C.C., Petitioner-Respondent, v. DENNIS MANNON (2026)

Dennis Mannon (“Mannon”) appeals the trial court's judgment granting a protective order against him under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act, § 455.010 ¹ et seq. (“the Act”) following a petition from C.C. Mannon argues three points on appeal. Because we agree that the trial court's finding of stalking is not supported by substantial evidence, the judgment is vacated and we remand to the trial court with instructions to deny C.C.’s petition.

Facts and Procedural History

C.C. was Mannon's brother's probation officer at the time of the events at issue in this case. Mannon reached out to C.C. over the phone to discuss Mannon's brother, who was unsuccessfully discharged from a program he was ordered to complete as part of his probation. On December 30, 2024, C.C. filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri, seeking a full order of protection against Mannon because he was allegedly stalking her.²

The record discloses two phone calls at issue: one on December 13, 2024, and one on an unspecified date shortly before December 13, 2024. The first phone call was approximately eleven minutes long and the audio recording was admitted as an exhibit at the protective order hearing. During this phone call, C.C. explained to Mannon that his brother was unsuccessfully discharged from the program and she would have to write a violation report. Mannon expressed that he felt his brother was not getting a fair chance and C.C. was trying to make his brother “go back in front of a judge.” C.C. explained that was not the case; she was required to do a violation report because his brother did not follow the conditions of his probation.

As to the first phone call, C.C. said “I'm not going to say it was aggressive. I'm going to say that he was trying to get me to do things that were outside of my duties.” C.C. did not identify any alleged threat contained in the first call. C.C. admitted Mannon never raised his voice to her, threatened her, or cursed at her during the first phone call. C.C. also stated Mannon had permission to speak with her about his brother's case and the first phone call was only about his brother's probation and C.C.’s duties as his probation officer.

A one-minute clip of the second phone call from December 13, 2024, was admitted as an exhibit at the protective order hearing. C.C. described Mannon's demeanor during the second phone call as “aggressive” and “intimidat[ing].” During the second phone call, Mannon said “I know where you live.” He continued to explain he was from where C.C. lives and he moved away, but his brother stayed. C.C. testified when Mannon said he knew where she lived, C.C. “took it as, [Mannon was] going to come to my home or, you know, it put a literal fear in me at that point.” When asked if she was in fear of her health and safety, C.C. responded “[y]es. Yes.” C.C. conceded that the December 13, 2024 phone call was the only “aggressive situation,” that there was only a “singular act” which supported her claim and that the “entirety” of her assertion to the court was that this statement about knowing where she lives was a threat.

After considering the evidence, the trial court granted C.C. an order of protection against Mannon, effective until January 16, 2027. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court will affirm the trial court's judgment on orders of protection “unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” J.R.C. v. S.L.F., 686 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (citing L.M.M. v. J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). “Substantial evidence is competent evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably decide the case.” L.A.C. v. R.A.P., 671 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998)). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment. L.M.M., 619 S.W.3d at 596 (citing K.M.C. v. M.W.M., 518 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)). “Because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the credibility of the witnesses, in cases under [the Act], the discretion of the trial court should not often be superseded.” Id. The petitioner seeking the order of protection has the burden of proof to establish their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence Id.; § 455.040. “The reviewing court will defer to the trial court's determinations of witness credibility, as the trial court is in a superior position to assess credibility.” K.E.S. v. S.R.S., 700 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (citing N.C. v. Y.Q.L., 609 S.W.3d 56, 58 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)).

As explained in Lawyer v. Fino, 459 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015),

it is important to note that the Adult Abuse Act was not intended to be a solution for minor arguments between adults. There is a great potential for abuse, and real harm can result from improper use of the Act, not the least of which will be the stigma that attaches by virtue of a person having been found to be a stalker. For those reasons, courts must exercise great vigilance to prevent abuse of the stalking provisions in the Adult Abuse Act and in making sure that sufficient credible evidence exists to support all elements of the statute before entering a protective order.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Analysis

Because Mannon's third point is dispositive of this appeal, we need not review his remaining points. Mannon's third point argues that the trial court erred in granting C.C. a full order of protection because C.C. failed to show sufficient evidence to support a finding of stalking under § 455.010(15). We agree.

“Stalking” is defined under § 455.010(15) as:

when any person purposely engages in an unwanted course of conduct that causes alarm to another person, or a person who resides together in the same household with the person seeking the order of protection when it is reasonable in that person's situation to have been alarmed by the conduct.

Alarm is defined as “to cause fear of danger of physical harm[.]” § 455.010(15)(a). The petitioner seeking the order of protection must show both the objective and subjective components of alarm, meaning “a person must subjectively fear the danger of physical harm and a reasonable person in the situation would likewise fear the danger of physical harm.” L.M.M., 619 S.W.3d at 596 (citing E.D.H. v. T.J., 559 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)).

As used in the statute, “course of conduct” is defined as:

two or more acts that serve no legitimate purpose including, but not limited to, acts in which the stalker directly, indirectly, or through a third party follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to a person by any action, method, or device.

§ 455.010(15)(b) (emphasis added). Under the Act, “an activity with a legitimate purpose is one that is sanctioned by law or custom or is lawful or is allowed.” S.A.B., 675 S.W.3d at 253 (citing C.B. v. Buchheit, 254 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008)). While the motion court did not issue explicit findings as to each of Mannon's actions, “we will presume the court made findings in accordance with its decision as to whether a party's activity had a legitimate purpose.” S.M. v. Deierling, 717 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citing S.A.B., 675 S.W.3d at 253).

Even if this Court accepted C.C.’s argument that she presented substantial evidence of objective and subjective alarm as a result of Mannon saying he knew where she lived in the second phone call, the record contains evidence of only one instance – the second phone call – when an alleged threat was made.³ C.C. told the trial court that the December 13, 2024 phone call was the only “aggressive situation,” and stated that the “entirety” of her assertion to the court was that Mannon's statement about knowing where she lives was a threat. The existence of one alleged threat is insufficient to show a course of conduct under the Act's definition of stalking, which requires “two or more acts” that cause a fear of danger of physical harm. § 455.010(15)(a)-(b); see S.A.B., 675 S.W.3d at 254 (to support a finding of stalking under the Act, the motion court must find the course of conduct – two or more acts with no legitimate purpose – caused the petitioner both objective and subjective fear of danger of physical harm); see also R.K. v. Kelly, 630 S.W.3d 904, 911 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (“A single event causing alarm is insufficient to prove stalking because of the absence of repeated acts over a period of time.” (Internal quotations omitted.))

C.C. argues that the first phone call may be used as a second act to establish the “course of conduct” which would support a finding of stalking. While C.C. is correct that “it is the entire course of conduct – not each individual act in isolation – that must reasonably alarm the petitioner,” S.A.B., 675 S.W.3d at 253 (citing B.L.M. v. D.L.O., 643 S.W.3d 910, 916 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)), the record here does not support that the first phone call was an act that served “no legitimate purpose” as required by the statute.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the first phone call had a legitimate purpose because: (1) the topic was solely Mannon's brother and C.C.’s duties as a probation officer; (2) C.C. admits Mannon had permission to speak with her about his brother's case; (3) C.C. admits Mannon never threatened her, cursed at her, or raised his voice; (4) C.C. identifies no portion of the first call as aggressive or a threat;⁴ and (5) C.C. testified that she was complaining about a “singular act” and that the “entirety” of her claim was based on the statement in the second call. See Austin v. Jarred, 578 S.W.3d 847, 853 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019) (holding that an order of protection was not supported by substantial evidence where most of respondent's actions considered in the course of conduct had a legitimate purpose because they were part of his duties as city marshal). Because there is no allegation that the first phone call created “alarm,” and the record does not support that the first phone call had no legitimate purpose, there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that it is part of a “course of conduct” under the statute that would constitute stalking under the Act.

Point III is granted.

Conclusion

The Judgment of the trial court is vacated and the matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the order of protection and deny C.C.’s petition.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as amended through January 16, 2025.

2.   C.C.’s petition also included allegations of harassment against Mannon. However, C.C. and Mannon are neither family members nor members of the same household. Therefore, “stalking is the only ground upon which an order of protection may be sought under [the Act].” S.A.B. v. J.L.R., 675 S.W.3d 245, 252 n.2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (citing M.L.G. v. R.W., 406 S.W.3d 115, 117 n.3 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)).

3.   The second phone call is approximately 28 and a half minutes long, but only a one-minute clip is included in the record. Therefore, we only consider the content of the one-minute clip of the second phone call in the record.

4.   While C.C. stated that she would not call the first phone call “civil” because Mannon was trying to get her to do something she could not do in regards to his brother's probation, she also testified that in her ten years as a probation officer it was not uncommon for people to plead with her not to violate them.

MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS