LEMASTERS v. STATE (2026)

Andrew Luke Lemasters (“Movant”) appeals the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief following evidentiary hearings. In the underlying case, Movant was convicted on June 5, 2013, of one count of statutory sodomy in the first degree (§ 566.062)¹ and sentenced to a term of 31 years’ imprisonment.

During the underlying jury trial on June 5, 2013, after voir dire but prior to opening statements, the trial court took up pretrial motions. Movant's trial counsel made an oral motion in limine requesting the exclusion of any evidence relative to Movant's physical abuse of the victim's (“Victim”) stepmother (“Stepmother”) and Stepmother's two sons also living in the home. The trial court preliminarily sustained the motion in limine, but allowed the prosecution to make an offer of proof. After the offer of proof, the trial court ruled the State could introduce evidence “as to physical abuse witnessed by [Victim], verbal abuse to herself, but not verbal abuse to others, any physical abuse she saw, and physical abuse to herself.”

That pretrial ruling is the basis of this appeal. During the trial, Stepmother testified as to some of the issues covered by the motion in limine. In his sole point, Movant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to object to [Stepmother]’s testimony that [Movant] had abused her and her sons for years, in violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling in limine[,]” and consequently Movant asserts he was convicted of the charged crime based on evidence of other uncharged crimes.

This case has a tortured postconviction procedural history, including two trips to the Missouri Supreme Court,² but for the purposes of this appeal, two evidentiary hearings are important as to Movant's Amended Motion Under Rule 29.15 (the “29.15 Motion”): the first hearing held on September 29, 2017 (the “2017 hearing”), and the second on December 4, 2024 (the “2024 hearing”). The transcript from the 2017 hearing was admitted as an exhibit in the 2024 hearing. After the 2024 hearing, the motion court took the matter under advisement and denied the 29.15 Motion on June 17, 2025.

Finding the motion court's denial of postconviction relief was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Factual Background

Movant's trial counsel testified during the 2017 hearing that he had been a practicing criminal attorney for 45 years and had taken 300 to 400 cases to jury trials. Regarding objections at trial, trial counsel testified that generally, he might not pose objections at trial “depending upon how damaging [he] consider[ed] the testimony [was], ․ how irritating [his] objection might be to a jury, whether or not it's going to come in [anyway],” and if “the benefit to be gained from objecting would not have justified the possibility of alienating the jury.” Trial counsel further explained that he thought that it was “important for a defense attorney ․ to try to maintain rapport with the jury, and ․ that you can object to the point where you're damaging your credibility with the jury by overly objecting.”

At the trial in June of 2013, the State called Stepmother to the stand and asked her whether Movant had abused her and her sons. Defense counsel did not object. Stepmother answered in the affirmative, and later elaborated that Movant shot her, stabbed her, and hit her with his car, and that she lived in constant fear for her life and the lives of her children due to Movant abusing them for 19 years. Trial counsel cross-examined Stepmother about her testimony relative to this abuse of herself and one of her sons. Trial counsel also interposed other objections during Stepmother's testimony on grounds unrelated to the abuse.

Regarding Stepmother's abuse testimony and his failure to object, trial counsel testified at the 2017 hearing,

I do recall that I thought that [Stepmother] was overly dramatic ․ to the point where I believed that she was actually damaging her own credibility with the jury by some of her extreme statements and the fact that it – her hostility towards [Movant] was – would be obvious to the jury, and I felt – I recall feeling that just letting her run off at the mouth from a strategic standpoint probably helped us rather than hurt us.

Trial counsel further explained, “[S]he was just so extreme and she was destroying any credibility she had with the jury.” He elaborated, “I believe that [Stepmother] had created an impression that she hated [Movant], that she was going to do anything she could to try to hurt him, and that the jury had pretty well picked up on that[.]” Trial counsel continued, “[P]art of our defense was that I think that [Stepmother] had encouraged all of this and that she would stop at nothing to ․ try to make [Movant] look bad.” Movant's postconviction counsel asked, “So given that[,] ․ you're willing to let evidence of uncharged bad acts and potential crimes be testified about to the jury?” and trial counsel replied, “[I]t reached a point where the jury wasn't even believing what she said, so it just wound up making her look bad. That would have been my thought.” Trial counsel confirmed that he felt that Stepmother's testimony “hurt[ ] the State more than help[ed] it[.]” When questioned, “[L]ooking back after the result of the jury's verdict, do you think it worked?” trial counsel replied, “this was a difficult case to defend” and “[trial counsel] d[id]n't think [Stepmother's] testimony had any impact on the jury.” Trial counsel further confirmed that objecting to some questions and not others was a matter of trial strategy.

At the 2024 hearing, trial counsel confirmed that he recalled testifying at the 2017 hearing that he did not object to Stepmother's testimony about Movant's physical abuse because he felt that she had lost her credibility with the jury. Postconviction counsel asked, “[I]f the record reflects that you did, in fact, object to [Stepmother's] testimony in several places after that time, then how could you say that you've chosen not to object to her because she's already lost all credibility?” and trial counsel replied,

It's been too long. I don't know what my strategy was at the time․. [S]ometimes you let things go to the point where, if you don't think they're hurting you, you don't object. And then it goes beyond a certain point where you think it may be doing some damage, then you are going to object.

Trial counsel acknowledged that his recollection of the trial was certainly clearer at the 2017 hearing.

Citing the evidence from the 2017 hearing, the motion court emphasized trial counsel's testimony that he “made the conscious decision not to object to [Stepmother's] testimony as he felt that [she] had already lost credibility given her testimony up to that point.” The motion court found that “the failure to object was a matter of trial strategy on the part of [trial counsel]” and that “[i]f a failure to object ․ is a reasonable matter of trial strategy, then no ineffective assistance of counsel can be shown.” The motion court determined Movant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and was not entitled to postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Under Rule 29.15(k), “[a]ppellate review of the [motion] court's action on the motion filed under this Rule 29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.” This Court presumes the motion court's findings are correct, and a judgment is clearly erroneous only when “in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016)). We conduct a de novo review for:

errors of law, rejection of factual findings for which there is no substantial evidence, and – in the rarest of cases – rejection of factual findings for which there may be substantial evidence but regarding which the reviewing court, nevertheless, on the entire record, is left with a definite and firm conviction (or impression) that a mistake has been made.

Id. at 419. “In applying this standard, appellate courts should defer to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and recognize the [motion] court is entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post conviction hearing.” Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).

Analysis

To prevail on a claim of postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must establish “(1) his or her counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would in a similar situation (performance prong), and (2) the movant was prejudiced by that failure (prejudice prong).” Blade v. State, 685 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). If the movant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test, we need not consider the other. Id. at 638 (citing Anderson v. State, 66 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)). The movant must also “overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.” Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 906). Reasonable decisions of trial strategy, “no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance” of counsel. Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004). “This Court ․ has never found that a failure to litigate a trial perfectly constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, nor does this Court believe a ‘perfect’ litigation to be possible.” Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636, 650 n.7 (Mo. banc 2008).

“To establish Strickland prejudice, a movant must prove that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Tisius v. State, 519 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Mo. banc 2013)). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693.

“A trial counsel's failure to object is ordinarily trial strategy and therefore afforded considerable deference.” Shelton v. State, 440 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014); see also Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 679 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (“In arguing ineffectiveness[,] a movant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's failure to object was sound trial strategy.”). “[A] trial attorney's failure to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence may constitute reasonable trial strategy.” Riley v. State, 475 S.W.3d 153, 160-61 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). When an appellant bases their ineffective assistance of counsel claim on their counsel's failure to object, they have a “significant hurdle” to overcome: “In many instances, seasoned trial counsel do not object to otherwise improper questions or arguments for strategic purposes. It is feared that frequent objections irritate the jury and highlight the statements complained of, resulting in more harm than good.” Hays v. State, 484 S.W.3d 121, 128-29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citation omitted). In addition, “[a] movant does not overcome the strong presumption that counsel had a strategic reason for his decision even where trial counsel fails to verbalize a trial strategy for his decision.” Salazar v. State, 499 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (finding that counsel's failure to recall whether he had a strategic reason for not making an objection was insufficient to overcome the presumption that one existed). Moreover, “trial counsel may sometimes want to interject otherwise objectionable evidence into a case if it can assist defense counsel in supporting the defense theme of the case.” Hays, 484 S.W.3d at 131 (alteration in original). Consequently, “a failure to object is rarely found to be ineffective assistance of counsel.” Nigro v. State, 467 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).

While Movant has the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland analysis, he fails to satisfy either. Here, Movant's trial counsel, with over 45 years and several hundred jury trials of experience, developed a trial strategy during Stepmother's testimony that led him to believe the better course of action was to allow her to testify as to the issues he raised in the motion in limine because he believed her testimony was hurting the State's case rather than Movant. As trial counsel explained in 2017 and 2024, he believed Stepmother's testimony was “overly dramatic” and that by allowing the testimony to come in without objection, he was allowing her to undermine her own objectivity and credibility. This was a reasonable trial strategy given trial counsel's experience and his view of the evidence as it was coming in during the trial. Trial counsel followed up with a line of questioning on cross-examination that called into question the veracity of Stepmother's claims and was consistent with his explanation and trial strategy. He then followed up with cross-examination that further questioned her credibility and objectivity. Moreover, there is evidence in the record that his strategy of using Stepmother's claims of abuse to convince the jury that she was not credible and that her extreme hatred of Movant had influenced Victim to make similar false allegations against Movant may have worked.

As one example, Stepmother claimed that Movant had shot her. On cross-examination, trial counsel elicited Stepmother's admission that no medical personnel treating her ever identified her injury as a gunshot wound and that law enforcement was never contacted about the incident. Trial counsel later explicitly referenced this testimony in his closing argument, while arguing to the jury that the State failed to establish that Victim had a reasonable fear justifying her delayed disclosure of the alleged sexual abuse. Further, following trial counsel's cross-examination of Stepmother, on redirect examination the prosecutor stated that Stepmother “seem[ed] a little flustered.” Stepmother replied, “Yeah, because everybody is acting like I'm the bad person,” indicating a concern that trial counsel's strategy in attacking her credibility might have been effective.

Either way, trial counsel's decision whether to object at trial was within his judgment. “Ineffective assistance of counsel is not to be determined by a post-trial academic determination that counsel could have successfully objected to evidence in a given number of instances.” Helmig, 42 S.W.3d at 678 (citation omitted). Rather than posing objections which might “irritate the jury and highlight the statements complained of, resulting in more harm than good[,]” trial counsel reasonably decided to let Stepmother damage her own credibility. Hays, 484 S.W.3d at 128-29. In reviewing the entire record rather than an isolated segment, as this Court must, it cannot be said that trial counsel's trial strategy was unreasonable. State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 747 (Mo. banc 2012).

Movant also argues that trial counsel did object to other parts of Stepmother's testimony, and so his purported trial strategy argument is inconsistent with his performance at trial. However, a careful review of the record reveals his subsequent objections were unrelated to testimony about Movant's alleged physical abuse of Stepmother or her sons, and were aimed at technical errors in the question asked. For example, trial counsel objected to the prosecutor leading Stepmother's testimony on two occasions, and to her non-responsive answers. He also objected to the relevancy of Stepmother's depression and psychological treatment and the terms of Stepmother's and Movant's divorce judgment. These objections were not inconsistent with his trial strategy of allowing Stepmother to commit to what might be perceived as outrageous allegations about physical abuse toward her and her sons.

Though we need not reach the second prong of the Strickland analysis, we note that Movant also failed to establish prejudice insofar as the trial court's preliminary ruling permitted Victim to testify not only that Movant physically abused her throughout the time that she lived with him, but that she witnessed Movant physically abuse Stepmother and Victim's younger brother as well. Victim testified that Movant made her and her brother beat Stepmother with a baseball bat after handcuffing Stepmother to a bed. Movant fails to explain why, in view of this admitted evidence, there is a reasonable probability that Stepmother's testimony about Movant's physical abuse affected the outcome of the trial. See Marshall v. State, 681 S.W.3d 668, 677 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Lusk v. State, 655 S.W.3d 230, 238 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)) (“Counsel's failure to object to cumulative evidence, even where the trial court would have sustained the objection, does not result in prejudice.”).

Conclusion

The motion court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2015), and all statutory references are to RSMo 2000.

2.   State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 426 (Mo. banc 2015) and Lemasters v. State, 598 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Mo. banc 2020).

JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J.

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS