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Laura A. HAYES, Appellant, v. John MILLER, Jr., et al., Respondents.
Introduction
Laura Hayes (Hayes) appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of John Miller III (Miller III) on his counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Hayes raises three points on appeal. First, she argues the trial court erred in entering a monetary judgment in favor of Miller III because Miller III was never a party to the lawsuit. In Point Two, Hayes claims the court erred by entering a monetary judgment in favor of Miller III because there was not substantial evidence the payments made by Miller III provided a basis for an unjust enrichment claim. Lastly, Hayes alleges the court erred in entering a judgment for the full amount of damages against her because Hayes was only a one-fifth owner of the property.
We hold the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Miller III, who was not a party to the suit. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's judgment in favor of Miller III, which is dispositive of the appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
In September 2024, Hayes filed a petition for ejectment against John Miller, Jr. (Miller Jr.), John Doe, and Jane Doe. Also included as defendants were Hayes’ siblings: Aaron Catling, Sr. (Aaron), Donna Thomas, Renee Donato, and William Catling, Jr. Hayes alleged she and her four siblings were the owners of the property at 8328 Richard Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63132, per a probate court judgment. Hayes further alleged the property was occupied without permission by Miller Jr., and possibly by unknown persons identified as John Doe and Jane Doe.
In October 2024, Miller Jr. answered the petition denying Hayes’ allegations. Miller Jr. also asserted three counterclaims: quiet title, unjust enrichment, and fraud in the inducement. Miller Jr. alleged he occupied the property at 8328 Richard Avenue. The document referenced the defendant as either “Mr. John Miller, Jr.,” “Mr. John Miller,” or simply “Defendant.” Attached to the answer was an affidavit of Miller Jr. attesting to the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in the document. The affidavit was signed, and the name below the signature line is “John Miller, Jr.”
Hayes moved to dismiss each of Miller Jr.’s counterclaims for failure to state a claim. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the quiet title and fraud counterclaims, leaving only the unjust enrichment counterclaim. The case proceeded to bench trial on March 24, 2025. Before the trial began, the court made a record of the attorneys present and who they represented:
The Court: Okay. And Mr. Jimerson.
Mr. Jimerson: Mr. and Mrs. Miller, Your Honor.
The Court: All right. John Miller, Jr.
Mr. Jimerson: Yes.
(Emphasis added).
Hayes was the sole witness for the plaintiff. She testified the home at 8328 Richard Avenue originally belonged to her father, who passed away in 2015. Afterwards, the property was occupied by her brother Aaron until he moved to Arizona. Hayes received a letter from an attorney, Mr. Jimerson, regarding a petition for heirship of her father which had been filed by Aaron. On September 29, 2022, the probate court issued its judgment determining heirs in which it determined Hayes and each of her four siblings owned a one-fifth share of 8328 Richard Avenue.
Some time after the heirship judgment, Hayes went to the property and knocked on the door. A young man opened the door. Hayes identified herself as the owner of the property and asked to be let in. The young man refused her entry. On November 7, 2022, Hayes, through an attorney, sent a notice to vacate addressed to “Occupant.” Hayes received a response from Mr. Jimerson dated November 14, 2022:
Dear Ms. Hayes and relatives:
We are in receipt of your letter dated November 7, 2022.
You and your siblings have committed fraud in the inducement regarding the real estate at 8329 [sic] Richard Avenue, University City, MO 63132. You induced my client to occupy and repair the property along with filing a suit to clear the title.
Further, because you encouraged Mr. Miller to occupy and repair this residence with intent for ownership, we will be seeking damages for unjust enrichment of $75,000 or more. Your claim is vexatious and fraudulent. We intend on pursuing legal remedies.
The letter was cc'd to “John Miller.” On December 8, 2022, Hayes’ attorney responded to the letter, which expressed the siblings’ concerns about a conflict of interest given Mr. Jimerson's prior and recent representation of them in the probate action. The letter also denied the allegations put forth by “Mr. Miller.”
Miller III and his wife, Barbara Miller, testified for the defense. Miller III testified he and Barbara live across the street at 8331 Richard Avenue and that he became acquainted with Aaron while Aaron was living at 8328 Richard Avenue. Aaron told Miller III he was moving to Arizona and nobody in his family wanted the house. Aaron stated there had been a tax sale on the house, but there was still time to reclaim it. Miller III paid the $5,454 in back taxes on July 5, 2022, and told Aaron of the payment. Before leaving for Arizona, Aaron left the keys with Barbara.
On cross-examination, Miller III stated he never lived in 8328 Richard Avenue, rather, it was his son—John Miller IV—and his family living there. Miller III also confirmed he never entered into a contract to purchase or lease the property, nor did he instruct his attorney to take steps to clear the title. Miller III admitted that he signed the answer to Hayes’ suit as Miller Jr.
After the defense rested, Hayes moved for judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim, arguing Miller III was not party to the suit. The trial court denied Hayes’ motion. On May 9, 2025, the trial court issued its order and judgment.
The court acknowledged the petition and answer identified the lead defendant as John Miller, Jr., but found the evidence indicated Miller III was the proper defendant and would be treated as such in the judgment. The court found Hayes established she had a right to possession of the property and granted her claim of ejectment against Miller III and all occupants of 8328 Richard Avenue. As to Miller III's unjust enrichment counterclaim, the court, citing section 524.160,1 found he had demonstrated expenditures to repair and update the residence, and awarded Miller III a total of $28,796.08.
Hayes filed a motion to amend the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial in which she renewed her argument that Miller III was not a party to the suit. Hayes alleged that because this was an ejectment action, the only parties to the suit would be the property owner and the occupants. Hayes stated Miller III was neither the property owner nor the occupant, rather it was Miller Jr. who was occupying the property and had been served with her petition.2 The court denied Hayes’ post-trial motion. This appeal follows.
Discussion
This case involves a strange situation in which Hayes, the property owner, brought an ejectment action against a John Miller, Jr., as well as John and Jane Doe, who Hayes believed to be occupying the property. In reality, it was John Miller IV and his family living at 8328 Richard Avenue. Meanwhile, it was actually John Miller III participating in the litigation as John Miller, Jr. This raises the question: Will the real John Miller please stand up?
Hayes presents three points on appeal. However, given our dispositive ruling below, we need not reach Points Two or Three, which complain of the sufficiency of the evidence of Miller III's unjust enrichment claim 3 and the allocation of damages on that claim, respectively.
Non-Party
As a preliminary matter, Hayes argues the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Miller III because he was not a party to the suit. Hayes claims Miller III was never a party to the suit, there is no evidence he was a party, and the evidence established he was not a party. We agree because the evidence established Miller III was neither the property owner nor the occupant, and Miller III neither moved to join, nor was permitted to join, as a codefendant.
Trial courts only have the authority to grant relief for or against parties to an action. Section 511.030.1 provides:
Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants; and it may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as between themselves, and it may grant to the plaintiff or the defendant any affirmative or other relief to which he may be entitled.
See also Campbell v. Webb, 363 Mo. 1192, 258 S.W.2d 595, 605 (1953) (holding a person who was never a party plaintiff could not recover).
An ejectment action “shall be prosecuted in the real names of the parties thereto, and shall be brought against the person in possession of the premises claimed.” Section 524.040.4 “The person from or through whom the defendant claims title to the premises may, on motion, be made a codefendant.” Section 524.050.
Hayes testified that following the probate court's heirship determination, she attempted to enter the home at 8328 Richard Avenue, but was denied entry by a young man. Although it is unclear how Hayes determined John Miller, Jr. was the occupant and therefore the proper defendant, Hayes brought the ejectment action against John Miller, Jr., John Doe, and Jane Doe. Hayes indicated the man present at trial, apparently Miller III, was not the person who had answered the door and added that this was the first time she had ever seen Miller III. Furthermore, Miller III testified he did not live at 8328 Richard Avenue, rather it was his son's residence.
Based on the testimony, it is evident that Miller III was not a party to the ejectment action. He was not the named defendant. He did not move to join the suit as a codefendant. He did not own the property, nor did he occupy the property. It is unclear how the trial court determined Miller III was the proper defendant. It is clear, though, this determination was erroneous and that, consequently, the court exceeded its authority in awarding judgment in favor of Miller III, a non-party, for unjust enrichment.
Miller III urges us to affirm the judgment because the error is a non-fatal misnomer. He argues the correct party was before the court and participated in the litigation, and that Hayes was not prejudiced. Miller III also cites the general rule that a party cannot acquiesce to an error at trial and then claim reversible error on appeal. These arguments are flawed for two reasons.
First, the trial court's choosing a different defendant was not a misnomer. “A misnomer is a misdescription or a mistake in some aspect of a party's name. It occurs where a summons is served on the right party but with the wrong name.” Johnson v. Delmar Gardens West, Inc., 335 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Hayes’ petition likely did contain a misnomer in that it named John Miller, Jr. and it was served on the occupant, apparently John Miller IV. But that issue is not before this Court.
Second, even if Hayes had not raised the issue, this Court has an obligation to determine its own jurisdiction. Bureaus Inv. Grp. v. Williams, 310 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). “In cases where the trial court has exceeded its authority in entering an order or judgment, we cannot consider the merits of the appeal, but we have the jurisdiction to confine a trial court to its authority.” Id. at 300 (citing In re Est. of Shaw, 256 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Mo. banc 2008)). Nevertheless, it is not clear from the record that Hayes acquiesced to Miller III's participation in the suit.
After sending the occupant a notice to vacate, Hayes received a response from Mr. Jimerson which referenced “Mr. Miller” and was cc'd to “John Miller.” Hayes brought the ejectment action against John Miller, Jr., who answered the petition and asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The case proceeded to trial, where Miller III's attorney even announced his appearance for John Miller, Jr.
Hayes testified Miller III was not the young man who answered the door and that she had never seen Miller III until trial. Furthermore, Miller III admitted he signed the answer as John Miller, Jr. Hayes then, moving for judgment on Miller III's unjust enrichment counterclaim, argued Miller III was not party to the suit. Hayes renewed that argument in her after-trial motion, and it is now the primary basis for her appeal. We cannot say she acquiesced to Miller III's arguably furtive participation in the trial proceedings. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's judgment for Miller III on his unjust enrichment claim.5
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the trial court's judgment in favor of John Miller III on the unjust enrichment counterclaim.
FOOTNOTES
1. All section references are to RSMo (2016). Section 524.160 permits a person who has been dispossessed of property to recover compensation for improvements made in good faith prior to having notice of adverse title.
2. We note that Miller III's response to the motion to amend contained several citations to nonexistent cases.
3. Compounding the confusion, the trial court seemingly transformed the unjust enrichment counterclaim into a claim under section 524.160. Though we do not reach the merits of the issue, we note that Miller III was not in possession of the property and therefore would be unable to make a claim under section 524.160.
4. We note there appears to be some confusion as to the proper named defendant. Hayes brought the suit against John Miller, Jr., but acknowledges in her brief the defendant should be John Miller IV. None of the Millers—Jr., III, or IV—have appealed the ejectment, so whether ejectment was proper is not before this Court.
5. Normally, when a trial court enters an order it has no authority to enter, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment. List v. Dir. of Revenue, 469 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015). But, Rule 84.14 authorizes us to dispense with the remand process and vacate the judgment “when the record and evidence on appeal give us some degree of confidence in the reasonableness, fairness and accuracy of that disposition.” Linhardt v. Dir. of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 202, 204-05 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).
Virginia W. Lay, Judge
Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concurs.
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Docket No: ED113836
Decided: June 16, 2026
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
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