STATE OF MISSOURI v. STEVEN HILGEDICK (2026)

Steven A. Hilgedick (“Defendant”) challenges his conviction for second-degree burglary (§ 569.170)¹ following a jury trial. Defendant claims the trial court plainly erred in accepting “inconsistent verdicts” because he was convicted of second-degree burglary but acquitted of the underlying offense of violating an order of protection. Finding no facially substantial grounds to support this claim, we affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Defendant and Victim were in a romantic relationship for several years before the events of this case. On August 12, 2024, Defendant and Victim were living together when she applied for an order of protection against him. Based on Victim's safety plan with law enforcement, she shared her location and was pulled over while driving with Defendant in the passenger seat on August 13, 2024. Law enforcement removed Defendant from the vehicle and served him with the order of protection. Victim was told she could leave. After leaving the scene, Victim went to Wal-Mart where she saw Defendant, who retrieved his belongings out of Victim's car and wanted her to dismiss the order of protection. Victim said she would get the protective order dismissed because she was fearful of Defendant and felt guilty.

Later that day, Defendant showed up at Victim's home with his boss to get his belongings from the residence. Victim let him in to gather his things. After Defendant's boss left, Defendant told Victim he wanted to work things out, that he loved her, and that he would “never hurt [Victim] again.” Victim asked Defendant to leave, but felt she had no choice but to let Defendant stay.

Defendant did not leave Victim's home, and Victim was “frightened of what might happen if [she] took it further” by attempting to make him leave. Defendant took Victim's phone, but she was able to retrieve it under the pretense of making a work phone call. Victim texted her friend that she “had forgotten to turn the coffee pots off,” which prompted Victim's friend to call the police.

The police arrived at Victim's residence and found Defendant attempting to hide in a suitcase in Victim's bedroom. Defendant was arrested and removed from Victim's home. Victim later texted Defendant and told him she “had to involve law enforcement and [Defendant] couldn't come back here.”

Later that evening, Defendant again came back to Victim's residence to speak with her and ask her to “drop the order of protection.” Defendant entered Victim's residence and took her phone again. Defendant stayed in Victim's home until the next morning, August 14, 2024. Victim told Defendant she had to go to work and Defendant gave Victim her phone back. Victim left her home and contacted the police who returned to her residence, found Defendant behind a box inside Victim's bedroom closet and arrested him again.

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree burglary (§ 569.160); two counts of violating an order of protection (§ 455.085); and one count of fourth-degree domestic assault (§ 565.076). After submitting verdict forms, the jury was sent back for further deliberations because they had submitted multiple inconsistent verdict forms for two of the counts. Ultimately, Defendant was found guilty of two lessor included offenses: one count of second-degree burglary (§ 569.170) and one count of first-degree trespass (§ 569.140).² The jury found Defendant not guilty of all other charges, including the two charges for violating an order of protection. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

“Where a defendant claims that verdicts are impermissibly inconsistent, the defendant is obligated to raise the issue before the jury is discharged so that the inconsistency can be resolved.” State v. Herring, 715 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citing State v. Flemons, 144 S.W.3d 877, 881 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)). The defendant waives the claim if it is not presented at this point. Id. However, “[t]he concept of waiver in a criminal case is generally limited to self-invited errors.” State v. Nickels, 598 S.W.3d 626, 634 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (citing State v. Clay, 533 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. banc 2017)). If no objection to an allegedly inconsistent verdict is raised, appellate courts may only review such claim for plain error. See State v. Young, 597 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).

Generally, appellate courts do not review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Burkett, 725 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Mo. banc 2025) (citing State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. banc 2025)). However, Rule 30.20 ³ states “plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Burkett, 725 S.W.3d at 571 (emphasis omitted). Appellate courts may “assess the facts and circumstances of the case to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to review for plain error.” Id. However, plain error review should be “used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review.” Id.

“Generally, the existence of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice depends on the strength of the evidence leading to conviction and whether the error was outcome determinative.” Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (citing Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. banc 2002)) (internal quotation omitted). Even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice can still occur. Id. However, “mere prejudice alone fails to demonstrate manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 513 (Mo. banc 2017)). The appellant bears the burden of establishing “facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court's error was evident, obvious, and clear and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, Defendant claims the trial court plainly erred in accepting “inconsistent verdicts” that resulted in manifest injustice because he was convicted of second-degree burglary, charged as knowingly remaining unlawfully in an inhabitable structure “for the purpose” of committing the offense of violating an order of protection, but acquitted of actually violating the order of protection. We disagree.

“Missouri courts have continually found that when a defendant is tried on a multiple count charge involving crimes with different elements, the jury's verdict does not have to be logically consistent.” Young, 597 S.W.3d at 223 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “So long as the charge for which he is convicted is supported by sufficient evidence, logical inconsistency is not a ground for rejecting an individual verdict.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). This Court analyzed similar allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts in an instructional error context in State v. Brown, 669 S.W.3d 733 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). In Brown, this Court held that the fact that defendant was not convicted of the underlying crime in his burglary charge did not mean the jury could not believe he entered the residence with the intent to commit the underlying crime. Id. at 736.

This is not the first case in which a defendant has been found guilty of burglary but acquitted of the separate charge the state alleged the defendant intended to commit after unlawfully entering or remaining in a building. Acquittal on a separate offense does not preclude a jury from rationally inferring that a defendant unlawfully entered into a building with the intent to commit that offense. Such verdicts are not necessarily illogical or inconsistent as long as the offenses have different elements.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Under § 569.170, of which Defendant was convicted, “[a] person commits the offense of burglary in the second degree when he or she knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.” (Emphasis added). Under § 455.085.7, of which Defendant was acquitted, a violation of an order of protection is defined as:

A violation of the terms and conditions, with regard to domestic violence, stalking, sexual assault, child custody, communication initiated by the respondent or entrance upon the premises of the petitioner's dwelling unit or place of employment or school, or being within a certain distance of the petitioner or a child of the petitioner, of an ex parte order of protection of which the respondent has notice, shall be a class A misdemeanor․

(Emphasis added).

Here, Defendant's acquittal on the charge of violating a protective order does not create an inconsistency with his conviction for burglary in the second degree because the two offenses have different elements, and the finding of guilt on the burglary charge is not dependent on a finding of guilt for the underlying offense. See McClanahan v. State, 276 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (verdicts finding defendant guilty of burglary and not guilty of the underlying offense of arson were not inconsistent because the State only had to prove defendant entered the building with the purpose of committing arson); see also, Young, 597 S.W.3d at 224 (verdicts were not inconsistent where the findings of guilt for the offenses defendant was convicted of were not dependent on findings of guilt for the underlying offenses). Second-degree burglary only requires that the person unlawfully enter or remain in a building or inhabitable structure with the purpose of committing a crime and does not require that the crime itself actually be consummated. § 569.170.

The fact that the jury found Defendant not guilty of violating a protective order would not have precluded the jury from rationally inferring that Defendant entered Victim's home with the intention of violating the protective order. See Brown, 669 S.W.3d at 736 (“[W]e will not presume to delve into the collective mind of the jury and create an inconsistency where one need not exist.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The verdicts were not inconsistent, and Defendant has not facially established substantial grounds that the trial court plainly erred in accepting them. Thus, we decline to exercise plain error review.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo (2016), as amended through March 13, 2025.

2.   Defendant does not challenge his conviction for first-degree trespass on appeal.

3.   All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

BECKY J. WEST, C. J. – CONCURS JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – CONCURS