TAZL DEVELOPMENT LLC v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY (2026)

Introduction

TAZL Development, LLC (TAZL) appeals the circuit court's judgment granting BNSF Railway Company's (BNSF) motion for judgment on the pleadings on TAZL's adverse possession claim. In 1924, BNSF's predecessor in interest acquired a railroad right-of-way in fee simple. TAZL's storage facility and fence encroach upon a portion of BNSF's right-of-way (Disputed Property). TAZL raises two points on appeal. Point One argues that the circuit court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because precedent from the Supreme Court of Missouri provides an exception to section 516.090's ¹ protection against adverse possession when railroad property is disconnected from any reasonable railroad purpose. Point Two asserts that the circuit court erred in granting judgment for BNSF because the federal preemption authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) is inapplicable under these facts.

Because federal law preempts state law determination of abandonment of railroad property and the theory of disconnection is merely non-precedential dicta, neither abandonment nor disconnection can support TAZL's claim of adverse possession. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1924, BNSF's predecessor, St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Company, purchased the right-of-way property located in Festus, Missouri in fee simple by warranty deed. The parties do not dispute that the property formed part of the railroad's right-of-way.

In 2013, TAZL purchased land next to BNSF's property. In 2023, TAZL filed a petition to quiet title and for adverse possession. In its First Amended Petition, TAZL alleged that since 1929, a commercial structure, now used as a storage facility, has existed on the land it purchased, a portion of which encroaches upon BNSF's property. TAZL also alleged that, for many years, a chain link fence along the edge of TAZL's land has also encroached upon BNSF's property. In its operative petition, TAZL contends that the Disputed Property “has been abandoned by the railroad as it was never used for railroading and never intended to be used for railroading,” and that TAZL has met all elements of adverse possession. TAZL's First Amended Petition did not allege that the Disputed Property was disconnected from any reasonable use which the railroad might require. However, after BNSF filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings, TAZL's reply in opposition alleged that the theory of disconnection provides another exception by which railroad property may become subject to adverse possession. Additionally, TAZL contends that the gravamen of its claim is actually disconnection, not abandonment.

In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, BNSF alleges that the ICCTA bestows exclusive authority upon the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to determine whether railroad property has been abandoned and that TAZL has affirmatively alleged that BNSF has abandoned the disputed parcel in its pleadings. BNSF further argues that the STB must first determine whether the Disputed Property had been abandoned before TAZL could pursue that theory in circuit court. The circuit court granted BNSF's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and TAZL now appeals.

Standard of Review

“A court's grant of a judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo.” BBX Cap. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 713 S.W.3d 590, 601 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). This Court reviews the circuit court's ruling “to decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the face of the pleadings.” Campbell v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 697 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting Gross v. Parson, 624 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Mo. banc 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We treat the “well-pleaded facts of the non-moving party's pleading [ ] as admitted for purposes of the motion.” City of St. Louis v. State, 682 S.W.3d 387, 396 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal quotation omitted). “However, this Court will not blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleaders from the facts.” Gross, 624 S.W.3d at 883 (internal quotation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

“[J]udgment on the pleadings, as a matter of law, is not appropriate where the pleadings raise a question of material fact.” BBX Cap. Corp., 713 S.W.3d at 601 (citing Eaton v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 596, 599–600 (Mo. banc 2007)). When reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court has repeatedly noted, “[w]e are entitled to affirm on any ground sufficient to sustain the judgment and are not limited to the grounds relied on by the trial court.” Coburn v. Kramer & Frank, P.C., 627 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original).

Analysis

Point Two: The circuit court did not err in granting BNSF's motion for judgment on the pleadings because federal law preempts state court determination of abandonment of railroad property

For ease of analysis, we consider TAZL's two points in reverse order. TAZL's Point Two alleges that because the Disputed Property does not concern the determination of abandonment of the specified types of railroad tracks and facilities listed in 49 U.S.C. section 10501(b), intervention by the STB is unnecessary. We disagree.

In 1995, Congress enacted the ICCTA which vests the STB with exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers;” and “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities[.]” 49 U.S.C. Section 10501(b) (emphases added); see also Vill. of Big Lake v. BNSF Ry. Co., Inc., 382 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting 49 U.S.C. Section 10501(b)(2)). “Transportation” is broadly defined as “property ․ of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail[.]” 49 U.S.C. Section 10102(9)(A); Vill. of Big Lake, 382 S.W.3d at 128.

Moreover, “[c]ourts have recognized that Congress intended to give [STB] extensive authority in this area.” City of Lincoln v. Surface Transp. Bd., 414 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted); see also Vill. of Big Lake, 382 S.W.3d at 128 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, the ICCTA “preempts state law on the question of abandonment while the [STB]² retains jurisdiction over the right-of-way.” Grantwood Vill. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 95 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 1996).

Additionally, “ICCTA preemption does not depend upon the source of a state law claim. The claim is preempted if the requested remedy will ․ impede rail operations or pose undue safety risks.” City of Ozark, Arkansas v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 843 F.3d 1167, 1172 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). “[I]t can never be stated with certainty at what time any particular part of a right-of-way may become necessary for railroad uses.” City of Lincoln., 414 F.3d at 862. For example, in City of Lincoln, the court upheld STB's conclusion that the city's taking of a 20-foot strip of railroad right-of-way was preempted because permanently removing property from the railroad could interfere with present and future railroad use. Id. at 861–62.

Here, the remedy TAZL seeks would, if granted, permanently divest BNSF of a portion of the railroad's right-of-way. That remedy would remove the property from present or future rail transportation, which implicates STB's exclusive jurisdiction under the ICCTA. To the extent that TAZL relies on abandonment in its First Amended Petition, that issue is committed to federal authority. See 49 U.S.C. Section 10501(b); Vill. of Big Lake, 382 S.W.3d at 128; Grantwood Village, 95 F.3d at 658–59.

Point One: The circuit court did not err in granting BNSF's motion for judgment on the pleadings because the theory of disconnection is not binding precedent, and TAZL failed to allege disconnection of the Disputed Property in its First Amended Petition

In its first point on appeal, TAZL argues that, although its First Amended Petition alleged only abandonment, it no longer relies on that theory to advance its adverse possession claim. Instead, TAZL urges us to accept a theory of disconnection to support its adverse possession claim, arguing that the right-of-way property is disconnected from any railroad purpose and may therefore be adversely possessed regardless of the protections of section 516.090. We decline TAZL's invitation.

TAZL relies on St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Dillard, 43 S.W.2d 1034 (Mo. 1931), a case that predates the ICCTA by sixty-four years, as the basis for its disconnection argument. In Dillard, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t may be that lands owned by a railroad might be so disconnected with any reasonable use which the railroad might reasonably require or which have been so entirely abandoned as a part of the railroad right-of-way, depot grounds, etc., that same become subject to the statute of limitations ․” Dillard 43 S.W.2d at 1037.

TAZL's reliance on Dillard is misplaced. Dillard did not decide the case based on disconnection. Accordingly, its discussion of this theory was unnecessary to the judgment and constitutes dicta, which we are not obliged to follow. See Penzel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Jackson R-2 Sch. Dist., 655 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, TAZL's petition relies only on the theory of abandonment of the Disputed Property, and as discussed above the determination of that issue is wholly preempted by federal law.

Because federal law preempts state court determination of abandonment of railroad property, and because the theory of disconnection has been addressed only in dicta and thus lacks precedential value, neither abandonment nor disconnection can support TAZL's claim of adverse possession of the Disputed Property. Points One and Two are denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016) unless otherwise indicated. Under section 516.090, land appropriated to public use is exempt from adverse possession. Land acquired for railroad purposes falls within this exemption. See St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. King, 50 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Mo. 1932) (internal quotation omitted).

2.   In January 1996, STB assumed responsibility of ICC for regulating rail transportation. Neb. Trails Council v. Surface Transp. Bd., 120 F.3d 901, 903 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Judge

Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge and Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concur.