STATE v. BLACK (2026)

Stacie Dewayne Black (“Black”) appeals the judgment (“Judgment”) of the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Missouri (“trial court”), convicting him of one count of the class D felony of possession of a controlled substance following a jury trial. See section 579.015.¹ In his sole point on appeal, Black challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the Judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial showed as follows.² Black's vehicle was stopped by law enforcement on May 4, 2023, due to a registration violation. Black was the only occupant of the vehicle, a pickup truck. The officer asked Black if there was anything illegal in the truck, and Black said there was not. Black had trouble producing insurance, so the officer had him sit in the officer's patrol car. Black agreed to let the officer search the pickup truck. During that search, the officer found a syringe snugly fit “like a needle or a pin in a pin cushion” in the foam of the driver's side seat. The “plunger or the top end of the syringe” was visible to the naked eye. The location of the syringe was such that Black could have “[v]ery easily” reached it with his hand at any time while he was sitting in the vehicle. When confronted with the syringe and asked about the manner in which he used methamphetamine – did he “shoot up” or “smoke” – Black said he smoked. Black never acknowledged the syringe belonged to him and told the officer he did not know it was there. When photographing the syringe, the officer noted that it appeared to be empty of any liquid or powder, but did indicate there was a dried substance on the plunger. Black told the officer his stepdad might be buying the truck, but denied that his stepdad used methamphetamine. Prior to the officer finding the syringe, Black told the officer he used methamphetamine, and had last used it “a couple months ago[.]” A witness testified at trial that, around May 5, 2023 (the day following the law enforcement stop), Black admitted to using methamphetamine within the last few days. The State called a forensic scientist employed by the Missouri State Highway Patrol Crime Lab Division as a witness. The scientist confirmed the presence of methamphetamine inside the syringe and explained the process they had used to detect it.

The jury found Black guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Black to 15 years’ imprisonment in the Department of Corrections subject to the Long Term Substance Abuse Program under section 217.362, RSMo Cum.Supp. 2021. Black appealed.

Analysis

In one point on appeal, Black contends:

The trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's motion for judgment of acquittal, because the State did not prove the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Mr. Black's right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, in that the State did not present sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have reached a “subjective state of near certitude” that Mr. Black knowingly possessed the methamphetamine residue in the syringe.

Standard of Review

“[T]his Court reviews whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charged crime, based on the elements of the crime as set forth by statute and common law and the evidence adduced at trial.” Winter, 719 S.W.3d at 745 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). “Common law” in this context refers “to judicial constructions given those statutory elements when necessary.” Id. “The elements of a crime are found only in the statute creating that crime.” Id.; see also sec. 556.026, RSMo 2016 (“No conduct constitutes an offense or infraction unless made so by this code or by other applicable statute.”).

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winter, 719 S.W.3d at 746 (alteration and internal quotation omitted). “[T]he Court does not act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). This Court “accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidences and inferences.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). This Court “may not supply missing evidence, or give the [s]tate the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

State v. Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Mo. banc 2026).

“In a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a criminal conviction, this Court defers to the jury's superior position to weigh and evaluate the evidence, determine the [reliability and] credibility of the witnesses, and resolve inconsistencies in the testimony presented.” State v. Hines, 377 S.W.3d 648, 654 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (citing State v. Whiteley, 294 S.W.3d 114, 115 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009)); State v. Meuir, 138 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). “The jury, as fact finder, may choose to accept or reject all, some, or none of the testimony of any witness.” Hines, 377 S.W.3d at 654 (quoting State v. Hobbs, 106 S.W.3d 498, 509 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). “[W]hen there is conflicting evidence, an appellate court presumes that the fact-finder ‘resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’ ” State v. Blackmon, 421 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) (quoting State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 53 (Mo. banc 1998)).

Applicable Legal Principles

The statute defining the offense of possession of a controlled substance provides: “A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he or she knowingly possesses a controlled substance[.]” Sec. 579.015.1. The elements of the offense are whether a person 1) knowingly, 2) possessed, 3) a controlled substance. ․ The legislature has defined both “knowingly” and “possessed.” In section 556.061(31)(a), the legislature defined “knowingly,” when used with respect to “[c]onduct or attendant circumstances,” as meaning “a person is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist[.]” In section 195.010(38), the legislature defined “possessed” or “possessing a controlled substance” as:

[A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, has actual or constructive possession of the substance. A person has actual possession if he has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control. A person who, although not in actual possession, has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in constructive possession of it. Possession may also be sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of a substance possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint[.]

Sec. 195.010(38); see also sec. 556.061(38) (providing a virtually identical definition of “possess” or “possessed” for the revised criminal code).

Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 437 (all statutory references are to RSMo Cum.Supp. 2020).

An analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance should begin with whether there was actual possession of the controlled substance under section 195.010(38). “A person has actual possession if he [or she] has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control.” Sec. 195.010(38). If yes, then the reviewing court should determine if the person had “knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance.” Id. Absent an admission, whether the person had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance will be based on circumstantial evidence alone. It is difficult to envision a circumstance when knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance will not follow from actual possession based on the requirements for actual possession. In other words, if a substance is within a person's easy reach and convenient control, there is likely strong circumstantial evidence the person had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance based on the person's proximity to and ability to access the substance.[ ] Assuming there is actual possession under section 195.010(38), the person still must have acted “knowingly” under section 556.061(31). As with whether the person had “knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance,” whether the person acted “knowingly” will almost always be based on circumstantial evidence, and it is again difficult to envision a circumstance when “knowingly” will not follow based on the requirements for actual possession.

․.

[K]nowledge almost always will be based on circumstantial evidence alone, whether possession is actual or constructive. Possession, too, almost always will be based on circumstantial evidence. “Possession and knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” [State v.]Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d [801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016), overruled in part on other grounds by Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 439].

Id. at 439-41 (footnote omitted) (all statutory references are to RSMo Cum.Supp. 2020).

Although not required, a court may use what our courts refer to as Stover factors “to guide its analysis of whether there is sufficient record evidence a person knowingly possessed a controlled substance.”³ Id. at 441-42. Stover factors relevant to this case include (1) “[t]he presence of the defendant's personal belongings in close proximity to the drugs;” (2) “[m]aking false statements in an attempt to deceive the police;” and (3) “[o]ther conduct and statements made by the accused[.]” Id. (quoting Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147). This Court has also determined that attempted concealment of illicit materials also supports a finding of knowing possession thereof. See State v. Welch, 603 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (where this Court determined that a defendant's attempted concealment or disposal of an illicit substance, following an officer knocking on the door of the portable bathroom that the defendant was occupying, was consistent with the defendant having knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance and his efforts to not be caught with it).

The visibility of a drug is a factor that supports an inference that a defendant who saw it knew of its presence and nature. In [State v.] Breese [250 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008)], “a white, powdery substance was visible on the scale and present in an amount sufficient to allow [the deputy] to field test it. If the powder was visible to [the deputy] it would also have been visible to [the d]efendant.” Id. However, the invisibility of a drug does not necessarily preclude knowing possession. In State v. McKelvey, 129 S.W.3d 456 (Mo.App. S.D.2004), the contraband was “a small piece of cotton weighing .01 grams that contained unmeasurable amounts of methamphetamine.” Id. at 458. The court did not limit its sufficiency analysis to whether the substance could be seen or weighed. Instead, it stated:

The test is not whether the drug is visible or measurable, although these facts can be used to show a defendant did not intentionally, knowingly, and consciously possess the substance. ․ If the state can demonstrate that a substance is in fact a controlled substance, then it must also show that a defendant intentionally, knowingly, and consciously possessed it.

Id. at 460-61 (emphasis in original).

As a result, an analysis of whether sufficient evidence supports an inference that a particular defendant knew of the presence and nature of a controlled substance is fact-intensive and case-specific.

State v. Kopp, 325 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).

Application of Legal Principles to the Facts

As directed in Eggleston, we begin our analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence to support Black's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with whether Black had actual possession of the methamphetamine.⁴ The officer testified at trial that the syringe in which the methamphetamine was discovered was lodged in the foam accessible through a tear in the driver's seat, where Black was sitting at the time the vehicle was stopped, and that Black could have reached into that tear at any time while sitting in the driver's seat. “A person has actual possession [of a substance] if [they have] the substance on [their] person or within easy reach and convenient control.” Section 195.010(38). Our Supreme Court in Eggleston determined there was actual possession of a controlled substance by a defendant driving a vehicle with a passenger, when the substance in question was located in a dashboard cubby and within reach of the driver's seat occupied by the defendant. See Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 442. The syringe containing the substance in this case was even more easily accessible to Black than the defendant in Eggleston where the defendant was found to be in actual possession of the substance. As such, the State presented sufficient evidence here from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude Black was in actual possession of the methamphetamine.

Because we determine that Black had actual possession of the methamphetamine, we now must determine if Black had knowledge of the presence and nature of the methamphetamine. In cases where actual possession has been found, “it is ․ difficult to envision a circumstance when ‘knowingly’ will not follow based on the requirements for actual possession.” Id. at 440. The following additional evidence supports a finding that Black knowingly possessed the controlled substance:

1. The syringe was discovered shoved into the foam of the driver's seat like a pin in a pincushion, with the upper portion sticking out of the foam. Attempting to conceal illicit material supports a finding of the knowing possession thereof. See Welch, 603 S.W.3d at 749 (“The attempted concealment ․ was consistent with [d]efendant having knowledge of the illicit nature of the material and his motivation to avoid being caught with [it] on his person ․.”).

2. The methamphetamine was found in a vehicle which belonged to Black, who was the only occupant of that vehicle at the time it was pulled over. “The presence of the defendant's personal belongings [(in this case the vehicle and its contents)] in close proximity to the drugs” support knowing possession thereof. Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 441 (quoting Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147). The fact that the vehicle was under Black's exclusive control also suggests knowledge of the presence and nature of the vehicle's contents, which would support the knowing possession of the methamphetamine.

3. Black admitted to the officer that he used methamphetamine, although he claimed he last used a couple months prior. While admission of use of the illicit substance discovered is not a specific factor articulated under Stover, those factors were not intended to be exhaustive, and one specific factor is “[o]ther conduct and statements made by the accused[.]” Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 441 (quoting Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147). On this matter, we conclude that Black's admission suggests knowledge of the presence and nature of the methamphetamine.

4. Black told the officer that he had last used “a couple months ago[.]” Another witness testified that, the day after he was pulled over, Black admitted to using methamphetamine within the last few days. Making false statements in an attempt to deceive the police is evidence supporting knowing possession. Id.

Black argues this case requires reversal due to its similarity to Kopp. In Kopp, the defendant was at a house with several other people that was visited by the police in the execution of a search warrant. 325 S.W.3d at 467-68. At some point the defendant picked up a syringe and put it in his pocket “to get it out of sight.” Id. at 473. When the police asked him if he had any weapons on him, the defendant disclosed the syringe, which subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine residue. Id. The defendant never admitted to using methamphetamine. Id. at 472. The content of the syringe was both invisible and unweighable. Id. at 473. Despite the defendant being found to have actual possession of a syringe, which tested positive for methamphetamine residue, that he had taken steps to conceal, his conviction was overturned based upon insufficient evidence related to (1) defendant's conscious and intentional possession of the controlled substance, and (2) defendant's awareness of the presence of the controlled substance and its illegal nature. Id. at 473-74.

Kopp is distinguishable from the current case. Black was in his own vehicle by himself, not in a house with several other people. Instead of almost immediately disclosing the syringe when asked (and as a potential weapon, rather than a drug), as the defendant in Kopp did, Black did not disclose the syringe prior to its discovery, and claimed to not have known the syringe was there when confronted with it. The defendant in Kopp made no admission to using methamphetamine, but, here, Black did and provided an inconsistent account of his last use thereof to that given by another witness at trial. The defendant in Kopp put what appeared to be an empty syringe with no visible substance in his pocket, while in the instant case the officer observed a dried substance on the plunger end of the syringe. If the dried substance on the plunger was visible to the officer, it would also have been visible to Black, and would have alerted Black that the syringe was not empty. See Kopp, 325 S.W.3d at 469 (“The visibility of a drug is a factor that supports an inference that a defendant who saw it knew of its presence and nature.”).

In light of the foregoing evidence, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Black knowingly possessed methamphetamine. As such, the trial court did not err in overruling Black's motion for judgment of acquittal. Point denied.

The trial court's Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2017.

2.   Not only does our standard of review require us to view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, but we must ignore all contrary inferences. State v. Winter, 719 S.W.3d 738, 753 n.7 (Mo. banc 2025). “If that evidence supports equally valid inferences, it is up to the factfinder to determine which inference to believe, as the factfinder is permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the evidence as the evidence will permit.” Id. (quoting State v. Lehman, 617 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Mo. banc 2021)).

3.   Such factors as are specifically articulated in State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138 (Mo. banc 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 439, are not exhaustive. Those specifically described are:Finding a large quantity of drugs in the vehicle;Finding drugs having a large monetary value in the vehicle;Easy accessibility or routine access to the drugs;The odor of drugs in the vehicle;The presence of the defendant's personal belongings in close proximity to the drugs;Making false statements in an attempt to deceive the police;The defendant's nervousness during the search;The defendant's flight from law enforcement;The presence of drugs in plain view;Other conduct and statements made by the accused; andThe fact that the defendant rented the vehicle.Eggleston, 728 S.W.3d at 441-42 (quoting Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147).

4.   We note that Black, in his point on appeal, describes the content of the syringe as methamphetamine “residue.” The 2010 Kopp case, which Black cites in support of reversal, evaluated the meaning of the word, noting that its definition in reference to drug paraphernalia as set forth in section 195.010(18) (wherein it is defined as a substance distinct from a controlled substance) means that “the legislature has indicated that, at least in cases involving negligible residue, it sees such residue as merely an indication of past drug use of the object, not as proof of present possession of the drug itself.” 325 S.W.3d at 472 (quoting State v. Baker, 912 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995)).However:“Missouri's drug statutes do not establish a minimum amount necessary to sustain a conviction for illegal possession.” State v. Moore, 352 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). See also section 195.017.4(3)(c) (defining a Schedule II controlled substance to include “[a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances ․: [m]ethamphetamine”). “Rather, the defendant's guilt depends on his acts and knowledge–whether his knowing possession may be fairly inferred given the de minimus amount combined with all the surrounding circumstances.” Moore, 352 S.W.3d at 400.State v. Gillum, 574 S.W.3d 766, 769 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019).While the syringe in the instant case was almost entirely empty, the officer who seized it did testify to observing a dried substance on the plunger, and the contents of the syringe did test positive for methamphetamine. The State presented the testimony of a forensic scientist who explained the process by which methamphetamine was detected inside the syringe. This was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the content of the syringe was methamphetamine, not methamphetamine “residue” as a substance distinctive from methamphetamine under section 195.010(18).

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS