The statute [§ 510.261.1 RSMo Cum. Supp. (2020)] allows punitive damages “if claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that [Relators] intentionally harmed [Grooms] without just cause.” [Relators’] motion to exclude claim under Section 105.711 RSMO, Subsection 5 is denied. Court reads the statute as excluding the fund paying for punitive damages, not the claim.

On May 1, 2025, Relators filed a writ of prohibition with this Court seeking to prohibit Respondent Judge from granting leave to Grooms to include a request for punitive damages. After issuing a show-cause order, we issued a preliminary writ. Thereafter, the case proceeded to briefing and oral argument.

Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs pursuant to article V, section 4.1 of the Missouri Constitution. State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Mo. banc 2024). “[P]rohibition is an extraordinary remedy which should only be employed in unequivocal cases[.]” State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1986). A writ of prohibition is discretionary, but it is appropriate: (1) to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority or jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion by a lower court; or (3) to prevent a party from suffering irreparable harm. State ex rel. Hanaway v. Hellmann, 728 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Mo. banc 2026).

The issue before us is whether the trial court's ruling, allowing Grooms to seek punitive damages from Relators, was a correct application of § 105.711 governing the SLEF. That ruling does not fall within the list of four immediately appealable interlocutory orders listed in § 512.020(1)-(4). See Thomas v. H'Doubler, 663 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Mo. App. 2023). A writ proceeding is appropriate when a trial court erroneously decides an important question of law and no adequate remedy at law exists. State v. Smiley, 478 S.W.3d 411, 417 n.5 (Mo. banc 2016); State ex rel. Poucher v. Vincent, 258 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Mo. banc 2008); State v. Larson, 79 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. banc 2002). When the issuance of a writ depends on the interpretation of a statute, we review the statute's meaning de novo. State ex rel. White Family P'ship v. Roldan, 271 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Mo. banc 2008).

Discussion and Decision

Relators present one point for decision. They contend the trial court exceeded its authority by permitting Grooms to amend her petition to seek punitive damages. They argue that, pursuant to § 105.711, punitive damages are not recoverable in an action defended under the SLEF. We agree.

The SLEF is governed by §§ 105.711-105.726. “The legislature established SLEF in 1983 to replace the tort defense fund.” Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. banc 2021). “Moneys in SLEF are used to pay claims or judgments against the state, its agencies, any officer or employee of the state or its agencies, and certain other designated individuals and entities.” Id. The investigation, defense, negotiation, or compromise of any claim covered by the SLEF is conducted by the attorney general. § 105.716; see City of St. Louis v. Bertels, 699 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Mo. App. 2024). As explained by our Supreme Court in Holmes:

Matters of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo. Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Commc'ns Avionics Sys., Inc., 533 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Mo. banc 2017). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent as evidenced by the text and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 665 (Mo. banc 2010). In determining the meaning of words in a statute, the words should not be read in isolation but rather “must be considered in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words.” Cosby v. Treasurer of State, 579 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Mo. banc 2019).

Holmes, 624 S.W.3d at 149.

We begin our analysis by examining the text of § 105.711. Two subsections of that statute are important to the resolution of the issue in this appeal. The first is § 105.711.2. In relevant part, it states:

Moneys in the [SLEF] shall be available for the payment of any claim or any amount required by any final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction against:

․

(2) Any officer or employee of the State of Missouri ․ upon conduct of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state[.]

Id. The second is § 105.711.5. In relevant part, it states:

All payments shall be made from the [SLEF] by the commissioner of administration with the approval of the attorney general. ․ In the case of any claim or judgment against an officer or employee of the state or any agency of the state based upon conduct of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state or any agency of the state that would give rise to a cause of action under section 537.600, the [SLEF] shall be liable, excluding punitive damages, for:

(1) Economic damages to any one claimant; and

(2) Up to three hundred fifty thousand dollars for noneconomic damages.

The [SLEF] shall be the exclusive remedy and shall preclude any other civil actions or proceedings for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the state officer or employee, or the officer's or employee's estate. No officer or employee of the state or any agency of the state shall be individually liable in his or her personal capacity for conduct of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state or any agency of the state.

§ 105.711.5 (emphasis added).

Judge Privette and Bell were, at all times relevant to this proceeding, employees of the State. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Cnty. v. Kirkpatrick, 426 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Mo. 1968) (circuit judges are judges of the State); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Mo. App. 1989) (trial court judges are State employees); Hawkins v. Missouri State Emp. Ret. Sys., 487 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. App. 1972) (Missouri law is well settled that circuit judges are State employees); see also § 483.083.4 (circuit clerks are “considered state employees for all purposes except the manner of their selection, appointment or removal from office”); Allsberry v. Flynn, 730 S.W.3d 271, 281 (Mo. App. 2025) (relying on § 483.083.4 to hold that a circuit clerk was a State employee for purposes of an “MHRA claim”). We also note that Bell had no ability to initiate a contempt proceeding on her own, and she was sued under a civil conspiracy theory of acting in concert with Judge Privette. Therefore, we solely analyze Judge Privette's actions to determine whether his conduct arose out of, and was performed in connection with, his official duties on behalf of the State. See § 105.711.2.

In the prior writ proceeding initiated against Judge Privette by Grooms, our Supreme Court recognized that, as presiding judge, Judge Privette had general administrative authority over all judicial personnel and court officials in the circuit. Grooms, 667 S.W.3d at 98 n.7. One aspect of the administrative authority was Judge Privette's statutory duty to examine Grooms’ bills of costs:

In the instant case, the circuit court proceeded against Grooms for contempt of court for her alleged deficiencies in complying with its order directing her to prepare a spreadsheet regarding bills of costs and state reimbursement of incarceration costs. By statute, the circuit clerk is required to calculate and determine the costs that have accrued in criminal cases and prepare a bill chargeable to the state containing certain costs payable to the county as provided by law. Sections 550.140, 550.020. Pursuant to section 221.105.2, RSMo Supp. 2022, the clerk must include in the bill of costs county incarceration costs that are properly chargeable to the state. The judge is required to “strictly examine[ ] the bill of costs” and verify, among other things, that the defendant was convicted of an offense or offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, that the services were rendered for the prosecution of [the] offense or offenses, that the fees charged are expressly authorized by law, and that they are properly taxed against the state. Section 550.210. The bill of costs is then to be certified to the director of the department of corrections for the state to reimburse the county as appropriate. Sections 550.190, 550.260. The preparation and certification of bills of costs charging the state for incarceration costs are clearly statutory duties of the circuit clerk and judge.

Id. at 97-98 (internal footnotes omitted). The Court held, however, that Judge Privette exceeded his authority by proceeding against Grooms for contempt under the circumstances. Id. at 98. The Court gave the following explanation for its narrow holding:

This Court's holding, however, should not be interpreted to suggest presiding judges and the courts they serve cannot request from the circuit clerk information related to the reimbursement of incarceration costs. Pursuant to the statutory duties of the clerk and the court to prepare and certify costs chargeable to the state in criminal cases, it was more than reasonable for Judge Privette to request the information he sought from Grooms. The court merely lacked the authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged failure to provide information about the reimbursement of costs counties incurred to incarcerate individuals.

Id. at 98-99.

Because Judge Privette had a statutory duty to examine Grooms’ bills of costs, we hold that his conduct arose out of, and in connection with, his official duties. In so holding, we are simply applying the plain and ordinary meaning of § 105.711.2 to the case at bar.

Our holding dictates the disposition of the remaining issues in the case. Because Relators are covered by the SLEF, punitive damages are not recoverable. See § 105.711.5. More importantly, the SLEF is Grooms’ exclusive remedy, which “shall preclude any other civil actions or proceedings for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the state officer or employee[.]” Id. This also means that Judge Privette and Bell cannot be held individually liable in their personal capacities for the conduct forming the basis for Grooms’ lawsuit. See id.; Laughlin v. Perry, 604 S.W.3d 621, 632-33 (Mo. banc 2020) (public defenders covered by the SLEF cannot be held personally liable for any costs or judgments resulting from the litigation).

For these reasons, Respondent Judge's ruling below was in error in two respects. First, the controlling statute on the issue of punitive damages is § 105.711, rather than § 510.261 RSMo Cum. Supp. (2020). Second, the exclusive-remedy provision and the preclusion of individual liability mean the request for punitive damages is barred, not just the payment of such damages by the SLEF. Based on the plain language of § 105.711.5, Respondent Judge's ruling was incorrect.

Grooms’ brief argues in support of Respondent Judge's ruling that “[t]his Court and the Missouri Supreme Court have each previously ruled that Relators were not entitled to Writs of Prohibition on the grounds that they were entitled to official or judicial immunity.”⁵ Grooms’ argument misses the mark for the following reason:

The mere denial of a petition for writ of prohibition where the appellate court issues no opinion is not a conclusive decision on the merits of the issue presented. Indeed, there are a number of reasons why the appellate court might decline to review a writ petition on the merits, not the least of which is the probability that the issue presented can be adequately reviewed ․ on direct appeal after the facts pertaining to the issue are fleshed out more thoroughly at trial.

Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 61 (Mo. banc 1999) (citations omitted); see also Concerned Citizens for Crystal City v. City of Crystal City, 334 S.W.3d 519, 524-25 (Mo. App. 2010) (the denial of a writ petition is not a conclusive decision of the merits of the issue presented). Therefore, the issues of official immunity and judicial immunity are still live questions in Grooms’ lawsuit.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent Judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing his order granting leave to Grooms to amend her petition to seek punitive damages from Relators. Our preliminary writ of prohibition is made permanent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sovereign immunity, if not waived, bars suits against employees in their official capacity because such suits are essentially direct claims against the State. Metcalf v. Beard, 717 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. App. 2025); Suppes v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 613 S.W.3d 836, 855 (Mo. App. 2020); Betts-Lucas v. Hartmann, 87 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Mo. App. 2002).

2.   A claim for civil conspiracy requires: “(1) two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful overt acts, and (5) resulting damages.” Mackey v. Mackey, 914 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. App. 1996); see Oak Bluff Partners, Inc. v. Meyer, 3 S.W.3d 777, 780-81 (Mo. banc 1999). Each member of the conspiracy need not have actually committed the unlawful act supporting liability. See Mackey, 914 S.W.2d at 50; Garrity v. A.I. Processors, 850 S.W.2d 413, 418 (Mo. App. 1993).

3.   On that date, Relators also filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this Court alleging that Grooms’ claims were barred by official and judicial immunity. The writ petition was denied. Relators next filed a petition for writ of prohibition in our Supreme Court, which was also denied. Both this Court and the Supreme Court denied each of Relators’ petitions without issuing an opinion.

4.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016), unless otherwise specified.

5.   As noted in n.3, supra, Relators filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this Court (Case Number SD38839) on January 17, 2025. We denied the petition without the issuance of an opinion on January 22, 2025. On February 4, 2025, Relators filed a petition for writ of prohibition in our Supreme Court (Case Number SC100962). That petition was denied without the issuance of an opinion on March 4, 2025.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J.

BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCUR MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCUR