STATE OF MISSOURI v. DUSTIN LEE BARTON (2026)

Dustin Lee Barton (“Barton”) appeals a judgment convicting him of second-degree harassment pursuant to section 565.091.1 ¹ after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Polk County, Missouri (“trial court”). Barton raises two points on appeal, both of which claim that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal and entering judgment and sentence against him, because there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that he committed second-degree harassment. We affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

On September 29, 2024, B.R. had guardianship of Barton's children and they were living at her home. Barton came to her home that day and began banging on the door, ringing the doorbell repeatedly, trying to turn the locked doorknob, and requesting to see his children. B.R. asked him to leave, but Barton remained on her property for 30 minutes or an hour, and B.R. had to call the police. During the time when this incident was occurring, B.R. was “[v]ery upset because [her] children were upset[,]” and the children ran into the bedroom crying. B.R. stated that she had had guardianship over the children since they were babies, and incidents like the one she described at trial had been occurring all during the summer months of 2024. B.R. testified that she had previously allowed Barton to see his children at her home, but that she had asked him to stay away prior to this day because he had been causing problems. B.R. could not remember whether it happened during this incident or a previous one, but she testified that Barton had threatened to take the children away as well. Officers responded to the scene and arrested Barton at a park about one or two blocks away.

Based on this incident, the State charged Barton with first-degree harassment in that:

[Barton] without good cause, engaged in an act with the purpose to cause emotional distress to [B.R.] by coming to [B.R.]’s house to yell at [B.R.] using obscenities and by communicating threats to take children which are in the legal custody of [B.R.], and such act did cause [B.R.] [to] suffer emotional distress.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that B.R. had not suffered the emotional distress required for first-degree harassment, but it found Barton guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree harassment.² Barton appeals.

Standard of Review and Governing Law

Both of Barton's points challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. This Court recently set out the standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a bench-tried case:

The trial court's findings “have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury” in a court-tried criminal case. Rule 27.01(b); State v. Crawford, 68 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Mo. banc 2002). Appellate review is limited to whether there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably “could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Mo. banc 2014); see also State v. Shands, 661 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). We apply the same standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in bench-tried cases as in jury-tried cases. State v. Peeler, 603 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (citing State v. Brown, 360 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). In determining whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support a finding of guilt, this Court does not reweigh the evidence; this Court accepts as true all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which supports the judgment and ignores all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. This Court does not act as a “super juror,” but grants great deference to the trier of fact in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Brown, 661 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (quoting State v. Naylor, 510 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Mo. banc 2017)). “On appeal from a bench-tried case where the trial court made no findings of fact, we consider all fact issues as having been found in accordance with the result reached.” Peeler, 603 S.W.3d at 920 n.1.

State v. Epenesa, 691 S.W.3d 353, 356-57 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024).

Regarding the elements of second-degree harassment:

Section 565.091.1 states, “A person commits the offense of harassment in the second degree if he or she, without good cause, engages in any act with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another person.” “The offense, therefore, contains the following elements: 1) to engage in any act, 2) with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another person, 3) without good cause.” R.M. v. Juv. Officer, 625 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

State v. Morris, 640 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022).

Analysis

Point 1

In his first point on appeal, Barton claims:

The trial court erred in overruling [Barton's] motion for judgment of acquittal and entering judgement [sic] and sentence for harassment in the second degree, because ․ the State did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, absent speculation, that [Barton] acted with the purpose to cause emotional distress to B.R.

We disagree.

In the Missouri harassment statute,

[e]motional distress is defined as “something markedly greater than the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness, or the like which are commonly experienced in day-to-day living[.]” § 565.002(7). The emotional distress “must be considerable or substantial to a reasonable person.” [Morris, 640 S.W.3d at 766 (quoting R.M., 625 S.W.3d at 783)].

State v. Crockett, 731 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026).

With respect to the scienter required to commit harassment, the statute requires that a person must act with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another person.

“A person ‘acts purposely’, or with purpose, with respect to his or her conduct or to a result thereof when it is his or her conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.” § 562.016.2. Intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof and is usually inferred through circumstantial evidence. State v. Perkins, 640 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022).

State v. Smith, 668 S.W.3d 605, 608-09 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023).

Finally, the statute requires only that the defendant act with the intent to cause the victim emotional distress; not that the victim actually experience emotional distress. State v. Collins, 648 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Mo. banc 2022).

In this case, while his children were inside the home, Barton repeatedly banged on B.R.’s door, rang her doorbell, and tried to turn the locked doorknob trying to gain access to her home to see his children. B.R. stated that Barton stayed at her home for 30 minutes to one hour, even after she asked him to leave. B.R. testified that she and the children were very upset by this conduct, and that the children were crying. B.R. also testified that Barton had threatened – either previously or during this occasion – to take the children from her.

Our case law has held similar conduct is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendant acted with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another. In Crockett, the Western District of this Court found there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant in that case went to the Chief Marshal's home with the purpose of causing him emotional distress. 731 S.W.3d at 236.

The defendant in Crockett had previously been arrested for trespassing at the Boone County courthouse after he caused a disturbance there and refused to comply with courthouse rules. Id. at 234. The Chief Marshal was involved in that process. Id. A few days later, Crockett went to the Chief Marshal's home and rang the doorbell. Id. When the Chief Marshal's wife answered the door and told Crockett that the Chief Marshal was not home, Crockett said to her: “You tell [Chief Marshal] I was here.” Id. The interaction left his wife very upset, and she believed Crockett sounded “aggressive” and “intimidating.” Id.

The Western District held that such conduct was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that Crockett went to the Chief Marshal's house with the purpose of causing emotional distress to the Chief Marshal. Id. at 236. Specifically, Crockett had not been invited to the Chief Marshal's house, went there only a few days after he was removed from the courthouse, spoke to the Chief Marshal's wife in an intimidating and aggressive tone, and did not make any attempts to contact the Chief Marshal at his office address or phone prior to going to his home, despite both of those contact methods being available online. Id. at 236-37.

Similarly here, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Barton acted with the purpose of causing B.R. emotional distress. While B.R. had allowed Barton to see his children at her home on previous occasions, she asked him to stay away from her home before this incident because he had been causing problems. On this occasion she asked him to leave, and her testimony was that Barton nevertheless remained at her door for 30 minutes to one hour. B.R. also testified that Barton had threatened to take the children from her legal custody during this timeframe. While Barton argues that he was only there for the purpose of seeing his children, his refusal to leave, his conduct both in the months before this incident and immediately after (banging on B.R.’s door, trying to twist the doorknob, and repeatedly ringing the doorbell for an extended period) – especially when children were inside – constituted sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Barton acted with the purpose to cause emotional distress to B.R.

Point one is denied.

Point 2

In his second point on appeal, Barton argues that:

The trial court erred in overruling [Barton's] motion for judgment of acquittal and entering judgement [sic] and sentence for harassment in the second degree, because ․ the State did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, absent speculation, that [Barton] acted without good cause.

We disagree.

Our case law has defined “good cause” to mean:

“a cause or reason sufficient in the law: one that is based on equity or justice or that would motivate a reasonable [person] under all the circumstances.” [State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Mo. banc 2012)] (quoting State v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971)). This Court found “the exercise of constitutionally protected acts clearly constitutes ‘good cause ․’ ” Id. Hence, the legislature's use of the “without good cause” language signals its intent to criminalize only conduct unprotected by the constitution.

Collins, 648 S.W.3d at 717 (alteration in original).

Barton does not argue that his conduct was protected by the constitution or was sanctioned by the law. Rather, all parties acknowledge that B.R. had legal guardianship over Barton's children and that he did not have any legal custody rights to them at the time this incident occurred. Barton simply argues that he was at B.R.’s home to see his children, as he had done before, and that B.R.’s “[u]nexpected denial” of his visitation constituted good cause.

To the contrary, B.R. testified that she had previously asked Barton to stay away from her home because he had been causing problems leading up to this incident and throughout the summer of 2024. Furthermore, absent any legal custody rights to his children, B.R. was well within her rights to deny Barton access to his children, and Barton did not have “good cause” to bang on B.R.’s door, threaten to take the children, ring her doorbell, try to twist the doorknob, and demand to see his children for 30 minutes to one hour, after B.R. asked him to leave. Such conduct, under these circumstances, does not fall within the realm of “the exercise of constitutionally protected acts[,]” which is how our courts define good cause. Id.

Barton's second point is denied, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2017, unless otherwise noted. All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2026).

2.   First-degree harassment requires that the victim actually suffer emotional distress, whereas second-degree harassment requires only that the actor engage in the conduct with the purpose to cause emotional distress. Compare section 565.090.1, with section 565.091.1.

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS BECKY J. WEST, C.J. – CONCURS