JONATHAN LEE JENKINS v. STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Jonathan Lee Jenkins (“Movant”) appeals the motion court's order denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State charged Movant as a prior and persistent offender with second-degree domestic assault, § 565.073 (Count 1); possession of a controlled substance, § 579.015 (Count 2); and felony tampering with physical evidence, § 575.100 (Count 3).¹ Count 1 alleged Movant knowingly caused physical injury to Victim by choking her and smashing her face into a wall between November 8, 2019, and November 12, 2019. Counts 2 and 3 allege that on November 12, 2019, Movant was in possession of methamphetamine and then attempted to destroy it to impair its availability in an official proceeding or investigation.

Movant waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held on December 4, 2020. At trial, Victim testified that she met Movant while he was in prison and was involved with him continuously for nine years while he was incarcerated. After Movant was released from prison in February of 2019, Victim lived with Movant in an apartment in Cape Girardeau. The relationship was tumultuous and abusive. Victim left Cape Girardeau in November 2019 to stay with friends in a trailer in Butler County. Victim testified Movant “found” her on November 8th by knocking on doors in the small trailer park. Once outside the trailer, Movant grabbed Victim by the hair and flung her into his car, hitting her head on the car.

Movant then took Victim to the Holiday Inn in Poplar Bluff, where a friend had reserved a room for Victim for a few days. Victim checked in and they both went to the room. Once in the room, Movant hit and strangled Victim. Police were called due to noise and Movant and Victim were eventually asked to leave the hotel. Not having transportation, Victim left with Movant in his car. Movant then took Victim to a “trap” house on Poplar Street in Poplar Bluff, where Movant “shot [Victim] up” with methamphetamine.

Movant and Victim then went to Cape Girardeau on Saturday night, November 9, 2019. At 1:00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 12, they went back to Poplar Bluff and Movant took Victim to the Poplar Street house, where he assaulted her again. After leaving the Poplar Street house, Movant hit Victim in her face repeatedly while in his car, including once with his phone, which knocked out Victim's tooth. Victim testified she blacked out and then awoke in the Poplar Bluff Walmart parking lot. Movant took Victim to a nearby Hardee's and parked behind the restaurant for a couple hours. Movant then drove to a nearby gas station to refuel his car.

At the gas station, Victim volunteered to go in and pay for the gas. When she went inside, Victim asked the attendant to call the police and not to start the pump until they arrived. Police arrived and interviewed Victim. Victim reported that she had been assaulted over the last several days. She had visible injuries, which were documented by a police photographer. Victim told the police that Movant had drugs on him, specifically “he had a rock” of methamphetamine, and that he “kept it either in his rectum or underneath his testicles.”

An initial pat-down search of Movant did not discover the “rock” of methamphetamine or any drugs. Movant was placed in a patrol car while statements were taken. When police returned to the patrol car, there was a powdery substance, suspected to be crushed methamphetamine, in the back seat. The substance was inside the car, “crushed” and “smashed up against the door” as well as all over the floor. It was on “the door panel” and “down beside the seat and down into the floor.” No one else was in the car at that time. The car had been checked by police prior to that day's shift and no one else had been in the back seat since that time. The police collected the portion of the substance that could be recovered, but had to vacuum out additional powder from the vehicle. This kept police “from being able to get a proper weight of the amount that [Movant] possessed[.]” Not all of the substance was “available” to the police or prosecutors at trial. The part that could be collected was sent off to the crime lab and was identified as methamphetamine.

Movant testified in his own defense at trial. Movant agreed that from “November ninth through November twelfth” Victim “was pretty much basically with [him].” Movant generally denied assaulting Victim but did not offer any explanation for her injuries. Movant admitted he had methamphetamine on him at the time of his arrest. Further, Movant admitted that the “powdery substance” was not in the patrol car before he got in the vehicle. Finally, Movant seemed to dispute that he tried to alter, destroy or conceal the methamphetamine by testifying that it was “loose” and not in rock form and inadvertently fell out of his pants, causing it to be in the patrol car.

At trial, Movant was convicted on all counts. On March 19, 2021, the trial court sentenced Movant to ten years’ imprisonment on Count 1, and concurrent terms of seven years’ imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3 to run consecutive to Count 1, for a total of 17 years’ imprisonment. Movant appealed his convictions but then dismissed his appeal. The mandate of this Court dismissing that appeal was issued on October 21, 2021. Movant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 on December 17, 2021. Motion Counsel filed an amended motion (“the Motion”) on April 20, 2022. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 18, 2024, and the motion court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying post-conviction relief on January 28, 2025. Movant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 10, 2025. Additional facts of the underlying case and the evidentiary hearing are referenced as necessary in the analysis below.

Timeliness

Before reaching the merits of Movant's appeal, we must address the issue of whether the Motion was timely filed. Under the Supreme Court of Missouri's holding in Scott v. State, 719 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Mo. banc 2025), the version of Rule 29.15 in effect at the time of Movant's sentencing on March 19, 2021, controls the timetable for filing for post-conviction relief. Movant timely filed a pro se motion on December 17, 2021. Motion Counsel was appointed on December 21, 2021. The appointment order granted Motion Counsel “120 days from the date provided in Rule 29.15(g) to file an Amended Motion[.]”

The Motion was filed on April 20, 2022, within the 120 days specified in the appointment order. However, under the version of Rule 29.15 which was in effect on the day of sentencing, March 19, 2021, Movant had 60 days to file an amended motion and was allowed to request two extensions of time, not to exceed 30 days each. Motion Counsel did not seek any extensions and, thus, the Motion was untimely.

Although the Motion was not timely, we need not remand the case to the motion court for an abandonment hearing or for further analysis of Movant's claims. During the evidentiary hearing, all counsel and the motion court agreed that the Motion was timely filed and, thus, did not conduct an abandonment hearing. The findings of fact and conclusions of law also found both motions were timely filed. Accordingly, Movant was abandoned, but no remand for an abandonment hearing is required. When abandonment is “clear on the face of the record” and the claims in the amended motion have been heard at an evidentiary hearing and adjudicated, we will review the merits of those claims “without further delay.” Nelson v. State, 719 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Mo. banc 2025); Sauter v. State, 719 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).

Principles of Review

We commence our analysis from the required presumption that the motion court's judgment is correct. Staten v. State, 624 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2021). Our review is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Mo. banc 2024) (citing Rule 29.15(k)). We must view the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, recognizing that the motion court has a superior opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses and is entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing. Id.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland ² test: the performance prong and the prejudice prong. Staten, 624 S.W.3d at 750. If Movant falls short of satisfying either prong, that ends our analysis. Id. The performance prong requires Movant to show that “counsel failed to exercise the level of skill, care, and diligence practiced by a reasonably competent attorney in a similar situation[.]” Id. Movant “must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013).

To satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong, a movant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 422. “Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011)). Matters of trial strategy are “virtually unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim.” Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 900 (quoting Vaca v. State, 314 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Mo. banc 2010)). “No matter how ill-fated it may appear in hindsight, a reasonable choice of trial strategy cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id.

Analysis

Point 1

Movant's first point alleges that the motion court clearly erred in denying post-conviction relief as Movant had a meritorious claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as to Count 3, the felony offense of tampering with physical evidence. Specifically, Movant alleges Appellate Counsel in his direct appeal was ineffective in advising him to dismiss his appeal because Movant's actions did not impair or obstruct the prosecution of a felony. We disagree.

“The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective appellate counsel is essentially the same as that employed with trial counsel; movant is expected to show both a breach of duty and resulting prejudice.” Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Mo. banc 2019). Appellate counsel has no duty to present every possible issue on appeal. Id. “Relief from appellate ineffectiveness requires that the error not raised be so substantial as to amount to a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 148 (Mo. banc 2005)). If the appellate counsel's decision is trial strategy, it is not a ground for ineffective assistance. Storey, 175 S.W.3d at 149; Wooten v. State, 654 S.W.3d 904, 912 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (deciding to exclude a point from a direct appeal is “virtually unchallengeable”).

The motion court found that Movant failed to prevail on both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland. We first address the prejudice prong. In order to show prejudice, Movant must present “strong grounds” demonstrating “appellate counsel failed to assert a claim of error which would have required reversal had it been asserted and which was so obvious from the record that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized it and asserted it.” Courtois v. State, 693 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (quoting Smith v. State, 467 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015)). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed by considering whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational fact finder to find each of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Russell, 656 S.W.3d 265, 282 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). All evidence favorable to the State is accepted as true, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary are disregarded. Id.

Section 575.100 – Tampering With Physical Evidence, states:

1. A person commits the offense of tampering with physical evidence if he or she:

(1) Alters, destroys, suppresses or conceals any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity, legibility or availability in any official proceeding or investigation ․

2. The offense of tampering with physical evidence is a class A misdemeanor, unless the person impairs or obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony, in which case tampering with physical evidence is a class E felony.

Thus, the elements of the felony offense of tampering with physical evidence in the context of this case are: (1) the alteration, destruction, suppression or concealment of the methamphetamine, (2) with purpose, (3) to impair its availability in an investigation, and this tampering, (4) resulted in the impairment or obstruction of a felony prosecution. Russell, 656 S.W.3d at 282, see State v. Samsinak, 688 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024); State v. Patterson, 489 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

Movant argues that the fourth element was not met as there was no evidence that Movant's actions impaired or obstructed a felony prosecution. Specifically, Movant's argument states: “Under § 579.015 there is no weight requirement for possession of methamphetamine. Therefore, the charge would be the same even if [Movant] possessed merely residue, so long as there was enough to test.” Thus, Movant's argument is that he cannot be guilty of tampering with physical evidence which “impairs or obstructs” the prosecution of a felony if there is ultimately sufficient evidence to convict. Movant's assertion is incorrect.

This Court's recent decision in Samsinak, 688 S.W.3d at 259, refutes Movant's contention. In Samsinak, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder, second-degree arson, armed criminal action, and felony tampering with physical evidence. Id. The evidence there showed that the victim died due to numerous blunt force injuries consistent with a baseball bat. Id. at 263. The felony tampering with evidence charge in Samsinak related to the subsequent arson of the house where the murder occurred with the bat inside. Id. at 264. The bat, the presumed murder weapon, was charred and the handle melted so that it could not “be tested for blood and other things.” Id.

This Court found sufficient evidence that the bat was highly relevant to the murder and armed criminal action charges. Id. Thus, the conviction for tampering was affirmed even though the State was successful in obtaining convictions for murder and armed criminal action. Id. Other cases have reached similar rulings. See Russell, 656 S.W.3d at 265 (felony tampering with evidence conviction affirmed where defendant took murder victim's cell phone which was never found); Patterson, 489 S.W.3d at 912 (conviction under previous version of tampering with evidence affirmed where defendant destroyed 25 pills of what he alleged was Vicodin).

In the present case, the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict shows Movant successfully concealed a “rock” of methamphetamine, evading detection in a pat down. When he was alone in the police car, the “rock” was altered into powder and was strewn over the police car's door and floorboard carpet. Due to Movant's actions, law enforcement could not obtain an accurate measurement of the amount of methamphetamine in Movant's possession at the time of his arrest. Even though Movant was unsuccessful in his efforts to evade conviction, he is entitled to no relief under Samsinak. Thus, Movant has not met the prejudice prong of Strickland analysis.

As to the performance prong, Appellate Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he advised Movant there were no viable issues in his direct appeal. Appellate Counsel spoke with Movant about the sufficiency of the evidence and told him there was “overwhelming evidence supporting the charges he was convicted of[.]” Appellate Counsel admitted there was no weight requirement to Count 2, possession of a controlled substance, but testified that in “my understanding of the statute and attendant case law, I'm not aware of any case that would show that -- there would have had to be -- been a showing that he actually obstructed the particular felony.” Appellate Counsel's testimony correctly analyzed the issues under this Court's holding in Samsinak. Accordingly, Appellate Counsel's recommendation not to pursue this claim was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant met neither prong of the Strickland test and point 1 is denied.

Point 2

Movant's second point alleges that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that Movant possessed methamphetamine that had a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, as required by § 195.017. Specifically, Movant contends Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the State failed to prove the substance in Movant's possession was “dextro” as opposed to “levo” methamphetamine. Movant further alleges that absent this ineffectiveness, there was a reasonable probability that Movant's trial result would have been different. We disagree.

At trial, the State offered a Certified Drug Chemistry Report (“the Report”) as evidence. The Report stated, in part:

Analysis Result: The crystal material, weighing 1.38 ± 0.05 grams, contains methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.

Drug analysis was performed by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, gas chromatography-flame ionization detection, and color testing.

The Report was admitted at trial without objection. Trial Counsel moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence and again at the end of trial alleging that the State failed to prove all counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial Counsel did not specifically address the Report in his arguments.

At the evidentiary hearing, Movant presented testimony from Sarah Brown (“Criminologist”). Criminologist testified she worked at the Highway Patrol Crime Lab in Cape Girardeau as a forensic drug chemist. She conducted the testing on the substance involved in Movant's case and prepared the Report. She described the testing done on the sample. None of the testing she performed determined whether the substance was dextro or levo methamphetamine or a combination of the two.

Movant also presented testimony from Professor James Chickos (“Chemistry Expert”). Chemistry Expert testified that there are two types of methamphetamine: (1) levo; and (2) dextro. Samples can also contain a combination of levo and dextro. He explained that levo and dextro methamphetamine are enantiomers, meaning they are mirror images of each other, however, they are not the same substance. Chemistry Expert further testified that “if this were D methamphetamine, this would be the Schedule II drug. Okay? ․ And L methamphetamine is available over the counter.” Chemistry Expert opined that the analyst in this case did not run necessary tests to show which isomer of methamphetamine Movant possessed.

“A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he or she knowingly possesses a controlled substance[.]” § 579.015.1. Methamphetamine is classified as a Schedule 2 controlled substance by Section 195.017.4(3). The particular definition of methamphetamine in that section provides:

[a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:

․

(c) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers[.]

“Proof that a substance is contraband drug does not always require expert testimony, but the proof must be sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the substance was the charged contraband beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Foster, 722 S.W.3d 390, 393-94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Eyman, 828 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)). The nature of an illegal substance can be proven with circumstantial evidence. Id. at 394 (citing State v. Krutz, 826 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991)).

[S]uch circumstantial proof may include evidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved in the transaction, evidence that the substance produced the expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the illicit drug, testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and evidence that the substance was called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence.

Id. (quoting Krutz, 826 S.W.2d at 8).

Movant rests his argument on his belief that Trial Counsel should have challenged the State's alleged failure to introduce evidence – from scientific testing in a laboratory – that the methamphetamine possessed by Movant was conclusively dextro methamphetamine, eliminating the possibility that the methamphetamine was levo methamphetamine, which can be found in some over-the-counter medications, such as Vicks VapoRub. We hold that the motion court did not clearly err in concluding Trial Counsel provided effective assistance of counsel.

Here, the State introduced laboratory testing at trial that conclusively proved the substance in question was, in fact, methamphetamine. However, that testing did not distinguish whether the methamphetamine was levo methamphetamine or dextro methamphetamine. The particular enactment of the legislature, § 195.017.4(3), does not differentiate between levo methamphetamine and dextro methamphetamine by those terms. It is not necessary to resolve in this appeal whether levo methamphetamine is included within that potentially far-reaching definition of “methamphetamine” even though Movant claims that “[u]nder the wording of § 195.017.4.(3), only [dextro]-methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance[.]” Instead, we believe that the following testimony, presented at trial, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the methamphetamine possessed by Movant “had a stimulant effect on the central nervous system.”

[State:] Now, you spoke with law enforcement. Correct?

[Victim:] Yes.

[State:] Did you inform them of any controlled substances that [Movant] had on him?

[Victim:] Yes. I did.

[State:] Okay. Did you know [Movant] had drugs on him?

[Victim:] Yes. I did.

[State:] Had you seen them?

[Victim:] Yes.

[State:] What form was it in?

[Victim:] [Movant] had a rock. It was the size of a rock. It was over thirty-two grams, and he was bragging about just the rock being that size on his own and that was after he had taken me to Poplar Bluff and had gotten everybody high.

[State:] So at that time it was still in a rock form?

[Victim:] Yeah. I mean there was small like -- you know, I mean there was loose powder in there. But, he had a very large sized piece of ice.

[State:] Is that methamphetamine?

[Victim:] Yes. I apologize. Methamphetamine, yes.

[State:] And you informed law enforcement that [Movant] had that on him. Correct?

[Victim:] Yes. I did.

[State:] Did you tell them where he kept it?

[Victim:] Yes. I did. I told them that he kept it either in his rectum or underneath his testicles.

Movant took the stand during trial and admitted it was “[s]afe to say” that he was a drug dealer and had gotten several people “high” on methamphetamine, including himself and Victim in the days leading up to his arrest. When asked, “You did have methamphetamine on you?,” Movant answered, “Yes. I did.”

The above testimony, along with other testimony at trial, proves that the methamphetamine in question was the type that has an “effect on the central nervous system.” Victim, as well as other people, had gotten high from the substance. Movant used secrecy and deviousness to hide the substance in his rectum. Movant was well aware of the illicit nature of the narcotic. Point 2 is denied.

Point 3

Movant's third point alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying post-conviction relief because Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present impeachment evidence of text messages Victim sent to Movant's phone. We disagree.

On the day of trial, Movant's mother gave Movant's cell phone to Trial Counsel. Trial Counsel did not impeach Victim with any text messages from Movant's phone or otherwise use the phone at trial.

At the evidentiary hearing, Movant testified there were text messages on the phone between Movant and Victim which showed Victim's version of events was untrue. In preparation for the evidentiary hearing, Motion Counsel had a forensic extraction conducted on Movant's phone. Motion Counsel did not produce the entire text message string, but produced eight specific text messages authored by Victim. Six of those messages were sent in the afternoon and evening of November 8, 2019, and disclose that Victim was in Poplar Bluff and wanted Movant to come get her and take her to the Holiday Inn where someone had reserved her a room. In the early morning hours of November 9, 2019, Victim sent Movant a text with her current location. The final text message was sent at 10 :33 a.m. that same day, and expressed Victim's displeasure that Movant had not yet arrived. The motion court held that Trial Counsel was not ineffective, as he had insufficient time to view or to attempt to use the text messages at trial, and Movant was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's decision to not use the text messages.

“The mere failure to impeach a witness does not entitle a movant to relief.” Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Mo. banc 2014). In order to obtain relief, a movant must demonstrate that the decision was not a matter of reasonable trial strategy and that the impeachment would have provided him with a defense or would have changed the outcome of the trial. Id. Moreover, if a prior inconsistent statement does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the movant's guilt, such impeachment evidence is not a basis for a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Potter v. State, 679 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). In order to receive post-conviction relief, the prior inconsistent statements cannot be “collateral.” A statement is “collateral” “if the fact in dispute is of no material significance in the case or is not pertinent to the issues developed.” Kelley v. State, 618 S.W.3d 722, 740 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Mo. banc 2004)). A matter is not collateral when it is “related directly to the central issue.” Id.

In the present case, all of the produced text messages were sent prior to the assaults in question. The text messages are arguably inconsistent with Victim's testimony about how she came to be in the presence of Movant in Poplar Bluff. However, they do not provide Movant with any conceivable defense to the assaults which happened later. The text messages, at best, relate to a collateral matter and are not directly related to the central issue of the assaults. The messages certainly do not give reasonable doubt of Movant's guilt nor would they have changed the outcome of the trial. Thus, Movant has not met his Strickland burden to show prejudice. We need not address whether Trial Counsel had insufficient time to analyze the phone given to him on the day of trial. Point 3 is denied.

Points 4 and 5

We address points 4 and 5 together. Point 4 alleges that Trial Counsel “was ineffective for failing to adequately advise [Movant] about his right to a jury trial[.]” Point 5 alleges Appellate Counsel “was ineffective for advising [Movant] to dismiss his direct appeal when he had a meritorious claim that the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial without first obtaining a constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to a jury trial.” We again disagree.

“The constitutions of the United States and Missouri both guarantee a defendant in a criminal case the right to a jury trial.” State v. Hilbert, 663 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Mo. banc 2023); U.S. Const. amends. 6, 14; Mo Const. art. 1, secs. 18(a), 22(a). “A defendant may waive this right with the consent of the court.” Id. A waiver by a defendant shall be made in open court and entered of record and the waiver “must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. “The best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on the record, to ensure that the defendant understands the right, understands what is lost in the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive the right.” Id. (quoting State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Mo. banc 2006)); Sinks v. State, 699 S.W.3d 506, 515 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024); Rule 27.01(b). Moreover, the decision to waive a jury trial is a matter of trial strategy and does not provide a basis for post-conviction relief. Sinks, 699 S.W.3d at 515.

With the foregoing in mind, the record in the present case refutes Movant's claims. Movant waived his right to a jury trial on two occasions. First, on August 11, 2020, Movant waived trial by jury after an explanation from both Trial Counsel and the trial court. Movant reaffirmed his jury trial waiver on the day of trial, December 4, 2020. Movant testified at the evidentiary hearing that he agreed to have a bench trial and waived his right to a jury trial on the record. Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that it was Movant who made that decision. Movant's waivers were clearly knowing, voluntary and intelligent. In addition, Trial Counsel testified he had a “strategy reason” for advising Movant to have a bench trial, as he “felt like the judge would not be as emotional as a [ ] jury would be.” Trial Counsel also testified that neither he nor Movant believed that Victim would show up for trial, and that a bench trial would happen sooner due to COVID-related constraints. Points 4 and 5 are denied.

Conclusion

We affirm the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo Supp.(2017). All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2021), unless otherwise indicated.

2.   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS