FREEDOM BANK OF SOUTHERN MISSOURI v. CHRISTOPHER ROSS SECURITY BANK OF SOUTHWEST MISSOURI (2026)

Jackie Ross appeals an original judgment and an amended judgment in which the trial court found and concluded that her brother, Respondent Christopher Ross, fraudulently conveyed real estate to Jackie.¹ She raises four claims on appeal, challenging the trial court's application of the law and alleging the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. We dismiss Jackie's appeal from the trial court's original judgment because the original judgment was rendered a nullity when the amended judgment was entered and is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. We affirm the amended judgment because the trial court did not misapply the law and the court's factual findings are not against the weight of the evidence.

Background

Christopher raised and sold cattle. To facilitate his business, he took out loans from Respondent Freedom Bank of Southern Missouri (“Freedom Bank”). Some of these loans were secured by livestock, farm machinery, or vehicles. The largest loan and some of the smaller loans were secured by a deed of trust on 90 acres of real estate (the “Farm”).

Christopher stopped making payments and his loans became delinquent. Freedom Bank offered to reamortize Christopher's loans if he sold all his livestock and applied the proceeds to his outstanding debt. Christopher told Freedom Bank he would sell his cattle at the end of the summer after they had put on weight. By December, Christopher remained delinquent and had stopped responding to Freedom Bank's calls and texts. Freedom Bank called all of Christopher's outstanding loans, totaling approximately $343,000.

Christopher did sell cattle, but he did not use the sale proceeds to pay down loans secured by the livestock. Christopher sold some of the cattle to Jackie and sold the rest at auction. He deposited the proceeds into an account jointly owned by Christopher and Jackie at another bank.

Fearing Freedom Bank would foreclose on the Farm, Christopher decided to transfer ownership to Jackie if she would satisfy the loan against it. Jackie knew the Farm had a fair market value of at least $350,000. By its terms, the maximum amount secured by the deed of trust was $115,000 plus accumulated interest and fees. Christopher executed a warranty deed and conveyed the Farm to Jackie for a stated purchase price of $115,000. Jackie executed a deed of trust in favor of Respondent Security Bank of Southwest Missouri (“Security Bank”), which had loaned Jackie the purchase money.² Freedom Bank released its deed of trust on the Farm, having received payment for the maximum value its deed of trust had secured.

After Christopher sold his cattle and transferred the Farm, he was “flat broke”: his debts far exceeded the value of his assets. He maintained possession of and continued to reside at the Farm for a year after the transfer. Jackie listed the Farm for sale at a price of $475,000, declining offers to purchase for $360,000.

The payment to Freedom Bank only partially satisfied Christopher's debt. Freedom Bank filed suit and obtained a judgment against Christopher. After applying proceeds from the repossession and sale of farm equipment, Christopher still owed approximately $195,000.

Freedom Bank sued Christopher and Jackie under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 428.005 et seq.,³ alleging Christopher's conveyance of the Farm to Jackie was a fraudulent transfer. After a bench trial, the trial court granted Freedom Bank's petition, finding the transfer of the Farm to Jackie was fraudulent because she was an “insider” as defined by § 428.009(7); Christopher did not receive a “reasonably equivalent value” (see § 428.024.1(2) and § 428.029.1) for real estate with a fair market value of at least $350,000; Freedom Bank was a present creditor of Christopher at the time of the transfer and received approximately $117,000 from the proceeds of the sale, satisfying about 35% of Christopher's debt; Christopher was insolvent both by presumption and as a result of the transfer (see subsections 1 and 2 of § 428.014); and Christopher and Jackie had an actual intent to defraud Freedom Bank. A judgment lien in favor of Freedom Bank was placed on the Farm, subordinate to Security Bank's deed of trust, and Jackie was prohibited from selling or encumbering the Farm until she fully satisfied the judgment.

Jackie filed a motion to alter or amend the original judgment. While that motion was pending, Jackie appealed the original judgment. The trial court subsequently entered an amended judgment, correcting some mislabeling in the original judgment but not altering the findings or conclusions material to the outcome. Jackie appealed the amended judgment, as well. We consolidated these appeals for all purposes.

Finality of Judgment and Authority to Appeal

Because Jackie appealed both the original and amended judgments under § 512.020(5), which permits an aggrieved party to appeal from a final judgment, we must determine which is the final judgment from which an appeal lies. Southside Ventures, LLC v. La Crosse Lumber Co., 574 S.W.3d 771, 779, 782 (Mo.App. W.D. 2019).

“When a judgment becomes final for purposes of filing a notice of appeal depends, in part, on whether an authorized after-trial motion was filed.” Heifetz v. Apex Clayton, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo. banc 2018) (citation modified), as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 25, 2018). Subject to an exception not applicable here, “[t]he trial court retains control over judgments during the 30-day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment within that time.” Rule 75.01.⁴ “The filing of a timely authorized after-trial motion extends a trial court's jurisdiction for up to ninety days after the filing of the motion.” Heifetz, 554 S.W.3d at 393 (citation modified). The combined effect of Rules 75.01 and Rule 81.05(a) affords the trial court authority “to modify its judgment for any reason for good cause within thirty days of its entry, and the authority between the thirty-first and ninetieth day following entry of a judgment to modify its judgment to remediate a matter raised by a party in an authorized after-trial motion.” State ex rel. Mo. Parks Ass'n v. Mo. Dept. of Nat. Res., 316 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Mo.App. W.D. 2010).

Prior to filing a notice of appeal and within the 30 days after entry of the original judgment, Jackie filed a motion to amend that judgment. A motion to amend a judgment is an authorized after-trial motion for purposes of Rule 81.05. Heifetz, 554 S.W.3d at 393. The trial court ruled on this motion and entered an amended judgment fewer than 90 days from the date the motion was filed. Based on the foregoing, the trial court retained authority to enter this amended judgment regardless of the filing of the notice of appeal as to the original judgment.

“Unless an amended judgment shall otherwise specify, an amended judgment shall be deemed a new judgment for all purposes.” Rule 78.07(d). The amended judgment entered in this case did not include any provision that the original judgment was to survive. Thus, the original judgment was rendered a nullity with the entry of the amended judgment. See State ex rel. Mo. Parks Ass'n, 316 S.W.3d at 381-82. Due to the filing of the motion to amend and entry of an amended judgment, the nullified original judgment never became final for the purpose of appeal.

Entry of the amended judgment created a new judgment for all purposes, including the finality computation for purposes of Rule 81.05(a). No timely after-trial motion was filed after the amended judgment was entered, so the amended judgment became final 30 days after entry. Rule 81.05(a)(1). Jackie's notice of appeal related to the amended judgment was filed before that judgment became final. We consider her appeal from the amended judgment to be timely filed immediately after that judgment became final. Rule 81.05(b).⁵

“The original judgment quite simply is not the trial court's judgment; the trial court's judgment is the amended judgment.” State ex rel. Mo. Parks Ass'n, 316 S.W.3d at 382 (citation modified). The amended judgment is the only final judgment and the only judgment from which Jackie has statutory authority to appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Jackie's appeal from the original judgment and review only her appeal from the amended judgment.

Application of “Reasonably Equivalent Value” (Point I)

The ultimate conclusion that Christopher's transfer of the Farm was fraudulent was supported, among other grounds, by the finding that Christopher “did not receive ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in exchange for the transfer” of the Farm. Jackie argues the trial court misapplied the law in that the court considered only the fair market value of the Farm in determining whether Christopher received “reasonably equivalent value” rather than considering the totality of the circumstances.

Section 428.024, which defines transfers that are fraudulent as to present and future creditors, and § 428.029, which defines transfers that are fraudulent as to present creditors alone, both use the term “reasonably equivalent value.” It is not a defined term under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, as Jackie acknowledges. See § 428.009.

Freedom Bank was a present creditor of Christopher's at the time of the transfer. As such, it could pursue a fraudulent transfer claim under § 428.024, § 428.029, or both. Section 428.024 provides that a transfer is fraudulent if made: “(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor” incurred other debts beyond his ability to repay or engaged in other transactions for which the debtor's remaining assets were unreasonably small.

Jackie challenges the trial court's finding that Christopher did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the Farm, but the trial court also found an actual intent to defraud Freedom Bank. The latter finding would support the ultimate conclusion that the transfer was fraudulent regardless of the trial court's application of the law as to reasonably equivalent value. This reason alone would justify denying this point relied on.

Even so, we are not convinced that the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts of this case. We take no issue with the cases cited by Jackie, which stand for the proposition that “reasonably equivalent value” is a fact-dependent determination. Jackie acknowledges that fair market value can be considered in making this determination. She cites no authority for the further proposition that the court, as a matter of law, must give weight to other factors beyond fair market value when determining if a debtor received reasonably equivalent value for a transfer of property. Neither the transcript nor the language of the judgment indicates that the court ignored or failed to consider other testimony and evidence, only that it was persuaded by or gave the most weight to the fair market value of the property in evaluating reasonably equivalent value.

Jackie would have us require the trial court to base its determination on what a creditor accepts (or the limit of what it legally can require) to release its deed of trust, regardless of other ways to measure and compare the value of the property transferred and the value received by the debtor. Both as a logical proposition and under the specific facts of this case, it would be problematic to rely on this value alone as a proxy for the value of the property for purposes of a reasonably equivalent value comparison.

The trial court did not err as a matter of law in relying primarily on the fair market value of the Farm at the time of the transfer to find Christopher did not receive reasonably equivalent value when he transferred the Farm to Jackie in reaching the ultimate conclusion that the transfer was fraudulent. Point I is denied.

Freedom Bank's Authority to Assert its Fraudulent Transfer Claim (Points II, III, and IV)

Jackie next asserts that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence because Freedom Bank's release of its deed of trust barred it from pursuing a fraudulent conveyance claim by waiver (Point II), estoppel (Point III), and the doctrine of release (Point IV). “A judgment entered following a bench trial may be reversed if no substantial evidence supports the judgment, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. These are distinct claims, and each requires a distinct analysis.” Weeks v. City of St. Louis, 721 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Mo. banc 2025) (citation modified). Jackie emphatically and repeatedly states that these points relied on are against-the-weight challenges and should not be reviewed as challenges to the court's declaration or application of the law.

“[Jackie] has chosen a difficult path, as this Court rarely has reversed a trial judgment as against the weight of the evidence under the Murphy v. Carron standard.” Weeks, 721 S.W.3d at 876 (citation modified). An against-the-weight claim “requires this Court to weigh the probative value of the evidence supporting the judgment relative to the evidence not supporting the judgment.” Id. “A judgment will be reversed as against the weight of the evidence only if the circuit court could not have reasonably found, from the record at trial, the existence of a fact that is necessary to sustain the judgment.” Id. at 877 (citation modified). “When the evidence poses two reasonable but different conclusions, appellate courts must defer to the circuit court's assessment of that evidence.” Id. (quoting Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 206 (Mo. banc 2014)).

Jackie would have us review the facts de novo because the trial was relatively short and consisted, in substantial part, of the submission of deposition testimony and evidence without objection. “It is only when the evidence is uncontested that no deference is given to the trial court's findings.” White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308 (Mo. banc 2010). “Evidence is uncontested in a court-tried civil case when the issue before the trial court involves only stipulated facts ․.” Id. (emphasis added). The relative lack of objections to testimony and evidence at trial does not have the same legal effect as a stipulation, and it does not mean that the evidence or a fact issue was uncontested. Thus, we must defer to the trial court's findings on factual issues, acknowledging that the trial court “ ‘is in a better position to weigh the contested and conflicting evidence in the context of the whole case.’ ” Weeks, 721 S.W.3d at 877 (quoting Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 206).

More than fifteen years ago, this court summarized the four sequential steps necessary to present a persuasive against-the-weight argument. Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Mo.App. S.D. 2010). This framework has been applied consistently ever since and has been adopted by our supreme court. Weeks, 721 S.W.3d at 877. To prevail on her Points II–IV, Jackie must:

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition necessary to sustain the judgment; (2) identify all favorable evidence in the record supporting the challenged factual proposition; (3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to that proposition, resolving all evidentiary conflicts in accordance with the circuit court's implicit and explicit credibility determinations; and (4) demonstrate the favorable evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is so lacking in probative value it fails to induce belief in that proposition when considered in the context of the entire record.

Id.

Jackie acknowledges this framework but deliberately chooses not to follow it because she claims it “does not work” in this case, as she believes the facts are “undisputed.” This argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding not only of whether evidence and fact issues are contested, as we discussed above, but also the nature of this specific claim of error. “Because [Jackie] claims only [that] the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, this Court presupposes the judgment is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 876. If she believes, as her arguments in places seem to indicate, that all of the evidence was undisputed and none of it supported the judgment, then she should have raised a substantial-evidence challenge and followed the framework to present a persuasive argument under that standard.

Jackie's failure to follow the framework leaves us guessing as to even the first step in that analysis: what is the challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment? Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 187. As best we can surmise from her briefs, the challenged fact is that Freedom Bank released its deed of trust. Yet, her entire argument under all of these points relates to the legal effects or significance of this act, not whether it occurred or was credited by the trial court. Whether Freedom Bank had released its deed of trust was not an issue of fact the existence of which was necessary for the court to determine that the transfer of the Farm was fraudulent as defined by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.⁶

Reviewing the short record in this case, it is clear that Freedom Bank released its deed of trust securing its debt. None of the court's findings of fact indicate that it did not credit this evidence or that it found otherwise. The problem for Jackie is that her claim of error relates to the weighing of evidence, and it does not appear that the trial court overlooked, did not credit, or inappropriately weighed the fact that the deed of trust was released. If her contention is that this fact has legal significance that precludes judgment in favor of Freedom Bank, as her arguments seem to indicate in places, then she should have raised a challenge to the application of the law to the facts of the case.

Jackie has not completed any of the analytical steps necessary for a persuasive against-the-weight challenge. “We have repeatedly reminded appellants that weight-of-the-evidence challenges must adhere to the mandatory analytical framework as set forth in the caselaw. Where the appellant fails to follow this framework, the appellant's argument is analytically useless and provides no support for her challenge.” Carter v. Carter, 721 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Mo.App. W.D. 2025) (citation modified). Accordingly, we deny Points II, III, and IV.⁷

Conclusion

We dismiss Jackie's appeal from the original judgment entered on March 4, 2025, because that judgment is a nullity and does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal. We affirm the amended judgment entered on April 21, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to Christopher and Jackie by their first names because they share the same surname. No familiarity or disrespect is intended.

2.   Security Bank did not appear at the trial in this case and has not filed a brief or otherwise participated in these appeals.

3.   Statutory references are to RSMo. (2016).

4.   Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

5.   This savings rule prevents appeals from being dismissed for the reason that the notice of appeal was filed before the judgment became final. The savings rule cannot be applied to the original judgment in this case because the original judgment was a nullity and never became final for the purpose of appeal.

6.   Estoppel, laches, release, and waiver are all affirmative defenses. Rule 55.08. Jackie, as proponent of the affirmative defenses, had the burden of proof. Clark v. Kinsey, 488 S.W.3d 750, 762 (Mo.App. E.D. 2016).

7.   After adamantly denying that her points relied on are anything other than a challenge to the weight of the evidence and refusing to follow the longstanding framework for that type of challenge, Jackie summarily requests plain error review if she “failed to properly follow the correct standard or the correct analysis.” However, in civil cases, plain error review is rarely granted and only appropriate where there is a miscarriage of justice “so egregious as to weaken the very foundation of the process and seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” Ampleman v. Dish Network Serv., LLC, 467 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Mo.App. S.D. 2015) (quoting Snellen ex rel. Snellen v. Capital Region Med. Ctr., 422 S.W.3d 343,356 (Mo.App. W.D. 2013). That situation does not exist in this case. Moreover, it is not our role to scour the record and devise arguments on Jackie's behalf, thereby becoming her advocate. Clark v. State, 697 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo.App. S.D. 2024). Thus, we decline to review for plain error.

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS LISA P. PAGE, S.J. – CONCURS