MAD TAX LLC v. JAMES WINFRED ROBINSON 2013 (2026)

Mad Tax LLC, (the “LLC”) appeals from the circuit court's judgment granting a motion to set aside a default judgment filed by the trustees, including James Winfred Robinson, and the beneficiaries of the J. Winfred Robinson and Barbara A. Robinson Revocable Trust Dated 9/5/2013 (collectively referred to as “Respondents”). Because we find merit in one of the LLC's three points relied on challenging the granting of Respondents’ motion, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand with directions to reinstate the default judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

The LLC filed a verified petition seeking to determine and quiet title to certain real estate located in Steelville, Missouri (“the Property”). The petition alleged Respondents lost all right, title, and interest in and to the Property following purchase by the LLC at tax auction conducted by the Crawford County Collector of Revenue. Respondents failed to timely plead or otherwise respond to this verified petition, and the LLC subsequently filed a motion for judgment in its favor. The LLC's motion includes a certificate of service upon Respondents.

On February 21, 2024, following a hearing at which Respondents failed to appear in person or by counsel, the circuit court entered a judgment finding that Respondents were in default and granting the LLC the relief sought in its verified petition. Exactly 365 days later, on February 20, 2025, Respondents filed an unverified motion to set that judgment aside. Following a hearing, the circuit court took said motion under advisement and allowed the parties to submit evidence.

Thereafter, the parties submitted evidence consisting of two affidavits—one offered by the LLC (filed along with suggestions in opposition to Respondents’ motion) and one offered by Respondents. We begin with the LLC's affidavit, containing the sworn statement of R. Brooks Kenagy, which we need only to summarize. In brief, the affiant claimed that he is a member of the Missouri bar and an affiliate of Lay Bonded Title Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Lay Bonded”); that in April of 2024, following the entry of the circuit court's default judgment, Lay Bonded received a sale contract between the LLC and a bona fide purchaser of the Property; and that Lay Bonded was willing to and did close a transaction involving Old Republic Title Company to insure the conveyance to the bona fide purchaser after a review of relevant background material.

Turning to Respondents’ affidavit, it contains the sworn statement of David Robinson, quoted here, in toto:

1. I [am] over the age of eighteen (18) and competent to testify in this matter. All claims set forth herein are true, accurate and based upon my personal knowledge.

2. James Winfred Robinson, who at all relevant times in this matter was the Trustee of the J. Winfred Robinson and Barbara A. Robinson Revocable Trust Dated 9/5/2013 (the “Trust”) is my father.

3. I am an authorized representative of the Trust.

4. At no time prior to this action being filed on October 23, 2023, did my father or any other trustee, representative or beneficiary of the Trust receive a notice from any person or entity stating that a tax sale had occurred related to the Property in question in this matter nor that the Trust had a right to redeem the Property.

5. The first notice that the Trust received regarding the tax sale or the claim by the Plaintiff in this matter related to the Property was service of the Summons in this matter on or about October 31, 2023.

6. Upon the receipt of notice of this matter, the Trust sought to negotiate with the Plaintiff to redeem the Property and made good faith offers to do so.

7. It was my understanding as the representative of the Trust that while we were attempting to negotiate with the Plaintiff in this matter the Plaintiff would not take adverse action in this lawsuit.

8. There was no intent to delay or impede the judicial process by not authorizing the attorney for the Trust to file a responsive pleading in this matter; we were simply trying to avoid unnecessary expenses while negotiations were ongoing.

By way of a docket entry, the circuit court ultimately sustained Respondents’ motion and set aside the default judgment. After the LLC timely filed a notice of appeal, the circuit court, with leave from this Court, thereafter entered a formal judgment where it ruled in the same manner as the previous docket entry—in favor of Respondents without any findings of fact or conclusions of law accompanying the ruling.

Applicable Principles of Review

A motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action, which must be concluded by the entry of a final judgment ruling on the motion. Rule 74.05(d), Missouri Court Rules (2025); see Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192, 200 (Mo. banc 2024) (stating “this Court's 2007 amendment to Rule 74.05(d) provides a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action resulting in an independent judgment․”). We review such a judgment for an abuse of circuit court discretion, which occurs when the ruling “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances” then before the circuit court “and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that the ruling shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful deliberate consideration.” Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 30 v. Cnty. of Jackson, 666 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Mo.App. 2023).

“Missouri appellate courts have traditionally afforded significant deference to the circuit court's decision to set aside a default judgment because of the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits and the distaste our system holds for default judgments.” Brungard v. Risky's Inc., 240 S.W.3d 685, 686 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The general policy favoring disposition on the merits, however, must be carefully applied to the facts of each case in the interest of justice; for, the law defends with equal vigor the integrity of the legal process and procedural rules and, thus, does not sanction the disregard thereof.” Xtra Lease, LLC v. Pigeon Freight Serv., Inc., 662 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Mo.App. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Discussion

“Rule 74.05(d) authorizes the circuit court to set aside a default judgment if the moving party establishes: (1) a meritorious defense to the suit; (2) good cause for failing to respond to the petition; and (3) the motion was filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year.” Behav. Sci. Inst., Inc. v. Transitional Ctr., Inc., 669 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Mo.App. 2023). “Failure of the movant to prove any of these requirements mandates denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.” 4021 Iowa, LLC v. K&A Delmar Prop., LLC, 681 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Mo.App. 2023). The LLC challenges the circuit court's judgment on each of these three requirements, in three separate points.

