STATE OF MISSOURI v. HAROLD EDWARD LEE (2026)

Harold Edward Lee (“Lee”) appeals his convictions of violating an order of protection under § 455.085, and resisting arrest under § 575.150.¹ Lee presents two points on appeal, both contending his cross-examination questioning was outside the scope of his direct examination. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background 2

Victims (“TB”, “YB”, or “Victims”, collectively), resided in West Plains in 2022. On July 11, 2022, Victims each filed petitions for orders of protection against Lee, who lived in their neighborhood. Lee opposed the petitions. However, the orders of protection were granted, prohibiting Lee from coming within 300 feet of Victims. The orders of protection were renewed and extended for an additional ten years on August 28, 2023.

On December 14, 2022, TB was shopping at a small, local grocery store in West Plains. As she was shopping, TB saw Lee enter the grocery store and walk down the same aisle in which she was shopping. TB abandoned her items and exited the store to call the police in her vehicle. As she exited, Lee remained in the aisle, but watched her walk toward the exit. Once in her vehicle, she was told to stay in her vehicle and wait for the police to arrive. While TB was waiting, Lee came from the store to his vehicle, which was parked a few feet from TB's vehicle. Lee stayed several minutes and stared at TB. Police responded approximately 25 minutes later to TB's call at the store. By that time Lee had left. The officer confirmed that TB had a valid order of protection and proceeded to Lee's house to arrest him for violating the order. Lee resisted the officer as the officer was attempting to arrest him.³

Between July 12, 2022, and June 13, 2023, Lee filed 22 petitions for orders of protection against Victims. Many of the petitions were denied without a hearing. Of those that went to hearing, none were granted.

On September 7, 2023, the State filed an information against Lee alleging two misdemeanor counts relating to Lee's actions on December 14, 2022: (1) violation of an order of protection and (2) resisting arrest. On October 11, 2023, in a separate case, Lee was charged by indictment with two felony counts of harassment in the first degree, § 565.090, pertaining to the 22 petitions for orders of protection filed against Victims. Lee filed a motion for joinder, asking that the two cases be consolidated and tried together. The State consented to the motion for joinder and the parties agreed that the State would dismiss the indictment on the felony charges of harassment, and file an amended information adding the felony harassment allegations into the case involving the misdemeanor violation of an order of protection and resisting arrest. The case proceeded to jury trial which was held on June 17-18, 2025.

The jury acquitted Lee on Counts 1 and 2, harassment in the first degree, but convicted Lee on Count 3, violating an order of protection, and Count 4, resisting arrest. On August 25, 2025, the trial court sentenced Lee to one year in jail on Count 3, which was suspended, and Lee was placed on two years of supervised probation with special conditions. On Count 4, the trial court sentenced Lee to one year in jail, and suspended ten months of that sentence with Lee to serve 60 days. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

Standard of Review

“The trial court must be permitted broad discretion in deciding the permissible scope of cross-examination, and an appellate court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless it finds that the trial court abused its discretion.” State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Mo. banc 2000). “An appellate court will find reversible error only where an abuse of discretion is found and the defendant can demonstrate prejudice.” Id. at 311. “[W]e will reverse only when there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial or deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Hallgrimson, 728 S.W.3d 451, 462 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Discussion

Lee's first point alleges the trial court abused its discretion in overruling counsel's objections when the State examined Lee about the petitions for orders of protection he filed against Victims. Lee's second point alleges the trial court abused its discretion in overruling counsel's objection when the State examined Lee about the incident at the grocery store. Lee contends that both of these lines of questioning were outside the scope of his direct examination and caused him prejudice. We disagree. Given the similarity and overlap of these points, we address them together. During his jury trial, Lee testified in his own defense. Relevant to Lee's allegations of error, he testified on direct examination as follows:

[Counsel:] [Lee], were you served with an order of protection that was filed by [Victims]?

[Lee:] Yes.

.․

[Counsel:] Now, [Lee], what, if any, research did you do after you received that order of protection?

[Lee:] I studied the order of protection laws.

[Counsel:] Is that Chapter 455 of the Missouri -- of the Revised Statutes of Missouri?

[Lee:] Yes.

.․

[Counsel:] Based upon what you read about the statute [․] [d]o you feel like, based upon that definition, though, that the order of protection was unfairly ordered against you pursuant to the letter of the law?

[Lee:] Yes.

[Counsel:] How did that make you feel?

[Lee:] Like I'd been raped. Like [Victims] were raping me.

[Counsel:] Did you feel threatened?

[Lee:] Yes. Threatened and vulnerable. They could send me to jail anytime they wanted to, on a whim.

Thereafter, the State cross-examined Lee, bringing up his feeling of being “raped” by Victims which was elicited on direct. The State asked Lee if he felt afraid of or threatened by Victims. Counsel objected, asserting that the questioning was outside the scope of direct. The trial court overruled the objection. When asked what he did in response to his feelings, Lee explained that he “tried to refile to have restraining orders on them to stay away from me.” Counsel again objected, and was overruled. The State showed Lee a petition for an order of protection completed by him. Counsel once again objected. A side bar ensued in which counsel stated that he intentionally avoided Lee's individual petitions for protective orders during direct examination. The trial court overruled counsel's objection. The State proceeded through each of Lee's 22 petitions, on which Lee identified his signature.

Later during his cross examination, the State asked Lee if he had seen the video footage from the grocery store. Counsel objected as being outside the scope of direct examination. The objection was again overruled. Eventually, Lee acknowledged on cross-examination that he was at the grocery store on December 14, 2022, but denied seeing TB, or, if she was there, did not recognize her. Lee made additional comments about being afraid of Victims due to the fact that they had obtained orders of protection against him.

A defendant who chooses to take the stand and testify on his own behalf is subject to contradiction and impeachment the same as any other witness. State v. Marshall, 302 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010); see also § 546.260 (a criminal defendant who decides to testify “shall be liable to cross-examination, as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief, and may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the case”). “The scope of cross-examination of a defendant is not limited to a categorical review of matters stated or covered on direct-examination but may cover all matters within a fair purview of the direct-examination.” State v. Haley, 73 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (quoting State v. Watts, 919 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)). If a defendant in his examination in chief refers to a subject generally, he may be examined in detail as to that subject. Tabor v. State, 356 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011); Haley, 73 S.W.3d at 752. An appellant cannot complain about cross-examination as to matters first brought into the case by the accused's testimony on direct examination. Haley, 73 S.W.3d at 752.

Lee's comments on direct about feeling “raped,” “threatened,” and “vulnerable” by Victims, opened the door to cross-examination questions regarding the petitions Lee filed against Victims. Those comments also opened the door to questions about his actions at the grocery store, which were inconsistent with Lee feeling threatened or afraid of Victims. The cross-examination impeached Lee and showed contradictions in his testimony. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination questioning that was within the fair purview of Lee's testimony on direct. See Haley, 73 S.W.3d at 752.

Furthermore, even if the questioning was outside the scope of direct, it was not prejudicial to Lee with regard to the counts upon which he was convicted. Lee was acquitted of the harassment charges in Counts 1 and 2, which dealt with the petitions for orders of protection against Victims. Lee, not the State, asked the trial court to consolidate those charges along with the misdemeanor charges of which he was convicted. Lee stipulated to the admission of the 22 petitions for orders of protection that he filed against Victims. The cross-examination inquiries complained of primarily pertained to Counts 1 and 2, of which Lee was acquitted. He cannot now claim that evidence as to those charges caused him any prejudice. See McLemore v. State, 635 S.W.3d 554, 653-54 (Mo. banc 2021) (holding that acquittals on some counts showed counsel's alleged errors had no effect on the convictions on other counts); State v. Jenner, 507 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (holding that a trial court's exclusion of testimonial evidence, even if in error, was not prejudicial because the defendant was acquitted of the charges relating to the evidence); State v. O'Neill, 825 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (“[o]rdinarily there is no prejudicial error when a defendant is acquitted of the charge to which the evidence relates”).

Lee was convicted of Counts 3 and 4. As to Count 3, § 455.085, the State was required to prove: (1) the court entered an order prohibiting Lee from coming within 300 feet of TB; (2) Lee knew of the existence of the order; and (3) Lee knowingly violated the terms and conditions of the order by being within 300 feet of TB. See MAI-CR 4th 432.06; State v. McCann, 952 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997). As to Count 4, § 575.150, the State had to prove: (1) the arresting officer was a law enforcement officer; (2) the arresting officer was making an arrest of Lee for violation of an order of protection; (3) Lee knew or reasonably should have known that the officer was making an arrest of Lee; and (4) that for the purpose of preventing the officer from making the arrest, Lee resisted by using violence or physical force. See MAI CR 4th 429.60.2; State v. Shipp, 125 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (a defendant pulling his hand away and continuing to struggle to get away constituted “physical force” under § 575.150). The record is replete with evidence that there was a valid order of protection against Lee and that Lee violated that order of protection on December 14, 2022. It is clear that Lee disagreed with the entry of the orders of protection; however, that provides no viable defense. The arresting officer testified Lee resisted arrest. The officer's body cam footage of the arrest was also admitted. There was no other evidence regarding the arrest. Lee has failed to show any prejudice. See DeLeon v. State, 690 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (if a movant's guilt is established by overwhelming evidence, prejudice cannot be established). Lee's points are denied.

Conclusion

We deny both points presented by Lee and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2021).

3.   The officer's bodycam footage was admitted into evidence showing the resistance.

BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS