STATE OF MISSOURI v. JACOB COLE BYLER (2026)

The State presents two points on appeal after the trial court entered an order purporting to dismiss with prejudice the State's five-count felony information filed against Jacob Cole Byler (“Byler”) after the trial court concluded Byler's constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The State's first point contends the trial court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice because “the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so after the State filed a memorandum of nolle prosequi, in that once a prosecutor voluntarily dismisses a case, there is no case, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take further action, and any orders entered are nullities.” We agree with the State's first point. Because we agree with the State's first point on appeal, we need not address the second.

Background

In June 2023, the State filed its original felony information against Byler, alleging he committed the offense of stealing by deceit, a class C felony, under § 570.030.¹ In September 2023, shortly after the trial court held a preliminary hearing, the State filed a nolle prosequi and the first case against Byler was dismissed without prejudice. Several days later, the State refiled an information against Byler, creating a new case, alleging the same stealing by deceit offense, but also including four counts of forgery, a class D felony, under § 570.090.² In February 2024, the trial court scheduled Byler's jury trial for September 23, 2024. On September 12, 2024, a new judge was assigned to the case. That new judge recused on September 17, 2024, and a docket entry was made stating that the jury trial scheduled to begin on September 23, 2024, was cancelled “[b]y agreement of the parties[.]” After reassignment to a new judge, the State filed a motion for change of judge on September 18, 2024. The State's motion was granted and a new judge was assigned on November 12, 2024. Byler then filed his motion for change of judge on November 13, 2024. Byler's motion was granted, and a senior judge was assigned on December 13, 2024. By agreement of the parties, the senior judge set the case for jury trial March 10-12, 2025.

On the morning of February 27, 2025, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing. A record was not made of the hearing, apparently because the audio recording system failed to function properly. Based both upon the subsequent conduct of the parties and subsequent docket entries by the trial court, one of the issues discussed at the pre-trial hearing was the State's intention to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice by filing another nolle prosequi. Neither party claims that the State orally dismissed the case by nolle prosequi at the pre-trial hearing.

On that same day, February 27, 2025, Byler filed a document at 11:56 a.m. titled “SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND MOTION FOR SPEEDY TRIAL PURSUANT TO § 545.780, R.S.Mo OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE” (“Byler's Motion”). Byler's Motion requested the following relief: (1) an order denying the State's Motion to Dismiss ³ without prejudice, (2) in the alternative, an order dismissing the case with prejudice, and/or (3) an order directing that the case be brought to trial under § 545.780 within 180 days. Byler's Motion alleged the State was engaging in “judge shopping.”

At 12:40 p.m. on February 27, 2025, the State filed a memorandum of nolle prosequi. The following day, in light of these filings, the trial court scheduled a hearing for March 10, 2025. After the hearing, the trial court entered a written order on March 12, 2025, purporting to dismiss the State's five-count felony information with prejudice. The trial court concluded that the State's nolle prosequi did not immediately terminate the trial court's jurisdiction as there was a pending motion requesting a speedy trial. After concluding the trial court retained jurisdiction regardless of the nolle prosequi, the trial court proceeded to analyze on the merits whether Byler's rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court concluded that Byler's “constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial” were violated and dismissed the case with prejudice. The State timely filed its notice of appeal.

Discussion

“A determination of the scope of a circuit court's jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Whirley, 666 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023); see, e.g. State v. Alqabbaa, 525 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (dismissal with prejudice after nolle prosequi reviewed de novo). “A nolle prosequi is a prosecutor's formal entry on the record indicating that a pending criminal charge will no longer be prosecuted, and results in a dismissal without prejudice unless jeopardy had attached.” State v. Dozler, 455 S.W.3d 471, 473 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015) (quoting State v. Keightley, 147 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004)). Because a prosecutor has broad discretion to determine when, if, and how criminal laws are to be enforced, the prosecutor has unfettered discretion to enter a nolle prosequi, and the circuit court may not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. Id. “Once a prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi, the trial court is without jurisdiction to take any further action in the case.” Id. “Any orders entered after a trial court loses jurisdiction in a case are nullities.” Id.

“This discretion has been codified in section 56.087[.]”⁴ State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Mo. banc 2015). Section 56.087 grants the prosecutor “the power, in his or her discretion, to dismiss a complaint, information, or indictment, or any count or counts thereof, and in order to exercise that power it is not necessary for the prosecutor or circuit attorney to obtain the consent of the court.” § 56.087.1. “Unless double jeopardy has attached, a dismissal by the prosecutor will be without prejudice, meaning the prosecutor ‘has complete discretion to refile the case, as long as it is refiled within the time specified by the applicable statute of limitations.’ ” Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting § 56.087.3).

Here, we conclude the State's nolle prosequi, filed February 27, 2025, at 12:40 p.m., immediately terminated the trial court's jurisdiction, and the trial court's subsequent order purporting to convert the State's voluntary dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice was a nullity. As soon as the State filed its nolle prosequi, the “trial court did not have authority to convert the dismissal to one with prejudice.” Id.

This conclusion is strongly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Sisco that held the trial court did not err in refusing to convert the State's nolle prosequi from a dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice following an unfavorable evidentiary ruling to the State's case. Id. at 310-11. Our Supreme Court reasoned that “[b]ecause double jeopardy had not attached,[ ] the dismissal was without prejudice, and the prosecutor could refile the charges against [the defendant.]” Id. at 310 (citing § 56.087). The Court in Sisco further stated that “[t]he trial court did not have authority to convert the dismissal to one with prejudice.” Id. (citing Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Mo. banc 2003)). In the present case, the trial court should have refrained from purporting to convert the State's voluntary dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice. Any concerns for Byler's constitutional rights to a speedy trial can be raised in a subsequent proceeding if and when the State refiles the case.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions that the trial court vacate its dismissal with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   References to § 570.030 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2021).

2.   References to § 570.090 are to RSMo (2016), including, as applicable, statutory changes effective January 1, 2017.

3.   The record reveals that the State never filed a “Motion to Dismiss” seeking the trial court to act.

4.   References to § 56.087 are to RSMo (2016), including, as applicable, statutory changes effective January 1, 2017.

BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C. J. – CONCURS JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS