STATE EX REL HANAWAY v. KIME (2026)

At the request of the Prosecuting Attorney of Iron County (“the Prosecutor”), the Governor of the State of Missouri (“the Governor”) issued a letter directing the Attorney General (“the AG”) to assist the Prosecutor with a criminal case against a named defendant (“Defendant”). Thereafter, the AG, through an assistant attorney general, signed and filed the criminal complaint in said case, charging Defendant with first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the AG's involvement, arguing that under section 56.060, RSMo (2016), the statutory authorization to file the complaint rested solely with the Prosecutor. The AG opposed this motion on several grounds, including authorization to aid the Prosecutor under section 27.030, RSMo (2016). Following a hearing on the matter, where the Prosecutor confirmed he asked the AG for assistance, the associate circuit court judge (“Respondent”) granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The AG petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alterative, mandamus. We issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which we make permanent.

Standard of Review and Governing Law

This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.1. Prohibition is “an extraordinary remedy ․ to be used with great caution and forbearance and only in cases of extreme necessity.” State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A writ of prohibition is discretionary and is appropriate: (1) to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority or jurisdiction or abuse of discretion by a lower court; and (3) to prevent a party from suffering irreparable harm.

State ex rel. Hanaway v. Hellmann, 728 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Mo. banc 2026). “In limited cases, a writ may be used when a trial court erroneously decides an important question of law, and no adequate remedy at law exists.” State v. Larson, 79 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. banc 2002); see also State v. McMillian, 455 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo.App. 2015) (holding that the dismissal of a complaint at the preliminary hearing stage is not an appealable final judgment).

As in this case, where the issuance of a writ depends on the interpretation of a statute, we review the statute's meaning de novo. State ex rel. White Family P'ship v. Roldan, 271 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Mo. banc 2008). The “primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.” Id.

The two aforementioned statutes are at issue. The first statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach prosecuting attorney shall commence and prosecute all civil and criminal actions in the prosecuting attorney's county in which the county or state is concerned[.]” Section 56.060.1. The second statute, in toto, provides:

When directed by the [G]overnor, the [AG], or one of his assistants, shall aid any prosecuting or circuit attorney in the discharge of their respective duties in the trial courts and in examinations before grand juries, and when so directed by the trial court, he may sign indictments in lieu of the prosecuting attorney.

Section 27.030.

Analysis

Turning to the AG's six points relied on, we begin and end our analysis with the second point, which seeks relief in prohibition on the basis that “Respondent exceeded her authority in dismissing the State's complaint, on [Defendant]’s motion, in that the [AG]’s office is authorized to sign the complaint under [section] 27.030, which allows the [AG]’s office to assist local prosecutors in any way once authorized by the Governor.” Here, it is undisputed that the AG was properly authorized to “aid” (the word used in the statute) the Prosecutor in the State's case against Defendant under section 27.030. The crux of the matter, therefore, is whether such “aid” includes the signing and filing of the criminal complaint against Defendant. We hold that it does.

As a transitive verb, “aid” is defined, “to provide with what is useful or necessary in achieving an end[.]” Aid, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003). Such an end, as elaborated by the provisions of section 27.030 that follow, includes “the discharge of [any prosecuting or circuit attorney's] respective duties in the trial courts and in examinations before grand juries[.]” Excluding the AG's signing of an indictment in lieu of the prosecuting attorney, which has to be “so directed by the trial court,” section 27.030 does not place any limitations on the manner by which the AG may “aid any prosecuting or circuit attorney in the discharge of their respective duties ․.” Furthermore, as made clear by Defendant's (and now Respondent's) reliance on section 56.060.1, such respective duties in the trial courts include the prosecuting attorney's duty to “commence and prosecute all ․ criminal actions in the prosecuting attorney's county in which the county or state is concerned[.]” (Emphasis added.) The AG's signing and filing of a criminal complaint—the situation presented here—plainly qualifies as a form of aid to the Prosecutor in the discharge of said duty in the underlying action against Defendant. See State v. Todd, 433 S.W.2d 550, 553-54 (Mo. banc 1968) (Section 27.030 “was obviously intended primarily, if not exclusively, to cover the institution and trial of criminal cases, and proceedings before grand juries.” (Emphasis added)).

In her brief, Respondent likens the filing of the complaint in this case to the AG exercising “concurrent original jurisdiction” to commence a criminal prosecution. Cf. section 407.020.4, RSMo Cum.Supp. (2020) (explicitly granting the AG such authority, but for prosecutions of unlawful merchandising practices only). These things, however, are not the same. Here, the AG's involvement in this case came only after receiving a request from the Prosecutor and direction from the Governor. Only then did the AG, through an assistant attorney general, sign and file the complaint against Defendant. We reject the suggestion that such actions (all of which are consistent with section 27.030) rise to the level of “concurrent original jurisdiction” over the criminal matter at issue.

In sum, we hold that the AG's signing and filing of the complaint in this case qualifies as “aid” to the Prosecutor under section 27.030. The AG's second point is granted. Because the AG's remaining points are rendered moot, we need not address them.

Decision

The preliminary writ of prohibition is made permanent.

BECKY J. WEST, C.J.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS