STATE OF MISSOURI v. DANIEL MATLOCK (2026)

Daniel W. Matlock (“Matlock”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Howell County, Missouri (“trial court”) convicting him of one count of child molestation in the second degree pursuant to section 566.068, for conduct which occurred on March 22, 2019.¹ In one point on appeal, Matlock claims the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear approximately 22 minutes of Victim's Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) interview wherein she discussed previous, uncharged acts of sexual abuse that Matlock committed against her. We affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

After having lived with her mother in Wisconsin, Victim moved to West Plains, Missouri, to live with Matlock, who is her father. On March 22, 2019, when she was 11 years old, Matlock came into the bathroom where Victim was getting ready and asked Victim if he could touch her breast. Though Victim told Matlock no, he reached under her shirt and grabbed and squeezed her breast anyway. Victim disclosed the incident to her friend's parents, and her friend's mom called the police.

Victim underwent a forensic interview at the CAC and disclosed the incident where Matlock grabbed her breast in the bathroom. She also told the forensic interviewer that Matlock had touched her breasts more than one time. When the interviewer asked Victim if Matlock had done anything else to her, Victim disclosed that Matlock had done something to her private part more than once. Victim stated that one specific incident had occurred one week prior, when Matlock called Victim into his bedroom. Victim stated that her pants were off, Matlock was only wearing a shirt, and the two were in Matlock's bed when the incident occurred. Over Matlock's objection, the State played Victim's entire CAC interview to the jury at trial.

The State charged Matlock with child molestation in the second degree and attempted enticement of a child based on the incident that took place on March 22, 2019, where Matlock grabbed Victim's breast. The jury convicted Matlock of child molestation in the second degree and acquitted him of attempted enticement of a child. The trial court sentenced Matlock to five years’ imprisonment, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on five years of supervised probation. Matlock appeals.

Standard of Review 2

“Our standard of review in addressing the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial is for abuse of discretion.” State v. Newton, 689 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (internal quotation omitted). “A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial.” State v. Antle, 670 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). “The trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “We review the evidentiary ruling of the trial court for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Thomas, 628 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Mo. banc 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In a criminal case involving improperly admitted evidence, the test for prejudice is whether the error was outcome-determinative.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id. at 694 (internal quotation omitted).

State v. Duncan, 729 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026).

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, Matlock claims as follows:

The trial court abused its discretion admitting from 51:48 to 1:03:40 of Exhibit 1, [Victim's] statements regarding unadjudicated prior sexual conduct involving [Matlock], because this violated his rights to due process of law, to a fair trial, and to be tried only for the offenses with which he was charged, ․ in that the minimal probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice, including the inherently inflammatory impact of [Victim's] statements recounting unadjudicated allegations, the creation of a prejudicial “mini-trial” diverting the jury's attention from the charged offenses, and the real risk the jury decided [Matlock's] case based on emotion and not evidence, thereby depriving [Matlock] of a fair trial.

We disagree.

Evidence of prior uncharged crimes and bad acts is generally inadmissible to show the defendant's propensity to commit such crimes. See State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 473 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Gilyard, 979 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo. banc 1998)). But there are exceptions where “otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted.” Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 818 (quoting State v. Primm, 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011)). Evidence “of uncharged crimes that is part of the circumstances or the sequence of events surrounding the offense charged may be admissible ‘to present a complete and coherent picture of the events that transpired.’ ” Id. (quoting [State v.] Schneider, 483 S.W.3d [495,] 505 [(Mo. App. E.D. 2016)]). Additionally, in 2014, the Missouri Constitution was amended to reflect the longstanding “practice of admitting evidence of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct for purposes of proving the defendant's propensity to commit the sex offense with which he was charged.” [State v.] Brammer, 614 S.W.3d 18, 27 [(Mo. App. E.D. 2020)] (quoting [State v.] Williams, 548 S.W.3d [275,] 281 [(Mo. banc 2018)]). The amendment states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 and 18(a) of this article to the contrary, in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving a victim under eighteen years of age, relevant evidence of prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible for the purpose of corroborating the victim's testimony or demonstrating the defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is presently charged. The court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

State v. Robertson, 674 S.W.3d 153, 163-64 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting Mo. Const. art. I, section 18(c)).

Matlock argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of unadjudicated allegations that Victim made against Matlock in her CAC interview. Specifically, he argues that the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative, and that this is not the “rare exception” where courts can admit evidence of unadjudicated acts. Matlock does not argue that there was not a permissible use for the testimony, but argues it is not legally relevant in that the prejudicial nature of the testimony outweighs its probative value. See State v. Dodd, 711 S.W.3d 619, 630 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (“Once a permissible use is identified, the trial court must use its discretion to determine whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.”).

The testimony Matlock complains about begins at approximately minute 42 and continues to the end of the approximately 57-minute-long CAC interview.³ During this portion of the interview, after discussing the abuse allegations at issue in this case, the interviewer asks Victim if Matlock had ever done anything else to her, to which Victim responds that he had. Victim then went on to discuss that Matlock had done something to her “private part” exactly seven days before the interview – the previous Monday. Victim stated that this incident occurred at her home, on Matlock's bed, when Matlock was not wearing clothes.

Because the trial court played for the jury this portion of the CAC interview where Victim discussed uncharged abuse allegations against Matlock, Matlock argues that “nearly one full third of the CAC video testimony in this case was devoted to unadjudicated propensity allegations[.]” Matlock argues that he was prejudiced by this evidence because the State otherwise had a weak case, as evidenced by the jury acquitting him of the child enticement charge, and the State was therefore forced to rely on uncorroborated testimony that was contradicted by the defense.

Because Matlock does not argue that the evidence presented was not probative – as it certainly was – we must only weigh its probative value against its costs, such as the danger of unfair prejudice. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817-18; Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290.

“Legal relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence against its costs—unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.” Dodd, 711 S.W.3d at 626 (internal quotation omitted) (emphases added). “A trial court should therefore exclude logically relevant evidence if its costs outweigh its benefits.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “We afford great deference to the trial court's assessment of whether the evidence is legally relevant.” State v. Lumzy, 713 S.W.3d 729, 743-44 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (internal quotation and alternations omitted). To determine whether evidence of an uncharged prior bad act is prejudicial, we may consider how much time the State spent on this evidence, whether an objection was made and sustained, and if the prior bad act overshadows the charged crime. See State v. Greer, 679 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (internal quotation omitted); see also Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290 (internal citation omitted).

Duncan, 729 S.W.3d at 299.

Contrary to Matlock's arguments, Missouri courts have consistently held that a victim's testimony regarding prior, uncharged sexual acts that the defendant committed against the same victim are admissible to show the defendant's sexual desire for the victim and therefore his motive to commit the charged act (satisfaction of sexual desire for the victim). See State v. Dudley, 880 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (finding “intact the law regarding admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct with the same victim”); State v. Barrett, 41 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (“Motive to commit a crime involving sexual misconduct may be shown by evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct toward the victim.”); State v. Thompson, 341 S.W.3d 723, 731-32 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (holding that evidence of the defendant's prior, uncharged sexual conduct towards the victim was relevant to prove defendant's sexual desire for the victim, which in turn establishes a motive for the sexual crime for which he was charged); State v. Thurman, 272 S.W.3d 489, 495 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“Numerous cases hold that prior sexual conduct by a defendant toward the victim is admissible as it tends to establish a motive, that is satisfaction of defendant's sexual desire for the victim.”); see also State v. Boulware, 923 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct against the victim was admissible to establish intent, motive, and to present a complete and coherent picture of the events that transpired).

The probative value of the evidence about which Matlock complains falls into these exceptions and therefore outweighs the costs. The evidence was admissible. Matlock's point is denied and the judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016, including changes effective January 1, 2017.

3.   While the interview technically runs slightly over one hour, the last few minutes of the interview are spent discussing matters that do not relate to this appeal or Matlock's abuse of Victim.

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS