STATE v. SAWTELLE (2026)

Introduction

Jeffrey Sawtelle (Sawtelle) appeals from his convictions for first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sodomy. Sawtelle raises two points on appeal. First, Sawtelle argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal for the statutory sodomy charge because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sawtelle touched Victim's genitals with his hand. Alternatively, Sawtelle claims the trial court committed a clerical error by denoting in its written judgment that Sawtelle was convicted of first-degree statutory rape in Count II. We affirm judgment as to Point One. As to Point Two, we grant the point and remand to the trial court with directions to correct its clerical error.

Factual and Procedural Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial established the following relevant facts. In August of 2019, when Victim was thirteen years old, Victim and her immediate family were living with her grandmother and step-grandfather, Sawtelle. While Victim's mother and grandmother were at the store, Sawtelle entered Victim's bedroom. Victim was in bed.

Sawtelle sat down on the bed and began rubbing Victim's back. After Victim told Sawtelle to stop, he began touching Victim's thighs and moving up towards her “private area.” Victim attempted to get Sawtelle to stop by pushing his hands and hitting him. Sawtelle inserted his hands into Victim's pants. In response to the prosecutor's question as to where Sawtelle touched her, Victim testified “[h]e was fingering me basically.” Victim described Sawtelle's fingers as being “very rough” and “nasty looking.”

Sawtelle pushed Victim onto the bed and pinned her hands above her head with one hand while using his other hand to cover Victim's mouth to keep her from yelling. While still covering Victim's mouth, Sawtelle pulled both his and Victim's pants and underwear down and inserted his penis into her vagina. When Victim's grandmother and mother got home, Sawtelle returned to his bedroom, instructing Victim not to tell anybody or he would hurt her. Shortly thereafter, Victim, along with her mother, stepfather, and siblings, moved out.

In February of 2022, Victim disclosed to her mother that Sawtelle had raped her. Victim was taken to Park Hills Police Department, where she spoke with a detective. A couple of days later, Victim's mother took Victim to the Child Advocacy Center for an interview, where she gave a more detailed account of Sawtelle's conduct.

The State charged Sawtelle with first-degree statutory rape (Count I) and first-degree statutory sodomy (Count II). The State alleged in Count II that Sawtelle knowingly had deviate sexual intercourse with Victim, who was a child less than fourteen years old, by touching Victim's genitals with his hand. The case proceeded to jury trial in February of 2025. The jury found Sawtelle guilty of both counts.

The trial court sentenced Sawtelle to life imprisonment on both counts, to be served consecutively. However, the written sentence and judgment lists as Count II an additional charge of first-degree statutory rape, rather than first-degree statutory sodomy. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Appellate “review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Mo. banc 2011). We do not assess whether we believe the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, we determine “whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 509 (internal quotation omitted). We accept as true “all evidence favorable to the State ․, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence,” and disregard “[a]ll evidence and inferences to the contrary[.]” Id. “Circumstantial evidence may support a finding of sexual contact.” State v. Roberts, 710 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).

Discussion

Point One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first point, Sawtelle alleges the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence for first-degree statutory sodomy ¹ because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Sawtelle touched Victim's genitals with his hand. Specifically, Sawtelle argues the State failed to elicit evidence of the precise charged act because Victim did not explain what “fingering” meant to her. We disagree because the jury could reasonably infer Sawtelle committed first-degree statutory sodomy.

A person commits first-degree statutory sodomy “if he or she has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years of age.” Section 566.062.1.² “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as

any act involving the genitals of one person and the hand, mouth, tongue, or anus of another person or a sexual act involving the penetration, however slight, of the penis, female genitalia, or the anus by a finger, instrument or object done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person or for the purpose of terrorizing the victim[.]

Section 566.010(3).

“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that sexual contact occurred, the issue is whether there is at least a reasonable inference that there was the touching of the genitals.” State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 619 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). While “genitals” is not defined in Chapter 566, this Court has defined the term as “the organs of the reproductive system; esp. the external genital organs.” State v. Ray, 852 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (internal quotation and italics omitted).

Accepting as true all evidence favorable to the State, including all favorable inferences and disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary, the State presented sufficient evidence Sawtelle touched Victim's genitals. During the State's direct examination of Victim, Victim testified:

Q: Did he touch you with his fingers at all?

A: Yes.

Q: When was that?

A: That was before he had pushed me onto the bed.

Q: Okay. And where did he touch you?

A: He was fingering me basically.

Q: Pants down?

A: They weren't off. But, like he went under my pants.

Although Victim did not specify precisely where Sawtelle touched her under her pants, the context supports a reasonable inference he touched Victim's genitals.

Sawtelle went into Victim's room while her mother and grandmother were away and shut the door, which Victim said was unusual. When Victim's mother and grandmother returned, Sawtelle returned to his bedroom. That Sawtelle touched Victim while they were alone supports a reasonable inference Sawtelle touched her genitals “as opposed to a more benign body part that would not have required secrecy.” State v. Hankins, 531 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017).

Sawtelle relies on State v. Barbee, 568 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) to argue Victim's imprecise description of Sawtelle's sexual act is insufficient evidence of first-degree statutory sodomy. In Barbee, the court held the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of first-degree statutory rape. 568 S.W.3d at 32. The State needed to prove any amount of penetration, however slight. Id. at 31. The court found the term “vagina” was not being used in a “purely anatomical sense,” rather it was being used “to refer to the entirety of the female sex organ[.]” Id. at 32. Consequently, the court found that while there was evidence the defendant touched the victim's genitals, there was no evidence of penetration as required by the first-degree statutory rape charge. Id. at 31-32.

Sawtelle's reliance on Barbee is misplaced. A victim's failure to use anatomically correct language “does not render the evidence of sexual contact insufficient.” Hankins, 531 S.W.3d at 82. Although the State in Barbee failed to prove penetration because of imprecise anatomical language, the present case is distinguishable. Here, to prove first-degree statutory sodomy the State only needed to prove Sawtelle touched Victim's genitals. Although Victim did not testify using anatomically correct language, the State's case was aided by additional inferences as discussed above. Point denied.

Point Two: Nunc Pro Tunc

In his second point, Sawtelle alleges the trial court erred by denoting in its written judgment that Sawtelle was convicted of first-degree statutory rape in Count II. The State concedes the written judgment contains a clerical mistake, and this Court agrees.

“Clerical errors in the sentence and judgment in a criminal case may be corrected by an order nunc pro tunc if the written judgment does not reflect what actually was done.” State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 426 (Mo. banc 2015). “In a criminal case, Rule 29.12(c) allows the court to amend its records according to the truth, so that they should accurately express the history of the proceedings which actually occurred prior to the appeal.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

The written judgment here does not reflect what occurred during this case. Sawtelle was charged in Count I with first-degree statutory rape and in Count II with first-degree statutory sodomy. Both counts were submitted to the jury, which returned guilty verdicts on both. But the written judgment erroneously states Sawtelle was convicted of a second first-degree statutory rape charge in Count II. Accordingly, an order nunc pro tunc correcting the written judgment to reflect what actually occurred is appropriate. Point granted.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, this case is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc order that corrects the clerical error in the written judgment. The trial court's judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sawtelle does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of first-degree statutory rape.

2.   All section references are to RSMo (2016). All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025).

Virginia W. Lay, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge, concurs.