DARNELL v. REMETIO (2026)

Mark Christopher Darnell (“Appellant”) ostensibly appeals from two orders of the circuit court denying various post-judgment motions for relief, clarification/elaboration, and sanctions, though his points relied on complain of other alleged acts and omissions of the trial court following the filing of his Notice of Appeal. Daniel Zacek Smith (“Respondent”) filed “Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal[,]” and the motion is taken with the case.¹ Because Appellant's appeal is moot, we grant Respondent's motion and dismiss the appeal.

Though laborious, the chronology of this case is important to understand the issues before the Court. Appellant and Suzanne Kay Remetio (“Defendant Remetio”)² began dating in August of 2016. Appellant ended his relationship with Defendant Remetio in December of 2018, and she moved out of state. Six days after the break-up, Defendant Remetio gave birth to their child. Appellant filed a paternity action and on April 23, 2019, received a judgment declaring he was the natural father of the child. On July 7, 2019, Defendant Remetio filed a petition for an order of protection against Appellant. Appellant was subsequently charged criminally and arrested for several alleged violations of the ex parte order of protection. Appellant's ex-wife (“Defendant Gee”) became involved in those criminal cases and Appellant alleged he was denied access to his son with Defendant Gee, necessitating Appellant filing a motion for contempt and motion to modify custody against Defendant Gee. In March of 2020, after a hearing, the court vacated the ex parte order of protection and denied the full order of protection. In May of 2020, the criminal charges against Appellant were dismissed.

This case began in May of 2021 when Appellant brought a pro se civil action against Defendant Remetio alleging multiple theories and counts, including “malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel and slander[,]” as well as “breach of contract and conversion of property[.]” Appellant hired counsel who entered their appearance in August of 2021 and amended the petition to include Defendant Gee.

Years of litigation followed, including counterclaims by both defendants Remetio and Gee and intense discovery.³ In May of 2023, Defendant Gee was removed from the case by way of a mutual dismissal, but in October of 2023, Appellant added Respondent, a detective with the Greene County Sheriff's department, to the lawsuit. Appellant's allegations against Respondent included civil conspiracy, negligence, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

At this point, the legal file skips over a year and a half of pleadings and orders, picking back up in July of 2025. All this Court can do is cautiously presume based upon the docket entries that multiple motions for sanctions were filed against Appellant.⁴ On November 15, 2024, Appellant dismissed all claims against the defendants, as well as Defendant Remetio's counterclaim, thereby resolving all claims, though the trial court retained jurisdiction over Respondent's pending sanction motions pursuant to Rule 67.05 ⁵ and set them for hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing on January 21, 2025, the trial court decided that sanctions of reasonable expenses and attorney fees were appropriate.⁶ On February 5, 2025, the trial court entered a “Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions” ordering Appellant to pay Respondent sanctions in the amount of $21,913.24.⁷ Appellant did not appeal the Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions.

Garnishment procedures started in July of 2025 attempting to collect from Appellant. On September 12, 2025, Appellant filed a “Report to the Court Regarding Attorney Damon Phillips's Professional Misconduct, Motion for Sanctions and Discipline Against Attorney Damon Phillips, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment[.]” While that motion was pending, Appellant filed “[Appellant]’s Motion to Stay Proceedings and Objection to [Respondent]’s Discovery Requests Pending Ruling on [Appellant]’s Motion for Relief from Sanctions and for Sanctions Against Attorney Damon Phillips[.]” On January 20, 2026, the trial court denied Appellant's motions. The following day, Appellant filed a motion requesting the trial court amend or clarify its order. The next day, the trial court clarified, to the extent it was necessary, that it denied all relief requested by Appellant's two motions. The same day, Appellant filed his notice of appeal.

On February 11, 2026, Appellant filed a “Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment” in the trial court, alleging that the Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions was paid in full on January 28, 2026. Two days later Appellant filed “[Appellant]’s Formal Statement for Record Clarification and Appellate Preservation[,]” and a “Motion for Sanctions, Formal Findings of Rule Violations, Protective Enforcement Order and Additional Relief[.]” The Judgment Creditor filed a “Satisfaction of Judgment” on February 18, 2026. The same day, Appellant filed a “Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions, Protective Enforcement Order, and Additional Relief[.]”

On March 13, 2026, the trial court entered the following docket entry:

Court in receipt of correspondence of [Appellant] requesting rulings on pending motions. Court notes certain issues are now mooted by previous rulings and the Satisfaction of Judgment filed February 18, 2026. To the extent any of [Appellant]’s motions are not (1) already moot, (2) beyond this court's authority due to pending appeal, or (3) otherwise disposed, all pending motions and other requests are now respectfully DENIED.

On March 16, 2026, while the matter was pending on appeal, Appellant filed in the trial court, “[Appellant]’s Motion to Clarify and Amend the Court's Order of March 13, 2026[.]” On April 1, 2026, the trial court denied this motion.

Appellant's three points are stated as follows:

1. The trial court erred in vacating the February 10, 2026 garnishment termination entries after the Notice of Appeal was filed because the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to take further substantive action, and the March 13, 2026 order constituted a substantive modification rather than a clerical correction, in that it altered the legal effect of a prior judicial ruling, thereby exceeding the trial court's authority.

The February 10, 2026 termination fully resolved the garnishment proceeding at that stage, and the subsequent March 13 order effectively reversed that determination after appellate jurisdiction had already attached. [(Emphasis added.)]

2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying sanctions because it failed to apply or articulate governing legal standards despite record established violations of mandatory procedural rules, including Missouri Supreme Court Rules 90.19 and 74.11, in that the record reflects noncompliance with mandatory garnishment and satisfaction requirements while the court denied relief without addressing deterrence, reasonableness, or its inherent authority to enforce compliance, as recognized in State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. McGraw, 934 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996), and Koonce v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. App. 1987).

3. The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motions for clarification and findings because the absence of articulated reasoning prevents meaningful appellate review, in that the court summarily denied relief without identifying the legal standards applied or the basis for its rulings, thereby impairing appellate review and constituting reversible error under Cohen v. Cohen, 178 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).

As best we can surmise, Appellant's points allege error in denying the motions for relief at various points in the proceedings (January 20, 2026, January 22, 2026, and March 13, 2026). Our review of this case has revealed numerous issues with Appellant's claims, including but not limited to questions of whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction over such issues, whether omissions from Appellant's legal file inhibit our analysis on appeal, and whether Appellant's noncompliance with our briefing rules ⁸ impedes our ability to analyze his claims and preserves nothing for review. We need not address these myriad issues, however, as the record we do have discloses that Appellant's claims are moot.

Mootness

Appellant's points are moot. “A threshold question in the appellate review of a controversy is whether the matter has become moot due to subsequent events.” S. Mo. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, Inc. v. Kirk, 334 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011). An appellant cannot simultaneously acknowledge and deny the validity of the judgment. Id. at 602. In deciding whether a case is moot, an appellate court may consider matters outside the record. State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001).

“[A] cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy.” Id. (quoting Shelton v. Farr, 996 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)). Stated another way, “[w]hen an event occurs that makes a court's decision unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by the court impossible, the case is moot and generally should be dismissed.” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Elmore, 990 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)).

On January 28, 2026, Appellant tendered the final funds necessary to satisfy the Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions against him.⁹ He did not post a supersedeas bond, nor request and obtain a stay. Appellant makes no claim that more money was collected than necessary to satisfy the sanctions owed, nor that additional garnishments were requested after that time. “Generally, the voluntary satisfaction of a judgment renders any appeal from that judgment moot.” Odermann v. Mancuso, 670 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citation omitted), see also Kinser v. Elkadi, 654 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. banc 1983). Appellant's desire for additional explanation does not create appellate jurisdiction, and a request for advisory findings on matters that are otherwise moot does not constitute a live case or controversy.

Conclusion

This appeal is moot. Respondent's motion is granted, and Appellant's appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent, represented by counsel, did not file a respondent's brief.

2.   Defendant Remetio, pro se, did not file a respondent's brief.

3.   The docket sheet in the legal file is 53 pages long.

4.   Our review of this case is hampered considerably by Appellant's failure to include relevant pleadings and orders from the trial court that would have provided important background and context for Appellant's points.

5.   Unless otherwise indicated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2026).

6.   Appellant's attorneys requested leave and were allowed to withdraw as counsel for Appellant prior to this hearing.

7.   Although Appellant repeatedly complains about the trial court's deficiencies and omissions, the “Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions” against Appellant was conspicuously absent from his legal file. We can only surmise the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $21,913.24 based on a July 10, 2025 garnishment included in the record on appeal.

8.   Further analysis would include violations of Rule 81.04(a), Rule 84.04(c), and 84.04(d). Ultimately, “point[s] that cannot be understood without resorting to the transcript or argument portion of the brief preserve[ ] nothing for appellate review.” City of Springfield v. Rogers, 867 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993).

9.   A motion for sanctions is not a “claim[,]” and consequently, an order granting (or denying) such a motion is not a judgment. See Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Mo. banc 2011); Riegel v. Forsythe, 608 S.W.3d 777, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). Therefore, if the trial court's February 5, 2025 “Judgment and Order of Discovery Sanctions” was neither a Judgment nor appealable under Rule 74.01(b), the appeal must be dismissed even if it was not moot. Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2012); Wood v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 737 S.W.3d 840, 844-45 (Mo. App. S.D. 2026). “[A] circuit court's determination [that an order constituted a judgment for purpose of appeal] is not dispositive; instead, it is the content, substance, and effect of the order that determines finality and appealability[.]” Ndegwa, 371 S.W.3d at 801. (internal quotation omitted).

JOSEPH L. HENSLEY, J.

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J., concurs BRYAN E. NICKELL, J., concurs