STATE v. STEED (2026)

Antonio Steed (Appellant) appeals from the trial court's judgment convicting him of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action following a jury trial.¹ The trial court respectively sentenced him to concurrent terms of fourteen and three years for robbery and armed criminal action. We affirm.

Background

Victim accompanied his fiancé (Fiancé) from California to St. Louis in July 2018 for her cosmetology seminar. After spending the day at Lumiere Casino, Victim met Fiancé and her colleagues for dinner. A few hours later he returned to the casino after telling Fiancé, “If I don't see you, I love you.”

Casino video footage showed the following events in the early hours of July 30, 2018: Codefendant approached Victim, who was playing blackjack, at approximately 4:25 a.m. Next the pair emerge from the restroom at 4:33 a.m. and appeared to exchange something hand-to-hand before joining Appellant at the roulette table. After Victim cashed out $400 in chips, he returned to the roulette table until 4:47 a.m. Codefendant privately spoke with Appellant before all three entered the parking garage at 5:02 a.m. and left in Codefendant's car.

Before 6 a.m., Victim was found dead from a gunshot wound to his forehead and several to his chest on the front walkway of a vacant residence on Athlone Avenue. He was stripped down to his underwear and socks. Surveillance video from New Carrie's Corner Market at the corner near the residence where Victim was found recorded Codefendant approaching and showed Appellant outside the vehicle, along with a person who appeared to be Victim. As Victim moved off screen, Appellant bent down and picked up something from the ground where Victim was standing.

The following day, Codefendant arrived at Appellant's home while the police were conducting surveillance. Appellant entered his car and exited shortly thereafter. Then police arrested Codefendant and took Appellant into custody at his home. Appellant and his wife consented to a search of the house from which police recovered a pair of blue tennis shoes, blue pants, and a shirt matching Appellant's clothing in the casino video. Appellant told the police Codefendant had dropped Victim off at North Grand and West Florissant.

Appellant testified at trial and acknowledged going to the casino with Codefendant. He said he spent the whole time at the roulette table and he was unaware of Victim or Codefendant hanging around Victim. Appellant did not notice Victim until they got into the car and Codefendant told him he had offered to drop off Victim in exchange for gas money. Appellant claimed he was checking his phone as they drove and he nodded off because he had been taking Xanax. After the car parked by the vacant residence, Appellant remembered he jumped out of the car and dropped his two phones from his lap after he heard a “smack.” He noticed Victim was missing his clothes and Codefendant was holding a gun on him. Appellant told Codefendant to let Victim go, but then he heard gunshots and ran back toward the car. Appellant claimed when Codefendant returned, he put a gun to Appellant's head, ordered him into the car, and threatened him and his family. After leaving the scene, Codefendant entered an alley, “put something on fire,” and broke Victim's phone.

The jury deliberated approximately four hours before they sent a note stating they were deadlocked on the murder count but had reached a verdict on the first-degree robbery count and accompanying armed criminal action. After the “hammer” instruction, the jury said it was “hopelessly deadlocked” and the court declared a mistrial on the murder and associated armed criminal action counts. The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. The trial court, having previously found Appellant to be a persistent misdemeanor offender, sentenced him to fourteen years on the robbery count and three concurrent years on the armed criminal action count. This appeal follows.

Discussion

Appellant alleges trial court error in three points on appeal. First he argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prejudicial and irrelevant testimony of Fiancé; second, he claims the trial court erred in admitting surveillance video from the New Carrie Market without a foundation; and third, he asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial because there was insufficient evidence to conclude Appellant had committed robbery in the first degree.

Point One

In his first point on appeal, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the testimony of Fiancé because her testimony was highly prejudicial, logically and legally irrelevant, and there is a reasonable probability if his objection was sustained, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Preservation & Standard of Review

At trial the state questioned Fiancé about how she met Victim. Defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, which the trial court overruled but agreed to a continuing objection as the state asked her more about the history of their relationship. We find the claim is sufficiently preserved for our review on appeal.

An appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of its broad discretion, which occurs where its ruling is “clearly against the logic and circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 533 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotations omitted). “[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. “Absent a showing that the evidence inflamed the jury or diverted its attention from the issues to be resolved, admitted evidence, even if immaterial or irrelevant, will not constitute prejudicial error.” State v. Marr, 713 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (citing State v. Stoner, 907 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). Mere allegations of prejudice do not meet the appellant's burden. Id.

Analysis

Evidence must be both logically and legally relevant to be admissible. State v. O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d 615, 633 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable; it is legally relevant if the probative value of the evidence outweighs the unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness. Id. “It is error to admit evidence of an inflammatory nature if it does not reasonably tend to prove or disprove a disputed fact issue.” State v. Sprake, 637 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982) (citing State v. Mucie, 448 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Mo. 1970)).

Appellant argues Fiancé’s testimony minimally identified Victim and explained why they were in St. Louis. She also testified about the last time she saw Victim before he was killed, which the state referenced in its closing argument. Appellant compares this to the finding in State v. Sprake, that the widow was called to testify “to engender sympathy for the surviving family members and prejudice against the defendant.” Id. However, the court found no prejudice in that the evidence was harmless even if it “softened” the victim before the jury. Id. at 728.

Here, Fiancé testified to material matters by identifying Victim, providing the context of why she and Victim were in St. Louis from California, and why Victim went to the casino where he encountered Appellant and Codefendant. Like Sprake, Appellant has not shown prejudice even if some parts of Fiancé’s testimony did not “prove or disprove a disputed fact issue.” Id. at 727. Moreover, the fact the jury deadlocked on the murder charge shows her testimony did not engender so much sympathy as to convict Appellant on the remaining counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Appellant's first point is denied.

Point Two

In his second point, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in admitting the video from the New Carrie Market over his objection. He asserts the state's witness failed to establish the foundation to admit the video because the police officer was neither present at the time of the crime allegedly depicted on the video, nor did he testify as to the setup or functioning of the video recording system from which the video was taken.

Preservation & Standard of Review

The state argues Appellant's point is not preserved because his objection at trial did not specifically identify how the state failed to properly establish a foundation to admit the video evidence, but merely argued the testifying officer believed the recording system was a DVR system but did not recall what kind of DVR system. “[A]n allegation that evidence was admitted without a foundation can mean a number of things in context, such as that the evidence lacked authentication, identification, logical relevance, or legal relevance.” Michaud Mitigation, Inc. v. Beckett, 630 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, “a general allegation of a lack of foundation is not sufficiently specific to draw a court's attention as to what aspect of the foundation is allegedly lacking.” Id.

When the detective was called as a witness to introduce the video, Appellant immediately argued a lack of foundation because “he wasn't there.” Then during the detective's testimony, Appellant's defense counsel more specifically objected:

Judge, I'm going to object. He believes it was a DVR system. He doesn't recall what kind of DVR system it is. He just knows he input some data into the computer and it spits it back out to him that (sic) he downloaded and that's it.

The trial court overruled the objection because the detective testified the video was a fair and accurate representation of the setting “outside the New Carrie Market,” even though he was not present during the incident. The court stated it would allow the defense to cross-examine the witness. Assuming without deciding Appellant's argument at trial is similar enough to his argument on appeal, we find even if the error was preserved, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video.

The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a sufficient foundation has been established to support the admission of evidence. State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 899 (Mo. banc 2015). “We review trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence ‘for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’ ” State v. Santillan, 1 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Mo. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. banc 1996)). The appellate court views the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009).

Analysis

A party offering a video into evidence must show it is an accurate and faithful representation of what it purports to show. State v. Minner, 256 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotation omitted). The traditional means to lay a sufficient foundation is by “testimony of any witness who is familiar with the subject matter of the tape and competent to testify from personal observation.” Id. (citing State v. Powers, 148 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004)). Thus, a witness to an incident, even unfamiliar with the surveillance system, may still authenticate the video as a “fair and accurate recording” of the relevant event. State v. Moyle, 532 S.W.3d 733, 736 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (quoting State v. McNear, 343 S.W.3d 703, 704 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)).

If the detective's testimony was somehow lacking, we find Appellant suffered no prejudice from admission of the video evidence because he relied on the same to support his defense. See Santillan, 1 S.W.3d at 579. Appellant did not challenge the detective's testimony the video was true and accurate on cross examination as per the court's ruling. Instead, he elected to pursue a clever trial strategy to use the video for his benefit and show he had no part in the robbery or murder. Appellant's own testimony sufficiently authenticated the video as a fair and accurate representation because he was competent to testify from personal observation as an actual witness familiar with the subject matter of the video. Moyle, 532 S.W.3d at 736 (citing McNear, 343 S.W.3d at 704).

In his defense, Appellant asked the jury to watch the same video he now argues on appeal was not properly authenticated. He was not sure if the video depicting the body casting a shadow was Victim or Codefendant. He testified he was in the street, no one was standing by him, he did not have a gun in his hand, and was not near the walkway where Victim's body was found. Appellant admitted he did move toward the direction where the person was in the video and picked up something, which he claimed was his phone.

On redirect, Defense counsel relied on the video to question Appellant about the events it depicted:

[Defense Counsel]: We're going to watch this video. I want you to watch it closely. Watch the shadow closely. You can see the shadow and you can see movement, right? You can see that, right?

[Appellant]: Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel]: Did you see anybody that was part of the shadow, did you see that person drop anything?

[Appellant]: No, sir.

Indeed, in his opening statement, Appellant promised the jury they would see video showing he did not have a weapon and rather than participating in the murder and robbery, he actually tried to save Victim from Codefendant. Finally, his closing statement asked the jury to look closely at the video because it does not prove anything.

We hold the court did not err plainly or otherwise in admitting the surveillance video. Notably, Appellant himself authenticated the same as a witness to the events in support of his own case. In fact, Appellant may well have derived a benefit from his testimony as the jury deadlocked on the murder charge. “As with invited error, a party may not complain of prejudice which his own conduct creates.” State v. Copeland, 95 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (quoting State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Mo. banc 1984), citing State v. Ray, 647 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Mo. banc 1983)).

After considering the entire record, including the circumstances of Appellant's guilt as established by his own testimony about the video, he cannot claim on appeal the trial court abused its discretion or committed plain error. His second point on appeal is denied.

Point III

In his third and final point on appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial at the close of all evidence because there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude he had committed robbery in the first degree.

Preservation & Standard of Review

The trial court denied Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence, and Appellant included this claim again in his motion for new trial. Thus, it is preserved for appellate review.

An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under the same standard used in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's guilty verdict. State v. McClain, 685 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Bennish, 479 S.W.3d 678, 684-85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). Our review is limited to determining whether, by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime such that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 38-39 (quoting State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 736 (Mo. banc 2022), and citing see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We do “not act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers, but give[ ] great deference to the trier of fact.” Id. (quoting State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation omitted)).

Analysis

Appellant was charged in count three as an accomplice with committing the class A felony of robbery in the first degree, pursuant to Section 570.023 RSMo (Supp. 2017),² in that he acted alone or knowingly in concert with another, forcibly stole a quantity of cash and clothing in the possession of Victim, and in the course thereof Appellant and another participant in the offense caused serious physical injury to Victim. In count four Appellant was charged with the felony of armed criminal action, in violation of Section 571.015, in that by acting alone or knowingly in concert with another, he committed the felony of robbery in the first degree charged in count three, which allegations were incorporated by reference, and committed that felony with and through the knowing use, assistance and aid of a deadly weapon.

On appeal, we examine the evidence at trial to determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime of robbery in the first degree such that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McClain, 685 S.W.3d at 38-39. To establish accomplice liability, the state must show Appellant's affirmative participation. State v. Gonzalez-Gongora, 673 S.W.2d 811, 813-14 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984).

“Proof of any form of participation by defendant in the crime is enough to support a conviction and his presence at the scene, his championship and conduct before and after the offense, are circumstances from which one's participation in the crime may be inferred.” Creighton v. State, 550 S.W.3d 572, 578 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Gonzalez-Gongora, 673 S.W.2d at 813-14 (defendant's actions may also be collectively considered as circumstantial evidence) (internal citations omitted)). In Creighton, the defendant claimed he was unaware his accomplice intended to rob the victim as they entered her home without permission, looking for their friend's phone. Id. at 579. However, the court held the defendant was responsible for all reasonably anticipated criminal conduct that occurred as part of entering the victim's home without permission and embarking on a course of criminal conduct. Id. In addition to his presence at the scene, the defendant stood guard as his accomplice displayed a gun and stole from the victim's purse, then fled with his accomplice. Id. The court found the elements of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary were satisfied through accomplice liability. Id. A “factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.” State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 640-41 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

Appellant initially told the police Codefendant had dropped Victim off at North Grand and West Florissant. However, Appellant's testimony in authenticating the video evidence contradicted his statement to police by acknowledging his presence where Victim died. The video further depicted Appellant retrieving something from where Victim was standing before he moved off screen. Appellant claimed he was picking up the phones he dropped when he was startled by a “smack” and jumped out of the car.

However, the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant's testimony, especially because he did not pick something up until nearly three minutes after he appeared outside the car, and he did so farther away from the car than one would believe if he had dropped phones as he exited the car. It was reasonable for the jury to infer Appellant lied about his phones and instead picked up Victim's property, just as he lied about where they had dropped off Victim.

In sum, the evidence at trial showed Victim was last seen alive, getting into a car with Appellant and Codefendant. Appellant was present when Victim died, fled the scene of the crime, and associated with Codefendant after the crime as observed by police surveillance. Video from the casino showed after Victim cashed out $400 in chips, Codefendant and Appellant spoke privately just before the three men left the casino together by riding the elevator and walking into the parking garage.

This evidence was sufficient to show Appellant conspired with Codefendant to commit a robbery against Victim, who was found deceased with several gunshot wounds and stripped down to his underwear and socks on the front walkway of a vacant residence near the New Carrie's Corner Market, at 4448 Athlone. He no longer had the $400 cash he won playing blackjack or the backpack he had carried. As a result, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Appellant guilty of first-degree robbery and the accompanying armed criminal action. Appellant's third point is denied.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. The jury hung on the murder and accompanying armed criminal action counts and the trial court issued a mistrial as to those two counts. Appellant later pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter.

2.   All further statutory references are to RSMo (Supp. 2017).

Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Judge and Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concur.