GREENE COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE v. B.A.P., Appellant. (2026)

B.A.P. (“Father”) appeals from the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights to his children, H.P. and A.E.P. (the “Children”). The trial court found Father abused and neglected the Children, failed to rectify conditions that led to the Children coming into the care of the Children's Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services (“Children's Division”), was unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship, and that termination was in the best interest of the Children pursuant to section 211.447.¹ Father argues in two points the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights in that (1) the amended judgment fails to recite specific factual findings establishing a likelihood of future harm to the Children if parental rights are not terminated, and (2) the trial court's finding that the Children would suffer future harm if Father's parental rights were not terminated is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Discussion

H.P. was taken into protective custody on or about August 26, 2024, due to allegations of physical abuse by his parents. A.E.P., who was born on September 4, 2024, was placed into protective custody on September 6, 2024. The trial court adjudicated both children, who have special needs (Down's Syndrome and speech and occupational delays), as neglected and/or abused in a jurisdictional hearing on October 24, 2024.

The juvenile officer petitioned the trial court to terminate Father's parental rights. Testimony at trial revealed Father completed parenting classes and anger management class, but he did not develop skills to meet the physical and developmental needs of the Children. Father had previously pleaded guilty to two counts of domestic assault against Mother and was required to take anger management classes, but thought these classes were a “joke.” A counselor referred Father to the Good Dads Program, but he refused to participate. Father denied H.P. had ever been abused.

During one visit, Father could not get H.P. to eat a sandwich. Mother intervened to feed him “like they do at home,” and proceeded to force three-quarters of a sandwich into H.P.’s mouth at once. When the case worker asked her to stop and warned her H.P. could choke, Father became extremely upset and began yelling at the case worker to the extent the visit was terminated. Father testified these allegations were untrue.

The trial court entered its amended judgment terminating the parental rights of Father. Specifically, the trial court found two separate medical care providers diagnosed H.P. as having been physically abused. Father refused to acknowledge such abuse occurred or that he had any responsibility regarding why his children were in protective care. Further, he was neither receptive to any advice offered by parent aides nor was he willing to honestly engage in any services to reunify him with his children. The trial court ultimately found, “it would be in the best interests of the minor children to terminate the parental rights of ․ [Father] in, to, and over the minor children [H.P. and A.E.P.].” This appeal follows.

This Court reviews whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was presented to support a statutory ground for terminating parental rights under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). The trial court's judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2014). “The judgment will be reversed only if we are left with a firm belief that the order is wrong.” In Interest of J.P.B., 509 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Mo. banc 2017).

Father's points argue the trial court's judgment fails to recite specific factual findings establishing a likelihood of future harm to the Children, and there was not substantial evidence to support such a finding. We disagree.

“[I]t is insufficient merely to point to past acts, note that they resulted in abuse or neglect and then terminate parental rights.” In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. banc 2004). However, Father fails to appreciate “future harm” is not an essential element when analyzing whether parental rights should be terminated by a court. A.R.F. v. V.H.F., 593 S.W.3d 686, 688 (Mo.App. 2020). Rather, the “future harm” analysis is to be analyzed “within the context of the trial court's determinations as to ‘whether grounds exist and what is in the best interests of the child for the reasonably foreseeable future.’ ” Id.

The trial court did make specific findings as to whether Father's past actions presented a risk of future harm to the Children, stating:

There is a significant likelihood of future harm to the children if parental rights are not terminated because [Father] has abused H.P., and A.[E.] P. is at significant risk of abuse due to [Father's] refusal to honestly engage in services to rectify the causes of abuse to H.P., and [his] unwillingness to take accountability for the abuse. [Father has not] shown any ability to provide for the minor children's care, custody, and control.

The trial court analyzed Father's history of abuse and neglect toward the Children, along with his unwillingness to make any change to his behavior, in deciding that there would likely be future harm to the Children if they were returned to Father's care. This analysis, which specifically links the statutory grounds establishing Father's past abuse and neglect with the likelihood of future harm to the Children, is precisely what is required under K.A.W. and A.R.F.

The trial court made all the required findings mandated by section 211.447.5(2) (a)-(d). Specifically, the trial court made extensive findings with regard to subsections (c) and (d), and the Children's best interests. Father does not challenge the trial court's statutory grounds for termination with regard to abuse and neglect and failure to rectify.

Our Courts have repeatedly held that failure to challenge all of the trial court's statutory bases for termination of parental rights is fatal to a claim on appeal. See Interest of M.C., 717 SW3d 770, 774 (Mo.App. 2025); see also S.L.C. v. M.A.C., 675 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Mo.App. 2023). Here, Father solely challenges the trial court's future harm analysis without addressing any of the trial court's underlying statutory grounds for termination. This failure is fatal to Father's claims.²

Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2021. The court also terminated the mother's parental rights to the children, but the mother is not a party to this appeal, and her rights are not at issue in this case.

2.   The trial court's judgment makes a thorough review of Father's abuse and neglect of the Children and his failure to rectify the reasons they came into care as he had “not honestly engaged in any services to reunify.” Our ex gratia review of the trial court's findings reveals that these findings are supported by substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the findings that termination of Father's parental rights in, to, and over the Children, based on abuse and neglect and failure to rectify, is in the Children's best interests.

BECKY J. WEST, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS