RODNEY BAKER v. STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Rodney Baker (Baker) appeals from the denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion after an evidentiary hearing.¹ In Baker's sole point, he contends the motion court clearly erred in denying his request for post-conviction relief. Baker argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with Baker. Because Baker cannot relitigate an issue that was decided adversely to him in his direct appeal, we affirm.

Factual Background

In recounting the factual background, we borrow liberally from this Court's prior opinion in State v. Baker, 673 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. App. 2023). By amended felony information, Baker was charged with one count of committing the class B felony of vehicle hijacking, in violation of § 570.027, on June 26, 2021.

On July 1, 2021, Baker entered a plea of not guilty. The docket entry noted that Baker intended to hire private counsel. On July 8, Baker again appeared before the trial court. The docket entry stated that Baker was still trying to hire private counsel, but he had also completed an application for public defender services. One day later, a public defender, Samuel Reed, entered his appearance as defense counsel. Baker, 673 S.W.3d at 525.

On November 6, Baker filed a motion for speedy trial. On November 8, Baker requested release on his own recognizance so he could return to the Department of Corrections, where he had a parole hold. The trial court denied his request and set Baker's trial date for March 7, 2022. Id.

On March 1, 2022, six days before trial, Baker filed a motion to continue his case. The motion alleged that he and defense counsel had met on February 25 “to discuss the evidence in this case and [Baker's] options” and that Baker:

wished to waive his speedy trial request, and be allowed to either post his bond or request a release on his own recognizance in order to be returned to the Department of Corrections and serve his remaining time on that case. [Baker] stated his desire to seek private counsel to pursue this matter upon his release from the Department of Corrections.

Id.

At a pre-trial conference on March 3, a second defense counsel, John Zimmerman, entered his appearance on behalf of Baker. Baker waived his right to a speedy trial, as well as his right to a jury trial. Baker acknowledged that he “had plenty of time” to discuss the waiver with defense counsel, and defense counsel had answered all his questions. The trial court inquired as to whether Baker had any mental health or competency issues that would affect his ability to waive his rights. Defense counsel stated that, despite some concerns with Baker's mental health stemming from the facts of Baker's case, defense counsel believed Baker was “in good shape right now” and, therefore, competent. Id.

On March 4, defense counsel renewed Baker's motion for continuance, arguing that Baker was “not comfortable pleading guilty” and “believe[d] he can – he has the resources if – when he's released to hire private counsel, and he has some resources also through his dad that he would like to explore to hire private counsel.” The trial court stated Baker was “not understanding that this case has to be concluded at some point,” that there “had [been] many, many, pretrial conferences” and the request was clearly “a stall tactic[.]” Id. at 525-26.

Baker himself was given the opportunity to speak regarding the motion. Baker explained if he could get a bond reduction or be released on his own recognizance, he would be able to go back to the Department of Corrections, and, thereafter, “be released to a mental health facility in Kansas City where [he] would be eligible to work, to get a lawyer, and to have this done before the end of the year.” He also told the court he wanted private counsel because he had:

no contact with my lawyer, and I've been trying to get this from in front of you before it's getting this close. Like I've explained to him – I've been writing my lawyer. I've been calling my lawyer. My family has been calling my lawyer. I haven't been able to get in front of you since October, and I haven't seen [my lawyer] except Friday. So I really didn't have any – I had no other option.

Id. at 526.

Defense counsel explained he had attempted to visit Baker on multiple occasions at the jail but either other matters came up or the jail stopped bringing people out, so he was “not able to visit with Baker until later than [he] would have liked to have with the visit[.]” Id.

The trial court denied the motion for continuance and explained that the matter was ready for trial:

[T]he fact that now not only does [Baker] have one, but two public defenders. And the [c]ourt has great confidence in the level of time and advi[c]e that the parties have put into this case.

And I know that having three pretrial conferences for any defendant is unusual, and for the record, we are – our pretrial conference started yesterday morning. It was lengthy off the record when we returned at 1:30, and then we spent most of the afternoon with [Baker]. He was brought back this morning at 8:30. Our normal docket starts at 9:00, and now we are moving on this.

I have personally observed the conferences between counsel and in other cases. So this is not something that is just being done last minute. The case is ready with witnesses, and because I do have availability and this is[,] looking at the time standards in this case, a case that must be kept on track, and we are at a point where the case is procedurally ready to go.

Id. (internal footnote omitted). The case proceeded to trial, and the court found Baker guilty of hijacking a vehicle. Id. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 15 years in the Department of Corrections.

Thereafter, Baker appealed his conviction. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance because “his defense counsel had a complete breakdown in communication,” which entitled Baker “to attempt to obtain private counsel.” Id. at 525. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision for the following reason:

Baker fails to demonstrate there was a complete breakdown in communication between him and defense counsel. Defense counsel appeared with Baker on pre-trial matters on at least seven occasions in the eight-month period. Additionally, Baker's motion for continuance alleged Baker met with his defense counsel on February 25 “to discuss the evidence in this case and Baker's options.” (Emphasis added.) Likewise, Baker himself testified that he and defense counsel had had plenty of time to discuss his jury trial waiver and speedy trial waiver, and defense counsel had answered all his questions. Thus, the record does not support Baker's claim of a “complete breakdown in communication.” To the contrary, the record suggests defense counsel was in regular contact with Baker and had met to discuss Baker's case prior to trial. While Baker may be dissatisfied with the amount of time he was able to spend with defense counsel, that alone is insufficient to warrant a substitution of counsel on the eve of trial.

Id. at 527 (internal footnote omitted).

Baker timely filed his pro se Rule 29.15 motion. After post-conviction counsel was appointed, a timely amended Rule 29.15 motion was filed.² In the amended motion, Baker alleged, inter alia, that defense counsel “was ineffective in that counsel failed to adequately communicate with [Baker] during the entirety of the case.”

At the evidentiary hearing on the amended motion, the motion court heard testimony from Baker, his defense attorneys, and the prosecutor in Baker's criminal case. Baker testified that he had “no communication” with defense counsel and claimed that this prevented him from assisting in his defense and securing witnesses for trial. Both of Baker's defense counsel and the prosecutor gave contrary testimony.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied this allegation in Baker's amended motion for the following reason:

Attorneys Zimmerman and Reed both testified that they met with [Baker] repeatedly both at the jail and during court. Mr. Reed testified he met with [Baker] several times in court and had communications with him in person several times about his case. During those times in court, Mr. Reed testified he answered [Baker's] questions and any follow-up questions he had. Mr. Zimmerman testified that he met with and discussed the trial defense with Baker.

[The prosecuting attorney] also testified that, based on her observations and recollection, [Baker] and his counsel were together for court appearances at least six times and they always communicated with each other during those appearances.

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

An order denying a Rule 29.15 motion may be affirmed on any legal ground supported by the record if the motion court arrived at the correct result. See Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013); Cook v. State, --- S.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 522690, at *4 (Mo. App. S.D. Feb. 25, 2026); Watson v. State, 545 S.W.3d 909, 914-15 (Mo. App. 2018).

Discussion and Decision

Baker's sole point argues that, “[b]ecause counsel failed to adequately communicate with [him], [Baker] was unable to secure favorable witnesses and meaningfully assist with trial strategy, leading to counsel conceding [Baker's] guilt on a lesser included offense in contradiction of [Baker's] trial testimony, thus prejudicing him.” This argument fails because, in this post-conviction proceeding, Baker cannot relitigate an issue that was raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to him.

“It is well established that issues decided on direct appeal may not be relitigated in a PCR motion under a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel; a Rule 29.15 motion cannot be used to obtain review of matters which were or should have been raised on direct appeal.” Voss v. State, 570 S.W.3d 184, 197 (Mo. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mack v. State, 716 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo. banc 2025); Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992); Cook, --- S.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 522690, at *3; Lawrence v. State, 628 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Mo. App. 2021); McCoy v. State, 431 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Mo. App. 2014); Ayres v. State, 93 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Mo. App. 2002).

On direct appeal, Baker argued that there had been “a complete breakdown in communication” between himself and defense counsel. Baker, 673 S.W.3d at 525. After reviewing the record, this Court found no merit in that argument and denied Baker's point on appeal. Id. at 527. Thus, the adequacy of defense counsels’ communication with Baker was raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to Baker. The same issue cannot be relitigated in this Rule 29.15 proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the motion court's order denying relief.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All references to rules are to Missouri Court Rules (2022). All references to statutes are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2020).

2.   This Court has independently verified the timeliness of Baker's post-conviction motions. See Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822, 825-26 (Mo. banc 2015); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012).

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCUR JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCUR