STEELE v. PERKINS (2026)

Introduction

James Bryan Steele, Jr. (Father) appeals from the trial court's judgment granting Amanda Marie Perkins’ (Mother) motion to dismiss his motion to modify custody and support. We affirm.

Background

On April 4, 2018, Father filed a petition for child custody relating to the parties’ minor child (child). After almost two years of contentious litigation, an initial custody and support judgment was entered on January 20, 2020, granting the parties joint legal and physical custody. In November 2020, Father filed a motion to modify, which was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim. The parties resumed legal hostilities over their child after Mother filed a motion to modify in May 2022. After four days of trial on all pending matters, the court issued a final judgment of modification (Modification Judgment) on June 20, 2024. Mother was awarded sole legal custody for child's education, activities, and health care, but joint physical custody did not change. Father filed another motion to modify seeking sole legal and physical custody on April 3, 2025, which the trial court dismissed upon Mother's motion. This appeal follows.

Discussion

In his sole point on appeal, Father argues the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to modify because the allegations, broadly construed, were sufficient to state a claim. He specifically cites his allegations concerning Mother's failure to comply with the Modification Judgment hindered his ability to participate as expected in the child's life. He claims these were sufficient to require the trial court to consider whether the current custody provisions were in the best interest of the child.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. McBride v. McBride, 288 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (quoting Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. banc 2008)). “We will affirm the dismissal if it can be granted on any grounds supported by the motion to dismiss.” Id. at 750-51 (internal citation omitted). When reviewing the dismissal of a motion to modify for failure to state a claim, we give the allegations liberal construction, assuming all properly pleaded facts are true, and affording them all reasonable inferences. Id. at 751 (internal quotation omitted). The motion is viewed in an almost academic manner, only to determine whether the facts averred meet the elements of a recognized cause of action. Richardson v. Richardson, 218 S.W.3d 426, 428 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. banc 2001)).

Analysis

Section 452.410 RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2021),¹ governs modification of custody. Pursuant to the statute, the court “shall not modify a prior custody decree unless ․ it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.” Section 452.410.1 (emphasis added). Rooted in principles of public policy and concern for finality of judgments, Missouri courts require the alleged change be substantial in order to “modify a prior custody decree.” Wigglesworth v. Wigglesworth, 574 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal quotations omitted); Section 453.410.1. The plain language of the custody modification statute essentially incorporates “the doctrine of res judicata [and] precludes relitigation of facts and issues that were adjudicated under or prior to the preceding custody judgment.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In her motion to dismiss, Mother claimed Father failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We agree and affirm because we may do so on any grounds asserted in the motion to dismiss even if not relied on by the trial court.² See McBride, 288 S.W.3d at 750-51. Here, for the purpose of modifying custody pursuant to Section 452.410.1, Father was required to assert there were “facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree.” But in his motion to modify, Father solely relies upon his complaints about Mother's exercise of sole legal custody claiming she would not comply with the parenting plan to coparent, communicate, and cooperate with him.

It is true, a breakdown in communication and cooperation alone can serve as evidence to support a finding of change of circumstances warranting modification of custody, but it must have been unknown to the court at the time of the prior custody award. See Morgan v. Morgan, 497 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal quotation omitted); Ndiaye v. Seye, 489 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). Conversely, it follows if the breakdown in communication and cooperation was known to the court in entering the prior custody award, the same cannot serve as grounds to modify it.

Here, Father asserts nothing unknown to the court upon entering the Modification Judgment. These parents have engaged in protracted and hostile litigation since 2018 when their child was less than a year old. Even accepting Father's multiple averments in his motion as true, his allegations regarding Mother are hardly a surprise. During the four day trial on the numerous matters filed by the parties, these same circumstances were well-known and intensely litigated. After hearing all the evidence, the court awarded Mother sole legal custody after finding her conduct was in reaction to Father's “antagonizing behavior.”

Father did not prevail in his attempt to relitigate the same circumstances upon which the prior trial judge premised the custody award in a thoughtful and extremely well-crafted Modification Judgment. While this was Father's remedy of choice, he has other, effective legal options given the unique, ongoing nature of the court's authority in family law matters. The trial court did not err in dismissing Father's motion to modify for failure to state a claim.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All further statutory references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2021).

2.   The court's reliance on Foster v. Foster, 673 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) in granting Mother's motion is misplaced. Foster only concerned modification of child support, and we decline to extend it to a custody modification. However, we agree with the Foster court's aversion to adopting a “fixed rule as to the length of time” a party must wait to file a motion to modify a prior support decree and hold the courts should simply apply the proper legal standard to modify custody. Foster, 673 S.W.2d at 110.

Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Judge and Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concur.