RICE v. ARMSTRONG TEASDALE (2026)

Introduction

This appeal stems from another attack upon a 2007 lawsuit (“Franklin Case”) brought by Interfood, Inc. (“Interfood”) against Appellant Larry Rice (“Rice”) and his associate, M.H, centering upon control of Waltepco Holding Company (“Waltepco”) and its subsidiaries, including Interfood. In that case, the trial court entered a judgment (“2007 Judgment”) against Rice and M.H. Since then, Rice has filed numerous lawsuits in an effort to obtain a judgment declaring the 2007 Judgment void ab initio.

Rice's most recent effort to challenge the 2007 Judgment was filing a petition for a declaratory judgment against Respondents Armstrong Teasdale, LLP (“Armstrong Teasdale”), Thomas Cummings (“Cummings”), and Jeffrey Schultz (“Schultz”), the law firm and attorneys who represented Interfood in the Franklin Case. The petition, in pertinent part, sought a declaration the 2007 Judgment and other previously entered judgments against Rice are void ab initio because Respondents lacked standing to bring the Franklin Case. During litigation, Rice moved for summary judgment two separate times. The trial court denied each of the motions. Rice also filed a motion under Rule 74.06(b)¹ (“Rule 74.06 Motion”), seeking to set aside the 2007 Judgment and a judgment dismissing Rice's 2020 case against Respondents, where Rice asserted the same cause of action as in the underlying case. Respondents separately moved to dismiss Rice's petition. The trial court granted Respondents’ respective motions to dismiss and denied Rice's Rule 74.06 Motion.

Rice asserts five points on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the underlying case, denying one of his motions for summary judgment, and denying his Rule 74.06 Motion. This Court holds Rice's appeal fails to comply with the mandatory rules for appellate briefing. Mainly, he fails to challenge the basis upon which the trial court dismissed the underlying case and denied his Rule 74.06 Motion, fails to demonstrate any of the issues raised on appeal were preserved, and does not present a cognizable appellate claim with respect to the denial of his motion for summary judgment. Last, this Court considers this appeal frivolous. Thus, pursuant to Rule 84.19, damages are assessed against Rice in the amount of $75,000 and Rice's counsel, Lynn Rodgers, in the amount of $10,000.

Accordingly, Rice's appeal is dismissed.

Factual and Procedural Background 2

Following the entry of the 2007 Judgment, Rice filed numerous cases seeking a declaration the 2007 Judgment is void. For background and understanding of the underlying case, this Court will provide a summary of the conflict which gave rise to the Franklin Case and the almost twenty years of extensive litigation that followed.

Franklin Case

The Franklin Case arose out of a dispute over control of Waltepco, an Indiana corporation. Interfood is one of Waltepco's wholly owned subsidiaries. On one side of the dispute was Tepco BV (“Tepco”), who was a majority shareholder of Waltepco. On the other side was Rice, who in 2003 bought 49% of the outstanding shares in Waltepco. Rice entered into a shareholder agreement with Tepco wherein he and his associate, M.H., became officers and directors of Waltepco and Interfood. Between 2003 and 2006, problems arose between Rice and Tepco which gave rise to the Franklin Case.

In March 2007, Interfood initiated the Franklin Case by filing a petition against Rice and M.H. alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Tepco and Waltepco filed a joint motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. Rice did not object to the motion to intervene. In November 2007, while the matter was pending, Tepco sent notice of a shareholder action that Rice and M.H. had been replaced on the Waltepco board of directors. The notice also explained the new directors had removed Rice and M.H. as officers from Waltepco and Interfood.

The matter proceeded to trial in December 2007. The trial court entered the 2007 Judgment declaring Tepco's November 2007 shareholder action effective because it was the majority shareholder, and allowing Tepco to replace Rice and M.H. as directors and officers of Waltepco and Interfood. Following the trial court's entry of the 2007 Judgment, the parties continued to dispute control of the companies. Ultimately, the parties went to mediation and reached a settlement. Rice then disputed the enforcement of the settlement agreement. On December 30, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment enforcing the settlement agreement.

Rice unsuccessfully appealed the 2007 Judgment and subsequent orders enforcing the settlement agreement in three separate cases: Interfood, Inc. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (Interfood One); Interfood, Inc. v. Rice, 337 S.W.3d 731 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (Interfood Two); and Interfood Inc. v. Rice, 404 S.W.3d 272 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (Interfood Three). Each time this matter came before this Court, Rice argued the trial court erred in permitting Respondents to bring the Franklin Case on behalf of Interfood. This argument was rejected in Interfood One because Rice never objected to Tepco and Waltepco intervening in the Franklin Case litigation or raised the issue at trial. It was rejected again in Interfood Two because Rice's brief violated the appellate briefing requirements set forth in Rule 84.04 and raised arguments with respect to Respondents, who were not parties to the Franklin Case. Lastly, it was rejected a third time in Interfood Three because the issue had already been decided in Interfood One.

Federal Cases

Rice's attempts to challenge the 2007 Judgment did not end with the Missouri state courts. He also filed the following cases in federal court: Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 2014 WL 916951 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014); Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 2015 WL 331787 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2015); Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 2017 WL 2691914 (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2017); Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 709 F. App'x. 415 (8th Cir. 2018); Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 771 F. App'x. 704 (8th Cir. 2019); Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 2020 WL 1815820 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2020). In these cases, Rice was repeatedly sanctioned for his vexatious conduct in continuing to bring lawsuits based upon the same set of operative facts and issues that had been previously decided by numerous courts. In the most recent case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Rice's claims and sanctioned him because his “claims are not warranted by existing law and are presented for the improper purpose of harassing [d]efendants and needlessly increasing their costs of litigation.” Rice, 2020 WL 1815820 at *4. The district court awarded attorney's fees to the defendants, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See Rice v. Interfood, Inc., 856 F. App'x 60, 61 (8th Cir. 2021).

2020 Lawsuit

In November 2020, Rice returned to Missouri state courts and filed a lawsuit (“2020 Lawsuit”) against Respondents – the law firm, Armstrong Teasdale, and the two attorneys, Cummings and Schultz, who filed the petition in the Franklin Case on behalf of Interfood. In this lawsuit, Rice's amended petition requested the trial court declare the 2007 Judgment in the Franklin Case void for lack of standing because Respondents did not represent Interfood at the time the petition was filed. Respondents moved to dismiss the case and for sanctions. The trial court entered a judgment dismissing the case.

Subsequently, the trial court entered an amended judgment reiterating its decision to grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss and also granting Respondents’ motion for sanctions. Specifically, the trial court found: “Rice has failed to state a cause of action for declaratory judgment and damages. First, [Respondents] were not a party in the Franklin Case. Therefore, the allegation that the judgment in the Franklin case is void ab initio because [Respondents] did not have ‘standing’ is nonsensical.” The trial court concluded “[Rice's] premise based on lack of ‘standing’ is blatantly incorrect and any claim based on the premise, let alone any lawsuit based on the premise, is blatantly frivolous.”

Further, the trial court imposed a $50,000 fine on Rice and ordered:

Plaintiff Larry Rice shall not, directly, or indirectly through another party, file any lawsuits based on or arising out of the case captioned Interfood Inc. et al v. Rice et al., No. 07AB-CC00086 (Franklin Case) including, but not limited, to any lawsuits: (a) based on or arising out of the judgment entered in the Franklin Case; (b) based on or arising out of any conduct or actions of any party or counsel in the litigation of the Franklin Case; (c) to set aside the judgment in the Franklin Case.

The matter was dismissed with prejudice. On appeal this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. See Rice v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, 652 S.W.3d 286 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).

The Present Case

The disposition of the 2020 Lawsuit did not deter Rice from filing another lawsuit against Respondents. On February 13, 2024, Rice filed the underlying petition for a declaratory judgment, again requesting the trial court declare the 2007 Judgment void ab initio. The petition again alleged Respondents did not have standing to bring the Franklin Case on behalf of Interfood and, as a result, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review the matter. Rice filed a motion for partial summary judgment on March 1, 2024, and Respondents moved to strike the motion. Respondents, separately, moved to dismiss the case. On April 17, 2024, Rice filed his first amended petition, and the next day filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition. The trial court denied Rice's motion for leave to file an amended petition.

Rice moved for summary judgment a second time on December 6, 2024, and Respondents filed another motion to strike. Rice also filed his Rule 74.06 Motion, seeking to void the 2007 Judgment and the judgment entered in the 2020 Lawsuit. The trial court sustained Respondents’ motion to strike and denied Rice's motion for partial summary judgment. On March 7, 2025, the trial court granted Respondents’ respective motions to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. Further, the trial court denied Rice's motion for summary judgment and Rule 74.06 Motion.

In dismissing the action and denying Rice's Rule 74.06 Motion, the trial court explained Rice could not obtain a judgment declaring the 2007 Judgment void ab initio against Respondents because they were not parties to the Franklin Case. The trial court further emphasized the present case raised the same issues Rice raised in the 2020 Lawsuit against Respondents, where he had also filed a motion under Rule 74.06, and the lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice, his Rule 74.06 motion was denied, and a sanction of $50,000 was imposed on Rice.

This appeal follows.

Discussion

In Point One, Rice contends the trial court erred in dismissing the underlying case because it was based upon the judgment in the 2020 Lawsuit, which he contends is void ab initio because it was based on the 2007 Judgment, which he argues is also void ab initio. In Point Two, Rice contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment, filed on December 6, 2024, because the uncontroverted facts demonstrate he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In Point Three, Rice contends the trial court erred in dismissing his case with prejudice because Respondents’ motion to dismiss was directed to his original petition, which had been abandoned and had become a nullity. In Points Four and Five, Rice argues the trial court erred in denying his Rule 74.06 Motion because the orders and judgments entered in the Franklin Case and subsequent judgments were based on the 2007 Judgment, which is void ab initio.

Rule 84.04 Violations

Rule 84.04 ³ sets forth the mandatory rules for appellate briefing. See Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022). “[C]ompliance with Rule 84.04 is necessary to ensure that this Court retains its role as a neutral arbiter.” Murphree v. Lakeshore Estates, LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). “Deficient briefing runs the risk of forcing this Court to assume the role of advocate by requiring us to sift through the legal record, reconstruct the statement of facts, and craft a legal argument on the appellant's behalf.” Id. Rice's failure to comply with the briefing rules impedes our ability to address his claims on appeal. This Court discusses each Rule 84.04 violation in turn.

A. Statement of Facts

Rule 84.04(c) requires an appellate brief include “a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.” The rule also requires “[a]ll statements of facts shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Rule 84.04(c). “The failure to provide a fair and concise statement of facts with references to the record on appeal preserves nothing for review and is a sufficient basis to dismiss an appeal.” Shelton v. Shelton, 717 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Matter of James A. Long Tr. Dated Dec. 13, 2007 as Amended, 704 S.W.3d 729, 739 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)).

Rice's statement of facts fails to set forth the relevant facts. Instead, he presents this Court with two sections titled “General Overview and Summary” and “Background and History,” which selectively and briefly touch upon the procedural history of the underlying case and certain cases Rice previously filed. “A statement of facts that consists of nothing more than an abbreviated procedural history fails to provide an understanding of the case and is deficient.” Clark v. Aranda, 730 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting Yarnall ex rel. Yarnall v. Choudhury, 23 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000)). Also, Rice includes conclusory assertions and arguments throughout his statements of facts. Thus, we do not have “a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination” as required by Rule 84.04(c).

Further, while some factual assertions include citations to the record, a significant amount of Rice's fact statements fail to include any reference to the legal file or the record. “Specific relevant cites to the record are mandatory and essential for the effective functioning of appellate courts because courts cannot spend time searching the record to determine if factual assertions in the brief are supported by the record.” Sharp v. All-N-One Plumbing, 612 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not this Court's function to search the record to discover the facts which substantiate Rice's points on appeal. See id.

B. Points Relied On

Rice's points relied on for Points One, Four, and Five fail to comply with Rule 84.04(d). Subsection (d) requires that an appellant's points relied on: “(A) [i]dentify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) [s]tate concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) [e]xplain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Rule 84.04(d)(1). To ensure compliance, the rule itself provides the following template: “The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error].” Rule 84.04(d).

Here, the most obvious indicator of Rice's violation of Rule 84.04(d) is his failure to follow the simple template referenced above. Though Rice uses the key words (e.g., “the trial court erred,” “because,” and “in that”) referenced in the template, his points relied on do not challenge the trial court's findings for dismissing the action and denying his Rule 74.06 Motion. Instead, Rice's points relied on challenge the merits upon which he brought his declaratory judgment action and state reasons as to why the 2007 and 2020 judgments are void ab initio. The role of appellate courts “is to review specifically challenged trial court rulings․.” Geiler v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 621 S.W.3d 536, 547 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 557 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018)). “By not challenging a trial court's findings on appeal, a party waives any claim that necessarily runs counter to those findings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rice's “failure to challenge the articulated grounds for the trial court's ruling is fatal to [his] appeal.” Id. Further, this deficiency has a domino effect and, as a result, the “because” and “in that” statements do not comply with the rule because they are wholly unrelated to the trial court's ruling.

“The requirement that the point relied on clearly state the contention on appeal is not simply a judicial word game or a matter of hypertechnicality on the part of appellate courts.” Burgan v. Newman, 618 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting Culley v. Royal Oaks Chrysler Jeep, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)). Rice's failure to comply with Rule 84.04(d) is a sufficient basis for this Court to dismiss his appeal. See Young v. Missouri Dep't of Soc. Servs., 647 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).

C. Argument

Rice's points on appeal violate Rule 84.04(e). This subsection requires that the argument section for each claim of error “include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review.” Rule 84.04(e). Further, the argument section must demonstrate the erroneousness of the basis upon which the trial court issued an adverse ruling and provide sufficient analytical support for the claim of reversible error. Hicks v. Northland-Smithville, 655 S.W.3d 641, 649 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). “An argument that fails to comply with Rule 84.04(e) preserves nothing for appeal.” R.M. v. King, 671 S.W.3d 394, 400 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Washington v. Blackburn, 286 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)).

1. Preservation Statements

All five of Rice's argument sections fail to include a preservation statement explaining whether and how each point was preserved for appellate review. This statement is “essential to this Court's review of the case[.]” Williams v. Williams, 669 S.W.3d 161, 167 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting T.G. v. D.W.H., 648 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)). “It is not this [C]ourt's duty to supplement a deficient brief with its own research, to comb the record in search of facts to support an appellant's claim of error, or demonstrate it is properly preserved for appellate review.” Porter v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). Failure to demonstrate preservation of the alleged errors for review, as required by Rule 84.04(e), is grounds for dismissal. Young, 647 S.W.3d at 78.

2. Standard of Review

Points One and Two fail to include the applicable standard of review. “The standard of review is an essential portion of all appellate arguments; it outlines this court's role in disposing of the matter before us.” Matter of Marvin, 682 S.W.3d 788, 799 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Marck Indus., Inc. v. Lowe, 587 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019)). For Point One, Rice fails to assert the standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss and, instead, sets forth the standard of review for standing. This is a clear attempt by Rice to reach the merits of the underlying action and avoid challenging the substantive issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in dismissing the underlying matter.

As to Point Two, Rice cites to State ex rel. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. v. Dally, 369 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) and State ex rel. Pub. Hous. Agency of City of Bethany v. Krohn, 98 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) to support his contention that this Court can review the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. But in each of those cases, the parties challenged the trial court's denial of their respective motions for summary judgment in a writ–not in a direct appeal. See Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 369 S.W.3d at 774; Pub. Hous. Agency of City of Bethany, 98 S.W.3d at 913. It is well established the “denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to appellate review, even when an appeal is taken from a final judgment and not from the denial of a motion for summary judgment.” Hamilton v. Archer, 545 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Hihn v. Hihn, 235 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)); see also Stacy v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (citation omitted) (stating the denial of a summary judgment motion is not appealable and can “only be reviewed when its merits are completely intertwined with a grant of summary judgment in favor of an opposing party.”). Accordingly, Point Two does not present a cognizable appellate claim.

3. Arguments

“[T]he fundamental requirement for an appellate argument is that it demonstrate the erroneousness of the basis upon which a lower court or agency issued an adverse ruling.” Whitehead v. Moore, 728 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Halderman v. City of Sturgeon, 670 S.W.3d 193, 212 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). Here, Points One, Four, and Five contend the trial court erred in dismissing the underlying case and denying Rice's Rule 74.06 Motion because its findings were based upon voided judgments due to lack of standing. In summary, Rice's argument sections for these points fail to comply with Rule 84.04(e) in that they: (1) do not challenge the basis upon which the trial court dismissed the underlying suit or denied his Rule 74.06 Motion; and (2) do not reference any relevant portions of the record on appeal.

Specifically, Points One, Four, and Five focus on the controversy between Rice and Respondents and why the judgments in the Franklin Case and the 2020 Lawsuit are void ab initio. Additionally, Rice urges this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment, remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to sustain his Rule 74.06 Motion, and enter a judgment vacating the judgments in the Franklin Case and 2020 Lawsuit. It is clear to this Court these points attempt to address issues the trial court did not _decide, i.e., whether the 2007 Judgment and judgment entered in the 2020 Lawsuit are void ab initio, and whether Respondents had standing to file the Franklin case on behalf of Interfood.

Deliberately, Rice puts on blinders to ignore the existence of the previous judgments and orders entered against him by various courts. This willful blindness, however, does not give Rice the license to come before this Court and argue the merits of the underlying action in an attempt to relitigate issues previously addressed, or litigate issues that should have been raised in the Franklin Case or its subsequent appeal. Ultimately, these arguments fail to address the basis upon which the trial court dismissed the underlying matter and denied his Rule 74.06 Motion, principally that the 2020 Lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice and Respondents were not parties to the Franklin Case, as their role in that case was limited to their legal representation of Rice's opposition. Because Rice fails to challenge the grounds upon which the trial court's adverse ruling depends, he preserved no legal argument for appellate review. See Whitehead, 728 S.W.3d at 880.

Last, Rice's arguments include additional violations of Rule 84.04(e). Similar to his statement of facts, many of the statements in Rice's arguments fail to include “specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Rule 84.04(e). “If the [C]ourt were to take the time on its own initiative to comb the record for support of factual assertions in a brief, we would, in effect, become an advocate for the non-complying party[,]” which this Court cannot do. R.M., 671 S.W.3d at 399 (quoting Wong v. Wong, 391 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)).

Accordingly, Rice's noncompliance with Rule 84.04(e) justifies denial of all of his points, and dismissal of his appeal.⁴

Sanctions

Respondents request relief under Rule 84.19 (Damages for Frivolous Appeals), which provides if this Court determines an appeal is frivolous, it may award damages to the respondent as we deem just and proper. “An appeal is frivolous if it presents no justiciable question and is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.” Snelling v. Kenny, 491 S.W.3d 606, 616 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Aldi, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)). The purpose of this rule is: “(1) to prevent congestion of appellate court dockets with meritless cases which, by their presence, contribute to delaying resolution of meritorious cases and (2) to compensate respondents for the expenses they incur in the course of defending these meritless appeals.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 971 S.W.2d at 912).

In order to avoid the assessment of damages for frivolous appeals, the issues presented on appeal must be at least fairly debatable. Id. “Defective briefing by an appellant and indications that the appellant intends to pursue further frivolous claims are relevant to determining whether to provide relief under Rule 84.19.” Id. at 616–17.

Since 2009, Rice has filed numerous cases arising from the same operative facts and issues in both state and federal courts. This is Rice's fifth time before this Court asserting the same issues. Despite his continuous litigation, Rice has not prevailed in any of his cases and has been sanctioned for continuing to file cases based upon the same operative facts. Most recently, in the 2020 Lawsuit, the trial court's judgment expressly barred Rice from pursuing any future litigation, imposed a $50,000 fine, and dismissed the case with prejudice. This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and the sanction, but did not impose any additional sanctions. The trial court's direct order in the 2020 Lawsuit, instructing Rice to not file any more cases arising out of the same operative facts, and the imposition of a $50,000 fine did not curtail Rice's litigious proclivities. Apparently, it only fueled his obsession and led him to file the underlying case. As a result, this Court finds itself repeating that same ruling again. This time, however, it comes with sanctions.

Rice's defiance of state and federal courts’ express orders to not file any more cases concerning the operative facts and issues clearly indicates Rice fails to understand the Franklin Case has reached its conclusion. Rice's arguments present no justiciable questions and are so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record there is little prospect they can ever succeed. See id. at 616. Rice's “repeated attempts at beating the same proverbial dead horse demonstrate he intends to pursue further frivolous claims arising out of these same facts in the future.” Id. at 617. Thus, a sanction award of $75,000 against Rice is justified.

Furthermore, Rule 84.19 does not limit damages to be assessed only to the litigant. This Court “may impose sanctions under Rule 84.19 against either a party or counsel.” Ne. Pub. Sewer Dist. of Jefferson Cnty. v. Feucht, 535 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). In this case, this Court must also impose damages against Rice's counsel, as he is equally responsible for this appeal. An attorney “not only owes the client a duty of representation, but a duty to quell further litigation of a groundless appeal.” Jones v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 769 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989). While this Court acknowledges Rice filed the underlying lawsuit as a pro se litigant, counsel filed the post-judgment motion and this appeal on behalf of Rice. Based on counsel's statement of facts, it is clear he was aware of the trial court's reasoning for dismissing the underlying case and the previous cases Rice had filed, including the disposition of the 2020 Lawsuit and subsequent appeal. Yet, he proceeded with this appeal.

As discussed in this opinion, Rice's brief violates Rule 84.04(c), (d), and (e). Though an inadequate brief does not render an appeal frivolous, “such a [noncompliant] brief considered together with the record may reflect that no ‘fairly debatable’ issue exists to justify an appeal.” Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 662 S.W.3d 168, 174–75 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 645 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)) (emphasis in original). Here, Rice fails to present a “fairly debatable” issue to justify the appeal. Put simply, the underlying suit and this appeal should have never been filed. Why? The answer is three-fold: (1) Respondents were never parties to the Franklin Case; (2) Rice previously raised this exact same issue against Respondents in the 2020 Lawsuit and that case was dismissed with prejudice, barring Rice from asserting the same cause of action against Respondents; and (3) Rice was expressly ordered to not file any more lawsuits based upon or arising out of the Franklin Case. Additionally, this appeal is devoid of merit on the face of the record as there is no prospect of success due to Rice's failure to demonstrate preservation of the issues. This Court finds it was counsel's failure to advise Rice against filing this appeal that not only wasted judicial resources, but also forced Respondents to incur unnecessary expense in defending this case once again. Therefore, this appeal rises to the requisite level to justify an award of damages of $10,000 for a frivolous appeal against Rice's counsel.

Conclusion

Rice's appeal fails to comply with the briefing rules and, on its face, is without merit. Accordingly, Rice's appeal is dismissed. Pursuant to Rule 84.19, damages are assessed against Rice in the amount of $75,000 and Rice's counsel in the amount of $10,000 for filing a frivolous appeal. The damages of $75,000 shall be a judgment against Rice in favor of Respondents for which execution may issue. The damages of $10,000 shall be a judgment against Rice's counsel, Lynn Rodgers, in favor of Respondents for which execution may issue.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For background, Missouri Supreme Court “Rule 74.06(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment or order due to excusable neglect, fraud, irregular judgments, void judgments, or satisfied judgments.” Kalish v. Kalish, 663 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). The rule specifies when a motion under Rule 74.06 asserts a judgment is void, the motion shall be made within a reasonable time after the judgment is entered. Rule 74.06(b)–(c). The Supreme Court of Missouri has clarified, in this context, it is unreasonable to wait more than two years to bring a motion under Rule 74.06. Id.; C.J.G. v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, 219 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Mo. banc 2007).

3.   All references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2026).

4.   This Court notes in Rice's 2022 appeal, Rice, 652 S.W.3d 286, this Court dismissed many of Rice's points on appeal for briefing violations. There, this Court explained compliance with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory. Yet, Rice has again failed to adhere to the briefing requirements set forth in Rule 84.04.

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge

Philip M. Hess, Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.