Turning to the LLC's points, we begin and end our discussion with point two. There, the LLC contends that setting the default judgment aside was erroneous because the circuit court “abused its discretion in that Respondents did not present sufficient evidence that Respondents filed their Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ‘within a reasonable time’ as set forth in Rule 74.05(d).” We agree.

Per the language in the controlling rule, a motion to set aside a default judgment “shall be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment.” Rule 74.05(d). Here, Respondents filed their motion on the 365th day after the circuit court's entry of a default judgment, thereby satisfying the rule's outer-most deadline, albeit by a very narrow margin.

However, “in order to give meaning to every word in Rule 74.05(d), as we must, we cannot conflate the phrases ‘within a reasonable time’ and ‘not to exceed one year.’ ” 4021 Iowa, LLC, 681 S.W.3d at 316. Therefore, “[d]etermining that the motion was filed within one year is merely the first step of the inquiry[.]” Id. It follows that the second step, which the LLC's aforementioned point concerns, “tasks the reviewing court with determining whether, based on the explanation provided in the motion filings, the time in which the party filed its motion to set aside was ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. “In determining whether a motion to set aside a default judgment was filed within a reasonable time, we examine the circumstances surrounding the delay.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Importantly, the movant must explain the factual circumstances justifying the delay and adduce evidence thereof, such as in the form of affidavits, exhibits, or testimony.” Id. at 316-17. “Where, as here, the circuit court's judgment is silent as to its reasoning for concluding the motion was timely filed, we look favorably to the record for evidence in support of the judgment.” Id. at 317.

In their brief, Respondents assert that “the record was not silent as to the circumstances surrounding the delay” and cite to their motion to set aside the default judgment and their affidavit for “noting the ongoing negotiations[.]” This argument fails, in part, to the extent Respondents’ rely on the contents of their motion to set aside the default judgment, because such reliance is unavailing as that unverified motion is not self-proving. See In re Marriage of Callahan, 277 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Mo. banc 2009) (stating that “[a] motion to set aside a default judgment does not prove itself and must be supported by affidavits or sworn testimony”).

We turn to and therefore consider the sworn statements found in Respondents’ affidavit. Consistent with Respondents’ assertion, we note that references to “negotiate” and “negotiations” appear in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of said affidavit. Inconsistent with Respondents’ assertion, however, those paragraphs (and the preceding paragraphs) do not address the 365-day period following the circuit court's default judgment. Rather, the affiant admits the receipt of a summons on October 31, 2023, and states that upon said receipt, the Trust sought to negotiate and it was the understanding of the affiant that the LLC would not take any adverse action. The affiant then states that “[t]here was no intent to delay or impede the judicial process by not authorizing the attorney for the Trust to file a responsive pleading in this matter; we were simply trying to avoid unnecessary expenses while negotiations were ongoing.” (Emphasis added.)

The aforementioned sworn statements reflect, as was the case in 4021 Iowa, LLC, cited supra, “Respondents’ Rule 74.05(d) motion filings presented an account of circumstances preceding the issuing of the default judgment.” 681 S.W.3d at 318. Such circumstances that delay the filing of a responsive pleading to the petition are certainly relevant to the good cause requirement of the setting-aside-a-default-judgment analysis. However, again like in 4021 Iowa, LLC, “[w]ithout assessing the merits of Respondents’ explanation of good cause, the record is clear that Respondents offered no account of any circumstances that followed the entry of the default judgment and caused a [365]-day delay in filing their motion to set aside said judgment.” Id. (stating there was a “360-day delay” in that case). No dispute whether Respondents received notice of the LLC's motion or the default judgment that followed appears in their affidavit, dispelling any reasonable belief they may have once had that the LLC was refraining from taking adverse action against them pending negotiations. Yet, Respondents provided no explanation why they then took 365 days to respond to said adverse action, during which time the LLC allegedly sold the Property to a bona fide purchaser. “The law is clear that Respondents were obligated to demonstrate to the circuit court that they met all three rule requirements set forth in Rule 74.05(d), including that their motion was filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year.” Id. Because Respondents fail to explain why they took 365 days to act, “[t]he record is thus devoid of evidence on which we can rely to affirm the judgment.” Id.

Accordingly, the LLC's second point is granted. Again, as with 4021 Iowa, LLC, “[b]ecause [p]oint [t]wo finds that Respondents failed to meet one of the three Rule 74.05(d) requirements, we do not reach the other two prongs—good cause and a meritorious defense—raised in [p]oints [o]ne and [t]hree.” Id. at 319.

Decision

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to reinstate the default judgment.

BECKY J. WEST, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS