DAVISON v. FOLEY (2026)

Colby L. Davison (“Father”) appeals from a judgment modifying and adjusting Father's parenting time and child support obligation to his last remaining minor child. Father contends the trial court erred when it failed to comply with section 452.375 in modifying the parenting plan and improperly relied upon bank records admitted through deposition testimony in calculating his income and awarding attorney's fees.¹ Finding no such error we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Bobbie Foley (“Mother”) and Father's marriage was dissolved in 2020. Although three children were born during their marriage, only the youngest child (“Child”), remained under the trial court's jurisdiction at the time of these proceedings.

Father initially filed a Motion to Modify Judgment and later filed an Amended Motion to Modify on October 24, 2022, seeking modification of the child's residential address, parenting time, and child support. On November 10, 2022, Respondent filed a Counter Motion to Modify Judgment, which also sought modification of parenting time, child support and other relief. The trial court heard evidence over six days between 2022 and 2025 due to several unusual circumstances not related to this appeal.

The court received testimony from both parties, Child's adult brother, numerous financial witnesses, banking custodians through their deposition testimony, additional lay witnesses, and the Guardian ad Litem. The court further admitted and reviewed tax documents, financial summaries, and proposed parenting plans. Hundreds of pages of banking records were attached to the depositions of custodians of records of various banks. Father objected to the admission of these exhibits, but those objections were overruled.

The trial court entered a nineteen-page Modification Judgment, which contained extensive factual findings addressing custody, Father's income, child support, and attorney's fees. Father timely filed both a Motion to Amend Judgment and a Motion for New Trial, asserting, among other things, that the court failed to sufficiently analyze the statutory custody factors under section 452.375. Both motions were denied, and Father timely appealed.

Analysis

Point 1

Father's first point argues the trial court's judgment fails to recite the specific factual findings pertaining to the best interest of the child as required under section 452.375.2.²

When reviewing a modification of child custody, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and does not erroneously declare or apply the law. Speer v. Colon, 155 S.W.3d 60, 61 (Mo. banc 2005). “The trial court is presumed to have reviewed all evidence and based its decision on the best interests of the child. We presume the trial court properly considered the statutory factors when it made its decision.” Kinner v. Scott, 216 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Mo.App. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

If the parties have not agreed to a custodial arrangement, section 452.375.6 requires the court to include written findings on “each of the factors listed in subdivisions (1) to (8) of subsection 2 of this section detailing the specific relevant factors that made a particular arrangement in the best interest of the child.” However, the statute “does not require that the court make written findings on each of the factors, but only those relevant to the case.” Erickson v. Blackburn, 169 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Mo.App. 2005). Even where a judgment does not track the order or verbiage of the factors listed in the statute, it is sufficiently specific and detailed where the court's findings “clearly show that the judge made written findings on [the relevant] statutory factors.” Id.

Father argues the trial court's judgment is merely a checklist listing the best interest factors and indicating which party each factor favors. If this were true, the judgment would lack sufficient findings to meet the statutory requirements. See Nelson v. Nelson, 436 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Mo.App. 2013). However, in cases holding a trial court's findings under section 452.375.2 were insufficient, the trial judgments contained nothing of substance for the appellate court to review. Id. (holding findings were insufficient where “this Court has no way of ascertaining what facts the trial court found or how the trial court weighed each factor”); but see Speer, 155 S.W.3d at 62 (where the trial court failed to make any written findings); and In re Marriage of Swallows, 172 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Mo.App. 2005) (where the trial court made no finding that the judgment entered as to custody was in the child's best interests, and failed to detail the specific relevant factors that it concluded would make this arrangement in the child's best interests, findings were insufficient).

In contrast, here the trial court's judgment plainly contains numerous factual findings corresponding to several statutory best-interest considerations, which were relevant to the parties’ requests for modification. The court considered that Mother has always been the most significant parent in Child's life, and has always dealt with school issues, medical, and dental care. (Factor 2). It extensively considered allegations and testimony related to Child's relationship between Mother, Father, and Child's brother. (Factor 3). The court noted both parents love Child, have a good relationship with Child, and noted specific instances where Father would drop everything to pick Child up from school, and Mother would allow Child to eat at Father's on an unscheduled night (Factor 4). It also found both Father's allegation of excess drinking against Mother, and Mother's allegation of Father's lack of presence in Child's life, were without merit after considering conflicting testimony between the parties (Factor 6). It finally noted a rare agreement between Father, Mother, and the Guardian ad Litem that Child needed a “home base,” and that it was not in Child's best interest to alternate homes on a weekly basis during the school year as they had been doing.

Father concedes that the trial court's findings “touch upon four of the eight factors required by section 452.375.2․.” However, Father fails to present case law, and we find none, which compels a specific number of factors as a threshold in modifying a child custody judgment. See Harris v. Harris, 663 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Mo.App. 2023) (reiterating, “there is no prescribed format or magic formulation that the circuit court must include in its judgment in order to comply with the statutory requirements found in section 452.375.6; instead, it is only necessary that the circuit court's judgment ‘allow for meaningful appellate review’ ”). Significantly, not only did the trial court make written findings, but as in Nelson and Erickson, the findings are relevant to the requests of the parties, easy for this Court to ascertain, and clearly attributable to factors (2), (3), (4), and (6) under section 452.375.2. Nelson, 436 S.W.3d at 572; Erickson, 169 S.W.3d at 75.

Although the judgment does not mechanically address each statutory factor, section 452.375.6 does not require such a level of formality. The record clearly establishes the trial court made sufficiently detailed and specific written findings addressing the relevant factors set forth in section 452.375.2. The statute requires no more.

Father's first point is denied.

Point 2

Father's second point asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted banking exhibits attached to deposition testimony from various bank custodians because they were hearsay. We disagree.

The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Alberswerth v. Alberswerth, 184 S.W.3d 81, 100 (Mo.App. 2006). An evidentiary ruling is an abuse of discretion only if it is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration. Frawley v. Frawley, 597 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Mo.App. 2020). “In a bench trial, the court is given more latitude in the admission of evidence.” State v. Coaston, 609 S.W.3d 527, 528 (Mo. App. 2020). “A trial court judgment involving errors in the admission of evidence will result in reversal only if there is substantial and glaring injustice.” Lauck v. Price, 289 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Mo.App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). No substantial and glaring injustice exists “as long as there is substantial admissible evidence in the record to support the judgment.” S.W. v. K.H., 727 S.W.3d 839, 853 (Mo.App. 2025). “Missouri Courts have described this standard as being ‘practically impossible’ to meet.” Id.; see Frawley, 597 S.W.3d at 750.

Assuming without deciding that one or more banking exhibits should have been excluded, the judgment reflects that the trial court relied upon multiple sources — including tax returns, testimony, banking summaries, and credibility determinations — in determining Father's income. The judgment reflects the banking exhibits which Father claims to be inadmissible hearsay “were of some assistance to the [c]ourt in determining the gross income claimed by [Father]․was significantly understated.” (Emphasis added.) However, the court specified, “[o]f even greater assistance were the [f]ederal tax returns for [Father] which were included in the deposition testimony of Jennifer Buss, which was admitted into evidence as [Father]’s Exhibit 29.” (Emphasis added.) In fact, the trial court specifically stated it “primarily relied upon [Father's] 2021 and 2022 federal tax returns, which comprise a part of Exhibit 29,” when calculating Father's gross monthly income.³

Father mentions only once, in the final sentence of his brief, that the admission of the banking exhibits prejudiced him “because the court used the improperly admitted exhibits as a basis to make awards of child support and attorney's fees.” Notably, Father fails to support this assertion by directing this Court to the record where the banking exhibits to which he objects were used as the primary basis for the ultimate findings. He does not argue the trial court's modification judgment is unsupported by other substantial evidence if the banking exhibits are disregarded. We find ample substantial evidence, separate from the banking exhibits, in the record which supports the trial court's calculation of the modified child support award and attorney fees. Applying our standard of review, we find no substantial and glaring injustice exists from the admission of the banking exhibits that would result in prejudice. S.W., 727 S.W.3d at 853. Therefore, the admission of the banking exhibits, even if erroneous, would not justify reversal.

Father's second point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2021), and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

2.   Father also asserts the court erred when it failed to discuss public policy considerations and the failure to analyze why each parent's parenting plan was rejected under sections 452.375.6 and 452.375.4. Father failed to include these arguments in his motion to amend judgment and thus failed to preserve these arguments for appeal. See Rule 78.07(c); see also T.J.W. v. K.T., 614 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Mo.App. 2020) (holding when such claims are not raised in a motion to amend judgment, they are not preserved for appellate review).

3.   In its discussion of attorney's fees, the trial court reiterated it was able to “arrive at a more factual determination of [Father]’s income through the․tax records and taking the deposition of [Father]’s tax preparer, Jennifer Buss.”

BECKY J. WEST, C.J.

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – CONCURS JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J. – CONCURS