BRIAN SIELERT v. JORDAN SIELERT (2026)

Jordan Sielert appeals a judgment declaring his uncle, Brian Sielert, to be the sole owner of the Sielerts’ family farm (the “Farm”). Jordan argues Brian was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Farm, which had been held by brothers Loren, Brian, and David Sielert in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, had been converted to a tenancy in common, and a one-third share of the Farm was passed to Jordan automatically on the death of his father, Loren, by operation of a recorded beneficiary deed.¹ We affirm because Loren's recording of the beneficiary deed did not sever the Sielert brothers’ joint tenancy, Loren's death extinguished his interest in the Farm as a joint tenant and left no interest in the Farm to pass to Jordan under the beneficiary deed, and therefore Brian was entitled to declaratory judgment as a matter of law.

Factual Background

The Sielert brothers received title to the Farm from their mother as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. Nearly 20 years later, Loren executed and recorded a beneficiary deed purporting to transfer his interest in the Farm to his son, Jordan, on Loren's death. That beneficiary deed contained the following recital:

It is intended that this beneficiary deed shall sever and supersede any joint tenancy with right of survivorship interest of [Loren] in all of the tracts described herein so that [Loren's] interest shall be as a tenant in common and said interest shall pass under the provisions of this beneficiary deed instead of by survivorship under joint tenancy.

Loren died about two months after recording the beneficiary deed. David subsequently conveyed his interest in the Farm to Brian.

Brian filed suit for a declaration that he was the sole owner of the Farm in fee simple, or in the alternative, for partition. Brian moved for summary judgment on the theory that Loren's beneficiary deed had no effect, and Brian alone owned the Farm as a result of Loren's death and David's conveyance of his interest to Brian. Jordan filed a competing motion for summary judgment. Brian's motion was granted; Jordan's was denied.

Principles of Review

“The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law,” and our review is “essentially de novo.” Holterman v. Copeland, 700 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024) (quoting ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993)). Resolution of the points raised in this appeal requires interpretation and application of statutes, which also is a question of law reviewed de novo. Jennings v. Atkinson, 456 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Mo.App. W.D. 2014). “[W]e look at the summary judgment issues presented on appeal as the trial court should have initially under Rule 74.04, and we give no deference to the trial court's ruling.” A.O. v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 719 S.W.3d 923, 932-33 (Mo.App. S.D. 2025) (quoting Great S. Bank v. Blue Chalk Constr., LLC, 497 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Mo.App. S.D. 2016)). “We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id. at 933.

“Summary judgment is only appropriate if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Holterman, 700 S.W.3d at 337. No material fact is at issue here. The sole issue in this appeal is whether Brian, as the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The specific legal question to be answered in this appeal is whether a recital in a recorded beneficiary deed has the legal effect of severing a joint tenancy and converting it to a tenancy in common at the time the beneficiary deed is recorded. To answer this question, we must consider the types of tenancy involved, how a joint tenancy may be severed and converted into a tenancy in common, and the laws establishing and limiting beneficiary deeds.

Joint Tenancy and Tenancy in Common

“English common law provided three legal structures for the concurrent ownership of property that have survived into modern times: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002). The main differences between tenancy in common and joint tenancy are: 1) whether each of the tenants owns a fractional share or the entire estate, 2) severability of the estate, and 3) what occurs when a tenant dies. Tenants in common each own a separate fractional share in the undivided estate and may unilaterally alienate their shares, encumber their shares, or pass their shares to their heirs on death. Id. at 279-80. Joint tenants each have undivided possession of the entire estate rather than a fractional share and may not alienate their share unless the estate is severed. Id. at 280. Each joint tenant has an automatic inheritance known as survivorship, i.e., “Upon the death of one joint tenant, that tenant's share in the property does not pass through will or the rules of intestate succession; rather, the remaining tenant or tenants automatically inherit it.” Id. Accord Burkholder ex rel. Burkholder v. Burkholder, 48 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 2001) (“[A]t the moment of death, ownership vests exclusively in the surviving joint tenant or tenants[.]”).

Joint tenancy was the predominate form of concurrent ownership at common law, but tenancy in common is now the most common form of concurrent ownership. Craft, 535 U.S. at 279-80. In Missouri, an interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons is presumed to be a tenancy in common unless joint tenancy expressly is declared. Section 442.450.²

Four elements comprise a joint tenancy:

(1) the tenants must have one and the same interest (unity of interest); (2) the interest must accrue by one and the same conveyance (unity of title); (3) the interest must commence at one and the same time (unity of time); and (4) the property must be held by one and the same undivided possession (unity of possession).

In re King's Est., 572 S.W.2d 200, 211 (Mo.App. K.C. Dist. 1978). If a joint tenant conveys his or her interest in the property during the lifetime of that joint tenant, unity of title is destroyed, the joint tenancy is severed, and the surviving joint tenant(s) and the new owner of the interest transferred hold the property as tenants in common. Home Tr. Mercantile Bank v. Staggs, 714 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Mo.App. E.D. 1986); Remax of Blue Springs v. Vajda & Co., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Mo.App. W.D. 1986).

A joint tenant's unilateral right to sever a joint tenancy is the national norm and has been recognized in Missouri since before the Civil War. Wood v. Pavlin, 467 S.W.3d 323, 324 (Mo.App. S.D. 2015). “Severability is the ‘escape hatch’ available to each joint tenant. Whether he does or does not avail himself of his survivorship right is a matter of choice.” Id. at 326 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). “It is neither wrong nor immoral for a joint tenant who desires to terminate survivorship rights to do so without first obtaining the consent of the other joint tenant.” Id. (citation modified).

The new tenant need not be a person for severance to occur, as the unilateral transfer of a joint tenant's interest into his revocable trust has been held to sever a joint tenancy. Id. Likewise, severance can occur even if the new tenant's enjoyment of the estate does not occur until after the grantor's death. McClendon v. Johnson, 337 S.W.2d 77, 82-83 (Mo. 1960).

Not every conveyance, encumbrance, or attempted conveyance will sever a joint tenancy. An expressed intent to sever a joint tenancy, without taking the necessary steps to do so, will not suffice. Home Savings Ass'n v. Bratton; 721 S.W.2d 40, 42-45 (Mo.App. W.D. 1986). The filing of a partition suit or entry of an interlocutory judgment in a partition suit generally will not sever a joint tenancy, but a final judgment in such a suit does. Burkholder, 48 S.W.3d at 600; Heintz v. Hudkins, 824 S.W.2d 139, 143-44 (Mo.App. S.D. 1992). A pledge of property as security does not sever joint tenancy because a pledge is not a conveyance and the pledgor retains title to the property. Staggs, 714 S.W.2d at 794. Likewise, imposition of a lien arising from a pledge of property is not inconsistent with the continuation of the four unities and therefore does not sever a joint tenancy. Id. However, a creditor's execution on its debtor's interest in property held in joint tenancy would sever the joint tenancy and convert it into a tenancy in common. Remax of Blue Springs, 708 S.W.2d at 806.

Beneficiary Deeds

“Under American and English common law, a deed could not be used to transfer a decedent's title to real estate at death. Such deeds were void because they purported to function as wills without complying with the Statute of Wills.” Delcour v. Rakestraw, 340 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Mo.App. S.D. 2011). The Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri, § 461.003 et seq., “created an informal means by which property, including real property, could be transferred outside of probate, and without consideration, by a ‘beneficiary designation’ that could be revoked at any[ ]time, and that would not become effective to convey the property until the death of the grantor.” Bohr v. Nodaway Valley Bank, 411 S.W.3d 352, 356-57 (Mo.App. W.D. 2013). Thus, “beneficiary deeds are a creature of statute.” Id. at 356.

