BROOKE v. STATE (2026)

Jeffrey Duane Brooke (“Brooke”) presents a single point on appeal contending the circuit court clearly erred in denying, after an evidentiary hearing, the claim raised in his Rule 24.035 amended motion for post-conviction relief that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately litigate a motion to suppress evidence.¹ Finding no clear error, we affirm.

Background

The State's 3-count indictment alleged Brooke committed the offenses of: (1) possession of a controlled substance under § 579.015, a class D felony; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use under § 579.074, a class E felony; and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use under § 579.074, a class D misdemeanor.² Brooke entered an Alford guilty plea ³ on the possession of a controlled substance charge and the State agreed to dismiss the other two charges. The circuit court adopted the State's sentencing recommendation of “three years in the Department of Corrections.”

At Brooke's Alford plea hearing, the State described the factual basis for the plea as follows:

Your Honor, State's evidence to be introduced through its endorsed witnesses, ․ that on January 2, 2023, in the afternoon hours, [law enforcement] deployed on the Julie Coonts [(“Coonts”)] residence ․ on information that [Brooke], a person with -- with a warrant -- felony warrant was at that location.

They surrounded a barn that they had information he was inside. Upon making entry into the barn, they discovered a black bag in plain view. Part of that black bag was unzipped, and from the unzipped portion, they were able to see a white, crystalline substance in a zipped -- in a zipped baggie. That was seized. Bag was then searched and found to contain numerous items of [Brooke's], including, I believe, a debit card and an ID of some kind, as well as letters addressed to [Brooke] from [Coonts].

[Brooke] was later apprehended and did admit that the bag was, in fact, his. The white crystalline substance was sent to the Missouri State Highway -- sorry guys. The white crystalline substance lead to the discovery of a syringe containing a clear liquid. The syringe was sent to the Highway Patrol Crime Lab, where ․ a criminalist from the Highway Patrol Crime Lab would testify that the liquid was a half gram of methamphetamine, schedule II controlled substance.

Brooke then timely filed his pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief and appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion.⁴ As relevant on appeal, the amended motion contended that Brooke's plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to prepare and file an adequate motion to suppress. Specifically, Brooke claimed that the evidence seized in the barn was the fruit of an unlawful, warrantless search because the barn fell within the curtilage of Coonts’ residence where Brooke was purportedly living. Further, Brooke claimed that even if the search of the barn was lawful, law enforcement's warrantless search of the bag was unlawful in that the plain view doctrine did not justify the warrantless search.

During the evidentiary hearing on Brooke's amended Rule 24.035 motion, plea counsel testified that a written motion to suppress evidence was filed and was argued in front of the trial court at a suppression hearing prior to Brooke's Alford plea. For an unknown reason, no record was made of the suppression hearing.⁵ Plea counsel's written motion to suppress contended “[t]he items were not in the plain view of the officers nor at a a [(sic)] place the officers had a lawful right to be, and the criminal nature thereof was not immediately apparent[.]” The motion to suppress claimed “[t]he barn was inside the curtilage and is afforded due constitutional protection.” At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, plea counsel could not recall the exact legal theory argued at the suppression hearing. While a record was not made of the suppression hearing, the motion court judge was the same judge as the trial court judge who presided at the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the motion court made the following findings in its denial of Brooke's amended Rule 24.035 motion:

Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress on August 28, 2023 which alleges that law enforcement violated [Brooke's] 4th Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. A suppression hearing was held on September 6, 2023 where the State called witnesses and presented evidence establishing that the bag where the methamphetamine was located was found in an outbuilding on land owned by [Coonts], that [Brooke] was being supervised by probation and parole at the time, and that [Brooke's] home address was elsewhere. The issues raised by the motion to suppress were sufficient to both: (1) obtain a hearing and (2) raise the very same issues then that [post-conviction] counsel is raising now. The [c]ourt finds that [plea counsel's] performance was competent. [Plea counsel's] arguments at the suppression hearing were substantially similar to those presented in the Amended Motion and by [post-conviction] counsel. The [c]ourt determined that [Brooke] had no expectation of privacy in the outbuilding/barn and, therefore, no standing to assert a violation of his rights.

The motion court further found:

We know from the record that [Brooke] does not own the land. [Brooke]produced no lease documents or utility bills in his name at that address. He produced no driver's license or other government identification connecting him to that address. [Brooke]’s approved address (he was supervised by probation and parole at the time) was elsewhere. He had an affirmative obligation to notify his parole officer of any change in address; he did not. The [c]ourt is not required to accept his testimony. There is insufficient (if any) evidence supporting his testimony that he was residing on the property when the bag discovered in the barn was searched.

Standard of Review

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that counsel did not demonstrate the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would display when rendering similar services under the existing circumstances, and that movant was prejudiced as a result.” Spicher v. State, 547 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

Appellate review is expressly limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Only if, after review of the record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made, will the appellate court find the motion court's judgment to be clearly erroneous. Even if the stated reason for a circuit court's ruling is incorrect, the judgment should be affirmed if the judgment is sustainable on other grounds.

The motion court is free to believe or disbelieve any portion of the testimony, and we defer to the motion court's credibility determinations. We view the record in the light most favorable to the motion court's judgment, accepting as true all evidence and inferences that support the judgment and disregarding evidence and inferences that are contrary to the judgment.

Id. at 583-84 (quoting Oliphant v. State, 525 S.W.3d 572, 576-77 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017)).

“Where a conviction results from a guilty plea, ‘any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent that it impinges the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made.’ ” Id. at 584 (quoting Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Mo. banc 2011)).

Legal Analysis

Brooke argues his Alford guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently because his plea counsel failed to “properly litigate a motion to suppress evidence[.]” Brooke's argument is without merit for two primary reasons.

First, Brooke has not demonstrated on appeal that the motion court clearly erred in concluding his plea counsel's performance was competent. Plea counsel's written motion to suppress contained substantially the same argument Brooke now presents in his post-conviction proceeding. The written motion to suppress alleged “[t]he items were not in the plain view of the officers nor at a a [(sic)] place the officers had a lawful right to be, and the criminal nature thereof was not immediately apparent[,]” and that “[t]he barn was inside the curtilage and is afforded due constitutional protection.” In his post-conviction proceeding, Brooke has argued “the barn fell within the curtilage of the residence and was, therefore, subject to Fourth Amendment protections; and [ ] the plain view doctrine did not permit police to conduct a warrantless search of the contents of the duffle bag not in plain view.” Additionally, in the instant case, we have the benefit of the motion court judge also presiding at the suppression hearing. The motion court concluded “[plea counsel's] arguments at the suppression hearing were substantially similar to those presented in the Amended Motion and by [post-conviction] counsel.” Accordingly, Brooke has not demonstrated the motion court clearly erred in concluding plea counsel was not ineffective.

Second, Brooke does not have a meritorious fourth amendment claim because he has no standing. In order for a defendant “[t]o demonstrate that he has standing to challenge a search and seizure, the defendant must show that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing that the police searched.” State v. Snow, 299 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (citing State v. Toolen, 945 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)). “To prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched, the defendant must establish that (1) he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched, and (2) his expectation is reasonable.” Id.

It is undisputed that Brooke did not own or lease Coonts’ residence. Brooke produced no documentary evidence that Coonts’ residence was his actual address. Brooke's registered probation address was elsewhere. The only evidence that Brooke's post-conviction counsel has cited to support the factual allegation Brooke lived at Coonts’ residence was Brooke's own testimony. The motion court did not credit Brooke's self-serving testimony and we are bound on appeal to follow the motion court's credibility determinations. See Spicher, 547 S.W.3d at 583.

Conclusion

We affirm the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2023). All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

2.   On Counts 1 and 2, the State charged Brooke as a prior and persistent offender, alleging he pled guilty to the following offenses in prior cases: (1) felony DWI aggravated offender; (2) second-degree felony burglary; (3) felony tampering of a service or utility; (4) third-degree felony assault against a special victim and unlawful possession of a firearm; and (5) felony passing a bad check.

3.   “Pursuant to an Alford guilty plea, the defendant does not admit the acts of the crime but admits that in light of the State's evidence against him, he is likely to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.” Hackman v. State, 492 S.W.3d 669, 671 n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)).

4.   We have independently verified the timeliness of both motions. Knapp v. State, 720 S.W.3d 695, 700 n.4 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).

5.   In the amended motion for post-conviction relief, Brooke's post-conviction counsel included a claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure a record be made of the suppression hearing. That claim has not been presented on appeal.

BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C. J. – CONCURS BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS