STATE v. JONES (2026)

Introduction

Ritchie A. Jones (Jones) appeals from the trial court's judgment entered upon a jury's verdict convicting him of one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. We affirm.

Background

The following facts viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment were elicited at trial: On January 10, 2024, Theresa Prewitt, the property manager of 605 North Sprigg (manager), contacted police seeking their assistance to remove unauthorized individuals from one of the apartments she managed. To her knowledge, the sole tenant on the lease (tenant) was in the hospital at the time, and no one was supposed to be in the apartment.

Officers entered the apartment, announced themselves, and discovered three individuals, including Jones. After placing Jones under arrest for trespassing, Officer Cody Owens (Officer Owens) asked Jones for consent to search his person, which he granted. Officer Owens found a soft glasses case in the left breast pocket of Jones's shirt. Inside he found a small baggie with a white, crystal-like substance. In his experience and training, Officer Owens knew the substance to be methamphetamine.

Jones was initially charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and one count of misdemeanor trespassing in the first-degree. The state nolle prosequied the trespassing count, and Jones proceeded to trial on the count of possession of a controlled substance. Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress any evidence taken from his person because the search and seizure were made without a warrant or other lawful authority. The court held two hearings on the motion to suppress prior to trial and denied the motion. At trial, the evidence of the glasses case holding methamphetamine inside was introduced over Jones's continuing objection to its admission. A jury found Jones guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a prior drug offender to seven years in prison. This appeal follows.

Discussion

Jones asserts two points on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence as a result of the unlawful entry of police to the apartment, and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Point One – Motion to Suppress

In point one on appeal, Jones claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police unlawfully entered the apartment. He argues as an overnight guest, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, the officers did not have a warrant, and no exception to the warrant requirement or exclusionary rule applies.

Standard of Review

Generally, the ruling on a motion to suppress itself is interlocutory, and therefore, cannot be asserted as a point on appeal. State v. Lloyd, 205 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006). The defendant must object to the admission of the evidence at trial to give the court the opportunity to reconsider its pretrial ruling against the backdrop of evidence admitted at trial. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence at trial. State v. Kimberley, 103 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). We will reverse the court's decision in this regard only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

To the extent the court's ruling to admit the evidence at issue is based in part upon the evidence from the pretrial hearings and factual determinations, we consider the record made both at the hearings and at trial. We view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the court's decision. State v. Bromwell, 713 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (internal quotation omitted). “The trial court's ruling will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2016)). We review the question of whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.

Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. As a general rule, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Bromwell, 713 S.W.3d at 581. If a defendant seeks to have evidence suppressed based upon violation of the Fourth Amendment, he bears the initial burden of showing his rights were violated, or he was aggrieved by the search and seizure. State v. Woodrome, 407 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Soldal v. Cook Cnty. Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992)). He must do so by showing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id.

Jones relies largely on the United States Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v. Olson, to support his standing argument. 495 U.S. 91 (1990). In Olson, police were searching for the defendant in connection with a robbery-murder. Id. at 93, 94. The defendant spent the night in a residence as a guest, with permission from the owner. Id. at 94. The police entered the residence the next day and placed the defendant under arrest. Id. The Supreme Court held an individual who is a guest in someone's home, “with the permission of his host,” has a legitimate expectation of privacy and standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 99, 100 (emphasis added).

It is clear based on the holding in Olson if an individual is a guest in someone's home, with permission to be there, he has standing to allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Crucial to the issue of standing and the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness ․’ ” State v. Hernandez, 659 S.W.3d 614, 621 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted)). However, unlike Olson, Jones did not meet his burden to show he had permission from the tenant to be in the apartment. During the first suppression hearing, his sole evidence to support a reasonable expectation of privacy was the uncorroborated and limited testimony of his parole officer. She testified Jones reported he was living at the apartment in June 2023, and she conducted a home visit there in August 2023.¹ He did not present any evidence at the second hearing, and the only additional evidence to support his contention he had permission from the tenant to be there was his self-serving testimony at trial he was living there with the tenant's permission. To the contrary, the property manager unequivocally testified at both hearings and at trial no one had permission to be in the apartment while tenant was in the hospital.

An individual has no “reasonable” expectation of privacy in property where he is not authorized to be present. Jones's permission to be in the apartment was in dispute, therefore it was his burden to present sufficient evidence to show he was entitled Fourth Amendment protection. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of all witnesses. Woodrome, 407 S.W.3d at 706. In denying the motion to suppress we find the court reasonably believed Jones lacked standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy because he did not have permission to be in the apartment and was not a guest of tenant. We defer to the trial court's decision on the record before us.² See Id.

As a result, Jones did not have standing to challenge the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err in allowing admission of evidence found in Jones's possession following his arrest. Point one on appeal is denied.

Point Two – Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second and final point on appeal, Jones claims the trial court erred entering judgment and sentence on the jury's verdict because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he possessed methamphetamine knowing of its presence and nature.

Standard of Review

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Berwaldt, 652 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting State v. Glaze, 611 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). We accept as true all evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict, and we disregard evidence to the contrary. Id.

Analysis

A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he “knowingly possesses a controlled substance.” Section 579.015.1 RSMo (Supp. 2017). “Possessing a controlled substance” is defined in Section 195.010(38) RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018),³ as “a person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance has actual or constructive possession of the substance. A person has actual possession if he has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control.”

There is no dispute Jones had actual possession of the methamphetamine. It was found in a case in his shirt pocket. Jones argues there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to show he knew of the presence and character of the substance inside the case. However, in State v. Eggleston, the Missouri Supreme Court clarified circumstantial evidence should be analyzed “no differently from any other case.” 728 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Mo. banc 2026). To the extent previous cases required “additional incriminating evidence” to establish the element of possession where there is shared space, the Court held those cases do not follow the plain language of the relevant statutes and should no longer be followed. Id.

Instead, the Eggleston Court stated the analysis of whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance begins with whether there was actual possession under Section 195.010(38). Id. at 439-40. If the answer is yes, the reviewing court determines whether there was sufficient evidence the defendant had knowledge of the presence and nature of the controlled substance. Id. at 440. Absent an admission, this will be based on circumstantial evidence. Id. The Court found it would be “difficult to envision a circumstance when knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance will not follow from actual possession ․” Id. If the substance is within the individual's easy reach and control, there is “likely strong circumstantial evidence the person had knowledge of the presence and nature” of the substance. Id.

Jones testified the night before he heard a “ruckus” outside the door. He went to the front door and opened it but no one was there. Instead, he saw the glasses case outside the door and picked it up. Jones testified he did not feel any glasses inside and believed it was empty so he “wadded it up” and put it in his shirt pocket. He said he had “no idea” what was in the case, and specifically testified he did not know there was methamphetamine in the case. However, when the officer at scene removed the case from Jones's pocket and discovered the baggie containing methamphetamine from inside, Jones immediately said, “that's not mine.”

As previously discussed, there is no dispute Jones had actual possession of the methamphetamine. He admitted the glasses case had been in his pocket since he found it the previous night. The circumstantial evidence is sufficient to permit an inference Jones had knowledge of the presence of methamphetamine in the glasses case he was carrying in his shirt pocket. Moreover, the jury was free to disbelieve Jones's explanation the case was not his but he found it outside the door as well as his assertion he had “no idea” what was in the case, nor did he look inside. See e.g. Binion v. State, 649 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citations omitted). In light of his actual possession and the circumstantial evidence elicited at trial, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude Jones had knowledge of the presence and nature of the methamphetamine in the glasses case found in his front shirt pocket. The trial court did not err entering judgment upon the jury's verdict. Point two is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   She stated in June 2023, Jones reported he was living at 601 North Sprigg Street where she conducted the home visit. However, the address at issue was located at 605 North Sprigg Street. No clarification was provided regarding the different numbered addresses.

2.   Jones's reliance on State v. Ramires, 152 S.W.3d 385 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), is misplaced. In Ramires, the Western District concluded the state did not affirmatively waive the issue of defendant's standing to challenge the legality of a search and seizure. Id. at 397. However, the court recognized there was a wholly insufficient record, “barren of any facts” from which the trial court could have made any determination of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item seized from the vehicle he was driving, and therefore, remanded the cause for further consideration. Id. at 401-02 (citing Combs v. U.S., 408 U.S. 224, 226 (1972)). Here, there was a more than sufficient record from which the court could have made its determination as to Jones's standing.

3.   All further references to Section 195.010 are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018).

Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, Judge and Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concur.