Section 461.025.1 sets forth the requirements for a beneficiary deed to real property to be valid and enforceable:

A deed that conveys an interest in real property to a grantee designated by the owner, that expressly states that the deed is not to take effect until the death of the owner, transfers the interest provided to the designated grantee beneficiary, effective on death of the owner, if the deed is executed and filed of record with the recorder of deeds in the city or county or counties in which the real property is situated prior to the death of the owner. A beneficiary deed need not be supported by consideration or be delivered to the grantee beneficiary. A beneficiary deed may be used to transfer an interest in real property to a trust estate, regardless of such trust's revocability.

An “owner” is “a person or persons having a right, exercisable alone or with others, regardless of the terminology used to refer to the owner in any written beneficiary designation, to designate the beneficiary of a nonprobate transfer, and includes joint owners.” Section 461.005(8). “Joint owners” are “persons who hold property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and a husband and wife who hold property as tenants by the entirety[.]” Section 461.005(5).

Based on the plain language of § 461.025, a deed that purports to transfer a present interest in the property is not a valid beneficiary deed. The transfer of interest under a beneficiary deed can occur only “effective on death of the owner.” Section 461.025.1. “The relevant statutes also make clear that, prior to the death of the owner, the beneficiary has no rights in the property ․.” Jennings, 456 S.W.3d at 464 (citing § 461.031.1). Accord Hammack v. Coffelt Land Title, Inc., 348 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Mo.App. W.D. 2011). As relevant to this case, one implication of this feature of beneficiary deeds is that the present status of title to the real estate is not altered by the execution and recording of that deed.

The Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri does not preclude a joint owner from making a beneficiary designation or from executing and recording a beneficiary deed. The § 461.005(8) definition of “owner” expressly “includes joint owners.” So, for example, one or more joint owners may execute a beneficiary deed or deeds during their lifetime(s), but such deed(s) would not be effective until the death of the last surviving joint owner, and only if that owner was one who executed the deed.

One prohibited use of a beneficiary deed is an attempt to supersede a survivorship right or divest a surviving joint property owner of their ownership interest. “On death of one of two or more joint owners, property with respect to which a beneficiary designation has been made belongs to the surviving joint owner or owners, and the right of survivorship continues as between two or more surviving joint owners.” Section 461.031.2. This is not only a statutory prohibition, it also is a function of common sense: a beneficiary deed conveys nothing if, “at the moment the beneficiary deed is to take effect on the grantor's death, the grantor has been dispossessed of any interest to convey.” Bohr, 411 S.W.3d at 359.

Application

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Jordan, Loren had a clearly expressed intention to convert the property to tenancy in common and pass his share along to Jordan on Loren's death. The dispute in this case arose only because Loren attempted to sever the joint tenancy by means of a recital in a beneficiary deed.³ As Jordan conceded below, “If this recital is not in the deed, we lose[,] period[,] on the statute.”

Jordan first argues that the beneficiary deed actually conveyed Loren's interest in the property and severed the joint tenancy. Jordan acknowledges § 461.025.1, yet he overlooks or ignores the portion of that statute that states the transfer of interest occurs “effective on death of the owner”. As we explained earlier in this opinion, a beneficiary deed does not, and by statute cannot, transfer a present interest in the property, and the beneficiary has no interest in the property prior to the death of the property's owner. The express language of the beneficiary deed itself belies Jordan's argument: “THIS BENEFICIARY DEED is executed pursuant to Section 461.025 RSMo. It is not effective to convey title to the above described real estate until the death of [Loren].” “[T]he foregoing language is explicit and plain. It stands alone and it means what it says ․.” See Wheeler v. Rines, 375 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Mo. 1964).

Jordan next cites In re Robinson, 791 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Mo.App. E.D. 1990) for the proposition that, “Generally, a joint tenancy may be terminated during the lives of the joint tenants by any act, acts or conduct which are inconsistent with the continued existence of the joint tenancy or which operates to destroy or terminate any one or more of the essential unities of interest, title, time or possession.” He argues that the recital in the beneficiary deed was such an act that severed the joint tenancy at the time the beneficiary deed was recorded.

We agree with the holding in Robinson, but it is too dissimilar to be controlling or persuasive in this case. Robinson was a case in which a joint tenant, by his “acts, statements, conduct, and testimony” clearly renounced and relinquished all interest in jointly held property but later acted as if he had not. Id. at 850. The record in this case contains no indication Loren ever renounced or relinquished his interest in the Farm. “The facts in Robinson are too different from those here for Robinson to apply.” Rushing v. S. Mo. Bank, 859 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Mo.App. S.D. 1993).

Jordan next argues that the facts in this case are analogous to Wood, supra, and compel the same result because a beneficiary deed, like a revocable trust, is an estate planning tool under which the owner retains ownership of the property and can revoke or change the instrument or beneficiary election at any time prior to his or her death. Although they bear many similarities, one key element differentiates them for purposes of a severance analysis: present ownership of the property. As we explained in Wood, the transfer of property into a trust, even a revocable trust, is a present transfer of the property to an entity other than one of the joint owners, and that is why the unity of title is broken and joint title is severed. 467 S.W.3d at 324-26. A beneficiary deed does not, and statutorily cannot, transfer a present ownership interest to the beneficiary. Thus, the joint tenants’ unity of title remains unaffected by the execution and recording of a beneficiary deed.

Finally, Jordan contends, as he did below, that Loren's intent to sever the joint tenancy was clearly expressed, that courts must presume Loren did not intend a nullity, and that effect should be given to his stated intent. These principles of construction would deserve consideration if we were tasked with interpretation of ambiguous deed language capable of more than one meaning. See, e.g., Barlow v. Saxon Holdings Tr., 656 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Mo.App. S.D. 2022) (latent ambiguity in deed resolved by examination of parol evidence to determine parties’ intent). But that is not this case. We are deciding whether what Loren attempted to do is possible under the Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri. “The overarching principle in operation in construing the General Assembly's statutes is that the legislature's intent must prevail, and that intent is discerned from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's language.” Groh v. Ballard, 965 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Mo.App. W.D. 1998) (emphasis added). “[Loren's] intent [is] irrelevant–even in the face of conclusive evidence of his intent.” Id. See also Est. of Dugger v. Dugger, 110 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Mo.App. S.D. 2003) (“The general principles of equity will not be applied to frustrate the purpose of the laws or to thwart public policy. Equity will not permit that to be done by indirection which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.”).

A property owner's intention, no matter how clearly or vigorously communicated in a deed, cannot be given legal effect if the means by which that intention is expressed do not, by statute, permit such an intention to come to fruition. Beneficiary deeds can be important and valuable estate planning tools, but their purpose and legal effect is circumscribed statutorily.

Based on the case law and statutory authorities previously cited, we hold that a beneficiary deed, even one with a recital of intent as in this case, cannot sever a joint tenancy and convert it into a tenancy in common. Accordingly, we deny Jordan's point relied on challenging entry of judgment for Brian. Our resolution of Jordan's first claim of error moots his second claim: that the trial court erred in denying Jordan's competing claim for partial summary judgment.

Conclusion

We do not fault Loren for attempting to sever the joint tenancy and pass along his share of the Farm to Jordan after Loren's death. The estate planning tool Loren chose, a recital in a beneficiary deed, was not capable of accomplishing that purpose under Missouri law. The Sielert brothers’ joint tenancy continued after the filing of Loren's beneficiary deed and, on Loren's death, his title to the Farm as a joint tenant automatically was extinguished and vested in his surviving brothers, leaving nothing to pass to Jordan by way of the designation in Loren's beneficiary deed.

Brian is the owner of the Farm in fee simple and was entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to Loren, Brian, and David Sielert collectively as the Sielert brothers, and to the Sielerts individually by their first names because they share the same surname. No familiarity or disrespect is intended.

2.   Statutory references are to RSMo. (2016).

3.   At argument below, Brian conceded that Loren's stated intention could have been accomplished had he recorded a separate document that presently severed the unity of title and simultaneously filed a beneficiary deed that conveyed his interest effective on his death in the future.

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS